Macarthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero

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Summary: End result is what counts in war.
Review: MacArthur's War proves to be an fine indictment on General Douglas MacArthur's conduct during the initial year of the Korean War. While many reviewers out there don't like the negative look on this man, its pretty clear that MacArthur totally misread the entire military and political situation during his tenure. MacArthur's Inchon landing must be one of the great masterpieces of military operation but his actions after Inchon proves to be totally incompetent, out of touch and wishful thinking. MacArthur's fall from grace is nicely told in this book and despite of many reviewers prior to this writing who thought that the book was hack job on MacArthur, nothing can deny the fact that the Chinese caught MacArthur with his pants down, drove back his forces, inflicted losses on us and we suffered a major military defeat in North Korea under MacArthur's leadership. The author was correct in pointing out how little time MacArthur spent in Korea and that "Dug-out Doug" mentality didn't help the situation when things got rough along the Yalu. While Douglas MacArthur was one of our greatest soldiers of the 20th century, toward the end of his active career, his talents and instincts began to failed him. This book showed the flashes of his genius as well as follies of his arrogance.

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Summary: Subtly Disguised Hero Worship
Review: MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero is a confused polemic. Simultaneously a general history of the Korean War, biography, and polemic, it does not accomplish it's goal: to rehabilitate the reputation of General Douglas MacArthur. Weintraub wants to restore MacArthur's reputation, in order to honor the memory of those who sacrificed their blood for a stalemate and criticize political leaders, including Marshall and Truman for firing MacArthur.

Beginning as a general war history, the chronological narrative has little analytical force. There is no discussion of Korean history or even discussion of MacArthur's career. The narrative careens incompetently from Tokyo to various theaters in Korea to Washington. Although there are some flashy chapter titles, Weintraub offers no new interpretations or facts not already offered in other more responsible accounts.

The Korean War stands as a graveyard of mistakes, and as an academic monument to bad thinking. So multi-faceted, a definitive account could easily exceed a thousand pages, but a simple analysis might fit in a chapter. And, due to the number of players, any argument requires multi-lingual precision and the skill of a diplomat. The annoying nature of the armistice, the treatment of veterans, and the politicized atmosphere on the Korean peninsula make the author's task nearly impossible. Unless an author hides incompetence beneath the aura of an iconic figure. Weintraub gets no points for failing, because his effort merely reinforces MacArthur's iconic status, which is not what a history of the war requires. The politicized nature of the conflict and the history of Korea are just the essential aspects of the account Weintraub downplays.

This book represents the worse that the American academic publishing industry represents: "publish or perish". It contributes nothing to Korean War scholarship, is an affront to Korean history, and dishonors the memory of those who fought.

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Summary: A very disappointing book
Review: Mr Weintraub apparently has an ax to grind against General MacArthur. Mr Weintraub served in Korea during MacArthur's sojourn and this is really his personal version of events during that conflict.
As Mr Weintraub is generally a respected historian, I was disappointed with this mendacious approach to analysing MacArthur's role in the Korean conflict. He overfocuses on MacArthur's regular work day, his lunches, his supossed eccentricities and the fact that he likes to watch old movies every night (who doesn't?) and then, pow,links this up with bad management of the Korean conflict. The coverage is also uneven, with some individuals, namely a female reporter, being mentioned several times.
That's what the Korean conflict was all about - to Mr Weintraub.
I wasted my money.

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Summary: An Intriguing Book About a Mesmerizing & Enigmatic Subject!
Review: No other modern American military leader engenders such controversy and hotly-expressed differences in opinion than General Douglas MacArthur. Certainly, there can be no argument against the fact that his previous treatment by other authors such as William Manchester ("American Caesar") etc. does a much more comprehensive and objective service than does this book to anyone attempting to understand the man, his eccentricities, and his actions during the tenure of his fifty-year career as a virtual American military institution in the Orient. Yet, it should also be noted that this volume adds considerably to our understanding of MacArthur the man, the general, and the legend in an intriguing, unique, and somewhat different take on Macarthur, his character, vanity, conduct, and a blow-by-blow account of his prosecution of the Korean campaign.

