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Rating: 
Summary: One part qualified success, one part total failure.
Review: The aims of this book are: (1) to establish and defend Thomistic substance dualism as a viable view of what we are most fundamentally; and (2) to show that Thomistic substance dualism entails various (conservative) conclusions about medical technologies such as abortion, cloning, and euthanasia. The first part of the book, written by Moreland, pursues the first aim, and is a qualified success. Moreland argues that Thomistic dualism best accounts for our intuitions concerning free agency, the unity of consciousness, personal identity, the conceivability of disembodied existence, and so on. Some of the issues here are indeed difficult for non-dualists. Of course, they are difficult issues for dualists as well; and the inference (which Moreland at times seems to make) from "this is a difficult problem for materialists" to "therefore dualism is the right answer" is not only plainly invalid, but is all the more shaky when the postulated solution is a doctrine as obscure as Thomistic dualism. Moreland also fails to explain how an immaterial substance, the soul, can bring about extensive physical effects (as he claims it can--for example, during embryological development); and he fails to explain how Thomistic dualism can predict or account for the extensive and striking correlations between mental states and brain states (Moreland simply *asserts* that these correlations are to be expected on Thomistic dualism, without explaining *why* they are to be expected). Consequently, Thomistic dualism ends up looking very much less attractive than, say, William Hasker's "emergent dualism", on which mind-world interaction and mind-brain correlations are a lot less mysterious (because the mind, on Hasker's view, emerges from the states and operations of the brain). Still, if only because the issues here are difficult and because all the postulated solutions to the mind-body problem appear to have reasonable objections to them, this first part of the book is at least not a total failure. The same cannot be said, however, for the second part, written by Rae and pursuing the second aim mentioned above. Taking the first part of the book to have established that zygotes, embryos and foetuses are "persons" from conception onwards (where "person", following Boethius, was defined in the first part of the book to be "an individual substance with a rational nature"), Rae argues that important conclusions follow for medical ethics. For example, Judith Thomson aside, the pro-choice position on abortion is generally defended by appeal to the claim that zygotes, embryos and foetuses are not "persons". Since it was established in the first part of the book, Rae says, that zygotes, embryos and foetuses *are* "persons", therefore the pro-choice position is undermined and abortion is morally wrong. Similarly for cloning, euthanasia, and so on. Nice try, but it's a fallacy of equivocation. What the first part of the book argued was that foetuses are "persons" in the sense there defined, namely, "individual substances with a rational nature". In sharp contrast, what is at stake in debates over abortion and the like is whether foetuses are "persons" in quite a separate sense, namely, "individuals *with a right to life*". To argue, as Rae does, that foetuses are "persons" in the first sense and must therefore have a right to life is to equivocate between these two senses of the term "person". Put another way, from the (alleged) fact that foetuses are "persons" in the sense of being individual substances with a rational nature, it *simply does not follow* that foetuses are "persons" in the sense of having a right to life. This equivocation fallacy--I kid you not--pervades Rae's discussion of *every single issue* in the second part of the book, and renders practically all his conclusions unsupported. The second part of the book is therefore a total failure: it fails to show that any *mildly interesting* ethical conclusions, let alone any *important* ones, can be derived from Thomistic substance dualism. Of course, those who suspect you cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" might have predicted this failure from the outset; for what are Moreland and Rae trying to do, if not to derive conclusions about what we "ought" to do (e.g., not kill foetuses) from a theory about what each of us "is" (i.e., an immaterial soul)? So then: one part qualified success, one part total failure. Result: a rather generous two stars.
Rating: 
Summary: Essential, even though the first part is a bit heady!
Review: I am a few pages shy of finishing BODY AND SOUL. Part one argues for Thomistic Substance Dualism (differentiated from Cartesian Substance Dulaism), and it's written by J.P. Moreland.
