Freedom Evolves

Rating:
Summary: Important clarifying work on a central philosophical issue
Review: Although this book doesn't introduce anything radically new for those who follow Dennett, it does clarify his previous ideas on consciousness, free will, and human nature, and this
is far from a trivial matter. For anyone seriously interested in the question of how human free will can possibly be compatible with physical laws of cause and effect, and thought that nothing else could be reasonably said on the matter, this book is an essential. It will indeed help you clarify your thoughts, which is afterall one of the best things a work of philosophy can do for you, and one all too rarely accomplished by most philosophers.

For those who wonder about the conditions that foster human freedom and those that suppress it, this book doesn't quite delve into political or social philosophy per se, but it is at least a start at a real answer by providing clear thoughts and useful science and meta-science.

One very good reason for this book is that while Dan Dennett is a clear and vivid writer, particularly for a philosopher, he is also frequently rather badly misunderstood for some reason.
He has been described by reviewers as denying that human beings have free will or conscious awareness, and he has been accused of being an "ultraDarwinist," although he himself disputes these claims. In Freedom Evolves, he ties his previous ideas together and presents them in a way that will resist these misinterpretations of his ideas.

First, Dennett defends the compatibilist tradition (where free will and determinism are considered compatible in principle). He believes that the universe is probably deterministic in its physical nature, but that this doesn't mean our lives are pre-determined, nor does it prevent us from having forms of freedom worth working and fighting for.

This is done by distinguishing determinism clearly from inevitability with the help of his perspective tool of
different 'stances.' The 'stances' help see causation in different terms: mechanical causes from a physical stance vs.
functional causes from a design stance vs. the action of intentional agents from an intentional stance. We perceive inevitability in causal models from the design stance. Then we get confused between free will and determinism because we apply inevitability back to the physical, where it simply doesn't happen.

Then he builds a non-Cartesian account of choice and agency. Rather than distinguishing mind from mechanicals,
he describes different kinds of agency arising as the result of different raw materials available at different times and places. He uses the "toy model" of Conrad's Game of Life as an intuition pump to show how the appearance of agency arises from Darwinian algorithms through patterns like anticipating and avoiding harm.

The fact that the game is implemented on a device that follows instructions to the letter makes it a tough sell I think, and not entirely convincing (something he is acutely aware of, but can't seem to do anything about).

The human kind of agency is introduced by a much clearer discussion of Libet's "half second delay" experiments than he provided in "Consciousness Explained." He makes the point much more directly here how the half second delay can reflect a distributed decision making process rather than demonstrating that "we" are not in charge of our own actions, as the interpretation sometimes goes.

He still follows the basic interpretation used by Tor Norretranders in "User Illusion" and Dan Wegner in
"Illusion of Free Will," (which he has a lot to say about, mostly very good). The fact that there is a reliable
readiness potential prior to reporting our decision to act does mean that in some sense "I" don't directly initiate my actions. But Dennett further shows how we are shrinking this "I" too far when we use this argument to claim that "we" aren't in control or that a mysterious unconscious mind is in control.

"We" are able to disavow responsibility for our own actions under these contrived conditions because we break in
to the middle of the distributed process of decision making. Libet's results demonstrate the separate operation of the parts comprising the whole process, and the flexibility of our sense of self, not the ultimate powerlessness of the "I". This discussion is a high point of the book.

In building a case for the power of the "I" to take responsibility and form committments, Dennett does a brief
review of the literature on evolutionary game theory and the role of committment problems in human social life. He then makes his most important and final argument, that the capacities evolved to solve these problems have become the basis, through cultural evolution, of a fragile and socially and culturally nurtured and exercised ability to internallize reasons for behavior through reflecting on them and communicating them.

The idea that freedom, in the sense used in Dennett's final argument, is so real and yet so fragile is seen in the
way it can be heavily influenced simply by what we believe about it. The metaphor of "bootstrapping" runs throughout
the book, having been introduced in terms of the children's story of Dumbo the elephant. In some sense, we actually rely on useful illusions, such as the 'magic feather' that boosts Dumbo's confidence enough for him to try to fly. A crow flies up to shatter the useful illusion by grabbing the feather away. Dennett refers back to our frequent attempts to "stop that crow !" at various points in the book, pointing out where we may possibly be building real qbilities on the scaffolding of useful illusions, and trying to determine where the scaffolding can potentially be taken down once the real ability is in place.