At the outbreak of the Korean conflict MacArthur was preoccupied as the Governor-General of Japan with overseeing the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the defeated nation, and his first efforts to conduct the Korean campaign were through an attempt at long-distance management of the actions & ministrations of his field commanders. Of course, MacArthur couldn't stay out of the action long, & soon began actively interfering with command decisions from afar, and this led to a number of strains, breakdowns in communication, and military setbacks. The miscommunications and lack of clear and achievable military objective resulting from this situation soon turned into a both a political and military debacle, and according to Weintraub it was clear that MacArthur's fingerprints were all over the place in terms of poor planning, strategy, and tactics.

Moreover, given MacArthur's legendary self-absorption and his ego-driven association with Asian political potentates like national China's Chiang, his approach toward the military campaign in Korea often seemed less oriented to the stated and quite limited military goals of the Truman administration than it was an effort to achieve his own set of political objectives based on his own assessment of what the situation required, and these were possibly tied to his own aspirations for the 1952 Republican Presidential nomination, which he had reason to believe he could expect to come his way.

However, it should also be said that no one could lead a military action like MacArthur, and he was quite able, effective, and often brilliant in eventually pushing the Chinese back to the 38th Parallel. The problem was that he just would not yield to the chain of command, and through his campaign of sustained insubordination to President Truman forced his own recall and dismissal. Talk about being your own worst enemy!

In "MacArthur's War" author Weintraub treats us to a massively documented and carefully detailed yet quite readable and entirely entertaining view of the war in Korea. It is a blow-by-blow account of this, the bloodiest, fiercest, and most hotly contested military engagement since the Second World War. Told by way of the participants, and often in their own words, this is an engaging, entertaining, and scrupulously well-told history of a terrible conflict that cost 35,000 American lives and still, after almost fifty years, has over 6,000 American MIAs associated with it. This book should be read by anyone interested in military history, or with anyone who just loves a terrific story well told.

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Summary: Ignominious exit of an outstanding soldier
Review: Nobody will contest Douglas MacArthur's manifold achievements. Serving as a general in three wars, he arguably is famous for his bravery in battles during World War I, his spectacular Leyte landing to reclaim the Philippines in 1944 as well as for his eminently able direction of the occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1950, instituting such reforms as ownership of land for peasants, freedom of the press, and female suffrage. MacArthur is a giant of U.S. military history, even though his role in the Korean War during 1950-1951, when he was once again called to field duty, seriously dented his standing. This book by Stanley Weintraub covers MacArthur's involvement in Korea from June 1950 to April 1951. It is highly worth reading.

When conflict broke out in Korea in 1950, MacArthur assumed command of American, South Korean and U.N. forces to swiftly drive back the North Korean army over the 38th parallel, all the way up to the Yalu, the border river between Korea and China. At the centre of this stunning achievement was MacArthur's amphibious attack behind enemy lines at Inchon - an extremely risky undertaking that is generally acknowledged as a masterpiece of tactical warfare. However, military success ended with U.S. soldiers urinating into the frozen Yalu in November 1950. As tens of thousands of Chinese "volunteers" entered the stage - giving testimony to MacArthur's failure to anticipate Chinese entry into the war - U.N. forces hastily retreated southward, fleeing in disarray. It took a man like General Matthew Ridgway to gradually transform the demoralized Allied troops into a strong fighting body (thus keeping the Americans from leaving Korea altogether) and ultimately winning back some of the territory lost after China's intervention. Yet even after Ridgway had taken over as field commander, MacArthur continued to taunt the Truman administration, going so far as to suggest in a letter to a congressman - which became public - that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces in Formosa (today's Taiwan) could be brought into the war to fight the Communists. More and more out of touch with reality, MacArthur's peculiar reasoning culminated in his plan to "sowing a defensive field of radioactive waste on the southern bank of the Yalu", eventually resulting in President Truman dismissing him at the beginning of April 1951.