Part two takes the arguments for substance dualism and demonstrates the logical implications substance dualism has regarding abortion, euthanasia, human cloning, etc. The book is crucially important for anyone thinking through the bioethics of these issues. As important and fascinating as the book is, there are some weakneses. The first thing that will strike the reader is that part one (Moreland) is far more difficult reading than part two (Rae). Basically, part one assumes a more advanced philosophical background of the reader. This is not to say that a reasonably intelligent person with little background in philosophy cannot benefit, but it will take some work, re-reading certain paragraphs a few times, etc. I think it would be a worthwhile assignment for Mr. Moreland to rewrite part one to get the hay down out of the loft, so us cows can get to it:-) Part one would also flow better into part two as a result. It's interesting to note that Moreland, in a lecture I attended, did lay out the basic themes of the book in more user friendly language. I think his position is well articulated in the book, book it would be of greater benefit to many more if he would put out a version more like his lecture. By the way, here is a VERY important piece of advice: The average reader will follow Moreland's reasoning MUCH better if you get a hold of his lectures on the same subject, or at least get a copy of a taped radio program in which he discussed the book (The web site for STAND TO REASON). Just about anyone who is reasonably intelligent can follow part two of BODY AND SOUL more easily--FAR more easily. In part two, Rae does a good job of laying out conservative bioethics. But the arguments that are the crucial background to Rae's bioethics are, again, found in part one which is, in many respects, the most important part of the book since so much in bioethics stands or falls on the substance dualism articulated therein. A few crucially important premises put forth by Moreland in BODY AND SOUL: The soul is the "driver" behind the DNA of a person. As I understand Moreland, this explains the apparent teleological purposing end for which the DNA strives. This "driver" soul makes more sense than a purposeless physicalism. The brain/soul relation (the most fascinating aspect of the whole debate) is not problematic when properly understood. The effects of alzheimers/brain damage, etc., does not rule out the immaterial soul. The soul affects the body (Worry, thoughts, etc., which by definition are immaterial, affect physical health), just as much as the body affects the soul (brain damage affecting behavior, etc). For instance, a car needs a properly functioning driver, as much as a driver needs a properly functioning car. Either can be damaged and affect the other. A purely physicalist view of man cannot satisfactorily account for immaterial thoughts, feelings, etc., the way that substance dualism can. On this point Moreland provides a strong criticism of physicalist emergent properties. Moreland believes that animals have souls, which is to say an immaterial reasoning self, but these souls are not necessarily immortal, and they are inferior to human souls. For instance, Animals think, but they don't think about thinking--philosophizing, as man does. Moreland makes the important observation that Christians should not argue against animals having souls lest they inadvertantly (and wrongly) argue that a thinking animal need only be physical--the very physicalism that atheists often employ! BODY AND SOUL is a crucial book because it will affect your views on many crucial questions. If you are someone who wants to advance in knowledge and challenge yourself in the logic of human nature and the implications which follow, BODY AND SOUL is a good start.
