Rating: 
Summary: The Symbolic Species
Review: As a former linguistic anthropologist and language teacher, I found Deacon's explanations of the relationship between the evolution of the brain and the origins of language to be the most comprehensive and and encompassing study I have read yet on the subject. His explanation of the neurological evidence was illuminating, and his understanding of the paleontology insightful, but most of all, I think was his creative application of the ethological literature to the solution of the problem of the brain's function in language origin and development. As the most current (this week-April 15, 2002) research on human primate genetic differences show, it is in brain chemistry and brain genetics where humans have taken underlying primate biology and developed it evolutionarily. Deacon's range of knowledge is extradorinary and well grounded in solid research.
Rating: 
Summary: An ambitious, fascinating and frustrating book
Review: I first reviewed this book when it appeared back in
1998. I found it to be a genuinely thrilling read,
full of original insights. I gamely read it twice,
recommended it widely, and then looked around for other
authors who had written anything at all interesting
on the evolution of the human brain, and the
evolution of language.After several years, I found only one other book which
covers the same essential territory, Derek Bickerton's
"Language and Species," which was published in 1990,
fully eight years before Deacon's book. Deacon includes
Bickerton's book in his bibliography, and even refers
to it in his discussion of creole and pidgin languages. But there is apparently something deeply strange going
on here. We have two books on the evolution of language,
one written by Deacon (who is basically a biologist,
an evolutionary anthropologist, and a polymath) and the
other by Bickerton, who is a linguist and a polymath.
Since the subject is the evolution of language, in
theory the linguist might have an advantage, especially
since Deacon apparently has no linguistic training at
all. Yet Deacon manages to ignore all of Bickerton's most
important points! I'll single out the one I find most
important here. Describing the evolution of language as a
System Of Communication is fraught with problems. As
Deacon points out, there are apparently no "simple
languages" -- there are only animal calls and the hugely
different phenomenon of human speech. This indeed was
the key problem which caused Deacon to begin researching
his book -- a child asked him why animals do not have
simple languages. Yet Bickerton has the answer to these puzzles!! The
smooth and orderly evolutionary process is clearly
visible if we understand first that language is a
System Of Representation before it is a System Of
Communication. All animals with nervous systems and
senses have systems for representing the external world,
with a clearly visible evolutionary path from Venus
Flytraps through cockroaches, fish, frogs, dogs, chimps
and humans. As this Primary Representational System (PRS)
becomes richer and more informative, the animals so
endowed become progressively more ready to develop
"protolanguage" -- the earliest form of language,
clearly visible in pidgins, two-year-old humans, and
the "speech" of chimpanzees. The step from protolanguage
to language has only been taken by us, and it involved
_syntax_ as the defining characteristic. How could Deacon possibly have ignored all of these
extremely intuitive insights? One is forced to conclude
that (a) Deacon didn't actually read Bickerton
(b) Deacon holds these ideas in utter contempt, or
(c) Deacon is behaving like a territorial academic,
ignoring anything which is "Not Invented Here."
Unfortunately, alternative (b) seems unlikely, since
Deacon did put Bickerton in his bibliography. Thus
we are apparently left with (a) and (c) as our
unappetizing choices. Academic power politics may well be involved, too.
Deacon comes from the Harvard axis of academic power,
and he has loads of highly prestigious backers.
Bickerton is only a guy from the University of
Hawaii, and therefore a "lightweight." But there is, to my mind, no question at all (!) of
which book is more helpful -- indeed revolutionary.
Anyone interested in the subject will want both books,
but Bickerton is clearly the man who bears the palm
away.
Rating:
Summary: An ambitious, fascinating and frustrating book
Review: I first reviewed this book when it appeared back in
1998. I found it to be a genuinely thrilling read,
full of original insights. I gamely read it twice,
recommended it widely, and then looked around for other
authors who had written anything at all interesting
on the evolution of the human brain, and the
evolution of language. After several years, I found only one other book which
covers the same essential territory, Derek Bickerton's
"Language and Species," which was published in 1990,
fully eight years before Deacon's book. Deacon includes
Bickerton's book in his bibliography, and even refers
to it in his discussion of creole and pidgin languages. But there is apparently something deeply strange going
on here. We have two books on the evolution of language,
one written by Deacon (who is basically a biologist,
an evolutionary anthropologist, and a polymath) and the
other by Bickerton, who is a linguist and a polymath.
