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Rating: 
Summary: Plain-spoken and compellingly argued
Review: Excellently written and argued, the author proceeds at a calm and steady pace, laying out the many flaws in past and current approaches to the 'mind'.
More importantly, equally well layed out is the contruction of his own view of what he calls "biological naturalism". This view is neither a flavor of behaviorilism nor any other kind of reductionist attempt to deny consciousness. Indeed, consciousness retains it's unique position in his model without the kind of apologetic argument or mysticism (of the kind that usually occurs as a result of unwittingly thinking in the Cartesian dilemma mindset).Most shocking to me was the way in which Searle argued that the mind is not and cannot be an information processing system. As counterintuitive and remarkable as that may sound, it is quite apparently true after reading his arguments. He is not saying that we do not *think*, but rather that equating *thinking* and *information processing* is in error, primarily because the interpretation of symbols, syntax and semantics requires an outside intelligence to make the interpretation, so to say that we are information processing machines makes no sense for it is exactly our own intelligence that we are trying to explain. The devastating impact for AI and cognitive science from this viewpoint is also duly noted in a rather understated way. Likewise, the 'unconscious' loses it's imagined place as part of the mind, replaced with an equally (or perhaps moreso)complex 'Background' of non-conscious and potentially-conscious components. Also, so many activities of the brain that have been deemed as "mental" turn out to have no basis for such an ascription: it turns out they are anthropomorphisms placed on neurobiological processes that neither have intentionality nor mentality. As a result (my opinion), much of psychology and probably many theories of neurobiology are as wayward as their AI counterparts. In the end, the 'mind' that one is left with remains utterly rich and complex, with consciousness and all subjective experience intact and valid. However, now bereft of the possibility of computational models and rules and such to understand the brain in an abstracted programmatic way, and bereft of anthropomorphisms of lower-level brain functioning, we find that the brain is an organ - an organ of great ability and complexity that will require an immense effort to understand and appreciate.
Rating: 
Summary: state of analytic philosophy of mind at the end of century
Review: In this book, Searle briefly reviews the history of the mind-body problem and presents his solution to it. The text is less filled with archaic or strictly philosophical phrases than most books in this field, giving it a comprehensibility that is too often lacking in the mind-body problem. Searle is a brilliant rhetorician, and every one of his arguments is worded in a convincing way. Also, the critique that he presents of the previous work on the mind-body problem is revealing, since he gives what he calls "common-sense objections" to each solution. Overall, an outstanding book.
Rating: 
Summary: Clearest monograph EVER!!!
Review: Searle advocates Biological naturalism" as a valid theory, exposing the misdirectedness of the ever present mind-body problem as being entwined in the western philosophical tradition. Even though Cartesian Dualism has long been predominantly set aside, Searle argues, many of its concepts and vocabulary cloud current theorizing on the subject. Searle argues strongly for recognizing the Subjectivity of consciousness as a 1st-person ontology in itself, unexplainable by an objective epistemology, since its very nature is opposed to that method of investigation. By recognizing this Subjectivity as a property of the brain, and allowing that the mental and physical of the mind-body opposition need not be exclusive, Searle describes consciousness as a property of assemblies of neurons, in the sense that liquidity is a property of H2O moleculse. Unimaginable at the molecular level, but undeniable through a wider point point of view.
The clarity of Searles writing alone makes it worth the read, and his ideas address, if not solve, many of the most interesting topics in the philosophy of mind. Highly recommended to anyone interested in that field.
Rating:
Summary: Accessible and Convincing
Review: Searle approaches philosophy with unusual clarity and thoughtfulness. This book is a convincingly argued account for a philosophy of the mind that is both naturalist and respectful of subjective phenomenal experiences. The importance of this book's themes is only overshadowed by the extraordinarily lucid style with which Searle approaches his subject matter. By taking actual human experience as his starting point, Searle's argument gains force as well as meaning to less philosphically inclined readers. Searle has a knack for making complex issues in recent philosophy accessible to the less experienced reader while not losing any persuasiveness in conveying his argument. This book is a wonderful introduction to the philosophy of consciousness for anyone who has not done extensive work in the field and also a complex and intriguing argument that needs to be considered by the most serious philosophers.
Rating:
Summary: Good overview of the field...
Review: Searle presents a good overview of the field of consciousness theories that is worth the price of this book. I rather enjoy his tone (it would be fun to see Searle, Chalmers and the Churchland's debate their views) and many of his views, particularly as presented here, seem coherent. I believe that his view of the non-existence of the unconscious seems to be incorrect based on the experimental work of Libet and Gazzanadi in particular. He doesn't look at any concrete examples in this area to attempt to explain how many mechanisms that are clearly not accessible to consciousness seem to be communicated to conscious actions.
Rating: 
Summary: The study of the mind is the study of consciousness.
Review: This book gives a good picture of the structure of the mind and of its irreducibility.
