Rating: 
Summary: Time to Revamp FM 7-10, FM 7-20, FM 7-30
Review: The Battle for Hunger Hill should force the US Army Infantry School as well as the gurus at Ft Leavenworth to seriously consider re-writing current doctrine for light infantry units (especially with regard to Low Intensity Conflict and OOTW). The 1-327 Infantry proves again and again throughout the text that the "cookbook solution" (i.e. doctrine applied as dogma) is often the surest way to ensure one's own defeat. Rather, HOW to think instead of WHAT to think is the surest way to secure victory.Any soldier or leader concerned with mission accomplishment and force protection through the artistic application of Maneuver Warfare (Auftragstaktik) simply MUST read this book. It is highly entertaining as well as informative. Indeed, any commander whose unit is scheduled for a rotation to JRTC should require every officer and NCO to read this book no later than twelve months out (thirty-six months out for RC units). You may go without it...but only at your own peril.
Rating: 
Summary: A good overview
Review: This is a great overview of what it is really like to be a colonel in the Army. It was great to see the real world as opposed to the very neat world that we see in Tom Clancy novels.
Rating:
Summary: An Excellent Primer for Light Infantry Training
Review: This is another good book by COL Daniel Bolger, this time about his battalion's (101st ABN) rotations to JRTC in 1994 and 1995. Lots of great details and observations about JRTC and the OPFOR. Bolger's battalion was badly abused in its 1994 rotation and he decided to get even the next time, which was fortunately less than a year later. Bolger criticizes the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP), big Tactical Operation Centers and suggests alternatives. Thought-provoking as always but I don't agree with everything he says. There is no doubt that the US Army's cumbersome DDMP is geared toward set-piece, short-term battles but Bolger's approach combines common sense with anti-staff bias to try and just avoid all that messy staff work. From the intelligence viewpoint, he is dead wrong because Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) does save lives and it does take time to do it right. Bolger's command instincts are good, particularly about nitty gritty items like reducing soldier loads, but there is bias here that detracts from his message. For example, sometimes he says erroneous things, like the S-2 (intelligence officer) is on the S-3's staff (the S-2 works for the commander, not the S-3). Maps are poor.
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