Since the subject is the evolution of language, in
theory the linguist might have an advantage, especially
since Deacon apparently has no linguistic training at
all. Yet Deacon manages to ignore all of Bickerton's most
important points! I'll single out the one I find most
important here. Describing the evolution of language as a
System Of Communication is fraught with problems. As
Deacon points out, there are apparently no "simple
languages" -- there are only animal calls and the hugely
different phenomenon of human speech. This indeed was
the key problem which caused Deacon to begin researching
his book -- a child asked him why animals do not have
simple languages. Yet Bickerton has the answer to these puzzles!! The
smooth and orderly evolutionary process is clearly
visible if we understand first that language is a
System Of Representation before it is a System Of
Communication. All animals with nervous systems and
senses have systems for representing the external world,
with a clearly visible evolutionary path from Venus
Flytraps through cockroaches, fish, frogs, dogs, chimps
and humans. As this Primary Representational System (PRS)
becomes richer and more informative, the animals so
endowed become progressively more ready to develop
"protolanguage" -- the earliest form of language,
clearly visible in pidgins, two-year-old humans, and
the "speech" of chimpanzees. The step from protolanguage
to language has only been taken by us, and it involved
_syntax_ as the defining characteristic. How could Deacon possibly have ignored all of these
extremely intuitive insights? One is forced to conclude
that (a) Deacon didn't actually read Bickerton
(b) Deacon holds these ideas in utter contempt, or
(c) Deacon is behaving like a territorial academic,
ignoring anything which is "Not Invented Here."
Unfortunately, alternative (b) seems unlikely, since
Deacon did put Bickerton in his bibliography. Thus
we are apparently left with (a) and (c) as our
unappetizing choices. Academic power politics may well be involved, too.
Deacon comes from the Harvard axis of academic power,
and he has loads of highly prestigious backers.
Bickerton is only a guy from the University of
Hawaii, and therefore a "lightweight." But there is, to my mind, no question at all (!) of
which book is more helpful -- indeed revolutionary.
Anyone interested in the subject will want both books,
but Bickerton is clearly the man who bears the palm
away.
Rating: 
Summary: a must read for anyone intrested in linguistics
Review: i found this book very intresting. The most important part of this book is the argument against universal grammar. and is the best against it i have saw so far. Deacon offers an alternative "memetic" view of language citing that it is designed for children becuase of its selection pressure. As well as arguing against a 'language organ' by showing various places of neurological activity in the brain. Kanzi the bonobo and the speaking abilities of her also offer a problem for universal linguistics. I do feel this view runs short though. Although Deacon proclaims the universality of deep strucuture is due to selection pressure he gives no reason why language is this identical. also i do not believe the much more difficulty in adults learning languages can simply be attributed to it being based on adapting to children. I feel the chomskyian view of language and that of deacon both have parts correct in them. something that makes the field of linguistics very intresting at the time. A must buy if intrested. The chapters on human evolution also propose some intresting theories such as the first symbols not being verbal. but in ritual such as marriage. A goood overview of how co-evolution effected human development is also in this book. which will make it usefull to many aswell.
Rating:
Summary: An exciting book
Review: I was looking forward to learning Deacon's ideas on the symbolic basis for language-a notion that hasn't been given enough thought by linguists in my estimation. I hope that Deacon's attempt here, which amounts to jamming a square peg in a round hole, doesn't discourage others from looking at the symbolic basis of languages. Both Deacon and the reviewers who speak so glowingly about this book need to do their homework on cognitive psychology, perception science, and linguistics. Deacon takes phenomena that are exceptional and holds them up as a rule in order to support his thesis. The most glaring example of this is found in his discussion of the similarity in names for colors across different languages. He then generalizes on this striking anomaly to support his views. Even worse, and more damaging, is his contention that bonobos and chimps have acquired language. Linguists have convincingly argued that this is not the case and even primatologists are doubtful of this (see "Bonobos" by Franz de Waal). The most substantial claims of chimp language learning has not been peer-reviewed or has not been accepted as such when the claims have examined. Chimps and Bonobos are very clever, but it is very generous to call their rudimentary behavior in selecting symbols (after a lifetime of intensive training) language. Yet Deacon's thesis turns on this assumption. I also found that his notion of symbolic representation confusing and self-referential--even if it does have an element of plausibility on the level that he approached the problem from. Even though I waited eagerly for the book to arrive by mail, I stopped reading it at page 125.
Rating: 
Summary: Provocative but for the wrong reasons.
Review: Most of what I choose to read is non-fiction on cognition, education, memetics, and language. That said, I found this book hard to read. It has some interesting content, but it's broken up by so much detail it's hard to see the big picture. I finally got through it by skimming most of the chapters and doing a close read on bits that were interesting to me. His premise is that physical evolution of human brains and cultural evolution of language have proceeded together, shaping one another, so that languages evolved to be more learnable by humans at the same time humans evolved to be better at language. This kind of interaction is categorized as "Baldwinian selection", which is an elaboration of Darwinian selection (not a conflicting view). Deacon draws evidence from a wide range of sources including paleontology, live brain scans, electrode experiments, and animal behavior.
Rating:
Summary: some interesting content, slow going
Review: Most of what I choose to read is non-fiction on cognition, education, memetics, and language. That said, I found this book hard to read. It has some interesting content, but it's broken up by so much detail it's hard to see the big picture. I finally got through it by skimming most of the chapters and doing a close read on bits that were interesting to me. His premise is that physical evolution of human brains and cultural evolution of language have proceeded together, shaping one another, so that languages evolved to be more learnable by humans at the same time humans evolved to be better at language. This kind of interaction is categorized as "Baldwinian selection", which is an elaboration of Darwinian selection (not a conflicting view). Deacon draws evidence from a wide range of sources including paleontology, live brain scans, electrode experiments, and animal behavior.