It explains clearly what's the stumbling block of all scientific and philosophical problems with consciousness: the fact that the mind is only a subjective first-person experience. But the most interesting part, for me, was his convincing attack against cognitivismn (the theory that the brain is a computer and the mind a computer program). Nevertheless, I found his book 'The Mystery of Consciousness' more interesting, more profound and more specific, because it laid bare the accuracies / errors of other author's who wrote about the same important items.
Rating:
Summary: Clearest monograph EVER!!!
Review: This is the name John Searle gives is philosophy of mind. So what is it? The view, very broadly, is dedicated to the defense of the claim that mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological brain processes, and that these processes are themselves features of the brain. Sounds pretty straightforward to me, but one wonders, where has everyone else gone so hopelessly wrong over the decades? Searle accuses most in the field of the same general "neurotic compulsion" of attempting to force that which Searle views as the most fundamental and essential feature of the mind - consciousness - into various forms of materialism (the 'ol square peg into a round hole trick). Why is this? What fuels this compulsion? For Searle, the compulsion is fueled by a misplaced presumption - that a 20th (21st!) Century scientific world view can niether allow nor accomodate any "subjective ontology" - the fundamentally subjective nature of consciousness - into it. In other words, during each and every attempt to explain the mind, that which constitutes "the mental" is routinely left out of the equation. In the first few chapters, Searle outlines and argues against the various "materialisms" and attempts to "naturalize intentionality," in addition to explaining and arguing in support of the irreducibility of consciousness. In the latter chapters, Searle takes aim at cognitive science and its defenders (scientiffically-minded philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists alike), accusing pretty much everybody of refusing to recognize and accomodate the subjective component of reality - consciousness. Searle goes on to explain his own conception of consciousness as consisting of a "network" and a "background" (but NOT in the unconsious/conscious framework of folk psychology). In last couple chapters Searle takes aim at computational theories of the mind, arguing that a basic grasp of intrinsic vs extrinsic syntax and "the homunculus problem" are sufficient to dispatch them with ease. In the end, Searle supplies us with a simple set of guidelines to help us "get a grip" on ourselves with respect to the philosophy of mind proper: Stop saying things that are false; constantly remind oneself of things or facts known with certainty; never stop asking yourself what actual facts in the world are supposed to correspond with claims about the mental, and; "rediscover the social character of the mind." One has to admit, when all is said and done, a couple things about this book and John Searle. First of all, Searle may very well be the best writer - sylistically - I've ever read to-date. Second, Searle writes with such clarity and with such an attractive "attitude" that his views are terribly difficult to resist. Agree with him or not, this book is fantastically fun to read if you're into the philosophy of mind.
Rating:
Summary: "Biological Naturalism"
Review: This is the name John Searle gives is philosophy of mind. So what is it? The view, very broadly, is dedicated to the defense of the claim that mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological brain processes, and that these processes are themselves features of the brain. Sounds pretty straightforward to me, but one wonders, where has everyone else gone so hopelessly wrong over the decades? Searle accuses most in the field of the same general "neurotic compulsion" of attempting to force that which Searle views as the most fundamental and essential feature of the mind - consciousness - into various forms of materialism (the 'ol square peg into a round hole trick). Why is this? What fuels this compulsion? For Searle, the compulsion is fueled by a misplaced presumption - that a 20th (21st!) Century scientific world view can niether allow nor accomodate any "subjective ontology" - the fundamentally subjective nature of consciousness - into it. In other words, during each and every attempt to explain the mind, that which constitutes "the mental" is routinely left out of the equation. In the first few chapters, Searle outlines and argues against the various "materialisms" and attempts to "naturalize intentionality," in addition to explaining and arguing in support of the irreducibility of consciousness. In the latter chapters, Searle takes aim at cognitive science and its defenders (scientiffically-minded philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists alike), accusing pretty much everybody of refusing to recognize and accomodate the subjective component of reality - consciousness. Searle goes on to explain his own conception of consciousness as consisting of a "network" and a "background" (but NOT in the unconsious/conscious framework of folk psychology). In last couple chapters Searle takes aim at computational theories of the mind, arguing that a basic grasp of intrinsic vs extrinsic syntax and "the homunculus problem" are sufficient to dispatch them with ease. In the end, Searle supplies us with a simple set of guidelines to help us "get a grip" on ourselves with respect to the philosophy of mind proper: Stop saying things that are false; constantly remind oneself of things or facts known with certainty; never stop asking yourself what actual facts in the world are supposed to correspond with claims about the mental, and; "rediscover the social character of the mind." One has to admit, when all is said and done, a couple things about this book and John Searle. First of all, Searle may very well be the best writer - sylistically - I've ever read to-date. Second, Searle writes with such clarity and with such an attractive "attitude" that his views are terribly difficult to resist. Agree with him or not, this book is fantastically fun to read if you're into the philosophy of mind.
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