Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (Oxford Cognitive Science Series)

Rating:
Summary: Pseudoscience: Where Jerry Fodor Went Wrong
Review: This book is offensively bad.

First, when criticizing opponents, Fodor equivocates between empirical theories and a philosophical arguments. One example of this is the (surreal) criticism of Ray Jackendoff's theory as "begging the question"! Thus Fodor again and again engages in what Chomsky calls "strong methodological dualism," which is the penchant for: (1) using a hopelessly idealistic and false model of science to criticize extant empirical theories, and (2) urging the replacement of these empirical theories with a metaphysical view that has no predictive value, and is hence neither verifiable nor falsifiable.

Second, Fodor also ignores every single one of the most important theoretical issues in the theory of concepts, e.g.: (1) actually rigorously hooking up the "language of thought" with an empirical language, (2) compositionally accounting for prototypicality/exemplar effects in the context of the new "theory-theory" of concepts, (3) philosophically investigating the stunning new empirical evidence for some form of rationalism by psychologists such as Frank Keil. . . When Fodor does get near some of these issues he completely ignores (e.g. Montague Grammar, generalized quantifier theory) or fallaciously criticizes (e.g. Jackendoff, Pustejovsky) relevant work.

Seeing one of this centuries' greatest philosophers reduced to this is heartbreaking.

Rating:
Summary: Pseudoscience: Where Jerry Fodor Went Wrong
Review: This book is offensively bad.

First, when criticizing opponents, Fodor equivocates between empirical theories and a philosophical arguments. One example of this is the (surreal) criticism of Ray Jackendoff's theory as "begging the question"! Thus Fodor again and again engages in what Chomsky calls "strong methodological dualism," which is the penchant for: (1) using a hopelessly idealistic and false model of science to criticize extant empirical theories, and (2) urging the replacement of these empirical theories with a metaphysical view that has no predictive value, and is hence neither verifiable nor falsifiable.

Second, Fodor also ignores every single one of the most important theoretical issues in the theory of concepts, e.g.: (1) actually rigorously hooking up the "language of thought" with an empirical language, (2) compositionally accounting for prototypicality/exemplar effects in the context of the new "theory-theory" of concepts, (3) philosophically investigating the stunning new empirical evidence for some form of rationalism by psychologists such as Frank Keil. . . When Fodor does get near some of these issues he completely ignores (e.g. Montague Grammar, generalized quantifier theory) or fallaciously criticizes (e.g. Jackendoff, Pustejovsky) relevant work.

Seeing one of this centuries' greatest philosophers reduced to this is heartbreaking.

Rating:
Summary: Jerry on Concepts: CogSci Made Enjoyable
Review: This deceptively slim book was something of a delight. I was delighted for once to have a relatively brief (and devilishly tongue-in-cheek) overview of positions and thought among what too often strikes me as elitist, territorial, and occasionally even blinkered work in the nominally cross-disciplinary and open-minded field of academia that is Cognitive Science. Similarities and weaknesses among various competing theories and hypotheses were called to attention, and the (largely successful, I believe) explanation and details of the political infighting between prominent theorists was made strikingly clear. Furthermore, Fodor's relaxed language and humor helped ease me, the poor reader, through the dense and convoluted minefield that is the philosophy behind the philosophy of language.

Much as I enjoyed the book, I must refrain from a full five stars for one reason. It wasn't that I found his description and treatment of the theories he presented (particularly those I was familiar with) to be a bit shallow -- after all, Fodor isn't attempting an in-depth literature review, nor is he addressing an audience made up of more than simply his colleagues in related academic fields. Neither was it Fodor's tone, which did strike me as perhaps less than entirely professional -- but on the other hand, his flippant manner and backhanded compliments were a large part of what made the book as a whole enjoyable instead of dry, dense, and a chore to slog through (as too often academic literature of this nature seems to be). And nor was it Fodor's airy disregard for the empirical demands of modern science when he outlines his own theory of concepts -- it's been a few years since Philosophy 101, but I do vaguely remember that this is allowed.

No, my biggest concern, and greatest regret, is that Fodor spent so long criticising the prevailing view that he didn't seem to have enough space left in the book for too much exploration of his own, very interesting, ideas. Yes, yes, it's merely a starting point -- but I'm greedy, I want MORE!

Rating:
Summary: Jerry on Concepts: CogSci Made Enjoyable
Review: This deceptively slim book was something of a delight. I was delighted for once to have a relatively brief (and devilishly tongue-in-cheek) overview of positions and thought among what too often strikes me as elitist, territorial, and occasionally even blinkered work in the nominally cross-disciplinary and open-minded field of academia that is Cognitive Science. Similarities and weaknesses among various competing theories and hypotheses were called to attention, and the (largely successful, I believe) explanation and details of the political infighting between prominent theorists was made strikingly clear. Furthermore, Fodor's relaxed language and humor helped ease me, the poor reader, through the dense and convoluted minefield that is the philosophy behind the philosophy of language.

Much as I enjoyed the book, I must refrain from a full five stars for one reason. It wasn't that I found his description and treatment of the theories he presented (particularly those I was familiar with) to be a bit shallow -- after all, Fodor isn't attempting an in-depth literature review, nor is he addressing an audience made up of more than simply his colleagues in related academic fields. Neither was it Fodor's tone, which did strike me as perhaps less than entirely professional -- but on the other hand, his flippant manner and backhanded compliments were a large part of what made the book as a whole enjoyable instead of dry, dense, and a chore to slog through (as too often academic literature of this nature seems to be). And nor was it Fodor's airy disregard for the empirical demands of modern science when he outlines his own theory of concepts -- it's been a few years since Philosophy 101, but I do vaguely remember that this is allowed.

No, my biggest concern, and greatest regret, is that Fodor spent so long criticising the prevailing view that he didn't seem to have enough space left in the book for too much exploration of his own, very interesting, ideas. Yes, yes, it's merely a starting point -- but I'm greedy, I want MORE!