Rating: 
Summary: An excellent book with an interesting perspective.
Review: As my first glance into the history of this war, it was extremely interesting to read about the war, and the Arab buildup prior to the fighting from the Arab perspective. Add this to the already exciting account of how an outnumbered Israeli military force was able to defeat a technologically superior enemy, throw in some amazing strategic and political blunders, and you have yourself a fantastic book.
Rating: 
Summary: An Incomplete Account of What Happened
Review: Considering that it is a book coming from the western world & from a citizen whose country is the godfather & mother of the State of Israel it was pleasing to find that someone recognizes the achievements, to a certain extent, of the Arab armies during the 6th of October War, i.e. the Egyptian & Syrian armies. Especially, during the first few days of the war, when the Israeli's were in disbelief of what was happening to them.
The idea of making a story out of the events where you can relate to people who were involved at the family & personal level, dismissed the book from being a factual documentary, & I think that was the intention of the author in the first place. Maybe he would like one day someone to make a movie out of this book, which would be a good idea. A similar love story, to Yosi & Nati, should have been added but on the other side of the canal, to hide the bias a little bit.
However, there are a lot facts that the author omitted that must have been added. The author shows the Israeli's as fierce fighters, who were able to turn things around, on their own. This is completely far from the truth, & is very misleading to the reader. He should have explained that without the Air Lift operation that the USA started, the war would not have turned around in the direction it did, in the Israeli's favor.
The US satellite reconnaissance that was able to provide the knock out punch, that lead to the encirclement on the Egyptian Army in Suez, was completely omitted, & I don't know if that was intentional or because of the lack of knowledge by the author of these actions by the USA. It should have been made very clear to the reader that the survival of Israel, & may be the whole area, since the Israeli's were going to use their nuclear arsenal as a last resort, was immensely effected by the American interference to help its sister state.
The breach of the cease-fire, which is an Israeli habit, must have not been omitted from the sequence of events, as it gave the Israeli's more territories on the Egyptian side after they crossed the Suez Canal, to put them in a better position at the negotiating table, after the cease-fire.
The chess games that were played between the US (Kissinger), the Russians & Sadat, that may have led Sadat to make the huge military errors that he did, were also omitted. (Intentionally or not)
Did Kissinger fool Sadat during that time to make these mistakes & give the Israeli's a military edge to force a stand still, which developed to a cease-fire & later peace talks. Was he threatened by Kissinger that the Israeli's were going to use Nuclear Weapons & destroy the whole area & decided, instead of stopping the war pre-maturely, he was going to impose on his Generals taking foolish military decisions & force a turn around to the war & eventually to a stop, so that Israel could save a little face, after the embarrassment that it was put in.
Why didn't Sadat listen to his Generals about the consequences of developing the attack, or even in preventing & dealing with the Israeli crossing to the east bank of the Suez Canal. These decisions need to be deeply questioned to find out their motives that were behind the scenes.
Was this a game by the two super powers at the time & the only sufferer would be the fathers, brothers, sons, cousins & brave men who died as a result of irresponsible decisions taken by men in power. `Power is the greatest aphrodisiac' Kissinger was said to have once said.
The role of Ashraf Marwan will never be known to anyone, maybe until another 20 years, or until the time of his death, when his memoires or personal diary surfaces.
Overall, it's a good novel, but I was not too impressed with the quantity of facts that were over sighted & chosen to be forgotten. You cannot rely on this book on its own to know what happened during the 6th of October War. You need to do your own homework from several other sources.