Rating:
Summary: A Deterministic Basis For Free Will?
Review: Daniel Dennett has written (as he calls it) an apologia for determinism in "Freedom Evolves" in which he endeavors to reinstate free will in human affairs. In fact he states that the common belief that free will is banished by determinism is dead wrong! And I think he has succeeded in at least convincing himself that his definition of determinism allows for this seeming slight of hand. I have to note I am in no way a philosopher of science, so I will give here only my opinion of this as a biologist who has specialized in arthropods, and as a rank layman in theoretical evolutionary thought. I will also note that I tend to agree most with the views of Ernst Mayr on the subject.

Mayr quotes Sewall Wright in "Toward a New Philosophy of Biology", p. 288, as saying "The Darwinian process of continued interplay of a random and a selective process is not intermediate between pure chance and pure determinism, but in its consequences utterly different from either." Thus, like the argument between nature and nurture, the issue of determinism vs. indeterminism is at least in part spurious. Given, however, that there is some reason to discuss this issue at all (it is certainly fascinating) it seems very reasonable that a man as eminently qualified as Daniel Dennett should write this book. Indeed, Dennett wrote an excellent exposition of the determinist view of evolution in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea."

I have a few bones to pick, however. On p. 25, Dennett uses Van Inwagen's definition for determinism as the thesis that "there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future." He goes on to state that determinism thus defined does not imply inevitability. However, most dictionaries state in their definitions that determinism precludes free will. Is Dennett here redefining the meaning of the word to allow himself the luxury of free will? To some extent he is- at least the commonly understood meaning. However, he does so at his peril because words can and do get people into trouble and his detractors have the same privilege!

The second bone is the statement by Dennett that he felt the need to write this book because he and his associates (among whom he lists Crick, Watson, Wilson, Dawkins, and Pinker) are often misunderstood and misquoted by colleagues who disagree with "genetic determinism." He may have a point about his colleagues (although they have said the same thing about him). He also notes that there have been "some unfortunate overstatements and over simplifications," which have made him and his associates targets (undoubtedly in part because of sensational headlines often associated with them.) Unfortunately, the press, most politicians, and much of the general public will never understand the nuances of the argument and some don't want to do so for their own reasons! Beside, some of the people he names as associates, or "responsible, cautious naturalists," as he calls them (such as Pinker, Dawkins and even Wilson) and other "genetic determinists" that he does not mention (perhaps these, such as Thornhill and Ruse, are irresponsible naturalists?) have made statements in interviews and in their publications that lend themselves directly to sensationalism and criticism by their peers. He also should not be too surprised that Derk Pereboom (2001) runs with the idea that we have no free will, given the "unfortunate overstatements" of his associates.

A third bone is that although Dennett does admit that some of the deterministic ideas can be misused he states that they should not be. However, deterministic ideas based on little solid experimental or historical evidence (such as Pinker's genetic basis for infanticide or Thornhill's male hardwiring for rape) should not be stated as fact, especially when scientists urge their use to set social policy. While Eldredge in his recent book (2004) does not believe that a researcher should hide the truth to avoid unpleasant realities, he does think that they have to be reasonably sure that the view is not a biased untruth. To paraphrase Mark Twain, it is not what you don't know that causes trouble; it is what you "know" that ain't true!

How does Dennett handle his main arguments (including one that quantum theory cannot save us from a deterministic universe)? Very well, but to me unconvincingly! To be fair he (among his associates I think a first) points out that hard determinists are faced with a serious dilemma, namely how to give themselves free will while denying it to others! Dennett also (correctly I think) points out the rather flawed idea of using labels, such as "genetic determinist." I wish Steven Pinker had been as careful about the "blank slate" idealists (environmental determinists)!