Rating:
Summary: A definitive guide to human brain evolution: Outstanding.
Review: Professor Deacon's analysis and discussion of the the evolution of the human brain is a wonderful achievement. He applies his unique combination of expertise in evolutionary theory and neurobiology to present a thoroughly convincing and concise picture of how this important human trait evolved. It will be a cornerstone of human evolutionary neurobiology for years come and is currently recommended reading in the doctoral program in biological anthropology at Yale University.
Rating:
Summary: architectural structure of arguments
Review: Reading only one or two pages into this book already makes it clear that this is a work by an exceptionally well informed and disciplined writer; and reading to the end does not disappoint at any time. This is a tightly argued serious scientific thesis by a professor of biological anthropology with an encyclopedic knowledge of linguistics, neurophysiology, neuroanatomy and human evolution. It is an original work in which Deacon sets out his arguments and marshals the evidence for a comprehensive theory in a methodical and structured way. It is not for the faint hearted, and reading it demands careful attention to the tightly written dense structured prose; it is not repetitive and the logical structure of the arguments is architectural, so that careful reading and a good memory are essential. Useful diagrammatic illustrations help to make some of the concepts easier to grasp. The effort is worth every moment. Deacon's conclusions have consequences for philosophy and theory of mind no less than for the central area of linguistics and the evolution of human intelligence. This book has done more to shape and to consolidate my knowledge of who we as a "symbolic species" are than any other I have read in this decade. Strongly recommended.
Rating:
Summary: Neural Nets from Cultural Experience!
Review: Terrence Deacon has constructed a tome in which he unleashes his considerable learning in quest of several answers to the question, `What are we?' He is uniquely qualified to take an approach which details the origin and development of, first, language, then the brain, and, lastly, their `co-evolution.' Described on the jacket as `a world-renowned researcher in neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology,' all of his background is called upon at various times to pull together the mass of data and supposition that Deacon brings to the table. In spite of the vastness of the territory he covers, Deacon's writing is most often accessible with a quiet wit which carries the reader along. This reviewer must confess, however, that he found the middle section on the evolution of the brain to be pretty dense traffic. Perhaps someone with a stronger neuroscientific background could follow Deacon into the intricacies of `using fly genes to make human brains.' As the title indicates, Deacon attempts to show beyond much reasonable doubt that language does not `innately' exist in the brain like some sort of Chomskyian L.A.D. Instead he wishes to reveal that language itself has adapted to the brain over the years (much as we continue to adapt software programs for ease and complexity to computer hardwares). Over the millennia, language and brain have co-evolved, he reports, and thus there is no need to postulate a generative grammar or a single mother tongue from which all other languages emerged. He rests his case upon `Baldwinian evolution,' the theory of American psychologist Mark Baldwin from a century ago which suggests `that by temporarily adjusting behaviors or psychological responses during its lifespan in response to novel conditions, an animal could produce irreversible changes in the adaptive content of future generations' (pp. 322-323). Such changes over time lead to actual genetic changes. We are, therefore, the symbolic species, the only one who crosses the `symbolic threshold' as a matter of course-though Deacon does recognize that certain apes, chimps, and bonobo have been led across this threshold too. Borrowing from C. S. Peirce, Deacon understands that most species signal each other with iconic reference, a direct response to their environment. More advanced species learn to use indexical reference which indicates a class of potential references. With the development of actual language, we have crossed the symbolic threshold so our symbolic reference is most often to other symbols (each of which is indexically constructed). We take up residence in a `virtual' world with senses of time, space, and personhood unknown to other animals. These ideas will sound extreme to some but his patiently detailed exposition is generally quite convincing. He steps out into pure speculation when he suggests that the marriage contract was likely the origin of symbolic reference. (How else could mates mark their territory when one hunts and one gathers?) He doesn't address consciousness, itself, until page 438, where he follows the Peircean referencing system-iconic, indexical, symbolic-to speak of levels of consciousness, `yet few would be willing to say that the consciousness of a dog or cat is of the same sort that we ascribe to humans' (p. 439). When trying to determine whether or not simpler information processing animals can be said to be conscious, he throws up his hands and declares, `What a complicated mess!' (p. 441). Yet he eventually argues that only symbolic consciousness allows for a sense of selfhood and intersubjectivity: `Its virtual nature notwithstanding, it is the symbolic realm of consciousness that we most identify with and from which our sense of agency and self-control originate' (p. 452). This throws into doubt just what sort of consciousness he is attributing to instinct-bounded nervous systems of iconic reference. Without agency or selfhood, can a creature be fairly thought to be conscious when terms like non-conscious experiencing would do? He seems to understand the degrees of complexity as being fundamentally computational. This being the case, no one should be surprised when he predicts toward the end of his long book that computers will someday be capable of symbolic reference-but first they must attain sentience so as to become capable of self evolution. Not an easy request! If and when this does occur, `[t]he question before us is whether we will begin to treat people like unconscious computers, or come to treat conscious computers like people' (p. 464). A rather jarring note on which to close, I thought, especially for a book which focuses mainly on human mentality and the symbolic reference of language.
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