Rating:
Summary: An engaging story
Review: Historians could have almost predicted with certainty that the humiliation of Egypt and Syria in the Six Days War in 1967 would have consequences. But the manner in which it happened was the surprise. In The Eve of Destruction, Howard Blum opens masterfully with the strategy that the Arabs chose: a top-ranking Egyptian spy who completely fool the Mossad and the Israeli Cabinet into thinking another war would never come. It did, six years later.Blum masterfully narrates the events leading up to war: the unpreparedness of Israel's armed forces; the "Concept"; the realistic Egyptian General's war plan; and the gambit taken by Sadat and Asad to restore Arab honor to the Middle East. Told through some of the key players in the war, we see heroic tank battles taking place in and around the desolate Golan Heights, vastly undersized Israeli armor desperately trying to halt overwhelming Syrian forces. We watch as the Egyptians carry out the brilliantly conceived Suez Canal crossing to hold its east bank and the tactical blunders and disorder of the Israeli generals before they realize that directly assaulting Egyptian positions in the Sinai is suicide. On the southern front, the war ends largely in stalemate thanks to a counter-crossing through the Chinese Farm, but it is a close-run thing. To the north, ferocious defensive actions allow Israeli armor to block the Syrian advance and even turn it around. Blum's unique storytelling ability grabs the reader and places him or her right on the battlefield-one can almost smell the cordite. Yet, it is blended with behind-the-scenes in-depth insight and commentary, enabling one to understand why not only the Yom Kippur War was inevitable, but why, this time, there would be no easy victories-for either side. For me, the most fascinating aspect of the book lies in the manner in which Blum describes the participants: their hopes, veuve and zest, fears, and schemes, all placed in the context of Middle East culture that is still largely an anathema to western society.
Rating: 
Summary: Some Holes, but Engaging History
Review: Howard Blum knows how to write engaging history, and I ought to know since I spend a good portion of time reading dry as dust academic journal articles and books. Most scholarly treatments of any historical subject reek of infuriatingly dense prose, annoying jargon, and specialization carried to the nth degree. "The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War" avoids all of these trappings in an attempt to tell the events surrounding the disastrous war that started between Israel, Egypt, and Syria on October 6, 1973. I didn't realize it at the time, but this book arrives just in time to cash in on the thirtieth anniversary of that catastrophic conflict, a conflict that nearly sent the Middle East spiraling into nuclear conflagration. Howard Blum is an author who has written several other books, including "The Brigade," "Gangland," and "Out There." According to Blum, several important factors contributed to the near defeat of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Mainly, and this factor supposedly appears in print for the first time here, the Mossad and Israeli politicians made the nearly fatal mistake of relying heavily on an Egyptian double agent when formulating their national security policies. Referred to by Blum as "The Concept," the information this agent fed Israeli intelligence gave rise to a belief that until Egypt acquired long-range missiles and bombers and the Arab states unified, Israel would be safe. This "concept" soon informed all aspects of Israeli military and political policy to the point that a secret visit to Israel by the King of Jordan about the Egyptian/Syrian war plans went ignored. Coupled with an unforgivable level of arrogance expressed by figures like Moshe Dayan, still buoyed by the country's 1967 victory over the Arabs, Israel's complacency nearly led to its destruction. Evidence about Syrian troop massing on the border or Egyptian acquisition of Soviet made SAM missiles created barely a ripple in high level military circles. Meanwhile, an Egyptian army officer name Saad el Shazly created his own "concept," a plan to smash through the Bar-Lev defensive forts along the Suez Canal and retake the Sinai Peninsula from Israel. To accomplish this feat, Shazly would take air-to-air missiles and create a shield behind which Egyptian tanks and troops would advance into the peninsula. The Israeli Air Force was not familiar with these new missiles, so the shield would render Jewish planes ineffective against the Arab advance. Shazly, tapped by President Sadat to put this plan into action, quickly did so with an ingenuity that even Israeli generals later admired. Using high-powered water cannons purchased in Europe, the Egyptians managed to knock down giant mountains of sand the Israelis had built along the Suez. Arab forces quickly built pontoon bridges across the water and overran the forts on the coast. Simultaneously, a giant force of Syrian tanks and regular army invaded Israel from the north, capturing key military installations and nearly driving all the way into the interior of the country. The situation deteriorated so rapidly that Golda Meir and her cabinet approved the use of nuclear weapons against Egypt and Syria, a plan that fortunately never came to fruition. Threading its way throughout the book are stories about individual figures both Jew and Arab. Blum takes us into the high command bunkers of Egypt and Israel as the war unfolds, argues that Ariel Sharon was a reckless tank commander whose attempts to make a name for himself on the battlefield cost numerous lives and nearly lost the war in the Sinai, and