Rating: 
Summary: A Good Introduction to Thomistic Dualism
Review: I first came in contact with this work as I was preparing a response/critique to James P. Moreland's chapter in _The New Mormon Challenge_ (titled "The Absurdities of Mormon Materialism"). It was suggested to me by one of Moreland's friends and associates, Carl Mosser, as a good introduction to Thomistic dualism (as opposed to the better-known Cartesian dualism). I am now thankful for Carl's suggestion and this work. The Thomistic view of the soul is, in my mind, more advanced and more cogent than the Cartesian view of the soul. It differentiates between spirit/soul and mind, presenting the latter as a faculty of the soul and not it's very essence. It provides a better explanation of the mind-body (or soul-body) problem by asserting that the soul is the teleological foundation of the formation of the body (i.e., the soul directs the growth and development of the body). Further, this view emphasizes the need for a working brain that can also affect the spirit/mind for cognitive occurrences (this point is argued more vigorously in works outside of _Body and Soul_ by other authors, though Moreland hints at it in this work). The only disappointment for me was Moreland's insistence on critiquing the reductionistic class of materialism. For me, personally, the reductionists have too many theoretical problems to be a viable solution. I would have enjoyed a further critique of the emergent view of mind that is quickly becoming more prominent in scientific circles (Robert Nadeau, one of the reductionists that Moreland cites, has altered his conceptions towards this view; see _The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters of the Mind_). Further, I wish Moreland (or anyone for that matter) would recognize panexperientialism as given by David Ray Griffin as a viable alternative to the dualist and physicalist perspectives (see Griffin's _Archetypal Process_ and _Unsnarling the World-Knot_; this is unlikely, even now, since process thought stands under very different metaphysical paradigms, immediately placing itself at odds with much philosophical thought in the last millennia). If anyone has any references of people who have referenced and critiqued this view I would be very appreciative (I can't give money, but my thanks will be sincere). In line with the above: even though I am not a reductionist I still found some of Moreland's critiques unconvincing (this could be because I was reading my emergent/panexperientialist views into the reductionists' words). This does not mean that they are ineffective, only that I do not believe they hold the logical force that Moreland believes they do. One of the weaknesses of Moreland's words (at least in my opinion) is his bolstering of his own view as nearly impenetrable (he does make admissions, but they are few and not very pronounced) and the view of the materialists as fraught with problems. Both sides have difficulties that they must deal with, some which (admitted by some on both sides) may be unsolvable. Ultimately we probably could say, "Choose your poison." Overall, I believe this is a wonderful book. I believe that Thomistic dualism is a vast improvement from Cartesian dualism and should be the focus of non-Christian critiques of dualism (and treated with more respect than many, unfortunately, are willing to give to Cartesian dualism). Kevin Winters P.S. This review comes strictly from reading Moreland's section of the book. Honestly, I cannot say anything, one way or another, on Rae's section.
Rating:
Summary: Exellent Understanding of Thomistic Substance Dualism
Review: I received this book from my girlfriend to better understand Christian rational for the existence of a `soul' in human beings. In `Body & Soul' J.P. Moreland does a wonderful job explaining the body as a substance versus a property thing. The book is divided into 2 Parts. The first part of the book (about 2/3rds of the actual text) basically goes through the theoretical/metaphysical/scientific explanations for determining `personhood'. In the last third of the book (Part 2), Moreland delves into current ethical issues that play a role in a person's view of `personhood' whether they follow a substance dualist position or a physicalists/genetic determinist position. I found this area of the book to be the most likeable for those that aren't used to the university level writing - with every other word either being an `ism' or an `ology'. I didn't have a problem with this, but I can certainly see people whom may not have such an extensive vocabulary may find Part 1 difficult to read. But really, the only difficulties I can see, would be to understand what all the `isms' and ology's really are - so it would be extremely useful to keep a dictionary hand and write down the definitions for the various terminologies once an uncertain word first appears. Being a human geography student, I am quite familiar with this technical writing style, and I think by following the above is the best way to get the most out of this book.
Moreland definitely deserves credit for his extensive research in this book. A lot of references and endnotes further explaining and elaborating on key areas were very useful to me. Moreland obviously has a lot of respect for his counterparts in what is seemed as a fragile and tense area of ethics. He includes numerous citations by popular feminists, ethicists, scientists and philosophers alike that clearly reject Moreland's view of person as a substance thing. I found that the majority of the book tends to view the definition of a human `person' as a dichotomy between:
1. `Self' as Body/Genes (Physicalism/Genetic Determinism and Reductionism)
2. `Self' as Immaterial Soul (Substance Dualism)
Though I find nothing wrong with his understandings and realizations for such a structure of ontology, I believe Moreland left out another categorization that defines `personhood'. That being:
3. `Self as Socially Produced' (Social Constructionism)
This is the view of the person as described by Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Im a away, this view can be classified under #1 (Self and Body/Genes) because Foucault does state the `person without the body is nothing', but everywhere else he gives reason for viewing the `person' as a social construction. Although I do question many of Foucault's and Derrida's assertions, I think their view of the `person' could have been addressed in the book as well. But then again, this book was already quite thick. Maybe Moreland can go into his analysis of social constructionism in another future book. (I did find Moreland went into a bit of social constructionism in chapter 9 (Genetic Technologies and Human Cloning).
