The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Rating:
Summary: An ambitious work dated by time
Review: I have admiration for this important work, but this noted, the question of whether it is "the one book to get" is a fair one.
There is a great deal of cache attached to Kuhn's name, for reasons that are already obvious in several reviews. But there are alternatives to Kuhn, authors of no less insight, and they should not be excluded out of hand. Since Kuhn's original writing, others authors have taken pains to provide perspective and enumerate nuances and advances that have arisen since his writing, ones he could not be expected to have forseen.

One may reply "Well, no other author I know of has the same name as Kuhn, so why not read this classic?" If you goal is to be able to say you have read Kuhn, then yes, this would be the avenue for you. But if you goal is to grasp his ideas clearly and deeply, things become harder. It remains a regretable fact that even today people are debating what is was that Kuhn said.

Everyone seems to think that their own unique view of what he said was the one correct view (of course, we know he talked about paradigms, but the implications beyond that point remain hazy). Daniel Horgan in "End of Science" reports that Kuhn himself indicated that his book was often, if not widely, misunderstood. (And Kuhn himself has taken pains to correct initial misperceptions of his original ideas).

There may be some readers that will look to this work as a guide for 'escaping paradigms', but this was not Kuhn's explicit intention, and if this is what the reader seeks, there are other works that may accoplish the task more directly, and in fewer words. Owen Barfield would be one example (on the matter of seeing reality in a new way). I can affirm what another reviewer has said about Stove's critique of Kuhn (and upon hearing Stove's view, the matter remarkably seems that much more transparent)!

Finally, some readers of these reviews may wonder why some reviewers argue so doggedly that philosophy ought to be written clearly, not poetically or obtusely. This kind of critique is in fact itself a well-developed philosophical tradition. Readers interested to know more about this perspective may wish to seek out articles like that by Alexander Bryan Johnson, in "Classics in semantics".

Rating:
Summary: excellent review of human science
Review: I read this book at university when studying my first Economic courses and when studying Economic cycles. I really got impressed with style and the quality. Kuhn gives us and excellent view of the paradigms and the history of science. Scientific knowledge is not a continued process, but a history impulsed by changes in the enviroment (when a theory can not explain some phenomena) and that change is a complete one in the way of thinking. The historical examples are really good and help to understand his ideas. It is an excellent book to understand human progress and therefore human rationality limitations. It is one of the univesity books I remember the most.

Rating:
Summary: The two Kuhns
Review: Thomas Kuhn performed a memorable service for historiography of science by studying how new ideas and new ways of thinking displace the old. He invented the term 'paradigm shift' to describe what happens when 'normal science' runs into 'anomalies' and enters a 'crisis', which in turn leads to a 'scientific revolution'. Nobody had heard of such things before, so Kuhn had a scoop. He sketched some historical examples in iconoclastic style; the result is this short book, first published forty years ago and still wowing Cultural Studies students today.

Much of what Kuhn the historian of science says here is sensible and well taken. It has certainly been influential, perhaps in ways the author never intended, and should be read by at least everyone for that reason. But there are odd omissions. The greatest paradigm shift in physics since Newton - the adoption of fully-fledged quantum mechanics after 1925 - finds no significant place in this study. Eminent physicists, including Einstein, and even Schrodinger, one of its founders, regarded the new paradigm with deep distaste on aesthetic and philosophical grounds. Yet the new methodology was adopted universally almost at once. What sociological factors, what structures of power and patronage brought this about? We are not told.

It is when Kuhn puts on his philosopher-of-science hat and tells us about the 'incommensurability of paradigms' that we should question what he means, and more especially what some people have read into it. The idea is that Archimedes or Aristotle, encapsulated in their ancient world-view, would have been unable to see what Newton was getting at in his 'Principia'; and likewise Newton if you gave him a copy of Dirac's 'Quantum Mechanics'. This has been held to have implications for epistemology, viz: it is a mistake to think of the evolution of science (or any rational endeavor) as 'progress' in the sense of bringing us closer to an accurate picture of the world. Kuhn's position can be likened to Darwinian evolution: progress *from*, yes; progress *towards*, no. There is room here for fancy footwork. But the finer points are lost on some who simply cheer it as a poke in the eye for rationality.

