Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Suny Series in Philosophy)

Rating:
Summary: Is the Basic Premise really his own?
Review: A question to you all.

Isn't Wit's basic premise about language and truth just a slant on Sausseurian linguistics with lots of blather and a critique of his (Wit's) prior incarnation in the Tractatus? (the tractatus being the single most pseudo and naive work in the history of phi in my opinion and Wit's first book.)

Rating:
Summary: not very good
Review: I bought this book on the strength of Cora Diamond's blurb on the back cover. I was very disappointed. Especially in his discussion of rule following, Brenner does not so much explain the relevant ideas as he paraphrases them. (An example: in his discussion of sections 206-223, Brenner imagines someone asking "suppose different people respond in diffferent ways to the same order. Who is right?" He answers, "if there is an established practice among these people then the right way will mean the customary way." The answer is a direct paraphrase of the text around section 201. But simply paraphrasing or extracting from the text gets us nowhere. If you already understand Wittgenstein, you will understand this remark. If not you won't. Either way, it won't much help.) Brenner's discussion of the private language argument is better. But there's still _much_ better expository material available.

Rating:
Summary: A Voice Crying in the Wilderness
Review: You have heard it said that all philosophical arguments are nothing more than arguments about words. This was Wittgenstein's premise. He believed that the perfect definition was nothing more than a philosophical mirage. More importantly there is the hint of an ethical premise in The Investigations. The hint lies in the most misunderstood of all philosophical remarks: the "forms of life." Interpreted in more ways than you can fill out a lottery card, Wittgenstein insinuated that how you live your life is the most important of all philosophical statements you will ever make. He also insinuated that not all meaning was tied up in language, texts and signs. Both insinuations are as heretical now as they were then. Still today we find ourselves slidding on the "icey logic of language."