Decision Making for Technology Executives: Using Multiple Perspectives to Improve Performance (Artech House Technology Management and Professional Development Library)

Rating:
Summary: Real-reality has many aspects
Review: Formerly a professor of Systems Science at Portland State University, Linstone has written and/or co-authored several works on related topics such as social implications of technological developments. His 20 years of experience in the aircraft industry at Hughs and Lockheed further certify his credentials as an expert in systems analysis and operations management.

In his latest book, reviewed presently, Linstone describes three perspectives from which socio-technical systems may be viewed. Not merely mathematical formulae or computer models, these perspectives encompass particular sensitivities on the part of the individual or group that's conducting a critical analysis of a system, corporation, decision or other entity that's appropriately subjected to such scrutiny. The technical perspective (T) sees organizations as hierarchical structures, modeled using principles from system dynamics, to which decision analysis and other tools of management science may be applied. By contrast the organizational perspective (O) considers the strength of an organization relative to competitors. Effectiveness of an organization's leadership and the structure of its corporate chart are the main concerns of the O perspective. The third perspective, personal (P) focuses on those concerns that relate more directly to individuals. Job security and opportunities to advance with the organization are the domain of the P perspective.

That each of the three perspectives yields insights about a system that are generally not obtainable with the others is a central theme of Linstone's book. He persuasively shows that the integration of insights from the three perspectives reveals a system whose whole is more than the sum of the parts, just as one cannot appreciate the overall expanse of a three dimensional body from any one of the 2-D representations.

The following chapter-by-chapter summary serves as a detailed overview of Linstone's important work.

Chapter 1 introduces the main topics of the book. Here, the reader learns of how the author's experience in the aircraft industry and at a nonprofit (RAND) helped shape his views on systems analysis and decision making. Linstone first presents his case for multi-perspective organizational analysis in this chapter. That there is more than one way of looking at a system and that "each yields insights about it that are not obtainable from the others" is demonstrated via presentation of several systems and situations from varied disciplines. This point is made repeatedly and convincingly over the course of the book.

Chapter 2, entitled "The Usual Perspective and Its Limitations" demonstrates that the pervasive "problem-solution" view. It is an outdated approach that simplistically maintains that even complex problems have only one "best" solution and fails to consider that technological "solutions" tend to create new, unforeseen problems -- does not effectively address real-world complex problems, which only by exception are amenable to linear programming techniques. Further, "ignoring the individual" or (equivalently) "losing him in the aggregate view", so as to simplify problems may serve to exacerbate the problem of interest or cause new problems altogether. Similarly, the interaction of society and technology - obvious in the contemporary world where e-mail has supplanted "conventional" voice and written communication - has been largely ignored in the past with unfavorable circumstances.

In Chapter 3 ("Our Proposed Perspectives"), Linstone formally offers his interdependent perspectives for viewing organizations. Filtered through the lenses of technical, organizational and personal perspectives, the inherent complexity of systems and decisions worthy of consideration may be fully appreciated. The major characteristics of each perspective are succinctly tabulated in this chapter (Table 1, p.52), along the dimensions of "worldview" ("science-technology" for T), "system focus" ("social" for O), "ethical basis" ("morality, personal ethics" for P) along with other descriptors. Finally, this chapter shows how the integration of input from various perspectives gives rise to a cohesive view and how the perspectives may be cross-linked to yield further insights.

Chapter 4 considers applications of T-O-P to the public sector. Instructive examples are drawn from W.W.II events (e.g. the decision to use an atomic bomb) and military technology (M16 rifle). The A-bomb decision - from its inception through the predicted ramifications of each possible course of action - is treated exhaustively from each of the perspectives. Other examples include management of the immediate and long term aftereffects of Mt St Helen's eruption in 1980, as viewed from each of the perspectives. The chapter concludes by pointing out that moving beyond the T perspective is "exceedingly valuable", as O's and P's views help one greatly to understand the decision process.