If an epochal break can be found anywhere in the history of science, it is in the transition from the Aristotelian to the modern world-view which took place in early modern times. Since then nothing remotely like it has happened. The training of physicists still begins with a detailed study of Newtonian mechanics, which for many purposes, from shooting pool to spaceflight, provides an entirely adequate description. An important part of learning relativity or quantum mechanics lies in understanding how they fit in with Newtonian physics - in fact, precisely how the paradigms are commensurable where their domains overlap. The same people at different times use the paradigm of Newton and the paradigms of Einstein and Bohr/Heisenberg. They don't use the paradigm of Aristotle or the New Age paradigm because - interesting though these are to the historian or the social scientist - they don't work; they are not fruitful for puzzle-solving, Kuhn would say.

A process of generalization of paradigms has been characteristic of physics for the past few centuries, and this seems true of mature sciences generally. At the fundamental level a paradigm that has proven really useful is hardly ever scrapped (Kuhn cites two cases from physics since Newton: the recurring controversy over the nature of light - both sides seem to have won that one - and the caloric theory of heat). Instead, the old paradigm is subsumed into a more developed theory with a broader domain of application, yielding in some sense deeper insights. Kuhn the physicist knew this, of course, though some of his readers don't; so he had to defend the unusual position that e.g. Newtonian mechanics is fundamentally incompatible with Einsteinian mechanics, even though one is a limiting case of the other (Kuhn disputed this) and both are used successfully all the time. This was the only way he could maintain that they are 'incommensurable'.

Where does this leave the incommensurability of paradigms? The concept can be interpreted according to taste along a spectrum: at one end, true but trivial; at the other end, deep but almost certainly false. For what it's worth, my opinion is that Newton, far from 'living in a different world', would be perfectly at home with modern physics and raring to go, given a couple of years to get up to speed; Archimedes might take a little longer, while Aristotle would be a leading light at the Sorbonne.

More problematic even than incommensurability of paradigms in Kuhn's work are occasional gnomic statements such as the following:

"There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle"

and

"Scientific knowledge, *like language*, is intrinsically the common property of a group *or else nothing at all*" (my italics).

Taken with the thesis of the book (though Kuhn denied it) remarks like these open the door to all the baggage of so-called radical relativism. Now the baggage is in the hall and halfway up the stairs, as Gross & Levitt, Sokal & Bricmont and others have pointed out. Some of us wish it was out back in the hen-house.

At the heart of modern physics there is indeed an incommensurability, in at least one of Kuhn's senses. It is between the two fundamental theories, general relativity and quantum mechanics. That doesn't stop people from using both paradigms, but it's a great puzzle: no one knows how to fit them together correctly. When we find out (strictly speaking I should say 'if'), it will be as a result of a paradigm that hasn't shifted since the seventeenth century: theoretical structure expressed in the language of mathematics, built on and feeding back into an empirical base. And there will be real, at present unimagined consequences.

You may say that's naive or begs the ontological question. But I say it's the best we've got. No amount of self-regarding talk about hermeneutics and postmodern science - though it comes with a reference list as long as your arm to all the stars of critical 'theory' - will advance our understanding one iota. Whatever the world is, it isn't like that, and Kuhn never really imagined it was.

In spite of the impression I may have given, the book is well worth reading and it isn't difficult (some background knowledge of actual science would help). Read it for yourself; don't believe everything people say about it.

