Rating: 
Summary: Interesting Story, Not Great Writing
Review: * On 2:00 PM on 6 October 1973, the day of Yom Kippur, a
massive Egyptian barrage fell on Israeli outposts in the
Sinai as a prelude to an attack that sent the Israelis back
in disorder. In a near simultaneous thrust, in the northeast
of Israel, Syrian forces drove against the Israelis with
considerable initial success.Encouraged by their victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, the
Israelis became complacent, believing that their Arab enemies
were inherently inept and cowardly. As a result, Israel was
complacent while Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who had
succeeded Abdel Gamal Nasser on Nasser's death in 1970, pushed
through a meticulously planned limited military offensive,
setting up an umbrella of surface to air missiles to negate
Israeli air power and having infantry trained in tactics to
take on and defeat Israeli armor with anti-tank missiles. Sadat did his planning in secret, even misleading Egypt's
military patron, the Soviet Union. At the outset, the plan
worked perfectly, giving the Israelis a humiliating defeat
and placing the existence of Israel at risk. The Israelis
rallied, however, with a monster American airlift,
codenamed NICKEL GRASS, shuttling huge amounts of ammunition
and equipment to support a counteroffensive that turned the
tables back on the Egyptians and Syrians. By the time the fighting had sputtered out on 25 October 1973,
the status quo in the MidEast had shifted. US Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, operating with an unusual level of
empowerment as President Richard Nixon was effectively all but
out of commission due to the Watergate scandal, was able to
take considerable control of events, with the ultimate result
of turning Egypt into a US ally and creating a peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel. Egyptians felt they had won the war, and in many ways they
had, proving that Arabs were not all pushovers and providing
negotiating leverage against the Israelis. That had been Sadat's goals in the conflict, and he succeeded in them.
The Soviet Union was the big loser, reduced to standing on
the sidelines while Sadat manipulated them and Kissinger
outmaneuvered them, with Kissinger even intimating the USSR
by placing American forces on a DEFCON III nuclear alert for
a time. * The story of the October War is very interesting and that
makes THE 2:00 WAR a worthwhile read. However, while the
story is interesting, the same cannot be said for the
writing in this book, which is mediocre at best. Although
Mr. Boyne did considerable homework on THE 2:00 WAR, this
is not a scholarly book. That's fine in itself -- scholarly
books are valuable but a reader may not want or need to
have everything explained in excruciating detail -- but THE
2:00 WAR suffers from being too detailed to be a very clean
popular work on the subject without being detailed enough
to be a major work. Although I confess this is a bit of a nitpick, Mr. Boyne also
has a tendency to use what I call "Cosellisms", in honor of
the late great sportscaster Howard Cosell who used to go through
the dictionary to find unusual words to spice up his broadcasts.
Mr. Boyne has the tendency to use words and turns of phrase of
the sort that would sound laughable in ordinary conversation
(does anybody actually say that someone talks in "dulcet tones"?)
This is the sort of thing that an editor should catch, but
apparently the editors were asleep at the wheel. There's also a certain ham-fistedness, the most blatant being
stating as a fact that the Israeli attack on the US Navy spy
ship LIBERTY during the Six-Day War was deliberate. The actual
details of the case are highly arguable: saying it *may* have
been deliberate is one thing, insisting that it *was* deliberate
is not credible. I had to laugh at that, though, since Mr. Boyne
is a retired Air Force colonel, and as a ex-enlisted man myself
I had to think that we have very different views on just what
kind of ghastly dumb blunders a military organization is capable
of. I will still conclude that this is a worthwhile book. However,
I will probably end up outlining it for my files and then
donate it to the local library.
Rating: 
Summary: Objective look
Review: A very informed look at the Yom Kippur War, with brand new information on the manner in which the American airlift saved Israel from defeat and the world from a possible nuclear exchange. One of the most interesting facets is how the leaders of every country were almost always wrong, while the troops in the field, Arab and Israeli alike, did a magnificent job, and none more so than the American aircrews flying the C-5s and C-141s.
Rating: 
Summary: Interesting/But Inartfully Edited
Review: I bet this book was written under the working title "Operation Nickel Grass," the name of the American military operation to airlift supplies to Israel which arose virtually miraculously. Boyne describes this operation, which had to deliver goods "yesterday," very well and it made me, as an American, very proud. The vast majority of the book is about the rest of the Yom Kippur War and what led up to it; thus, I suspect, the title change. Boyne succeeds in presenting a very complex story, including explanations of Soviet instigations and diplomatic failures, and Henry Kissinger's diplomatic successes (both foreign and domestic). But the editing is a grave disappointment. A summary 25 year history of the region prior to the Yom Kippur war is placed as an appendix at the back of the book rather than as a prologue at the beginning, where the history belongs. Moshe Dayan, famous for having only ONE eye and a patch where his other eye had been, is described as having, during a perilous period, downcast "eyes." On one page a date about 2300 years ago is described as "B.C.E." (which means "before the common era" and is used by people who do not ascribe to the divinity of Jesus), while another date about 1950 years ago is described as "A.D." (which is Latin for "year of our Lord"); whereas "C.E." ("common era") is what is consistent with the use of B.C.E. Like many books about wars and battles, this book does not have nearly enough maps. Worst of all, the maps are positioned in all the wrong places. For example, a map showing Syrian thrusts at the very beginning of the war is placed near the end of book where the winding down of the war is described. So, I recommend the book, but keep in mind the editorial foul-ups.