follows the battlefield heroics of Israeli tank commanders who often held off hundreds of tanks with a minimum of equipment and soldiers. "The Eve of Destruction" is truly a compelling narrative history that does what good history ought to do: tell the reader the big picture while showing how individual people and actions shape that picture. Many of the accounts of the big tank battles are downright gripping, making the reader feel as though they are right on the front lines with the soldiers. Blum achieves a certain measure of objectivity about the whole affair, readily pointing out the numerous Israeli blunders before and during the war. He also shows how political posturing by Sadat led to the defeat of Egyptian troops in the Sinai. I would have liked more accounts about Egyptian and Syrian soldiers in combat, but I still feel that "The Eve of Destruction" does a better job at the balance game than many books written in recent years about the Arab/Jewish situation. Blum argues that Egypt's operation in the Sinai during 1973 was more of an attempt to regain a sense of national honor than a serious gambit to "drive the Jews into the sea," a claim that will certainly anger some readers, but one that does possess a certain logic. Moreover, the author states that in this aspect, Egypt succeeded in redeeming itself after its devastating loss in 1967. For Blum, the Yom Kippur War changed the Middle East forever, leading to Sadat's eventual overtures towards Israel a few years later and presumably, peace with Jordan as well. I know little of this specific conflict, as I'm not much into military history. I can say I came away with a better understanding of the power dynamics in this volatile area. One problem: Blum never adequately explains how the Arabs would have dealt with Israel's nuclear weapons. Perhaps Egypt and Syria didn't know Israel possessed these weapons at the time, but if so, Blum could have elaborated on this a bit better. Anyway, Blum's book is a great read and a good introduction to the last big Arab/Israeli War (excepting the invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s, of course).
Rating:
Summary: Good, but not great
Review: I have just started to get interested in the details of the multiple Israeli wars and this was my choice on the Yom Kippur war. As a war history book, it lacks details. Does not mention the US fleet in the area, that "confronted" the Russian naval forces in order to keep both countries out of direct contact during the war.
The book is a good story, but while we are told of the love story between Yossi and his wife, there is a lack of "where are they now".
Over 300 pages on build up/war and 2 pages on how it ended.
While the book is a good read, I will have to read another one, as many q's are still unanswered.
Rating:
Summary: Absorbing
Review: In this historical but thrilling work by Howard Blum, the reader learns how different history would have been save for a few twists of fate and a small cadre of extremely brave professional soldiers. In 1973, two massive Arab armies came within a few hours of forever changing the course of events in the Middle East. It was an unexpected war, a war which the massive and vast intelligence agency of the Israeli Mossad failed miserably to predict. It was a war that tested the very fabric of the still young Jewish state, and challenged the measure of the Israeli Defense Force. If one is looking for a detailed history of the conflict, this is not the correct book to turn to. However, if you want to be thoroughly absorbed into a war that can only be described as epic, The Eve of Destruction is the book to turn to. Separating this book from other histories, at least in the eyes of Blum, is its emphasis on the reasons for the Israeli intelligence failure. The new discovery concerns the "In-Law," a high placed Israeli asset who was part of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's inner circle. The Mossad was confident in the ability of the source to give them prior warning of any conflict. Unknown to the Israelis was the fact that the In-Law was, in fact, a double agent who was utilized to mask the Egyptian intentions. These intentions were nothing short of the destruction of Israel, in conjunction with the Syrians. Since the 1967 war, the Egyptian military in particular had been revolutionized by a re-energized corps of officers. Armed to the teeth by the Soviet Union, the Egyptians were determined to utilize their armaments, including SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles and a new generation of anti-tank missiles. At the same time, the IDF, flush from its glorious victory in 1967, was overconfident in its position and static in its doctrine. As long as air supremacy was assured, the IDF felt entirely secure that they could turn back any multi-front assault. On Yom Kippur, especially, the stance of the IDF was ridiculously relaxed. The critical forts on the Suez were woefully undermanned, and the way to Tel Aviv was relatively unguarded. The IDF received confirmation of the Arab attack a pitiful 12 hours before it was scheduled to begin, and the first wave of Arab armor poured into the borders of the Jewish state. Panic immediately gripped those in leadership positions. They had been caught off guard, and they knew what the stakes were. Early Israeli losses were critical as the Arab armies, especially the Egyptians, used updated tactics that negated IAF air strikes and IDF counter attacks. The first Israeli attacks were ineffective and disastrous. The Israeli leadership began to plan for doomsday, literally. As Blum dramatically recounts, Prime Minister Meir was presented with the Temple option, in which Israel would use nuclear weapons as a last