Rating:
Summary: The most referenced book in the latter half of...
Review: the 20'th century! This book has proven to be a landmark in not only the philosophy of science, but in practically the whole world of Western philosophy. The book is tremendously well researched, and is very pursuasive. Basically, Kuhn tries to disprove the myth of linear progression in the Naturwissenschaften, positing the theory of paradigms and paradigm shifts. The paradigm shift is likened to the Gestalt switch. To me, Kuhn's use of the word paradigm made me think of Wittgenstein's term "language game." There are some differences, but I think that it is good to relate the two as one reads through the book.

I have found this book to be a great use in papers that I have written since my reading of it. One should keep in mind, however, the extensive discussions that have arisen after its initial publication. If this is the only thing you have read about Kuhn's theory of the structure of scientific revolutions, be careful that you don't look stupid in front of people who have studied all the subtle and complicated discussions that have come about in response to the first edition of this book.

Rating:
Summary: Good for the brain...not a page turner
Review: I read this book because I thought it would be good for me. And I don't deny that it was. As many point out, its just so important to the way we think about things now that it's a worthwhile read. Also, I think the more time you're willing to put into the book, actually thinking about the arguments presented, the more you will get out of it. But it isn't a page turner. There were points at which I really wished I was done with it, so I could read something else.

Rating:
Summary: Seminal Work In Science Philosophy!
Review: If you are interested in science history, or science philosophy...IN ANY DISCIPLINE,...this book should be on your bookshelf (hopefully dog-eared and read!). I found Kuhn's ideas not at all discipline-specific. He describes general theories about how change and innovation take place, and the importance of the social/political/intellectual context that influence adoption or rejection of change (regardless of context). I am an educator and found his principles highly applicable to systems theory, technology adoption, ethical issues in science, organizational psychology, etc. I found the book fascinating...and I do not have a hard science background.

Rating:
Summary: How Humans interact with Truth.
Review: OK, this is one of those books that is so brilliant, so visionary, that it has left an indelible mark on culture. I'm not just talking about the stale culture of physicists in a lab, but the general culture. Phrases like "Paradigm Shift" and "Thinking outside the Box", owe their underpinnings to this book and its prodigious progeny.

Mr. Kuhn wrote this book in a way that will stand it in good stead throughout history. On the one hand, he avoided the inaccesible jargon and idiom of specialized academia, thus permitting his work to be absorbed by other thinking people. He does not simplify or dumb down his theory to the extent that it is plain for all to see. This book is a challenge, it requires a lot of thought and contemplation to really understand. That is because the structure of scientific revolutions is very difficult to comprehend.

This book is a challenge to read but a pleasure to have finished.

Rating:
Summary: As important as you've heard
Review: Even if the theory of science presented by Kuhn has recieved much critique, I find that I keep coming back to it in many discussions about the nature of science. It vitilaized the subject for sure, and most of the debate thereafter is based upon its controversial ideas.

Perhaps not so controversial anymore is the notion that theory replace theory not in small steps as part of a directed, cummulative effort of scientists but in paradigmatic revolutions with periods of "ordinary science" in between. Integral with that idea, however, is the still very much controversial notion of incommensurability, - that paradigmatic shifts leads to reinterpretations of basic notions and ideas in such a way that complete understanding of one paradigm cannot be made whilst living in another.

Rating:
Summary: Still revolutionary...
Review: In recent months there was a resurgence of interest in T. Kuhn's works: a new book of his later essays "The Road Since The Structure" is just published, as well as fiercely critical of him book "Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times" by Steve Fuller.

"The Structure" deserves continued attention. It is a rare feeling when reading a well-known book written a while ago, that still retains a sense of novelty and intellectual freshness. Like any true classics it is not an easy reading. This is not a polished, refined textbook. Often it has a feel of 18-century philosophical treatise; it is at times raw and inchoate, both sketchy and profound.

