The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul

Rating:
Summary: An I-opening experience
Review: After writing the magnificent 'Godel, Escher, Bach', for which he won a Pulitzer Prize, computer scientist Douglas Hofstadter (a professor at my alma mater, Indiana University) collaborated with philosopher Daniel Dennett on this anthology of essays and stories that explore the areas of human and artificial intelligence.

What is the mind? What is the self? Is there really a soul? Are feelings and emotions artificial constructs of information bits inside of us, and if so, is it possible that machines can think and feel for themselves?

For that matter, do we truly think and feel for ourselves?

Hofstadter and Dennett have selected pieces that approach these questions from many angles, from hard-science observational techniques to spirituality dimensions in stories. Each piece is followed by a reflection that sets the context of the piece in relation to the larger question of intelligence.

Contributors include mathematician Rudy Rucker ('Infinity and the Mind'), philosophers Raymond Smullyan (perhaps best known for logic puzzles) and Robert Nozick, literary figures such as Jorge Luis Borges and Stanislaw Lem, and pioneers in the field such as Alan Turing.

The editors use a section of Turing's early article on 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' from 1950 to set up much of the subsequent discussion. One often overlooked idea from Turing, oddly popular among British scholars of the first half of the twentieth century (and still more prevalent among British scholars and intellectuals than those of other cultures) is the idea of ESP and paranormal abilities. Turing felt that the final difference between machine-thinking, once it had reached full potential, and human thinking would be that humans have the capacity for ESP and other such abilities.

Turing's foundational point rests on the answer to and the meaning of the question, will a machine ever think? Turing's answer to this is yes, and upon this assumption, the meaning of a machine thinking becomes the critical determinant. People infuse too much emotionalism into the question, Turing thought. Ironically, half a century after Turing and two decades after publication of The Mind's I, people watch depictions of thinking machines in science fiction shows without a second thought, even as these shows explore the connection between thinking and emotion.

As many of the essays and stories make clear, it is often as much the way the question is asked as it is the content of the answer that can make a difference in the way the observer reacts and interprets. And yet, it becomes difficult to distinguish linguistic intelligence, intellect, and 'having a soul'. One question that is addressed can serve as illustration: Do animals have souls? For instance, does a chimpanzee with with partial linguistic ability learned in a laboratory and greater ability to care for herself and her offspring have more of a soul than an human being who is physical and mentally impaired? Almost everyone would say no, but how this difference is characterised becomes difficult in many contexts.

Terrel Miedaner has an intriguing set of stories, 'The Soul of Martha, a Beast' and 'The Soul of the Mark III Beast', which explores the fuzzy dividing line between the way in which we think of human feelings, animal feelings, and potentially even machine emotional responses. Part of the analysis of Hofstadter and Dennett focuses upon the construction of the stories, which are purposefully designed to evoke human emotional responses to anthropomorphised creatures. But this begs the question -- if we can anthropomorphise them, to what extent might they in fact have elements in common with human beings that make them worthy of consideration on a human level?

Issues such as the difference between education and programming, free will and determined patterns, conscious and unconscious potentials, and (perhaps both most maddening and enlightening) the difference between reality, apparent reality, belief, and thought about belief (see Smullyan's 'An Epistemological Nightmare').

This is a very entertaining, often witty, occasionally disturbing book, that presents these philosophical problems in an accessible format.

Rating:
Summary: An I-opening experience
Review: After writing the magnificent `Godel, Escher, Bach', for which he won a Pulitzer Prize, computer scientist Douglas Hofstadter (a professor at my alma mater, Indiana University) collaborated with philosopher Daniel Dennett on this anthology of essays and stories that explore the areas of human and artificial intelligence.

What is the mind? What is the self? Is there really a soul? Are feelings and emotions artificial constructs of information bits inside of us, and if so, is it possible that machines can think and feel for themselves?

For that matter, do we truly think and feel for ourselves?

Hofstadter and Dennett have selected pieces that approach these questions from many angles, from hard-science observational techniques to spirituality dimensions in stories. Each piece is followed by a reflection that sets the context of the piece in relation to the larger question of intelligence.

Contributors include mathematician Rudy Rucker (`Infinity and the Mind'), philosophers Raymond Smullyan (perhaps best known for logic puzzles) and Robert Nozick, literary figures such as Jorge Luis Borges and Stanislaw Lem, and pioneers in the field such as Alan Turing.

The editors use a section of Turing's early article on `Computing Machinery and Intelligence' from 1950 to set up much of the subsequent discussion. One often overlooked idea from Turing, oddly popular among British scholars of the first half of the twentieth century (and still more prevalent among British scholars and intellectuals than those of other cultures) is the idea of ESP and paranormal abilities. Turing felt that the final difference between machine-thinking, once it had reached full potential, and human thinking would be that humans have the capacity for ESP and other such abilities.

