Rating: Summary: Who are you? Review: The easiest thing to express, and the hardest to explain, is 'self.' If asked to define who you are, most people [excepting Daniel C. Dennett] would say, "Well, I'm me!" Pressed to define this expression those same people would likely flounder about, ending with something about being "conscious of myself - I know in my mind." It is that notion of consciousness that Dennett seeks to explain to us in this absorbing book on mind/brain awareness. Its audacious title notifies the reader that there are some fascinating concepts examined in this book. Dennett's thinking and writing skills have few, if any, peers, but be advised the going isn't always easy. 'Self' is the ultimate philosophical question and Dennett is challenging some dearly cherished beliefs here. The most common expression of "self" nearly always boils down to the idea that our mind has a central area that observes the world around us. That centre assesses and expresses our concepts of that world in thoughts, speech, writing, whatever. It is that concept that Dennett assaults in this book. Often referred to as the Cartesian Theatre from Rene Descarte's "I think, therefore I am" concept that the brain [physical] and mind [conceptual] were separate, Dennett finds this notion too simplistic. He knows the mind is in the brain. How it works in observing the world and expressing our ideas of it is the theme of this book. Dennett explains many facets of how we observe and how we react to what we observe. He strives admirably to counter the still widely-held belief that consciousness is a tangible "thing" that can be identified and dealt with. No such "thing" is there, he notes. Instead, the mind is weighing input and dealing with many options at once. He posits a concept of this situation he calls the 'Multiple Drafts' theory. The mind/brain is continuously processing information and making selections about what to respond to and how to make the response. Responses may be speech, writing or simply memory storage. While Dennett's use of terminology may make the novice quail, his down-to-earth approach to the issues makes this book delightful reading for anyone. Instead of arcane concepts or lofty language from America's pre-eminent philosopher, we're given many concrete examples of how our minds work. His stature, however, is in no small part due to his skills as a communicator. Those skills are artfully expressed in this book. If you have problems with terms like 'heterophenomenology' or 'qualia', take a moment to go back to his definitions, or read on to enjoy his explanations. Either way, there are rewards. Iin short, this whole book is rewarding and will go far in helping human beings understand just what they are. We are conscious, we think, therefore we are human. How to better understand that situation is amply explained by reading this outstanding book.
Rating: Summary: Amateurish Attempt Review: Weiner's book is not a mature exposition of a theory, it is a bit of popular banter whose underlying logic is imperfect. Perhaps we may begin with a quote which every budding researcher might like to learn: "The more I try to apply the methods of theoretical physics to computer science, the more I find that computer science is not theoretical physics." Basic to epistemology are the concepts of, well, concept, analogy, reduction, comprehension, to name a few. Weiner proves he has a cocktail-party mastery of analogy. He means to put forth a metaphysical theory (materialism) of consciousness, but without any clear reference to the above "delimiters" (to borrow a prase from computer science!). I must criticize any such attempt to study consciousness as immature; it boarders on demagogy. Based on this book, I would not recommend anyone to attend Tufts if he be interested in the "Cognitive Sciences."
Rating: Summary: Sloppy Thinking... Review: Dennett argues more like a lawyer than a philosopher. He seems more intent on "winning" his philosophical argument than in actually getting to a deep understanding. In the beginning of the book, for example, he begins by giving an example of a philosophical thought experiment. The original version of the thought experiment was created prior to the invention of computers. That experiment has been reformulated in modern times to posit using a computer to create a world of illusion (a la the Matrix.) Instead of addressing the issue of epistemology head on, Dennett spends pages explaining the combinatorial explosion that makes such a device impossible. That he is wrong about how such an item would be constructed is irrelevant, the thought experiment is about our basic manner of understanding reality and not about how that is presented to us. So he presents us with a strawman argument that he sets up and knocks down with great bravado. That this is a red herring leading away from the issue doesn't seem to bother him at all since he never comes back to the central question being raised by the thought experiment. At most, he simply requires us to go back and ask the question using God or a demon or some other construct. It's impossible to tell whether Dennett's Philadelphia lawyer argumentation is simply disingenuous or whether he is truly muddled in his thinking. This makes reading his book extremely difficult because even when agreement with him one has to be on constant guard against his wrapping himself around his own intellectual axle.
