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Rating: 
Summary: The darkness of Enlightenment?
Review: Because his objective is to expose the limitations of Enlightenment evidentialism, Clark begins with discussions of arguments for and against natural theology, concluding that all such arguments are inconclusive and thus fail as classical "proofs." Given both psychological differences and the stringent requirements of universal proof, none of these arguments can ever compel all rational beings to accept them. [Such arguments do often succeed as person-specific "proofs", more accurately, as sufficiently compelling inferences.] This standard -- to be universally accepted by all rational persons -- is one that extremely few propositions could ever attain. Held to this standard, one would be justified in believing nothing; he might even reject the proposition that his own mind exists (Descartes' famous argument not withstanding). The atheistic argument from the existence of evil and Plantinga's refutation of its claim of consistent logic receives more thorough attention than do the theistic arguments cited (cosmological, design, cumulative/probabilistic). The seemingly cursory treatment of the cosmological and probabilistic arguments becomes understandable in light of Clark's central argument, which emerges toward the end of chapter three. While recognizing that a professional philosopher should concern himself more with the form of an argument than with its species, it nonetheless seems that Clark misstates the probabilistic argument by citing inappropriate numbers (odds of one in one billion, one in ten billion). This is a mathematical argument and Clark's numbers are inconsistent with the actual mathematics of the argument. For example, mathematicians Hoyle and Wickramasinghe calculate the probability that an enzyme could be produced by shuffling amino acids at no better than one in 10 to the 6900th power. This level of improbability itself can only exist in a universe that is even more unlikely, Hawking and Beckenstein calculate a probability less than one over 10 raised to the power of 10 to the 123rd [Penrose says one over infinity]. None of this yet brings us to the odds of a living cell spontaneously appearing. The universe is not large enough to house the constituents (1, 2, 3 . . . ->) of the kind of number that would express odds like one over 10 to the 6900th, let alone the inverse of the greater numbers. Trillions of universes could not house the integrals of such a mathematical expression were they to be written out (the total number of particles in the universe, including the massless particles such as photons and gluons, is something like 10 to the one hundredth power, a miniscule number compared to those previously mentioned). These kinds of odds have no intelligible analogicity to odds such as a mere one in 10 billion!... None of this, of course, is what Clark intends this book to address. These mathematical (thus evidential) considerations do however carve a gaping hole in the beliefs of most 'Enlightened evidentialists.' The mathematician (information theory) Hubert Yockey notes that all college undergraduate textbooks present the primeval soup paradigm of spontaneous abiogenesis as an established fact although it cannot be evidentially supported either by biochemistry or by mathematics. Yockey says, "The belief that life on earth arose spontaneously from non-living matter, is simply a matter of faith in strict reductionism and is based entirely on ideology." The point being that the strict evidentiary standard of the 'Enlightened' agnostic is one that he himself does not satisfy in important instances where his will to believe sweeps aside his skepticism. While Clark is not particularly interested in probabilistic arguments, he does take some note of the practical inconsistencies of popular, so-called skepticism. In the second half of the book he examines the foundational structure of Enlightenment reasoning...
That evidential investigation is important to scientific truth seeking cannot ameliorate this approach to all potential truths. Something is not proved false because it does not lend itself to evidential scrutiny, nor may it cease to be something that warrants rational belief. An authoritarian evidentialism may result in fear of error superceding willingness to risk truth-seeking. The interaction of minds provides relevant examples: Clark quotes C.S. Lewis; "There are times when we can do all that a fellow creature needs if only he will trust us. ...in extracting a thorn from a child's finger, in teaching a boy to swim or rescuing one who can't, in getting a frightened beginner over a nasty place on a mountain, the one fatal obstacle may be their distrust. We are asking them to trust us in the teeth of their senses, their imagination, and their intelligence.... We ask them to accept apparent impossibilities: ... that hurting the finger very much more will stop the finger hurting -- that the water which is obviously permeable will resist and support the body -- that holding onto the only support within reach is not the way to avoid sinking -- that to go higher and onto a more exposed ledge is the way not to fall.... If the young mountaineer were a scientist, it would not be held against him, when he came up for a fellowship, that he had once departed from Clifford's rule of evidence by entertaining a belief with strength greater than the evidence logically obliged him to." Clark examines Plantinga's argument that belief in the existence of God is rationally a species of belief in the existence of other minds. As such, belief in God's existence cannot be reasonably restricted to scientific evidentialism. It may be a matter of properly basic reasoning -- this being the relevant concept in our relational knowledge of other minds. "No philosopher has ever constructed a good argument for the existence of other minds, and it is difficult to see how this task might be accomplished." Clark examines classical foundationalism and finds that in certain areas outside of physical science, namely in the realm of relational experience with other minds -- with persons, evidentialism is often irrelevant, rationally absurd, impossible, even perverse. This is the heart of the Reformed epistemological argument -- the rationality of 'immediate' knowledge (knowledge that cannot be mediated). The argument thus separates itself from evidentiary arguments.