Overall, I think this book was an amazing read. Some of his insights really challenged my conventional understandings of what constitutes a person, and how we being an immaterial soul really may not be that far fetched after all.
Rating:
Summary: Arguments for dualism
Review: In "Body & Soul," authors J P Moreland and Scott Rae present a spirited defense of substance dualism, a model of consciousness that has fallen out of fashion with most academic philosophers. The authors also discuss the repercussions of dualism and its primary competitor, physicalism, on ethics and free will. What are the arguments for dualism? Well, firstly, our mental states possess properties not held by our physical brains. For instance, if I close my eyes and imagine a green pasture, nothing in my physical brain turns green. Moreover, as my thought of a green pasture is not an empirical phenomenon, it cannot be verified by the methods of the hard sciences. It doesn't have an odor, a length, a height, a weight or a physical location in space. Secondly, I am in a position to know my mental life in a way not available to anyone else. I, and I alone, am privy to my mental states. A brain surgeon may know more about my physical brain and its operations than I do, but he cannot know my mental life as well as I do. He doesn't experience my fear of being operated on, or my hope that I make it through the operation alive. Furthermore, I cannot be mistaken about my mental states. If I have an experience of a grey rug, the rug itself may actually be white due to poor lighting. But I cannot be mistaken that I am experiencing what I take to be a grey rug. Thirdly, our mental states possess the property of intentionality. The intentionality of our mental states is the most powerful argument against physicalist accounts of consciousness. Our mental states possess the property of aboutness or ofness. We don't just think; we think "about" or "of" something. Our thoughts point beyond themselves to objects and things, even those that don't exist. Intentionality is troublesome for the physicalist, for how can our brain waves be "about" or "of" anything? If a neuroscientist could examine the brains of two classical music lovers, how could he tell one was thinking about the melodies of Bach and the other of Beethoven? And finally, the most interesting argument for dualism is the argument from qualia. When we see a red apple, it "looks" red. When we taste a chocolate bar, it tastes "chocolatey." When we smell a rose it smells "rosy." Philosophers call such things as the look of red, the taste of chocolate, or the smell of a rose "qualia." Moreland and Rae argue that qualia are experiences within our minds. For example, every time you place a wedge of a lemon in your mouth, you experience the sour taste of lemon qualia. This is a correlation between physical qualities and mental qualia. The physical qualities of lemons are very different in nature from the mental qualia they are correlated with. The "taste" of a lemon is not itself anything like the chemical composition of a lemon -- although it is caused by the lemon's chemical composition. Physicalism, in contrast with dualism, holds that our mental states are identical to our physical bodies. Some physicalists claim that if the mind is non-physical, it is not scientifically meaningful. But this objection fails for the simple reason that there exist many abstract objects that are non-physical. Numbers, for example, are abstract objects, having no weight, length or location in space. The numerals "5" and "V" each represent the number 5. In this case there are two numerals, but only one number -- the number 5 -- is expressed by the numerals. Also, if we are just matter, then we don't have free will. Our actions are determined by the laws of chemistry and physics, not our own human volition. A great defense of substance dualism.