Rating: Summary: Unfulfilled Promise, but a Worthy Read Review: The good news is, this is a thought-provoking book, and anyone reading it will walk away feeling they know a little more about what makes humans conscious. The bad news is he doesn't come close to fulfilling the promise of the title. Dennett presents a pretty simple theory that could be explained in a few pages and a nice diagram. The theory is this: 'Basically, instead of a tiny "soul" that represents consciousness, our mind is composed of many simple task-specific processes'. He could have presented this concisely and dug deeper into the components of the theory. Instead he seems to want to stretch it out unnecessarily for about the first 200 pages of the book, and he's not even clear in explaining it! He also overstates the impact of this theory repeatedly - commenting that it "might seem outrageous" and that it's "counterintuitive". Actually, it's neither of those things, so it just seems like he's trying to over inflate the theory. Usually when reading these types of books I get that "Aha!" feeling now and then, but I didn't get it once reading this book. He also builds up a straw man in the form of "the Cartesian theater" and repeatedly bashes it. I don't know why it's so important to him to put this theory to rest - probably this is something important in philosophical circles. If this Cartesian Theater is a big force in philosophy, I must say I'm a little disappointed in the whole philosophical field. They should learn about programming. I would much rather see him building on his existing model, digging deeper into the specifics, cataloguing and explaining what some of these "mini-homunculi" or automatic functions might be. Instead he repeatedly beats a dead horse. Most programmers have the mindset that complex behavior can be built up from many simple functions. It's what we all do day in and day out when programming. This is exactly what Dennett argues about the human mind, so it is nothing new. Then he starts arguing against the theory of the Cartesian Theater, which posits that the mind has a "center" or pineal gland, or soul, or one of many names it is given. As an atheist, this argument is also pretty much unnecessary to me, and probably to a lot of other readers out there. So it's similar to arguing to an astronaut that the earth is round. For 300 more pages! After a while you just want him to move on. He also didn't explore very much the role that emotions play, and how these might make our own consciousness seem slightly magical. I would have been interested in hearing him ponder that. He also talked about how words are important to thought, but then never bothered to mention how meditation (the absence of words/pictures/thoughts in the mind) is related to all this. If words are so important, is it possible to do thought without their use? I don't know - he never mentioned it. It may sound like I didn't like this book, but actually it is extremely thought provoking. Dennett is firmly in the materialist camp, so anyone with a scientific mind towards nature will agree with pretty much everything he says. The chapter on the evolution of consciousness is especially delicious. But it's like reading an astronomy book about the latest theories of the origins of the universe, and every five pages the author builds another straw man in the form of the earth being flat, then gleefully bashes the man down. Too much defense, not enough offense! He should have been braver and included more specifics. I think he was a little fearful of being proven wrong if he mentioned too many details. But a worthwhile read anyway.
Rating: Summary: Wheat and chaff unseparated Review: Dennett has a lot of interesting and important things to say. Unfortunately, they comprise at best a third of the book. This book tries to be both philosophy and science, and the philosophy suffers in the process. Dennett is not that good a writer. He is not the least concise, and he takes so many cheap rhetorical shots in making his points it left me gasping. It's fascinating in a way though what a shell game he plays to make his points. It actually obscures what contributions he makes to the field. Although Searle, apparently one of Dennett's chief adversaries, is less flashy, he shows much more respect for his readers.
Rating: Summary: Catch your hand with your hand Review: Here we see the attempted christening of a new language game, in which a simple-minded metaphor ("multiple drafts") is expected to do all the heavy lifting. Dennett ignores the central question, to be posed all over again: What is the field, what is the space, what is the "?" which is experiencing each draft? (Does this "multiple drafts" metaphor even apply to the conscious beings within cultures that lack the concept of "drafts", or the concept even "fiction" itself? It's scope of application is circular, bound into cultures which possess the requisite language-games) This is what you get when an ordinary-language-philosopher, drunk on the possibilities of parallel-distributed processing and Quinean physicalism, tries to come up against that which cannot be explained. Redescribe the "mystery" as a non-starter, collapse the definitions into your own parlance, and rhetorically fire away. Cheap. Two stars for some interesting anecdotal information, at least. If you want to read the work of someone who is truly committed to explaining consciousness on available evolutionary evidence, try Gerald Edelman. At least he has proposed a falsifiable (and thus scientific) theory.
