Thinking About Consciousness

Rating:
Summary: Great philosophy
Review: It has been a while, but this book has made the wait worthwhile. Finally, a book on the philosophy of consciousness that makes sense, that is clear, direct, uncomplicated, original, profound, and has the potential to stir and resolve many debates.

Papineau argues for materialism. Not many take the time to do that, nowdays. But it is true many people are still dualists, and those who are materialists do not know how to really defend their views. Other materialists are still thinking on dualist ways, and others cannot decide between token or type identities, fuctionalism, representioalist, HOT, materialist theories. Papineau sticks with token identity. This is the simplest and most plausible view. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE IDENTICAL TO MATERIAL PROPERTIES. end of story. Papineau has here avoided a lot of baggage. The argument? the same anti-epiphenomenalists have been making. All physical causes are caused by physical things. Phenomenal states have causes, and are caused. Therefore, phenomenal states are material things. (This is not exactly how papienau puts it, but its good enough for me).

Papineau does go throught the usual job of demolishing the knowledge argument, the zombie argument, and the explanatory gap argument. NOthing very new here. Mary learns something new not because phenomenal states are nonphysical but because you cannot cause a brain state to appear (which is identical to the phenomenal state) by simply knowing things. You have to experience them. Kripke was wrong, because although identities are necesary, this does not mean that by knowing one side of the identity you will know all there is to know about the property in question. Conceivability does not entail possibility, because there exist counter-examples, in the theory of names. You can conceive of impossible things if your concepts are different. And Papienau argues for conceptual dualism. Phenomenal concepts are different from material concepts, even if they refer to a single material property. Phenomenal concepts, however, refer directly to those properties.

Another novelty is that the book is actually about how we THINK about consciousness, and not consicousness itself. So, Papineau tells us how exactly to understand phenomenal concepts. Here I have some objections. What is the difference between phenomenal concepts and the states they refer to? Papineau first takes conclusions about one thing to argue about the other, but on other occasions seems to claim arguments do not apply to both the concept and the state. It seems strange to say that because concepts are indeterminate, then the states refered to will also be indeterminate. Papienau needs to be careful to distinguish when he is arguing about the concepts ore the states refered to, but other than that, the way he constructed phenomenal concepts seems to me to be a right way to argue for a theory of phenomenal consciousness.

Ppaineau strikes on the central problem in consicousness studies: why does materialism seem to leave something out? why is there a hard problem of consicousness, but not a hard problem of heat, or energy or water? why is matter correlated with feelings at all? Simple, says Papineau. Because intuitions are the greatest barriers that oppose philosophical advance. And people simply have the intuition that matter is simply not all there is to consciousness. Materialism seems to leave somehting out, like the explanatory-gap theorists claim. Ppaineau does not show them wrong, but shows them 2 ways one can get rid of the intuition that mind and brain are separate. First, identities need no explanation. Mind and brain are identical to one another, and it is not necesary to explain why this is so. And second, the intuition is fueled by a fallacy. The fallacy of concluding that mind and brain are separate, just because when you think of consicousness it feels one way, and when you think of matter it feels another way. Thinking of qualia brings the qualia to mind, but thinking of gray neurons does not, so one must conclude they are not identical. But this is a fallacy, the antipathetic-fallacy. Thinking of something does not have to make that thing happen. Just like in the response to the knowledge argument.

Papineau argues also that scientific studies of consicousness are doomed to failure, becuase the properties of phenomenal concepts makes it indeterminate to decide of wether a creature is conscious, or of wether it is the function or the matter composing the system that is identical to the phenomenal state. Here I think Papineau goes too far. His points are that since verbal reports are the primary evidence for consciousness research, and becuase we cannot decide between exactly what level of explanation is right (atoms, molecules, chemicals, neurons, electricity?), and because pehnomenal concepts are vauge, then sicence is in trouble. But this is not a principled matter. All you have to do is find a non-verbal way to reach criterions of consicousness, and indeed researchers are looking for those methodologies. And I believe it is in principle possible to decide between levels of explanation. For example, you could decide, in principle, wether it is the matter a brain is composed of or the way it is organized that is identical to a phenomenal state like this: take a subject, replace all his neurotransmitters for agonists witht he same proportions, and ask him to make a discrimination (between color plates of gradual hue changes, or memory of a color). Next, restore the subjects brain to normallity, and ask him to make another discrimination. If the discriminations are identical, then it is the orgainization, and not the matter itself (for a chemical is not materially identical, but functional identical to its agonist), that is the material property identical to the phenomenal property.

Or why not simply change the phenomenal concepts? Then the empirical research of the material basis of consicousness would continue problem-free. Amazingly thought-provoking book, inspite of my objections. Required reading.