ditch defense, vaporizing world capitals such as Damascus and Cairo. The bombers were ready, as were the Jericho missiles. However, news from the battlefield began to improve as the Egyptian leadership began to ignore its own officers and played right into the IDF's hands by extending itself entirely too far. Blum tells the story of the war by describing the actions of several IDF officers, such as those in the fabled 7th armored regiment, which held the line at the Golan Heights against overwhelming odds. By telling the story this way, Blum allows the reader to really connect with these men, many of them reservists, who were forced to stand up against a tide of Syrian armor. The alternative was the death of their nation. In the south, the general staff of Israel was thrown into disarray as General Ariel Sharon planned and carried out wide ranging counterattacks and various other adventures without consent, leading to both negative and positive outcomes. This fissure of command led to more military debacle, as the Egyptians proved a brave and well trained foe. However, as the IAF was able to again take to the skies, the tide turned quickly. Soon, what had begun so disastrously for the small Jewish state was turning into a monumental victory. Blum's work is very exciting and a great page turner. He writes in a very narrative style, giving the reader the idea that he or she is actually in the action. The horrors and the cost of war are highlighted, as are the stunning examples of courage seen on both sides. The books faults lie in the fact that it really fails to be comprehensive. This would not be a major problem, but the jacket and the cover do promise a lot more than the book really delivers. For such major components of the situation such as the American airlift and the superpower standoff to be totally ignored is disappointing. Also, it is apparent that some minor events are given an almost towering importance, while others of a more major nature seem relatively passe. With these detriments in mind, however, one should not hesitate to read this amazing story.
Rating:
Summary: History Told in an Anecdotal Style
Review: On October 6, 1973 at 2:00 in the afternoon, the armies of Egypt and Syria went to war. Along the Suez Canal, 100,000 Egyptian men and 1,550 tanks faced 436 Israeli troops and three tanks. In the Golan Heights, 45,000 Syrian troops and 540 tanks attacked an Israeli force of 175 men and 177 tanks. An Israeli army and air force, which was viewed by the world as invincible based upon its military success of June 1967, was clearly staggered by the surprise attack that coincided with the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Howard Blum's THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War is history in an anecdotal style. Blum tells the story of the war through the broad canvass of action by the nations involved, and the smaller snapshot of the individual participants in the conflict. Blum spends a great deal of his account attempting to answer a familiar and significant question. How did the Arab nations achieve such a surprise and why was Israel so unprepared for the war? Nearly half of the book is spent providing the answer, an answer that has eerie similarities to contemporary events in the Middle East. Israel had substantial information that war was impending. Prime Minister Golda Meir even had a secret meeting with Jordan's King Hussein wherein he advised Meir of Egypt and Syria's plans. Israeli intelligence chose to ignore the information received because it failed to comport with their strategy and analysis. In addition, the Israelis were duped by an elaborate double agent plot by the Egyptians that fed crucial false information immediately prior to the commencement of hostilities. The initial Arab assault succeeded in administering a near knockout blow to the Israelis. For 72 hours the Israelis staggered and tenaciously sought to hold off the advancing armies from both the north and south. So bleak was the situation that Defense Minister Moshe Dayan concluded that the "Third Temple" was about to fall. Prime Minister Meir authorized the use of Israel's nuclear arsenal should the nation be overrun. But just as the Israelis had miscalculated, so had Egyptian President Sadat, and that error changed the course of the battle. Sadat's strategy was for a limited retaking of territory across the Suez Canal. He assumed that the Israelis would counter-attack and his army had been thoroughly prepared in defensive tactics. The goal was to wear down the Israeli Army and obtain a superior bargaining position for peace negotiations. But the Israelis elected a different strategy. They eliminated the Syrian threat and then turned their attention to the Egyptian front. Through a series of maneuvers, they outflanked the Egyptians and crossed the Suez Canal. Ultimately, the Americans and Soviets prevailed upon the parties to cease the hostilities, but Israel had come perilously close to cataclysmic defeat. THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION focuses on many of the participants in the Yom Kippur War. Blum has interviewed hundreds of the participants and presents the story of the conflict in an easily readable narrative. This is not dry history loaded with footnotes and source material. The Six Day War of 1967 changed the balance of power in the Middle East. The Yom Kippur War tilted that balance back towards level. Those wars were actually battles in what has become a 35-year war that continues to be fought to this day. For those people who wish to better understand the ongoing struggle, Blum's book is mandatory reading. --- Reviewed by Stuart Shiffman
Rating:
Summary: Riveting Exposition of Progress of Yom Kippur War!
