The Yom Kippur War

Rating:
Summary: Insight into a war that led to peace
Review: Former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made two major gambles during his tenure as the leader of Egypt. The first was in 1973, when he risked defeat and a superpower confrontation by joining with Syria to launch a two-front attack against Israel. The second was in 1978, when he signed the Camp David accords, making peace with Israel. Ironically, the second could not have happened without the war, and his signing of the peace treaty with Israel cost him his life. Sadat had very limited war aims in 1973; his goal was to make a reasonable stand against the Israelis, erasing the stigma of the crushing defeat of 1967. He was quite correct in his belief that Israel would never negotiate with her Arab neighbors as long as they thought that they possessed overwhelming military superiority over the Arab states.
This book is an excellent description of the prelude to the war, explaining the (correct) Egyptian reasoning that concluded that war was necessary to peace. It also goes into great detail in explaining the air of complacency that existed in Israel. Since the Israelis firmly believed that they couldn't be beaten, then there was no chance of an Arab attack. The idea that the Arabs would fight simply to gain respect was something that they did not think of. The Israelis had also constructed a line of fortifications along the Suez canal called the Bar-Lev line. Since they considered this line impregnable, it was lightly manned and short of weapons. In other words, it was the Maginot Line syndrome all over again.
The descriptions of the cynical effectiveness of Henry Kissinger as U. S. secretary of state astounded me, showing a master of political reality at work. His beliefs were the same as that of Sadat, thinking that peace was not possible until Israel suffered some kind of defeat at the hands of the Arab armies. After the war broke out, his hope was that Israel would prevail, but would be bloodied enough to realize that an overwhelming military victory over the Arabs was no longer a certainty. Therefore, his ideal outcome was that the Arabs would pressure Israel, but that they would ultimately prevail, and Israel would stop before the Egyptian army was completely destroyed. This would cause the Israeli leadership to finally understand the need for negotiation with the Arabs and leave a strong, pragmatic leader in Egypt that they could negotiate with.
The Soviets held the same view and joined with the United States to force a cease-fire before the Israelis could destroy the Egyptian forces. Neither the American or Soviet side would abandon their client states, but neither wanted the other's clients to be severely damaged or destroyed. The leadership of both superpowers valued détente far more than the feelings of their client states, something that the leaderships of Egypt and Israel learned the hard way.
The Yom Kippur war was one of the few that actually had a positive outcome. The Arab armies showed that they were no longer a pushover and this new reality is what gave Sadat the credibility to consider peace with Israel. By having their military stressed to the maximum, the Israelis learned that the only road to a secure nation was to negotiate and trade land for peace. The positive outcome was the Camp David accords, which meant that as long as only conventional weapons were used, Israel could not be destroyed. Egypt was the only Arab nation that could possibly do that, and they were no longer willing to fight.

Rating:
Summary: THE definitive book on the subject
Review: Comprehensive, insightful, balanced, and more. I only wish there were more maps and some better fact-checking or proofreading, especially since the book is advertised as "the revised and definitive edition":

p. 271 says the carrier Independence can carry "eight hundred" aircraft; apparently "eighty" was intended.

p. 277 refers to "giant" Antonov-12s, although they're C-130 equivalents. the Antonov-22's are the real giants.

p. 356 says Watergate began in March of 1972 (June, of course, is correct)

p. 368 has Soviet recon satellites being launched from Archangel; it's Pletsetsk

Rating:
Summary: Excellent modern history, very well written...
Review: The authors have used all of their journalist talents and sources to compile this excellent history of the war between Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. They use extensive public and private sources, archives, biographies, news conference transcripts, interviews, documents, and radio and television announcements and commentaries. They also include U.S. and Soviet sources.

A tapestry of many threads, this book weaves several complex themes together: Israeli hubris, Egyptian planning and diplomacy, the failure of intelligence agencies, the impact of the conflict on all of the countries, diplomatic constraints on all the involved parties, how "client" states used the superpower conflict, and how Israel barely survived the attack. The authors also include personal commentaries from "ordinary" people in both countries. The authors' research is so extensive that they easily point to "holes" or "fractures" in the thinking of the national and international leaders, as the conflict developed.