Entitled "Illustrations from the Private Sector"; Chapter 5 considers applications of T-O-P to such problems as construction of a hydroelectric facility, and to the manufacture of commercial aircraft. The latter case is explored comprehensively from each perspective. Linstone concludes by detailing the contributions of the O and P perspectives. The O perspective suggests that the needs of corporate and marketing trump "rational analysis", with tragic results regarding product development strategies. Similarly, senior management tends to weigh more heavily the O relative to the T perspective with regard to purchasing and even safety issues. A final lesson that's obtained by O considerations concerns the "deadly" long-term impact of a persistent tendency towards inaction even in the face of serious safety concerns. Meanwhile, the P perspective shows that charismatic leadership and negotiating skill can save a failing organization, as evidenced by the manner in which Lockheed narrowly averted corporate disaster in 1971. Dan Haughton, Lockheed's Chairman of the Board at that time, is credited with personally saving the company by virtue of his superior negotiating skills and leadership ability.

Chapter 6 considers risk assessment and the unfavorable outcomes associated with system failure from the T-O-P perspectives. Illustrative examples of the risks associated with technological development include the notorious Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989 when that tanker spilled 10.8 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound. The behavior of the major players in this disaster - including Capt. Hazelwood, Alaska's governor, local fishermen, Exxon executives, and many others - is analyzed from both O and P perspectives through the course of Linstones' thorough treatment of this case study.

Nuclear accidents (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl) are treated in Chapter 6 as well. Common deficiencies that helped to cause or exacerbate these disasters are identified. Engineers' over-emphasizing the T perspective, while overlooking O and P, indirectly contributed to these catastrophes.

Entitled "Technology: Forecasting and Planning", Chapter 7 focuses on how to resolve the inconsistency of T, O, and P individuals with regard to their "planning horizons" and "discount rates". That is, those that are T dominant tend to plan far in advance (low discounting) while P's and O's respectively plan for the short (high discounting) and intermediate (moderate discounting) term. Yet T's, O's and P's must productively co-exist if their organizations are to succeed. Linstone describes a "space-time" discounting problem that leads to a "profound ethical dilemma: intragenerational vs. intergenerational equity". That is, how should individuals, organizations and society at large balance resources among the competing needs associated with improving the lives of the poor in our society today and the lot of future generations? In economic terms, one solution to this compelling problem implies that negative real discount rates are optimal in terms of societal preservation, suggesting that "our grandchildren are more important than we are". Next in this chapter, T, O and P-oriented forecasts are compared and contrasted in terms of biases. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of T-based planning.

The penultimate chapter focuses on future developments in the systems area. As complex nonlinear and adaptive systems become more commonplace, the challenge for forecasters becomes increasingly formidable. Systems that behave nonlinearly or exhibit instability are exceedingly difficult to modeling using conventional methods. Yet, computer simulations of complex, dynamic systems show promise for predicting the likely outcomes of such processes. A discussion regarding the tradeoffs between space and time, as a means of preparing better for future problems, is particularly compelling. Linstone suggests that "distant space/near time [may be] used as a surrogate for distant time/near space". As an example, potential solutions to future problems in urban transportation that American cities may face are already in effect in European ones. The author concludes Chapter 8 by commenting on "a different perspective on the perspectives". He speculates that O and P perspectives may "automatically sweep in `knowledge' ", just as succeeding generations through the course of human evolution benefit from "accumulated genetic knowledge".

Finally, in Chapter 9 Linstone concludes this volume on multi-perspective decision making by providing seven specific guidelines for the reader who is seriously interested in improving his professional livelihood? To summarize, they (1) suggest that a successful practitioner strikes an appropriate balance among the three perspectives and their integration (devote approximately equal emphasis to each), (2) uses good judgement in selecting perspectives, and (3) recognizes that O and P require distinctly different means of obtaining input than does T. That is, perspectives are distinguished by "how rather than at what we are looking". Additional guidelines cover (4) sensitivity to interdependencies of the perspectives, (5) taking care to avoid "thinking statically in a dynamic environment", (6) choosing appropriate (perspective dependent) media for communication, and (7) recognition of the "political sensitivity" of O and P. Taken together, these guidelines provide a practical means for technologically biased individuals to incorporate the multi-perspective approach to decision making and system analysis. As such, they appropriately reflect the lessons learned from a series of instructive case studies that are presented in a well-reasoned, compelling, and engaging manner.