The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them

Rating:
Summary: An Exhilirating and Uplifting Philosophy of Persons
Review: This is an amazing and important book on the nature of persons. Flanagan is a major contributor to the attempt to tame consciousness within a naturalistic theory (see his Consciousness Reconsidered, Dreaming Souls: Sleep Dreams and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind, and Self-Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of Life). In The Problem of the Soul he takes on an even bigger and more important problem. How are we to understand human nature -- free will, the self, morals and life's meaning -- if we take seriously the combined insights of Darwinian theory and work in cognitive science, neurobiology, and cognitive neuroscience? Flanagan explores the issues with great sensitivity, compassion and depth. Our humanistic image does take a hit for there is no such thing as an immortal soul, we are animals through and through. But we are still persons and persons (often) act freely -- but not with mysterious free wills. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal. Life has meaning and morality has an important function -- it makes social coordination possible and positions us to flourish. Flanagan treats theists and soulophiles with the respect they deserve, but which their ideas don't (as he puts it). Many readers of Crick and Dennett find the main message of philosophical naturalism depressing and dehumanizing. Flanagan -- more than either of these -- is concerned with providing a full theory of person's compatible with what science teaches. But thanks to his humane and respectful tone, the subtlety of his arguments and conclusions, we are left with a picture of ourselves as remarkably gifted animals suited to find meaning in living knowledgeably, honestly, and with love and compassion. Wilfred Sellars, one of Flanagan's heroes saw philosophy as the attempt to understand how 'things considered in the broadest possible sense hang together in the broadest possible sense.' This is a book of wisdom in the old sense. A philosophy of persons for the 21st century. Must reading for anyone who wonders: What am I? What does life mean?

Rating:
Summary: A Very Poor Book, but the Packaging is Deceptive
Review: Yes, three stars for a very good work. But that has to do with the caveat.
Flanagan's removal of the dichotomy between Cartesian free will and determinism is well done. His showing that a positive replacement for free will, voluntarism, the ability to plan and act voluntarily, is philosophically and cognitively conceivable.
Another good part to the book is that I believe Flanagan's Buddhist practice leads him to tink in some new directions and also enlivens his narrative.
The big caveat? His mischaracterization of Dan Dennett's views of the self as the "center of narrative gravity." I might agree that Dennett is not a postmodernist. I would NOT agree that Dennett does not believe the self is a fictive, or at least a semi-fictive entity.
Related to this is another concern. It is one thing to try an individualistic interpretation of Hume's well-known comment that whenever he tried to apprehend the self, what he saw was individual sensations. Hume's dead and can't be interviewed.
However, Dennett is alive and kicking. Flanagan could have asked him what he meant by his "narrative gravity" statement rather than trying to creatively shoehorn his interpretation of Dennett into Flanagan's own view of what the self is and is not.
The smaller caveat is that at least some Buddhists do believe in reincarnation, not of a personal soul but of an impersonal life force. Others believe in an individualized afterlife. Flanagan fails to disclose these facts about Buddhism at one or two relevant points.
Also, contrary to another reviewer here, Flanagan does NOT support epiphenomenalism.