However, Dennett reinstates free will by (I think) a mechanistic slight of hand (I might add that this slight of hand could be how the universe works!) He dismisses quantum effects (I think the jury is still out on that one - perhaps Roger Penrose is wrong, but we shall see!) as weakening the ability to reach a free will decision and thus defeating the very process it seeks to validify. In essence, as near as I can tell, he reinstates free will as being a necessary byproduct of deterministic processes.

In closing, I think Dennett's book is well worth reading, despite my disagreements with him. Some of his arguments I feel unqualified to judge and in any case I may be wrong in my criticisms. He certainly brings up numerous interesting points and articulately defends his position. I remain, however, somewhat skeptical. After wading over the years through books by Dawkins, Ruse, Wilson, Gould, Eldredge, Lewontin, Pinker, Mayr, Williams, Barash, Diamond, Lorenz and Dennett (not to mention the more popular, but also more sensationalistic writers Ardrey and Morris) I am getting a bit tired of the debate. It has to some extent taken on the appearance of a group of clerics arguing over esoteric and obscure points of the Old Testament, with no end in sight!

Rating:
Summary: Is that all?
Review: Daniel Dennett is attempting a thankless task, but one that is long overdue. Back in 1984, with the publication of Elbow Room, he sought to liberate free will - that perennial hobgoblin of philosophy - from a surplus of metaphysical baggage that is increasingly difficult to justify based on what we know about how brains work and how minds evolved. On these two topics, however, Elbow Room required the reader to reserve judgment. Since then, Dennett has given the world Consciousness Explained (1991), which, as the title implies, tries to tell us how brains work, and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), which tries to explain how minds evolved, and in the process provides one of the most lucid accounts yet of the philosophical implications of Darwinism. Now, with Freedom Evolves, Dennett attempts to tie it all together.

The problem with this book, as far as I am concerned, is that it feels rushed and disjointed. I was more than happy to read all 500+ pages of DDI because the topic deserved that much space and, honestly, that book is a pleasure to read. The topic of free will, if anything, requires even more space to develop, and I would have gladly sat through six or seven hundred pages if necessary. As it is, my understanding of Dennett's arguments is sketchy - even after letting them sink in a few days and re-reading a few sections - so sketchy, in fact, that I won't attempt anything like a synopsis here, for fear of bungling the job. Beyond that, I was a little annoyed with the amount of recycled material from CE and DDI.

So why is Daniel Dennett's task a thankless one? Because he insists that free will is not an "illusion" as some hardcore materialists claim - nor is it some "extra something" in the sense implied by traditional dualist philosophers. There are a lot of feathers to ruffle in this area. Affirming free will on a strict materialist basis would be quite a feat, if done clearly and convincingly. I believe that case can be made, and that it should be made, and that Dennett is qualified to make it. Unfortunately, in Freedom Evolves he didn't do so as clearly and convincingly as I wish he had. Until Dennett or somebody else does so, the task will remain long overdue.

Rating:
Summary: Depends on what you're looking for
Review: Each chapter in this book is a lesson, with a specific goal
of teaching us to think about something in a different way
than we probably have in the past. The result guides us to
understanding free will, freedom and morality of humans and
our society from a natural foundation - no God behind the
curtain, no Cartesian split of mind and matter, no meta-
physical magic.

Dennett is a master teacher, skilled in many of the tools
of his trade. This book doesn't read like some of the great

philosophical tracts of the past. It is approachable, and
more tutorial than Great Rhetoric.

If you disagree with his conclusions, then the informality
of his voice will make this book an easy target to criticize.

But, if your intuitions had been leading you in this direction,
as had mine, then you will find that this book completes and
realizes a vision of a natural based understanding of morality
and freedom that two weeks ago I would not have expected to
see in my lifetime.