Review: This absorbing new book deftly employs the prosaic tools of journalism to approach the subject of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Given the fact the war was one almost lost by the Israelis before they narrowly turned the tide, the riveting story-telling techniques used by author Howard Blum adds to the quality and drama of the unfolding events that fateful October. According to the author, even more than the six-day war in 1967 in which the Israelis made a preemptive strike against the forces arrayed around them to rewrite the maps and borders of the Middle East, this was a fateful struggle that created the perspective and defensive tactics that the Israelis have used to combat their enemies in the decades since. Blum uses a variety of materials and documents to inform his history of the conflict; availing himself of newly released documents, a growing collection of memoirs and personal accounts, and by painstakingly squaring off with some provocative and quite insightful questions for the more than 200 interviewees he spent hundreds of hours with; the answers he derives leads him in unsuspected directions, and offers the reader an opportunity to understand the conflict as an unqualified disaster for everyone involved, Israeli and Arab alike. Furthermore, by inquiring as to how it was that Israel allowed itself to be so surprised and so unprepared for the onslaught of the invading Arab forces, and how it was the attack that was driving so forcefully into the heart of the country was finally slowed and turned around. One fascinating and quite controversial aspect to the book is its reputed discovery of an Egyptian double agent who had successfully won the trust of the Israeli intelligence community and then subsequently gulled the top-level Israeli military leaders into believing that no attack was possible unless and until the several Arab states coalesced into a unified coalition, even while another Egyptian high in his country's planning prepared a scenario designed to play to the Israeli's strengths and use them against them to draw them out into dangerous territory and then counterattack again and again, bleeding the Israeli forces into defeat. To the extent it is true, it worked quite well, with the feckless Israeli Defense Forces flailing about ineffectually, losing large numbers of men, planes, and tanks in the first fateful 72 hours. So bad was the loss of men and equipment that the Israelis asked for and were given dozens of U.S F-4s, which were flown to Israel so urgently that many of them still carried USAF markings and insignia. One point to ponder is the degree to which this supreme fighting force was caught unaware, given the fact of just how close Israel came to total defeat in the autumn war. Blum provides the reader with a stirring and unforgettable description of the war and its progress, and in doing so provides the reader with a much more complete picture of Israel's precarious position, an historical fact that should serve to remind us as to why Israel's "obsession" with security is not necessarily the result of a siege mentality. This is truly a great read; enjoy!
Rating:
Summary: Excellent History On The Yom Kippur War!
Review: This book by Howard Blum gives you an excellent insight on the Yom Kippur War.Blum reports that Israel was totally misled by a secret source named the In-Law.The In-Law misled the Israelis
into being totally unprepared for the invasion by the armies of Egypt and Syria.Blum also details how the Israeli leadership
ignored several warning signs that they were about to be the
focus of a large scale invasion.This book also details how close Egypt and Syria came to defeating Israel.Blum also tells how
critical blunders by the invading forces cost them the war and allowed Israel victory.This book proved to be an excellent coverage of the Yom Kippur War.I had previously read the "Brigade" and "Wanted,The Search For Nazis in America".These were outstanding books as well. Read this book. It is very good.
Rating: 
Summary: On the front lines
Review: This book is a compelling look at the Yom Kippur War of 1973. It is at its best when it shares the stories of soldiers fighting at the front and when it relays the thoughts of the Egyptian military commander. One gets a feeling for the brutality of combat, as well as the chaos and relentlessness of it all. As it gets further from the action, it gets weaker - Golda Meir and Anwar Sadat never move to the forefront of the story. The U.S. airlift isn't mentioned at all, nor the U.S.-Soviet brinksmanship that threatened to make this a world war. In my mind, the book lacks context because of these omissions.
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