Stanley Weintraub's book is the product of a gifted mind at work. His judgment of MacArthur clearly is critical, blaming the general both for escalating the war and for seriously jeopardizing the war effort by his on-going insubordination towards the Truman administration. This is an outspoken but always fair account - in short: highly worth reading!

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Summary: Should be on your Korean War Reading List
Review: There is no question that Douglas MacArthur had a long and distinguished career. And that he showed great Barvery in World War I. That he planned some great island hopping strategy during World War II. And did much to help Japan reform and rebuild. But Korea is not an area where his career shines.

When conflict broke out in Korea in 1950, MacArthur assumed command of American, South Korean and U.N. forces and drove back the North Korean army to the Yalu river, which is the border between Korea and China. And at center stage was his very risky yet stunning achievement, his amphibious attack behind enemy lines at Inchon. But his total lack of failure to anticipate Chinese entry into the war and his delusion that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces in Formosa could be brought into the war to fight the Communists as a viable force had him lose all credability.

Only by General Matthew Ridgway taking command of the Allied ground forces were the Allies able to reverse the trend. General Ridgway took the demoralized Allied troops and transformed them back into a strong fighting force. Which under his command was able to recapture some of the lands lost to the Communist. During this time MacArthur actual came up with a plan to sow a defensive field of radioactive waste on the southern bank of the Yalu. This plan helped Truman to make the to make the decission to dismiss MacArthur at the begining of April 1951.

This work is well written and well worth reading.

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Summary: Continued MacArthur incompetence
Review: This book just reinforced my opinion of MacArthur, after reading about how he botched the defense of the Phillipines in WWII. He had an 8 hour warning from the Pearl Harbor attack, and yet let his planes be caught on the ground and destroyed. He had a 2 year supply of guns, ammo, food, and fuel in Manila for a defense at Bataan, and failed to move it there, so his men starved. He had months to train the Filipinos, and they ran at the first sight of Japs.
In Japan, for 5 years, he never once visited his troops. They were out of shape, and the men's equipment did not work.
When North Korea attacked, his men got killed because of their poor physical condition. They also got killed as the equipment did not work. Trucks, tanks, weapons, radios, batteries. Pusan harbor became a junkyard as they shipped over all this equipment that did not work, and that was all they had.
He refused to believe that the Chinese would attack in such numbers.
Gen Almond even continued the attack after the 8th army had been routed by the Koreans, and were in headlong retreat.
Mac was trying to run for President and his remarks and letters to Congressman became public.
The difference here vs what happened in the Phillipines was that in the Phillipines he got the Medal of Honor for his incopetence. This time, he got fired, as he should have at the Phillipines.
Inchon was a stroke of brilliance, in that it worked, in spite of all the natural obstacles. It worked because it was a Marine operation. MacArthur was not responsible for Marine training or equipment, so the men were trained, and the Marine equipment worked. Therefore, the Inchon invasion worked.

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Summary: Poorly written diatribe
Review: This is an poorly written diatribe that refects the author's intense dislike of MacArthur. As an historical analysis of the war, the book is sadly lacking and difficult to follow. Despite referance to many geographical features of the Korean peninsula, no map is provided beyond a simple map of Korea that includes only a handful of place names.

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Summary: Fine Book
Review: Weintraub is a serious scholar and a Korean vet. This book is credible because it matches the records as written down by the key players, such as George Marshall, Omar Bradley, Harry Truman, Eisenhower, and Samuel Morison.

Weintraub shows that MacArthur was paralysed at Pearl Harbor. Marshall called him and gave him a string of emergency instructions. MacArthur performed none of them. Instead he sat on his bed and read the bible, The result? Clark Field was bombed and most of the B-17 Flying Fortresses were destroyed.

When the Chinese surprised him in Korea, he panicked and wanted to get out completely. He sent a 38-page plan to the Joint Chiefs asking to get all troops and equipment out to Japan. He wanted Korea abandoned - another Dunkirk. Then Gen. O.P. Smith said, "Impossible. We don't have to lose this war. We can stay in Korea."