In addition, the writing is excellent, as only the Brits can do it. You will be entranced with their scope.

Another book you might find interesting is Two O'Clock War (also on Amazon.com), which details the U.S. airlift of crucial supplies during the war.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting but rather selective account of '1973 War'.
Review: The books begins with excerpts from the unique, lengthy reports and exchanges of radio communication from Israeli troops isolated within a bunker along the banks of the Suez Canal & their Headquarters.

Communications recorded during the initial, successful Egyptian offensive which breached the surrounding Israeli positions and by-passed them. The accounts of the soldiers concerned are very illuminating and provide a first hand account of the actual fighting.

The book then breaks off into an analysis of the lead up to the conflict. The book describes the Egyptian & Syrian objectives for the Yom Kippur War as having nothing to do with the Palestinian issue or the pursuance of any 'Palestinian state'. On this point I agree.

However, I take issue with the book's further elaborations of the Arab intent being, 'not to destroy Israel', but just to regain the lands lost to Israel during the 1967 conflict. This I find incredibly selective.

No mention is made in the immediate context that Israel offered to return all the lands captured in the '1967 War' immediately after the conflict in exchange for the recognition of the right of Israel to exist, secure borders and peace. All of which the Arab leaders refused at that time and even up to the Yom Kippur War itself.

The writers eventually acknowledge this on the following page, contradicting themselves and introducing an element of confusion at the outset.

Deviating from the conflict itself, the writers then refer to the obvious ambiguity of UN Resolution 242, adopted following the 1967 War.

The UN Resolution itself calling for Israeli withdrawal, but not being specific as to what the withdrawal entailed, plus the recognition of Sovereignty for all nations in the region and the freedom for all nations to live peacefully within secure borders, free from threats of force & a settlement of the refugee problem.

It is duly added that the UN Resolution was intentionally ambiguous due to the clear and present threat that any specific details would result in the veto of one or both the 'super-powers' so deeply involved in the political negotiations. (Even today we see one side or the other quoting the UN Resolution in accordance with it's OWN interpretation at the expense of the other.)

A great deal of the book is then devoted to the political machinations behind the scenes and the secret military build-up and preparations for the war by the Arab nations.

The intent of the Arab onslaught was clearly to catch Israel's military totally unprepared during the most Holy time of the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur.

To this extent the Arabs were largely successful. Yet, amidst the claims of Israeli intelligence failure in discovering the Arab plans for attack, it is shown that shortly before the Arab onslaught began, Israel was indeed aware of what was coming, yet political pressures went a long way to preventing another pre-emptive strike similar to that employed during the 1967 War.

The book reveals that shortly before the shooting began, the US told Israeli leaders in no uncertain terms that if Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against the assembled Arab forces, then the US would feel unable to supply fresh equipment which would surely be needed during the conflict's course.

However, the book quotes the US diplomatic sources as adding that "...if Israel refrained from a pre-emptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the aggressors, then America would feel morally obliged to help..."

When the book deals with the actual fighting itself, we are presented with a story of incredible courage and bravery of the soldiers/airmen on both sides, amid the high-stakes of the continuing diplomatic battles waged by the UN, the United States, and the Soviet Union, even as troops and pilots from Israel and the nine Arab states attacking it lost their lives.(Yes, there were contingents from other Arab countries involved as well, just as in 1948 and 1967.)

The ensuing Arab oil embargo is also studied in some depth plus the frantic negotiations to bring about a ceasefire before the 'opposing' super-powers found themselves on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Israeli forces being within artillery range of the Syrian capital Damascus and well on the road to the Egyptian capital Cairo & with Soviet Forces threatening to intervene.

Bearing in mind that the book initially declares that this war had nothing whatsoever to do with the Palestinians, then it does a 'commendable' account of manipulating the conflict to the Palestinian issue after it's conclusion.