Rating:
Summary: APPRAISAL OF "THE TWO O'CLOCK WAR"
Review: I HAVE JUST FINISHED READING THE BOOK "THE TWO O'CLOCK WAR" AND I
FOUND IT TO BE BRILLIANTLY WRITTEN. I AM AN AMATEUR HISTORIAN
(STRESS ON AMATEUR). ALTHOUGH I KNEW THE HISTORICAL OUTCOME, THE
WRITING STYLE IS SO EXCITING THAT I COULD NOT PUT THE BOOK DOWN.
THE CORE THEME IS ABOUT THE USA TO ISRAEL AIRLIFT, BUT THE
OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS WAR (POLITICAL,HISTORICAL,TECHNICAL,
PERSONALITIES) ARE QUITE THOROUGHLY TREATED ---WITH GOOD INSIGHT,
AND EVEN A BIT OF DRY HUMOR. WELL DONE!
Rating:
Summary: APPRAISAL OF "THE TWO O'CLOCK WAR"
Review: I HAVE JUST FINISHED READING THE BOOK "THE TWO O'CLOCK WAR" AND I
FOUND IT TO BE BRILLIANTLY WRITTEN. I AM AN AMATEUR HISTORIAN
(STRESS ON AMATEUR). ALTHOUGH I KNEW THE HISTORICAL OUTCOME, THE
WRITING STYLE IS SO EXCITING THAT I COULD NOT PUT THE BOOK DOWN.
THE CORE THEME IS ABOUT THE USA TO ISRAEL AIRLIFT, BUT THE
OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS WAR (POLITICAL,HISTORICAL,TECHNICAL,
PERSONALITIES) ARE QUITE THOROUGHLY TREATED ---WITH GOOD INSIGHT,
AND EVEN A BIT OF DRY HUMOR. WELL DONE!
Rating:
Summary: Enjoyable but Lightweight
Review: I read this book right after Oren's "6 Day War", which was spectacular in its coverage of the 1967 conflict, so much of this might be clouded by that juxtaposition. This book was an easy read but there were a couple of things that left me wanting more. One minor but annoying aspect was that there was a serious lack of maps (and lack of detail on the maps that did exist). I'm not a historian, so when the author spends 3 pages detailing an offensive designed to take or defend a certain town or area, I'd like to see a map with that town on it. Also, it would be nice to have an index of maps so I don't have to flip pages looking for them. These concerns are minor, of course. The author's coverage of the imminence of nuclear war became almost comical. I counted at least 10 times he wrote that a certain event "would lead the world to the brink of nuclear conflict" or something very similar, in very dramatic fashion. Then he devoted no more than 3 pages to the actual nuclear standoff in such a passing fashion that I found it hard to believe that was all there was to it. To me, the nuclear threat is one of the more interesting aspects to this war, and it became filler. The only other criticism I would offer is that the book does not do a comprehensive job of detailing the end of the war or the aftermath, both of which are critical to understanding why that region is the way it is today. He does spend a considerable number of pages describing the Israeli defiance of the cease-fire, but not nearly enough time discussing how Kissenger finally got them to recognize it. These are all minor criticisms of a book that's certainly worth the read. I was concerned that too much attention was going to be paid to the airlift itself, but thankfully this was nicely balanced.
Rating:
Summary: Enjoyable but Lightweight
Review: I read this book right after Oren's "6 Day War", which was spectacular in its coverage of the 1967 conflict, so much of this might be clouded by that juxtaposition. This book was an easy read but there were a couple of things that left me wanting more. One minor but annoying aspect was that there was a serious lack of maps (and lack of detail on the maps that did exist). I'm not a historian, so when the author spends 3 pages detailing an offensive designed to take or defend a certain town or area, I'd like to see a map with that town on it. Also, it would be nice to have an index of maps so I don't have to flip pages looking for them. These concerns are minor, of course. The author's coverage of the imminence of nuclear war became almost comical. I counted at least 10 times he wrote that a certain event "would lead the world to the brink of nuclear conflict" or something very similar, in very dramatic fashion. Then he devoted no more than 3 pages to the actual nuclear standoff in such a passing fashion that I found it hard to believe that was all there was to it. To me, the nuclear threat is one of the more interesting aspects to this war, and it became filler. The only other criticism I would offer is that the book does not do a comprehensive job of detailing the end of the war or the aftermath, both of which are critical to understanding why that region is the way it is today. He does spend a considerable number of pages describing the Israeli defiance of the cease-fire, but not nearly enough time discussing how Kissenger finally got them to recognize it. These are all minor criticisms of a book that's certainly worth the read. I was concerned that too much attention was going to be paid to the airlift itself, but thankfully this was nicely balanced.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting
Review: It is quite a reasonable study of the war together with a fasinating discussion on the airlift.
