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Summary: Darwinian determinism reconciled with a notion of free will
Review: The first point to make about this book is that Daniel Dennett's ability to engage readers is well-nigh unprecedented in current scientific or philosophic writing. Reading him is like watching a lion-tamer whose daring keeps us, breathless, on the edge of our seats. His basic effort is to reconcile the determinism of Darwinism with the humanist's concern with human freedom. To do so he jettisons the notion that free will is a metaphysical concept. Rather, he explains it in terms of contemporary objective science, specifically via the same sort of evolution that led to the development of the eye or of language. He relies heavily on Richard Dawkin's concept of the evolution of memes: ideas that compete with each other just as other characteristics do via natural selection. In other words he argues that freedom of will grows and evolves. To achieve this conclusion he makes the point that determinism (a cause mechanistically producing an effect) is not the same as inevitability. He uses an example from baseball (shades of the late Stephen Jay Gould!) to make his point. He says that a batter has a choice of turning away from a pitch that is going to hit him or allowing it to hit him, depending on which action will help his team. His action is not determined by the prior history of the universe, but by his own analysis in the moment. In a different game, he might make a different choice. This, and other similar arguments, lead Dennett to the conclusion that the more we know, the more varieties and degrees of freedom we can have. Thus, modern man has more freedom than did, say, the Neanderthal. Essentially then, Dennett, whose earlier work in the areas of consciousness (another concept that gives determinists fits) are seminal, asserts that natural science is the ally of freedom, not an argument against it. The audacious arguments he posits to support this position are breathtaking in their scope and are, for this reader, convincing.
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Summary: Metaphysical determinism reconciled with moral freedom
Review: The thrust of the argument of Freedom Evolves should be no surprise to those familiar with Dennett's earlier works on consciousness and on evolution; indeed, they strike me, as a scientifically-oriented naturalist, as extensions of common sense. Nevertheless, there are many who do not find Dennett's argument obvious. The point of the work is to show the compatibility of metaphysical determinism and moral free will. In Dennett's views, the metaphysical question of determinism vs. indeterminism is irrelevant to the issue of free will. Moral agency is a property of beings that have evolved the ability to communicate with other beings and to reflect (albeit imperfectly) upon their internal psychological state. When we say "she could have done otherwise", it is not a metaphysical statement; it is a statement of abilities at an agent level. Even though a chess program is unambigously deterministic, it is still meaningful to say that "it could have done otherwise." Michael Shermer has a review of Freedom Evolves in Science in which he takes minor issue with Dennett and argues that only a sort of "pseudo-freedom" is compatible with determinism. But Dennett's main point is that this "psuedo-freedom" is a real and meaningful -- indeed, it possesses all the meaningful properties that are desirable of free will. Not being one who follows philosophical debates on free will too closely, I found Dennett's reasoning fairly self-evident, but philosophers may take greater issue with it. Regardless, Dennett is a capable writer and clear thinker; his works are always fun reads.
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Summary: Compatibilism sharp and sour
Review: This book veers off onto a number of topics in addition to free will and determinism, most of which material is well worth reading even if you've read Dennett's other work. The argument with regard to free will is a somewhat original take on compatibilism - which is a longstanding position, all of Dennett's bluster about his groundbreaking scandalbraving notwithstanding. Our point of view as living acting human beings is not the point of view of atoms or of gods and cannot be, need not be, and cannot even coherently be imagined to be. If you want to get that point across to an intelligent, scientifically inclined clinger to metaphysics, mysticism, or their lord Jesus Christ, this might be an ideal book to give them. That said, I have some quibbles with Dennett's approach. He argues that an event can be determined but not inevitable, meaning not unavoidable (from the point of view of the agent involved), and he develops this point as something more than just a clever play on etymologies. But he goes on throughout the book to discuss free will in solely negative terms as the ability to avoid things. Why is there not one word on free will as the ability to create the new and unexpected? Why is there not even a comment on avoiding failing to be brilliant or heroic? In fact, Dennett uses forced confinement (as in a US prison cell) as an analogy for free will (we avoid child molestation by locking up people convicted of child molestation). Further, Dennett focuses part of his discussion of "intuitions" regarding free will on anger and resentment. Where in all of this is admiration, appreciation, self-satisfaction, gratification, or friendship? Dennett leaves out much of what is valuable about free will. Those who object to his compatibilism may use this fact against him. I find compatibilism completely convincing but Dennett's view of life depressing. Dennett clearly supports our habit of locking many people up in prisons, although he offers castration as a possible alternative for pedophiles. But, while protecting children from pedophiles may have something to do with the will power of former pedophiles trying to change, it ought to be seen as a separate issue from retribution for guilt grounded in freely willed criminal behavior. If we are going to be advanced enough to drop metaphysics, we should also be advanced enough to make our handling of crime forward looking, focused on reconciliation and restitution. Dennett's fantasy about guilty individuals adopting a "Thanks I needed that" attitude toward punishment does not advance this project at all.
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