If the Arab's weren't, as the book declares, fighting for the Palestinian cause, then why such a sweeping reference & sizeable section devoted to the Palestinians towards the end ?

To one who has studied the region for some time, it is clear that due to yet another military failure by the Arab world to provide a solution to the 'Israeli question', then the Arab world immediately seeks another weapon to pursue it's agenda. Hence the 'Palestinianisation' of the conflict then & to date.

With the greatest respect, I also feel that anyone who believes that the Arab intent during this war was 'not to destroy Israel' is not living in the real world, as the Arab military would never have stopped at any pre-determined 'border'.

Furthermore, being British, the disproportionate inclusion and support of the Palestinian issue by a representative of the British Press (Sunday Times Insight Team) is of no surprise to me.

Having said that, there is a lot to this book's credit and it is a useful reference on the Yom Kippur conflict and it's International repercussions. A far better account of this conflict is provided by Chaim Herzog in his excellent book entitled "The War of Atonement".

Rating:
Summary: biased, interesting
Review: This book tries to be all things to all people. It provides an excellent introduction that has real transcripts from the Israeli fortification the Suez and the radio contacts with HQ as they were overun and sourounded. This gives the reader the feeling of uter collapse that the Israeli army found itsefl in when Egyptian and Syrian units rolled over them in the first day of the war.

Yet the book goes on to detail the ensuing U.N machination, the historical buildup, the palistinian problem, the intentions of the 10 nations at war(this includes the arab contingents sent to fight in the war). The book details the 'brink' of nuclear war between the super powers and the subesquent airlifts.

In the end the Israeli army routed the Syrian and Egyptian armies and came within miles of Damascus and Cairo, encircling an entie egyptian army on the east side of the canal. The book has many drawbacks. It does not credit Mr. Sharon witht he credit he is clearly due for his hard hatted efforts to breakthrough and take the initiative while other isreali counteroffensives were crushed. THis book also is typically biased as the english press always is, towards the palistinians, who had nothing whatsoever to do with this war. In fact the war was fought by Sadat so that he could later sign a peace with israel and get rid of the russians so he could ally him self witht he americans(liek King Hussien had done). Sadat allowed his Syrian ally to be crushed while his soldier sstopped only miles from the canal, waiting under thier SAM missle shield.

Other books on the subject might be helpful in filling the gaps. Notably Sharons 'Warrior', Harzogs 'War of atonement' and Boynes 'Two O' Clock war'. For details fot he israeli counterattack on the Sinai one can read Aden(Bren)'s account of the war.

Rating:
Summary: biased, interesting
Review: This book tries to be all things to all people. It provides an excellent introduction that has real transcripts from the Israeli fortification the Suez and the radio contacts with HQ as they were overun and sourounded. This gives the reader the feeling of uter collapse that the Israeli army found itsefl in when Egyptian and Syrian units rolled over them in the first day of the war.

Yet the book goes on to detail the ensuing U.N machination, the historical buildup, the palistinian problem, the intentions of the 10 nations at war(this includes the arab contingents sent to fight in the war). The book details the 'brink' of nuclear war between the super powers and the subesquent airlifts.

In the end the Israeli army routed the Syrian and Egyptian armies and came within miles of Damascus and Cairo, encircling an entie egyptian army on the east side of the canal. The book has many drawbacks. It does not credit Mr. Sharon witht he credit he is clearly due for his hard hatted efforts to breakthrough and take the initiative while other isreali counteroffensives were crushed. THis book also is typically biased as the english press always is, towards the palistinians, who had nothing whatsoever to do with this war. In fact the war was fought by Sadat so that he could later sign a peace with israel and get rid of the russians so he could ally him self witht he americans(liek King Hussien had done). Sadat allowed his Syrian ally to be crushed while his soldier sstopped only miles from the canal, waiting under thier SAM missle shield.

Other books on the subject might be helpful in filling the gaps. Notably Sharons 'Warrior', Harzogs 'War of atonement' and Boynes 'Two O' Clock war'. For details fot he israeli counterattack on the Sinai one can read Aden(Bren)'s account of the war.