As truly revolutionary postulate should, "The Structure" left a deep sense of unease among large part of its audience - science historians, philosophers and scientists in general. It brutally cut the cords of continuity, the view of the science development as "growing tree in a garden", or pure pursuit of ever more detailed and sublimated "truth". It shattered the textbook history of science - a telescopic view that starts with the present knowledge and traces earlier discoveries as gradual approximation of today's picture. But as T. Kuhn argues it never was a smooth continuous process. One could only imagine what a world-shattering impact had a realization that geo-centric Ptolemy model is wrong and Earth is just one of the planets circling the Sun. The emerging Copernicus system was not just a new mechanical model describing Solar system. It was about completely changed worldview, reverberationg through philosophical, religious and political strife, not just scientific discussions. Together with later additions, like the discovery that the Solar system is itself not unique but an ordinary one among miriad of similar stars, it is not surprising that the ensuing turmoil will involve public burning of J. Bruno and persecution of G. Galilei. There is simply now way discoveries of such scope could be accepted smoothly by the establishment of that time (or any other times).

Kuhn was often criticised by people unhappy with the notion that scientific discovery is a process consisting of two radically different categories: the gradual "puzzle-solving" within well-defined and limited scope of a present paradigm, and occasional "revolutions" - periods of transformations so profound that new worldview not just subsumes the previous one, but throws it out altogether. However a different question can legitimately be posed - how can it be otherwise? The "paradigm" - as a collection of widely shared scientific knowledge - is neither simply a fleeting fashion or fad, nor purely rational and objective collective knowledge which instantly reacts to new facts and discoveries and flexibly adjusts to these changes. There are enormous institutional resources

invested in preserving, perpetuating and developing a "paragidm" - the huge educational and academic establishment of a modern society, careers and reputations of millions of scientists and thousands of labs and universities.

Moreover, the paradigm-preserving "normal science" is not necessarily a progress-handicapping factor. While many critics concentrated on the limiting, restrictive role of a scientific paradigm, it also has very important enabling role, also mentioned by Kuhn. A paradigm provides a solid foundation upon which further development is facilitated. It is a language that enables communication and understanding between researchers. Without a widely shared and tacitly assumed concept a scientific paper would spend most of its space just to explain and argue basic premises of the research topic, or refute basic assumptions of other works. Although Kuhn's notion of "normal science" as "puzzle-solving" activity sounds denigrating to some, in reality it can be hugely productive, creative and challenging occupation.

This is related to yet another point of criticism of Kuhn's work - whether a crisis in established paradigm is necessary for a scientific revolution. Presumably, if one can come up with a new theory explaining facts and observations better than old one, it would be enthusiastically accepted and triumph over the older one. Kuhn himself in the book's postscript seemed to be willing to backpedal on this issue: "Nothing important to my argument depends, however, on crises being an absolute prerequisite to revolutions". I think the author is too shy here to defend his thesis. Revolutions are extraordinary hard feats to accomplish.

Discovery is a very hard process, even within the scope of a paradigm, which provides at least some guidance for expectations, some sense of results which are often difficult to interpret. When encountering unexpected results, a scientist is presented by many possibilities, all of which need careful examinations. Is it an error of experiment (or computer code), impurity of materials, inaccuracy of measurements, influence of external factors difficult to account for? Or is is truly novel phenomenon which requires a new theoretical foundation? The latter happens much rarer than all the former possibilities. Often scientists tend to downplay their own unexpected results as errors, and only when becoming aware of similar results by other colleagues begin to take them seriously. An established paradigm persists not simply because of conservatism and backwardness of scientific community, but because true revolutions are rare, while errors, ambiguities, and outright quackery are far more frequent (Cold Fusion, anyone?). When a significant anomaly is repeated more than once, and the evidence for it became credible enough, a process of radical revision of existing

paradigm commences; and (on rare occasions) eventually revolution happens, quickly and disruptively.

One last point. Some opponents (in particular Steve Fuller) criticised Kuhn for, among other things, being an advocate for establishment, as it gave legitimacy to a single dominant paradigm at any given time (except rare periods of revolutionary mess). He viewed Kuhn to a large extent as a product of the Cold War-era statism of the 50's, with science dominated by huge government and military programs. The irony here is that the view of history as a process of gradual quantitative changes punctuated by sudden qualitative leaps (revolutions) is much closer to Hegelian-Marxist "dialectic materialism" - the official philosophical doctrine of the Soviet Union, on the opposite side of the Cold War struggle.