Rating: 
Summary: Excellent argument, Wrong conclusion
Review: I enjoyed this book tremendously. While I disagree fundamentally with the position argued in this book, I have nothing but high praise for the author. Clark writes masterfully; his summaries of philosophical ideas, even those espoused by his foes, are concise, accurate, and scholarly. Every sentence is well crafted and carefully reasoned. You will not find an ad hominum attack or a circular argument in this book.
Clark's thesis is that the existence of god is not a proposition that is appropriate to deem true or false based on an accumulation of evidence, as we would approach a scientific theory. Rather, it is a truth that is apprehended immediately and rationally in essentially the same manner that one immediately apprehends other minds, without subsequent need of rational proof. Clark maintains that "evidentialism" has been misapplied to theistic arguments, arguing that one does not base inter-personal relationships on objective evidence (at least not entirely), and thus it should be with man's relation to god.
Ironically, I find Clark an unwitting ally of atheism. I reason as follows. It is well known that the human mind is strongly predisposed to perceiving human faces and human intentions, even where none exist. We see faces in clouds and rocks, and ascribe intentions and attitudes to inanimate objects quite readily. A very likely explanation for this peculiar bias is that such perceptions are an over-generalization of the same mental machinery that allows us to immediately apprehend other humans and to assess their motives; a cognitive ability that is basic to all social interaction. With respect to this faculty false positives are far less troublesome than are false negatives, which is consistent with our innate tendency toward over-generalization. From this perspective, one can read Clark's entire book as a vehement first-hand account that betrays the source of religious conviction as a cognitive error; a result of a cognitive mechanism that is searching for evidence of human presence, and is apt to over generalize. In this light it is far more likely that the palpable sense of god's presence is an epiphenomenon of mind, not a perception of reality; in short, an illusion. (Theists will no doubt argue that this inherent sense is itself evidence of god's hand. This is an entirely different conjecture that would demands its own supporting evidence.)
Despite our diametrically opposed viewpoints, I concur with most of Clark's central argument -- we differ only on the ultimate inference drawn. Clark believes he has demonstrated the rationality of belief in god; I believe he has plainly exposed it as an illusion. Alas, even the most carefully crafted arguments seem only to widen the gulf between theist and atheist.
I gave this book four stars instead of five, not because Clark failed to reach the same conclusion as I did, but because he assiduously avoided asking the critically important question: How is it that our immediate apprehension of other minds can be trusted as valid evidence for god's existence? In particular, there are two enormous problems with Clark's premise that he does not address: 1) Our perception of other minds is on occasion demonstrably wrong, and 2) There is no evidence that this faculty has any validity whatsoever beyond the realm of natural human experience. Thus, not only is it possible that one's apprehension of god is in fact mistaken (i.e. has no referent), but there is absolutely no basis for claiming that it is applicable to a supposed supernatural realm. Unless Clark can face these obstacles squarely, and overcome them, the more parsimonious conclusion is that the apprehension of god is a mundane illusion, just as Freud and others have surmised.
The argument that the "perception" of god is in fact a common cognitive error (due to over-generalization) is explored and supported extensively by several authors, including Guthrie ("Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion") and more recently by Boyer ("Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought"). I urge everyone who has read Clark's book to read either Gurhtie's book or Boyer's book. I emphatically urge those who have read either of the latter two books to read Clark's book; it is a most startling admission in the light of recent insights into the human psyche.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent
Review: One of my favorite types of books is a concise introduction that is also opinionated. Kelley James Clark has written just such a book on the philosophy of religion. It is a presentation of that topic from a position that has been called "Reformed epistemology." As I understand it, Reformed epistemology is an attempt to develop a Calvinistic approach to the philosophy of religion based on the teachings of Calvin, as taught most recently by Alvin Plantinga. My knowledge of Calvin is quite limited and I haven't read anything by Plantinga, so I can't opine on whether Prof. Clark adequately sets forth their positions (although I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of his presentation). RETURN TO REASON doesn't deal with all the topics you would find in a standard survey book; for example, all the arguments for God's existence aren't dealt with. However, he does present an excellent discussion of the cosmological argument and the argument from design, and many other subjects. The best part of the book is a discussion of the failings of traditional ("evidential") apologetics. Many apologists for Christianity have argued that one shouldn't believe in God without proof, and that reason must some how validate revelation. Prof. Clark shows the pitfalls of this approach, which has its origins in the Enlightenment. For example, we often believe things - such as the existence of other minds or an external world without reflection, much less proof. Also, is a child wrong to believe in God without having studied the proofs for God's existence? I would have liked to see some interaction with other Reformed apologists. There is no mention of Cornelius van Til or Gordon Clark, two of the 20th century's best known American apologists, both staunch Calvinists. What makes Prof. Plantinga's work more "Reformed" than their's? This book came out in 1990. A more recent statement of Prof. Clark's views can be found in FIVE VIEWS ON APOLOGETICS, Cowan, ed. (Zondervan 2000), where he interacts with the views of other apologetic traditions.
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