Rating:
Summary: You are logical, you believe in evolution, you believe in...
Review: Freewill. As you continue to seek greater truth, you may be aware that there is no real certainty in our existence only beliefs based on perception, reason and memory. As our perceptions become more congruent with reality we may have observed how evolution provides a compelling structure for purpose. What then compels some of us to accept an alternative conflicting postulate, such as intelligent design? What if that compulsion to perceive one belief over another is driven by a universal desire to effect the world outside our bodies for our perceived benefit based on an individuals perceived values based on perceived purpose. As we agree that belief is based on perception therefore relative therefore variable and governs perceived purpose and perceived value in order to effect the outside world for perceived benefit, then having an accurate belief system should be the most effective for attaining perceived goals for perceived purpose. It also seems then that the relationship between purpose, value, and belief structure simply becomes a system of reason defined by logic based on outside variables. Perhaps a dynamic way to describe, I think I am as a reason for existence, is better defined as a "state of existence" because thought requires time, not unlike our state of reason. I desire therefore I have purpose as a cause for a state of reason seems to also follow. It seems then that to define the culminations of ones collective desires is to further if not completely define ones collective purpose. Replication and the manifestations of such a process in a limited resources environment such as survival of the fittest seem to be a pretty good idea to stick in the purpose slot to describe accurately aspects of our perceived environment seem to follow. From this frame of mind arguments accepting a priori, intelligent design, which seems to require a little more faith, begs this question among others what is that feeling that drives our desire to seek something less logical? As you take a moment to contemplate this idea you might ask yourself if there are other such ideas we might foster for the same reason. Are these logic anti-fields beneficial? What would it be like if there were others who's beliefs were also more congruent in their logic to see us. Some of us have never had a core belief change for one of two reasons, we value other things more than truth when reasoning or we have come to believe the most reasonable beliefs we have encountered. For some people, it seems possible that an illogical belief may make them more effective in achieving their actual purpose, making an illogical belief more congruent with purpose than logical ones. What would you write to those people if you had a perceived logical truth which seemed greater than theirs? I believe that some people will and some will not be able to perceive the illusion of choice. If you cannot, or it is not beneficial, this is the book for you. I obviously have an opinion implying that people who beleive in freewill because it seems logical will reason their way out of this belief in time.

Rating:
Summary: The best self-help book you'll ever read.
Review: I am honored to be the first to review this book. I have read most of Dennett's previous books (Elbow Room, CE, and DDI) and many of his essays but I have always felt a little anxious about his conclusions; like he is the crow in the Dumbo cartoon (read the book). Why is this man smiling?

Freedom Evolves ties together all of his previous books. He convincingly shows how a naturalistic account of ourselves gives us REAL free will. He also clarifies many previous arguments.

Dennett defines freedom as the "capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances." Despite the prevailing view, science does not decrease our freedom through exculpation, but increases it by giving us more options and self-control. He also points out that memes give us freedom by giving us new standpoints. Also, memes are tools and need to be used to work; that is, we still have to think. This is a very important point because almost everyone I try to explain memetics to hates it because they feel it robs them of their self. It does the exact opposite!

Dennett says that a human self results from an interpersonal design process and to become autonomous, we need a little help from our friends. I would add to this point by saying that some of the best "friends" we can ask for help in the arduous process of creating an autonomous self are the great artists of the ages. This is a point Richard Rorty has recently been making.

This is a fantastic and extremely important book. I am a philosophical dilettante (but I am a scientist) and I appreciate Dennett's extremely useful and lucid writing. If only more philosophers were like him.

More importantly, this book is wonderfully hopeful and can be thought of as a philosophical self-help manual. Now I know why he is smiling.

Rating:
Summary: Thoroughly unimpressed
Review: I didn't learn anything new in this book. The writing is cloudy and arrogant and redundant and inefficient. While I agree with Dennett's basic premise, that questions of ethics and free will should be asked from an evolutionary standpoint (how does this help the species survive?) I closed the book feeling altogether unsatisfied. Dennett always meanders around points and then claims them later. His arguments are not clear and convincing. Some of the main points in the book are:

that free will is an evolutionary adaptation
that indeterminism is not made possible by quantum mechanics
that decisions are processes taking place in the brain over space and time and therefore cannot be pin-pointed

but to me none of these theses are new or surprising, and I just don't see what took him so many pages to say what he said.