MacArthur took a grand total of 13 photo-op trips to Korea, staying from 90 minutes to three or four hours at a time. He never spent a day or night in Korea. Instead, he ran the war from his headquarters in Tokyo, which he loved because it overlooked the Emperor's Palace.

He thought America lost China because of politicians' incompetence. The truth is, Chiang Kai-shek's corruption and incompetence lost China.

When he finally found Korea a useful tool in his presidential plans, he demanded atom bombs - to drop on Chinese civilians. When he was refused (by everyone around Truman, not just Truman himself), he accused Truman of betrayal.

MacArthur messed up the war's initial stages, and then laid the blame on Truman, etc. It required Ridgway to clean up after MacArthur, but not before thousands of American lives lost.

MacArthur's contempt of Truman was open. He kept his Commander-in-Chief waiting, and then did not salute him before shaking hands. Young officers on the scene took it all in, and could hardly believe their eyes. How could MacArthur expect his subordinates to obey him when he was so insubordinate himself?

The memoirs of Gen. Bradley and Adm. Morison are particularly valuable for those who question Weintraub's assessment. I urge all to read their damning judgment of MacArthur.

The Republicans who wanted to impeach Truman set up a congressional inquiry. Then to their shock and horror, every major player - from Marshall to Bradley and Acheson - supported the president fully and rebutted MacArthur's charges. The accuser had become the accused and deserved culprit.

Why did the conservative National Review call MacArthur "the five-star peacock"? Why did the ultra-right-wing historian Paul Johnson refuse to defend MacArthur's conduct? The fact is, MacArthur was, and is, indefensible.

MacArthur's long record of incompetence and insubordination went back to the days of Herbert Hoover, and beyond, when he fired murderously on protesting veterans in Washington. Then he later tried to disobey Rooselvelt, who had to shut him up with a Congressional Medal of Honour (surely the least deserved on record). This vain clown with his oversized ego and undersized brain wanted to make himself president. But he was unelectable, in the eyes of clear-headed people who didn't want World War III. "The best clerk I ever had," as MacArthur called Eisenhower, became president, to everyone's relief (except MacArthur's).

FDR was right when he called MacArthur one of the two "most dangerous men" in America. (The other was Huey Long.) It is fitting that with time MacArthur's reputation "just fades away." He'll not be missed......except by the Japanese. But then the Japanese always see the world in their own peculiar way. If MacArthur is American Caesar, then I'm Jesus Christ.

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Summary: Stanley Weintraub: The Undoing of an American Historian
Review: Weintraub's account of the Korean War and General MacArthur is a huge dissapointment. For 360 pages, Weintraub rants and lashes out at MacArthur and his commentary becomes quite boring for that reason. This is a blow by blow account of the "Forgotten War" as mentioned by the author himself, a veteran, angry, because no one really mentions Korea anymore. Weintraub's prose is very hard to follow. In many paragraphs he wanders off from his focal point an ends up introducing another character who has really nothing to do with MacArthur. Since the book is written in blow by blow fashion, the information is very hard to retain and process. Most of the text is filled with useless, off-topic information because of the amount of characters. There is hardly any mention about MacArthur until page 70. Weintraub repeats himself over and over by bashing the life out of MacArthur's reputation. Although the book tries to give much insight, it looses the reader all too quickly and fails to communicate the reader the larger picture-how MacArthur affect the war in Korea. It most definately tries to answer the big questions, but even then looses the reader through more negative commentary.

The book could have been great if there were more of a balance between MacArthur's good and bad times and had told the story in a simpler, more epic-like account. If Weintraub used a lesser amount of characters this would have solved much of the book's problems and made the book more effective. If he had not given us the useless details on the war this would have solved much of the book's other problems.

I was unable to learn anything about MacArthur himself and found myself objecting to Weintraub unsupported rants. I suggest that you look for other reads on MacArthur-this one wasted my time. However, if there was one good thing to say about the book, it would be that it sheds light on a subject rarely spoken of and a great amount of research went into the preparation of the novel.