Turing's foundational point rests on the answer to and the meaning of the question, will a machine ever think? Turing's answer to this is yes, and upon this assumption, the meaning of a machine thinking becomes the critical determinant. People infuse too much emotionalism into the question, Turing thought. Ironically, half a century after Turing and two decades after publication of The Mind's I, people watch depictions of thinking machines in science fiction shows without a second thought, even as these shows explore the connection between thinking and emotion.

As many of the essays and stories make clear, it is often as much the way the question is asked as it is the content of the answer that can make a difference in the way the observer reacts and interprets. And yet, it becomes difficult to distinguish linguistic intelligence, intellect, and 'having a soul'. One question that is addressed can serve as illustration: Do animals have souls? For instance, does a chimpanzee with with partial linguistic ability learned in a laboratory and greater ability to care for herself and her offspring have more of a soul than an human being who is physical and mentally impaired? Almost everyone would say no, but how this difference is characterised becomes difficult in many contexts.

Terrel Miedaner has an intriguing set of stories, `The Soul of Martha, a Beast' and `The Soul of the Mark III Beast', which explores the fuzzy dividing line between the way in which we think of human feelings, animal feelings, and potentially even machine emotional responses. Part of the analysis of Hofstadter and Dennett focuses upon the construction of the stories, which are purposefully designed to evoke human emotional responses to anthropomorphised creatures. But this begs the question -- if we can anthropomorphise them, to what extent might they in fact have elements in common with human beings that make them worthy of consideration on a human level?

Issues such as the difference between education and programming, free will and determined patterns, conscious and unconscious potentials, and (perhaps both most maddening and enlightening) the difference between reality, apparent reality, belief, and thought about belief (see Smullyan's `An Epistemological Nightmare').

This is a very entertaining, often witty, occasionally disturbing book, that presents these philosophical problems in an accessible format.

Rating:
Summary: Wonderful introduction to a wonderous subject.
Review: Philosophy, especially cognitive philosophy, can be a rather dull and dry topic, which is a shame given that it directly pertains to questions that we all ask, such as "Who am I?", "What is self?", "What would it be like to be another person?", and so on.

This books takes the innovative approach of presenting an anthology of absolutely fascinating essays and stories that relate to these subjects, with each essay/story followed by commentary from Dennet and Hofstadter (both of whom are heavy hitters in Philosophic circles).

It is especially interesting that a large fraction of the stories are taken directly from the annals of science-fiction, capitalizing on the genres ability to deal with these kinds of deep issues in a manner that's entertaining and accessable.

Nor does the book push any particular agenda. For instance, although Dennet and Hofstadter are both strong AI proponents (in every sense of the term "strong"), they do not hesitate to include essays that argue against the possibility of AI.

Of course, there is a certain point beyond which popularizations cease to illuminate, and anyone seriously interested in these topics would be well advised to turn to heavier treatments (including those of the editors), but, as an introduction to the subject, you could certainly do worse, although you would be hard-pressed to do better, than to read this book.

Rating:
Summary: A Mixed Bag
Review: The Mind's I promises more than it delivers. Perhaps this is not surprising given the immensity of the subject, i.e., what is consciousness, what is self, who am "I". Hofstadter and Dennet wisely avoid attempting to answer these questions directly. They choose instead to share a collection of 27 science fiction stories and scientific essays from various authors, sharing their own "reflections" after each entry. The selections range from the playful (The Riddle of the Universe and Its Solution) to the analytical (Minds, Brains, and Programs), and the editors are to be commended for including a sampling of authors whose views they do not share.

Ironically, this is the basis of one of the book's weaknesses. Hofstadter and Dennet quickly dismiss opposing views as being based on false analogies, yet to win the reader over to their camp they employ similarly flawed analogies. (Of course, analogies are like false profits -- they should not be trusted.) A number of the reflections following certain science fiction entries choose to focus on the impossibility of the plot rather than the philosophical questions raised. Moreover, the editors' emphasis on artificial intelligence and whether machines can have souls, while occasionally helpful in pushing the reader to determine his own definition of consciousness, tends to obfuscate rather than clarify what should be the main thrust of the book: who am (is?) "I"? Finally, key concepts (e.g., dualism) are not clearly defined early on, a handicap for the casual reader.

But there is something worthwhile in The Mind's I for most readers. The science fiction fan will more than get his fill; the fiction writer will have fun imagining entire universes he has created; and the introspective soul will be seduced into reflecting on whether "I think therefore I am" is a strong enough argument.