Rating: Summary: Everything in this book is correct Review: The above sentence may seem over stated, but I'm keeping it because this is the only book I've ever been able to say that about--no other has come close. 100 years from now Dennet's theories will seem obvious, taken for granted. Advice to potential buyers: the book isn't the easiest to read. Though Dennet masterfully makes perhaps the most challenging subject fun and accessible, it remains perhaps the most challenging subject. A great deal of the book is just spent in laying the groundwork, getting the reader to the point where they can accept ideas that are counter-intuitive given our long history of societal misinformation. It makes for quite an extensive read, but when you're finished you'll have the same sense of completeness that follows a satisfying, well-balanced meal. Don't bother to read this book if you believe from the start that consciousness "can't" be explained. I'm sure that's not the advice Dennet would give you, but if you think it's impossible, it will be, for you. Just go on reading what you've been reading, and maybe someday you'll be able to accept something new, or if not, maybe your children will, or your cultural heirs. The title "consciousness explained" could appeal to just about every human being, but the book will not. It's not a book for starry-eyed romantics. It's not the first book you should read on the subject. I read this book because a lot of intelligent authors cited it, but it was only after 4 or 5 citations accumulated in my mind that I built up to reading it. Put it this way: if you're the kind of person who has seriously used the word "soulmate", or perhaps even "soul", lately, this book will let you down. The not-so-surprise ending is that there's really no such thing as "consciousness" (I think I'm stating this more explicitly than Dennet does, but not too much more). "Consciousness" is an amalgam of human behaviors we can point to--artistic creativity, byzantine social fabrics--but that doesn't mean that it is a thing that exists in the brain, any more than the Wizard of Oz was an omniscient omnipotent being. What the book seems to me to be most about is not consciousness or a theory of consciousness, but human fallibility. We have grown up--as individuals and as a culture--believing that we are infallible, that we know more than we possibly could. If you think you are a die-hard materialist, Dennet has a surprise for you--you only think you are, but you still almost certainly share a lot of mystical ideas left over as cultural baggage from centuries ago. There are so many ways for us to be mistaken, and Dennet points out so many that he seems at points like a stage magician, taking advantage of our pre-conditioning, but he is a benevolent magician, for he explains the tricks afterward, so we will not continue tricking ourselves. Also, Dennet is known as a philosopher, but this book is aobut reality. It is not about inventing torturous terminology by capitalizing ordinary words such as Mind, Being, Idea. It is about tumors in the brain, blindness in half of the visual field, computer aided design programs, empirical experiments with unambiguous results. If you're like I was though, and you've seen this book referred to by some of your favorite authors, then it is worth its reputation. This book answered all my questions and had answers to questions not yet formed in my mind.
Rating: Summary: What Dennett explains here is not consciousness. Review: The book's title is promising. This promise is nowhere fulfilled. Dennett does not explain consciousness, he does not even try to. He decides by fiat, which phenomena are to be called conscious "scientifically". He then attempts to explain them. His "explanation" amounts to DEFINING consciousness as what can be explained in non-conscious terms. Needless to say, the essence of consciousness, which is the personal experience, is not touched upon. Its mere mention brings accusations of Cartesianism or unscientific attitude. His multiple drafts idea is an atempt to use the unconscious and its mystery in order to hide the shortcomings of the undefendable idea that mind is a programme. The main reason I am reviewing this book is that I was tricked from the hype into reading it.
Rating: Summary: excellent critique of fundamental assumptions Review: In this book, Daniel Dennet encourages us to, among other things, stop thinking of opposites--an idea that has been around since Nietzsche, and then Bergson, and probably earlier than both. Rather, we should think in degrees, gradations. The prime example of this, as one might expect, in this book is consciousness and sub/ un- conscious. When we take the old Cartesian model of consciousness, there is a clear distinction between what i am conscious of and that which i am not--that which escapes the transendental "I". I find that Dennet, through explanations of various experiments (as opposed to the "armchair pyschology" we often get from philosophers) effectively destroys the old Cartesian "self", this self which gets to make all of these nice little choices as an observer. Furthermore, Dennet encourages us to get away from thinking of the mind as a movie screen that is projected before the great "I". Simply put, there is a strange (and entirely unfounded) tendency in both our thought and that of a great many philosophers to think of the mind in terms of representational images in what Dennet calls "mind stuff"--this is an assumption, and one that Dennet takes issue with. However, despite his effectiveness as a "destroyer", Dennet stumbles through his "creation", only positing a vague "multiple drafts" theory. Although his conclusions regarding the various experiements discussed seem to favor such a model of consciousness, it lacks any real support. Furthermore, despite his destruction of the idea of a transcendental self, Dennet assumes a strict materialism from the start, and would probably be unable to defend his materialism against a dualism that didn't assume either a Cartesian self or a representationalist model of the mind (perhaps something similar to Bergson's conception in "Mind and Matter"). However, despite this, i do not think that arguments against Dennet on the basis that he ignores spirituality, etc. are really valid, or, and more importantly, do anything to really uproot his work. Overall, a highly informative, clearly written book, especially when considering the difficulty of the topic discussed.
Rating: Summary: inevitable failure but 3 stars for trying Review: Dennet doesnt explain consciousness properly in this book. Dennet cannot explain consciousness properly. God consciousness is what we possess. In the deepest part of our being we find the Creator's signature. (Proverbs 20.27; 1 Corinthians 2.10; Gen 1.27). This book is pie in the sky 'feel-good' belief for Darwinists.
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