Rating:
Summary: a useful paradigm in it's own right
Review: THESIS: Scientific disciplines, once they have emerged from the pre-paradigmatic stage, undergo periods of "normal science" which allow them to obtain a high degree of precision and progress rapidly. Normal science is dependent on the adoption of a universally accepted paradigm which defines research problems for the scientist, tells him/her what to expect, and provides the methods that s/he will use in solving them. However, in the course of research, scientists inevitably stumble upon anomalies which the paradigm is unable to explain. If the paradigm repeatedly fails to explain the anomaly, a crisis ensues and alternative theories develop. Eventually a competing theory proves relatively successful in explaining the anomaly and it replaces the old paradigm. This replacement is Kuhn's "scientific revolution." Initially, the scientific community resists the replacement, but with time the success of the new paradigm gains enough support to win out. According to Kuhn, the adoption of a new paradigm necessarily establishes the creation of new research problems, methods, and expected results. The scientists within the discipline thus sees the world in a different way than it "was" under the old paradigm. Once the old paradigm is replaced and the revolution has ended, normal science reemerges only to await the discovery of new anomalies. -SYNOPSIS: Prof. John Dowell at Bowling Green

There, that was certainly easier than going through the exercise of coming up with my own version of Kuhn's argument. Just a quick perusal of the resources on the Internet indicates that there are two general bases of attack on Kuhn. First, there is a semantic attack because he is somewhat lackadaisical in his use of the term paradigm. Some nitwit has actually counted 21 different definitions for it in this one book. Big whoop! I think it is, or should be, generally accepted that we know what he means; a paradigm is basically the accepted wisdom of a society as it pertains to one area of knowledge--it is the prevailing explanation for something.

Second, many scientists attack him on the basis that his theory is too cynical, implying as it does that scientific theories are simply temporarily useful utilities for explaining things. And since, on some level, we are always awaiting the next paradigm shift, this theory undermines our confidence in their work. This, it strikes me, is precisely what makes Kuhn's theory so valuable. Like Karl Popper he has laid down a challenge to science. In the heady days of the Enlightenment, The Age of Reason and the Industrial Revolution, it was argued that it was possible that all of existence would yield to human reason and science would explain everything to us. Personally, I feel that this is true and we will eventually reach such a stage. But what Popper and Kuhn combined to do was to remind how far we are from such a point and to demonstrate the importance of doubting the current models of thought. Some scientists would like us to believe that they are discovering abstract truth; this is simply not the case. Science provides us with the best current explanation for things, not with truth.

Now Kuhn and Popper are also challenged in regards to whether history has actually followed their theories. Have scientific revolutions really followed the incremental paths that Kuhn describes? I don't honestly know the answer to that question. But it seems to me that his idea of a paradigm shift, taken metaphorically, does fit with our intuition about how a society's view of big issues evolves. Take Welfare Reform as an example. For 50 years the received wisdom of the elites was that government spending would alleviate poverty and provide the necessary stopgap to tide people over so that they could get jobs. Government agencies and liberal colleges spent millions of dollars on studies to show that this system was working. Even as research and observation steadily ate away at that notion and conservative critics began to question the system, the establishment clung tenaciously to the outmoded model. As competing theories were tried in states like Wisconsin and met with success, the public simply lost faith in the assurances of the bureaucracy and President Clinton was forced to adopt the conservative's competition model or be left on the dust heap of history. The paradigm had shifted and the revolution occurred.

It may be that Kuhn's thesis, like any of the paradigmatic systems of the past, will be disproved or has so many anomalies that it too will be discarded. But it certainly seems that, for now, it is a useful way of understanding how revolutions in our understanding of the world around us come about.

GRADE: A