Rating:
Summary: A Mixed Bag
Review: The Mind's I promises more than it delivers. Perhaps this is not surprising given the immensity of the subject, i.e., what is consciousness, what is self, who am "I". Hofstadter and Dennet wisely avoid attempting to answer these questions directly. They choose instead to share a collection of 27 science fiction stories and scientific essays from various authors, sharing their own "reflections" after each entry. The selections range from the playful (The Riddle of the Universe and Its Solution) to the analytical (Minds, Brains, and Programs), and the editors are to be commended for including a sampling of authors whose views they do not share.

Ironically, this is the basis of one of the book's weaknesses. Hofstadter and Dennet quickly dismiss opposing views as being based on false analogies, yet to win the reader over to their camp they employ similarly flawed analogies. (Of course, analogies are like false profits -- they should not be trusted.) A number of the reflections following certain science fiction entries choose to focus on the impossibility of the plot rather than the philosophical questions raised. Moreover, the editors' emphasis on artificial intelligence and whether machines can have souls, while occasionally helpful in pushing the reader to determine his own definition of consciousness, tends to obfuscate rather than clarify what should be the main thrust of the book: who am (is?) "I"? Finally, key concepts (e.g., dualism) are not clearly defined early on, a handicap for the casual reader.

But there is something worthwhile in The Mind's I for most readers. The science fiction fan will more than get his fill; the fiction writer will have fun imagining entire universes he has created; and the introspective soul will be seduced into reflecting on whether "I think therefore I am" is a strong enough argument.

Rating:
Summary: Looking inside
Review: The significance of this book's subject will keep it a timeless classic. The topic, of course, is "I". "Who am I? Can I explain my mind? Can I formulate what happens in anyone's mind?" And, of course, the daunting question: "can a computer become/have a mind?" With these troublesome queries in hand, Hofstadter and Dennett have collected a string of loosely connected essays to invigorate your thinking. As the Preface states, the anthology "is designed to provoke, disturb, and befuddle . . . readers." If it fails, the readers certainly cannot blame the "composers and arrangers," as the editors dub themselves.

Nothing in here is arcane or pedantic - there are no scholarly papers as such. In fact, some of the 27 submissions are from the realm of "SF" [in the delightful definition of that term coined by writer Harlan Ellison - "speculative fiction"]. Among these offerings are essays by Jorge Luis Borge and Stanislaw Lem. There are, of course, some philosophical statements. Fortunately, none of these require knowledge of "schools of philosophy." All that is required to read this book is a desire to open your own mind and speculate on how you think. And, perhaps, what you think.

A major virtue of this book are the "Reflections" following the essays. In these Hofstadter or Dennett [or both] provide further insights on the author's offering. The "arrangers" don't enlarge on the article or "interpret" its meaning. That's left to the reader. The editors do, however, frequently pose further questions adding to the value of the selection. There is little opportunity, except in a few cases, to critically assess the author's position. With SF, a "philosophical position" is rare in any event. Even so, the SF entries are not mere space adventures, but contributions to the idea of what makes a "self," particularly in a society with high levels of technology.

Concepts of "self" as confronted with modern technology form a sub-theme of the collection. The Turing Test provides a pivot point for many of the essays. Can a computer achieve "intelligence" defined in a blind test of responses to questions? Turing's original essay, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" is offered early in the book, with a thorough examination of the issues raised in an imaginary dialog following. Turing's thorny question is directly addressed in further essays and in the "Reflections". The editors make their own comments on this issue which, of course, is a foundation of developments in Artificial Intelligence [AI].

Dennett, whose capacity for wit is finely honed, brings those skills to these pages. His own essay on brain-body relations is a treasure for stimulating reflection. Hofstadter contributes three essays of his own. The real gem in this collection is Raymond Smullyan's "Is God A Taoist?". This dialog between a deity and a mortal on the issue of "free will" is outstanding - there is no other word that fits. It is fundamental reading in examining the human thought process and the laws of nature. The following Reflections by Hofstadter is rich with questions raised by Smullyan. Hofstadter notes that many will consider the essay "blasphemous," but that charge might be laid on the whole book. That, of course, is what gives it much appeal. While the open-minded will benefit most from this collection, you need only to leave your mind slightly ajar to benefit from what the "composers" have offered you.

Rating:
Summary: Looking inside
Review: The significance of this book's subject will keep it a timeless classic. The topic, of course, is "I". "Who am I? Can I explain my mind? Can I formulate what happens in anyone's mind?" And, of course, the daunting question: "can a computer become/have a mind?" With these troublesome queries in hand, Hofstadter and Dennett have collected a string of loosely connected essays to invigorate your thinking. As the Preface states, the anthology "is designed to provoke, disturb, and befuddle . . . readers." If it fails, the readers certainly cannot blame the "composers and arrangers," as the editors dub themselves.