Rating:
Summary: Thoroughly unimpressed
Review: I didn't learn anything new in this book. The writing is cloudy and arrogant and redundant and inefficient. While I agree with Dennett's basic premise, that questions of ethics and free will should be asked from an evolutionary standpoint (how does this help the species survive?) I closed the book feeling altogether unsatisfied. Dennett always meanders around points and then claims them later. His arguments are not clear and convincing. Some of the main points in the book are:

that free will is an evolutionary adaptation
that indeterminism is not made possible by quantum mechanics
that decisions are processes taking place in the brain over space and time and therefore cannot be pin-pointed

but to me none of these theses are new or surprising, and I just don't see what took him so many pages to say what he said.

Rating:
Summary: Now, Dennett should evolve
Review: In 1991, Dennett published his great work "Consciousness Explained," a brilliant benchmark on "consciousness." Then in the later 90's, he published his next major piece "Darwin's Dangerous Idea," and came up with a stunning and thought-provoking analysis of Darwinism that explained the subject far more effectively than almost any had done before. An argument could be made it was just a normal extension of his own work, I saw it as almost someone who did not know how to write the next chapter of their own book. This new book seems to nourish that conclusion rather than contradict it.

For someone of Dennett's prestige and genius- he's certainly one of the 20th century's great philosophers- he must feel pressured to come up with something new, to be more brilliant, to soar even higher than the last time, he is expected to deliver, and this is what I feel this book is, a book to satisfy those who demand from him new genius, but instead of delivering that, he has fallen into the trap of writing something simply because he feels he has to, instead of writing because he has found the next piece of the puzzle. He talks much, but says little.

Yet once again, as he has done in previous books, he writes much about Conrad's Life Worlds. I feel this is dangerous thing to do, to rest so much on this program, because in the future, if the logic and flaw of it are exposed, his writing so much about it will lessen the value of his own teachings. He needs new "examples" to get his points across and should not place so much emphasis continuously on this. I'm not saying it has flaws, but he is walking too much on this "plank."

He also seems to apologize too much for what he is about to say. Great philosophers don't make apologies. They accept them from others. He says many times people reading might be tempted to "stop that crow!" yet there is little here that merits that reaction. In fact, if there are two opposite ways to go from Dennett's work, he firmly stays outside the camp of the radical. "I'm not saying we're Zombies, I'm not saying to castrate" The question is can someone who is so worried about misinterpretation really be laying everything they think and feel completely on the line, or do they hold back from fear?" Has his position become so lofty, he enjoys the status quo and seeks to maintain it at the expense of his own development?

Dennett goes to great lengths to try to despel Libet's experiments, which is almost always a sure sign there might be something to them. An example of "The philosopher doth protest too much." Instead of turning me away from them, he has done the opposite and made me interested.

At the end of the book, he seems to have forgotten what the book is supposed to be about, and it lacks an ending chapter that summarizes everything before it and gives us something tangible in terms of clear-cut explanations about what he is saying on the subject matter. Instead, you are left on your own to sort out whether anything concrete has been said about it at all. The extensive reading lists he gives at the end of each chapter is also a clue that Dennett is not willing, or perhaps can't, fully discuss things to the satisfaction of the reader. He seems willing to insert meanderings of many topics in order to avoid having to discuss the real issues. The stories here are not as clever as before, the quotations less stimulating, and his take on things too brief and "thrown in" to have any impact. He expouses "free will" in terms of morality and ethics, topics of great interest and makes for great padding, but are not necessarily the most important in terms of conclusions.

The problem is that there is nothing "new" here. It's another revisit to the well of the past. Dennett would be best served to follow the streams of thought his "Consciousness Explained" produced and at the end of that stream, move to deeper waters.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent view of free will, in evolutionary context
Review: My advance appreciation for the book jacket:

To understand is to "stand under," to view the underpinnings. To find a useful standpoint for free will and determinism has been fraught with slippery footings and fear. Dennett tries viewing free will as an evolutionary emergent, able to expand further - or to shrink when novel choices cannot be imagined, judged, or carried out. Freedom Evolves is wonderfully clarifying about the evolutionary and cognitive issues involved in our responsibility for making moral choices.