Rating:
Summary: Arguments for dualism
Review: In "Body & Soul," authors J P Moreland and Scott Rae present a spirited defense of substance dualism, a model of consciousness that has fallen out of fashion with most academic philosophers. The authors also discuss the repercussions of dualism and its primary competitor, physicalism, on ethics and free will. What are the arguments for dualism? Well, firstly, our mental states possess properties not held by our physical brains. For instance, if I close my eyes and imagine a green pasture, nothing in my physical brain turns green. Moreover, as my thought of a green pasture is not an empirical phenomenon, it cannot be verified by the methods of the hard sciences. It doesn't have an odor, a length, a height, a weight or a physical location in space. Secondly, I am in a position to know my mental life in a way not available to anyone else. I, and I alone, am privy to my mental states. A brain surgeon may know more about my physical brain and its operations than I do, but he cannot know my mental life as well as I do. He doesn't experience my fear of being operated on, or my hope that I make it through the operation alive. Furthermore, I cannot be mistaken about my mental states. If I have an experience of a grey rug, the rug itself may actually be white due to poor lighting. But I cannot be mistaken that I am experiencing what I take to be a grey rug. Thirdly, our mental states possess the property of intentionality. The intentionality of our mental states is the most powerful argument against physicalist accounts of consciousness. Our mental states possess the property of aboutness or ofness. We don't just think; we think "about" or "of" something. Our thoughts point beyond themselves to objects and things, even those that don't exist. Intentionality is troublesome for the physicalist, for how can our brain waves be "about" or "of" anything? If a neuroscientist could examine the brains of two classical music lovers, how could he tell one was thinking about the melodies of Bach and the other of Beethoven? And finally, the most interesting argument for dualism is the argument from qualia. When we see a red apple, it "looks" red. When we taste a chocolate bar, it tastes "chocolatey." When we smell a rose it smells "rosy." Philosophers call such things as the look of red, the taste of chocolate, or the smell of a rose "qualia." Moreland and Rae argue that qualia are experiences within our minds. For example, every time you place a wedge of a lemon in your mouth, you experience the sour taste of lemon qualia. This is a correlation between physical qualities and mental qualia. The physical qualities of lemons are very different in nature from the mental qualia they are correlated with. The "taste" of a lemon is not itself anything like the chemical composition of a lemon -- although it is caused by the lemon's chemical composition. Physicalism, in contrast with dualism, holds that our mental states are identical to our physical bodies. Some physicalists claim that if the mind is non-physical, it is not scientifically meaningful. But this objection fails for the simple reason that there exist many abstract objects that are non-physical. Numbers, for example, are abstract objects, having no weight, length or location in space. The numerals "5" and "V" each represent the number 5. In this case there are two numerals, but only one number -- the number 5 -- is expressed by the numerals. Also, if we are just matter, then we don't have free will. Our actions are determined by the laws of chemistry and physics, not our own human volition. A great defense of substance dualism.
Rating:
Summary: A highly philosphical defense of substance dualism
Review: This is a great book for those who are well-versed in philosophy. The book's target audience is expected to have a good grasp of issues pertinent to philosophical discussions. Those without this background may feel overwhelmed by the first half of this book where the authors lay out their argument for the existence of the human soul. Their arguments are highly technical and are thoroughly elaborated. So what is the main thesis of this book? Moreland and Rae argue for "substance dualism". Substance dualism is the belief that humans possess both a material substance and an immateral substance. The first half of the book covers their argument for dualism and is more philosophically technical. Once the authors establish their view of humans, they spend the second half explaining how their view relates to current bioethical issues such as abortion, cloning, genetic engineering, and euthanasia. Having already believed in substance dualism, I found the second half to be more informative. Moreland and Rae argue convincingly for the view that all humans are persons from the time of conception until death, and that as persons our most fundamental right is the right to life. Those with an interest in bioethics need to hear what these thinkers have to say.
Rating:
Summary: Bravo! The existence of the soul defended!