Nothing in here is arcane or pedantic - there are no scholarly papers as such. In fact, some of the 27 submissions are from the realm of "SF" [in the delightful definition of that term coined by writer Harlan Ellison - "speculative fiction"]. Among these offerings are essays by Jorge Luis Borge and Stanislaw Lem. There are, of course, some philosophical statements. Fortunately, none of these require knowledge of "schools of philosophy." All that is required to read this book is a desire to open your own mind and speculate on how you think. And, perhaps, what you think.

A major virtue of this book are the "Reflections" following the essays. In these Hofstadter or Dennett [or both] provide further insights on the author's offering. The "arrangers" don't enlarge on the article or "interpret" its meaning. That's left to the reader. The editors do, however, frequently pose further questions adding to the value of the selection. There is little opportunity, except in a few cases, to critically assess the author's position. With SF, a "philosophical position" is rare in any event. Even so, the SF entries are not mere space adventures, but contributions to the idea of what makes a "self," particularly in a society with high levels of technology.

Concepts of "self" as confronted with modern technology form a sub-theme of the collection. The Turing Test provides a pivot point for many of the essays. Can a computer achieve "intelligence" defined in a blind test of responses to questions? Turing's original essay, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" is offered early in the book, with a thorough examination of the issues raised in an imaginary dialog following. Turing's thorny question is directly addressed in further essays and in the "Reflections. The editors make their own comments on this issue which, of course, is a foundation of developments in Artificial
Intelligence [AI].

Dennett, whose capacity for wit is finely honed, brings those skills to these pages. His own essay on brain-body relations is a treasure for stimulating reflection. Hofstadter contributes three essays of his own. The real gem in this collection is Raymond Smullyan's "Is God A Taoist?". This dialog between a deity and a mortal on the issue of "free will" is outstanding - there is no other word that fits. It is fundamental reading in examining the human thought process and the laws of nature. The following Reflections by Hofstadter is rich with questions raised by Smullyan. Hofstadter notes that many will consider the essay "blasphemous," but that charge might be laid on the whole book. That, of course, is what gives it much appeal. While the open-minded will benefit most from this collection, you need only to leave your mind slightly ajar to enjoy what the "composers" have offered you.

Rating:
Summary: Looking inside
Review: The significance of this book's subject will keep it a timeless classic. The topic, of course, is "I". "Who am I? Can I explain my mind? Can I formulate what happens in anyone's mind?" And, of course, the daunting question: "can a computer become/have a mind?" With these troublesome queries in hand, Hofstadter and Dennett have collected a string of loosely connected essays to invigorate your thinking. As the Preface states, the anthology "is designed to provoke, disturb, and befuddle . . . readers." If it fails, the readers certainly cannot blame the "composers and arrangers," as the editors dub themselves.

Nothing in here is arcane or pedantic - there are no scholarly papers as such. In fact, some of the 27 submissions are from the realm of "SF" [in the delightful definition of that term coined by writer Harlan Ellison - "speculative fiction"]. Among these offerings are essays by Jorge Luis Borge and Stanislaw Lem. There are, of course, some philosophical statements. Fortunately, none of these require knowledge of "schools of philosophy." All that is required to read this book is a desire to open your own mind and speculate on how you think. And, perhaps, what you think.

A major virtue of this book are the "Reflections" following the essays. In these Hofstadter or Dennett [or both] provide further insights on the author's offering. The "arrangers" don't enlarge on the article or "interpret" its meaning. That's left to the reader. The editors do, however, frequently pose further questions adding to the value of the selection. There is little opportunity, except in a few cases, to critically assess the author's position. With SF, a "philosophical position" is rare in any event. Even so, the SF entries are not mere space adventures, but contributions to the idea of what makes a "self," particularly in a society with high levels of technology.

Concepts of "self" as confronted with modern technology form a sub-theme of the collection. The Turing Test provides a pivot point for many of the essays. Can a computer achieve "intelligence" defined in a blind test of responses to questions? Turing's original essay, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" is offered early in the book, with a thorough examination of the issues raised in an imaginary dialog following. Turing's thorny question is directly addressed in further essays and in the "Reflections". The editors make their own comments on this issue which, of course, is a foundation of developments in Artificial Intelligence [AI].

Dennett, whose capacity for wit is finely honed, brings those skills to these pages. His own essay on brain-body relations is a treasure for stimulating reflection. Hofstadter contributes three essays of his own. The real gem in this collection is Raymond Smullyan's "Is God A Taoist?". This dialog between a deity and a mortal on the issue of "free will" is outstanding - there is no other word that fits. It is fundamental reading in examining the human thought process and the laws of nature. The following Reflections by Hofstadter is rich with questions raised by Smullyan. Hofstadter notes that many will consider the essay "blasphemous," but that charge might be laid on the whole book. That, of course, is what gives it much appeal. While the open-minded will benefit most from this collection, you need only to leave your mind slightly ajar to benefit from what the "composers" have offered you.