Overall, I found the work needs more work. If not for the airlift, Israel would not have perished. Both the Egyptains and Syrians were held before it started. If they had not stopped them then Israel would have had to turn to a nuclear defence.
What it did do was allow Israel to inflict a major defeat on the Arab armies!
Rating:
Summary: How Close We Came
Review: Retired Air Force Colonel Walter Boyne's book on the 1973 October War reveals much new information. Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that the world came to the brink of nuclear war, not once, but twice during the conflict. Boyne begins by exploring how Israel was ill-prepared for the well-planned and well-executed Arab surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish year. Following the stunning initial gains by the Egyptians in the Sinai, and the Syrians in the Golan, Israeli political leaders began to discuss what was known as the "Sampson Option." That is, if Israel were going to be destroyed, it was going to take down its enemies with it. Israel had no way of knowing that it was not the Arab goal to destroy the state. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's aim was simply to capture territory on the east bank of the Suez Canal, an objective he achieved in three days. Meanwhile, the Syrians had also made impressive gains, but failed to press their advantage, for reasons that are unclear. This, coupled with the Egyptian army's halt in the Sinai allowed Israel to regroup and press the offensive in the North. Egypt foolishly decided to press to the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai, and its armor was torn to shreds in the largest tank battles since World War Two. The war may have shifted to Israel's advantage, but supplies were running critically low, with only a few days' worth of ammunition left. The US, led by Henry Kissinger, decided to airlift supplies into Israel, allowing Israel to continue its offensive operations, crossing the Suez Canal, and choking off the Egyptian forces, while pushing back the Syrians, along with their Iraqi and Jordanian allies. Yet the massive airlift barely was able to begin, since no European country would allow the US an airbase to transfer its supplies, fearing the wrath of the Arab oil weapon. Finally, Portugal, in need of arms for its own wars, allowed the US a base in the Atlantic. The airlift was on, and it landed a huge number of supplies in a round-the-clock effort. With Israel advancing, the Soviets proposed inserting a unilateral Soviet force in the region, leading the US to place its armed forces on high alert, known as Def Con 3. The panicked Soviets quickly backed down from their demands, but nuclear tensions reached their highest point in years. Boyne's own Air Force background shines in his explanation of all events related to the air war and the airlift; he also has an impressive understanding of events in the diplomatic arena. Overall, this an excellent book, well-written, impeccably researched, and a gripping read.
Rating:
Summary: How Close We Came
Review: Retired Air Force Colonel Walter Boyne's book on the 1973 War reveals much new information. Perhaps the most important of which is the fact that the world came to the brink of nuclear war not once but twice during the conflict. Boyne begins by exploring how Israel was ill-prepared for the well-planned and well-executed Arab surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish year. Following the stunning initial gains by the Egyptians in the Sinai, and the Syrians in the Golan, Israeli political leaders began to discuss what was known as the "Sampson Option." That is, if Israel was going to be destroyed, it was going to take down its enemies with it. Israel had no way of knowing that it was not the Arab goal to destroy the state. Sadat's aim was simply to capture territory on the east bank of the Suez Canal, an objective he achieved in three days. Meanwhile, the Syrians had also made impressive gains, but failed to press their advantage, for reasons that are unclear. This, coupled with the Egyptian army's halt in the Sinai allowed Israel to regroup and press the offensive in the North. Egypt foolishly decided to press to the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai, and its armor was torn to shreds in the largest tank battles since World War Two. The war may have shifted to Israel's advantage, but supplies were running critically low, with only a few days ammunition left. The US, led by Henry Kissinger, decided to airlift supplies into Israel, allowing Israel to continue its offensive operations, crossing the Suez Canal, and choking off the Egyptian forces, while pushing back the Syrians, along with their Iraqi and Jordanian allies. Yet the massive airlift barely was able to begin, since no European country would allow the US an airbase to transfer its supplies, fearing the wrath of the Arab oil weapon. Finally, Portugal, in need of arms for its own wars, allowed the US a base in the Atlantic. The airlift was on, and it landed a huge number of supplies in a round the clock effort. With Israel advancing, the Soviets advocated inserting a unilateral force in the region, leading the US to place its armed forces on high alert, known as Def Con 3. The panicked Soviets quickly backed down from their demands, but nuclear tensions reached their highest point in years. Boyne's own Air Force background shines in his explanation of all events related to the air war and the airlift; He also has an impressive understanding of events in the diplomatic arena. Overall, this an excellent book, well-written impeccably researched, and a gripping read.
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