Review: This is one of the more difficult books that I have read recently. Sections of the book can be difficult and require focus; this is NOT beach reading. The authors' intended audience: "We have chosen to write the book at what we consider to be a fairly high academic level because we are convinced the view of a human person we affirm must be articulated and defended at that level for it to gain a hearing both within the Christian community and in the secular academic setting. Still, we hope a nonspecialist will be able to gain much from the pages that follow." (page 14) There are one or two sections in the book that defend the existence of an immaterial soul from the Bible (against those Christian thinkers who deny it) however; this book is not primarily an explanation/analysis of Scripture. As the authors themselves state, 'In this work we have attempted to make a case for the view of a human person that is both consistent with biblical teaching and that makes philosophical sense.' (page 343) To skeptics of the existence of the soul, to those who would argue that science has rendered the concept false, to those who argue that the concept of the immaterial soul is a foreign Greek concept that has nothing to do with the Bible, read this book. Moreland and Rae present a very strong case for the soul (their particular version of this: Thomistic substance dualism), they refute or significantly weaken most of the commonly offered critiques of their view and refute or critique the views that compete against theirs. There are 521 footnotes spread over 345 pages of text; averaging roughly 50 footnotes per chapter. I really liked this aspect of the book; the authors would frequently refer to other relevant literature and refer the reader to investigate it if interested. The book is divided into two sections: Part 1: Metaphysical Reflections on Human Personhood (about 66% of the book)
Part 2: Ethical Reflections on Human Personhood The Chapters:
1. Establishing a Framework for Approaching Human Personhood
2. Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things
3. Human Persons in Naturalistic & Complementarian Perspectives
4. Substance Dualism & the Human Person: Free Agency
5. Substance Dualism & the Human Person: Personal Identity
6. Substance Dualism & the Body: Heredity, DNA & the Soul 7. The Moral & Metaphysical Status of the Unborn: Abortion & Fetal Research
8. Reproductive Technologies in Substance-Dualist Perspective
9. Genetic Technologies & Human Cloning
10. Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide & the Care of Persons at the End of Life Chapters 1-3 lay out all the necessary philosophical distinctions (this section is probably the most difficult to follow, but it is worth it. Many of the concepts used here come up again and again later in the book) to discuss personhood. The relevant philosophical options of personhood are laid out and explained Chapters 4-5 constitute a defense of the substance dualism view; which basically says that in addition to physical bodies, human beings have a non-physical essence (i.e. soul). Chapter 4 argues that only substance dualism can make sense of the reality of human free will. Chapter 5 argues that the fact that you are the same person at ages 3, 10, 30, and 50 (this is the briefest way to attempt to explain their arguments) is only adequately explained by substance dualism. Taken together, the authors argue that only substance dualism can make sense of the moral and legal responsibility that we intuitively know we have. Chapter 5 discusses the relationship of the soul to the body, specifically DNA. The authors persuasively argue that personhood is NOT reducible to DNA or the body; the authors discuss the Human Genome Project and other relevant scientific discoveries and experiments. The Ethical Reflections section shows the implications of concluding that substance dualism is true. It is shown that many debates (especially abortion) surrounding life and death issues are, at their most basic level, based on one�s view of personhood. My only disappointment was that the authors did not discuss how the view that the soul does not exist developed, who the originators of the idea were, the relevant philosophical ideas that led to this conclusion; basically some historical background would have been helpful. All in all, this is a difficult book but it will improve and clarify your thinking not just in metaphysics but also in the raging moral debates of the 21st century.
Rating:
Summary: Scholarly
Review: Throughout Human History most people have believed that we are both physical and spiritual beings, that in fact the immaterial part of us can live on even when separated from our bodies by death. The rise of science, however, has called into question the existence of the soul. Concurrent with the demise of dualism has been the rise of advanced medical technologies that have brought to the fore difficult issues at both edges of life.
In this careful and thoughtful treatment J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae argue that the rise of these problems alongside the demise of Christian dualism is no coincidence. They therefore employ a theological realism to meet these pressing issues and to present a reasonable and biblically accurate depiction of human nature.
Rating:
Summary: Naturalists beware!
Review: You don't need an advanced degree in philosophy to understand this book, but it would help. Moreland and Rae give a very good defense of substance dualism (the view that human persons are essentially immaterial souls, not just physical bodies) and address some very important ethicalissues. ...
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