Rating: 
Summary: amazing framework, weak support.
Review: Chalmers is a philosopher that has contributed greatly to the debate of consciousness. He introduced the "hard problem-easy problem" distinction, has written many papers and edited collections, has a great web-page, and seems to know everything about the literature. This book is his full-lenght exposition of his ideas on consciousness. Chalmers is a declared property dualist (it is not terribly important to know the distinction between property or substance or emergent dualists. suffice to say that they hold that not all mental truths are implied by all the physical truths). His view is, however, not anti-scientific. He claims that indeed we can correlate consciousness with cognitive and neuronal architectures. He also holds a kind of functionalism. His attacks concentrate, however on qualia. So Chalmers distinguishes between the phenomenal aspect of consicousness, and its cognitive aspect, claiming that the former is not logically supervenient on the physical. He has two main arguments for this position, the knowledge argument (knowing everything about physical stuff leaves the possibility of not knowing qualia, so qualia are not physical) and the conceivability argument. Chalmers concentrates on this last one, and it is arguably his strongest argument. It consists of the possibility to conceive of a logically possible world where there are exact, particle-for-particle replicas of us, but who have no qualia (zombies). He aknowledges than in the actual world, this is not possible, but logically the notion is sound, and therefore possible. Therefore qualia are not implied by, supervinient on, the physical.From here Chalmers tries toexplain consciousness and qualia in terms of some notion of "information" to bridge the physical to the qualia, and speculates, in my opinion wildly, on epiphenomenalism (this view possibly forced in by the zombie possibility) and panspychism. Chalmers theory is the most impresive dualistic framework out there. But I do not think his arguments hold. The knowledge argument can be attacked from various points. One can hold that knowledge of qualia is knowledge of a physical fact in a different cognitive access mode. Or that there is no knowledge of qualia facts, but of new abilities. OR that the knowledge aquires is of a fine-grained mode of individuation mode that leaves materialism unscratched. The Zombie argument, is, I think, mush more interesting. We could attack it from functionalistic and information points of view (this last one probably inadequate, considering Chalmers speculations).
If functionalism is true, then the material of what a system is made of is irrelevant to its ability to cause consciousness. If so, and qualia are not-supervenient on the physical and therefore have a nonphysical substrate, one can conceive of a world identical to that one, where the qualia are caused by a purely physical system replacing the nonphysical substrate and qualia remains unchanged. Therefore, in any possible world exactly physically as ours, everyone must have the same qualia, and so, zombies as defined are in fact not possible. The first objection that comes to mind is this one: why would Chalmers ability of conceiving something determine its metaphysical possibility? Does conceivability imply possibility? I do not think it does. Consider the example of a XIX century vitalist, who can conceive of a world physically identical, but where animals, say, are not alive. He concludes that life is a nonphysical phenomenon. He was wrong, but because he did not know about modern genetics, molecular biology, etc. Chalmers knows this objection, but claims it is different from consciousness, because whereas life is a functional process (say, reproduction, feeding, etc.) qualia is not. But my objection would be: does the concepts utilized on the zombie possibility warant the distinction, or the arguments conclusion? I doubt it. For consider the concepts of "functional", "consciousness", "qualia", "physical", all of which are vague, to say the least. This was exactly the vitalist problem. His concepts of life, reproduction, biology, etc.. were incomplete, or flawed. So if the concepts in the zombie case are re-conceptualized, or informed with new developments in science, there is no guarantee that either the nonfunctionality of qualia, nor the arguments validity, as Chalmers states them, will hold.
Rating: 
Summary: Consciousness Appreciated!
Review: Even better than the exciting answers and proposals, which abound in The Conscious Mind, is the fact that it gets the question right. So many of us young students, who turned to philosophy of mind to grapple with the intuitively compelling mind-brain problem, always came away dry, almost wanting to yell: Stop telling us how, where, or in what terms the brain processes information, and start telling us how, on earth, this process relates to conscious experience! So much previous work deals with explaining the brain or our thought processes. But we already know that the brain is a complex piece of machinery. Yet it remains hard to imagine why ANY process, performed by such a machine, should necessarily be experienced phenomenally. This book zeros in on that problem, effectively, and departs from previous attempts to solve the problem by denying it exists. The Conscious Mind is also a comprehensive guide to the whole issue, for all levels. Of course there is room for further discussion, particularly on one point treated in this book. Is the failure of the mind to supervene logically on the brain really just a symptom of the failure of most pehnomena as we know them to follow logically from the matter, or the function, science has attached to them? Sure, as Chalmers appreciates, it is suprising that conscious experience arises from mushy grey stuff, or algorithms, or any objectively described system. But is this any more suprising than that liquidy stuff arises from a certain arrangement of Hydrogen and Oxygen??
Rating:
Summary: models in a mind, of things ephemeral and sublime
Review: I am conscious. If you don't believe me, I have nothing to say to you. I am conscious because I am a subject, and it is in the nature of subjects to be conscious, except when they're not. What does consciousness consist of? For David C., it means access to phenomenal qualities of information. Information is a difference that makes a difference. Physics is matter from the outside in, consciousness is matter from the inside out. Chalmers denies his idea leads to epiphenomenalism, the guess that we only think we're in control, we are really just riding our programs, if you decide to do X, it is because your brain physical processor decided to X, and decided to make you think it was you, conscious, who decided this. I admit I find epiphenomenalism an attractive option-I'm not responsible for my stupid moves, I really don't have to decide anything for the rest of my life, I can stand by, relax, and ride my program. But there is a less strong version, which some theorists embrace-we are somewhat in control, while being somewhat programmed. In this case, our task is to reprogram our brains as elegantly/fairly/artistically as possible, by feeding ourselves the foods of life, text and sext. If information is phenomenal, as he claims, then who notices this phenomenon? A subject. Where does she come from? We are not just information, we are points-of-view. There is a way it is like to be us. This is more than the integral of all info. Without a P.O.V., mentality would be chaos, info struggling against info, with no one to care. But I care. And chaos is not how it feels to be me. I can be quite stabile, amazing, given that constant light-speed burning computationalism is always happening. The brain computes a mind. Love is a computable state. Where does the buck stop? Because it stops. If we built a model of the brain, with atoms being one millimeter size ball bearings, then our brain would be one hundred thousand meters wide! That gives one view of the complexity. Another way is to look at some beautiful trees. You can actually see how complex your mind is, because mind is all we ever know, we see simply models in our mind, of things ephemeral and sublime. Maybe the key is to just realize we don't know what is happening. Like chimps can't understand quantum mechanics, we can't understand mentality. But we're not chimps-we can model reality, approach complexity from simpler levels, which theoretically means the difference, between what we know and what is to be known, approaches zero.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting questions, answers not always clear.
Review: I enjoyed this book; it should be read as a companion to mathematician/neuroscientist Scott's Stairway to the Mind. Both authors take the position of naturalistic dualism (Scott based on emergent properties and nonlinear mathematics) as well as questioning the role of quantum physics in consciousness (both see it as just another factor which still doesn't answer the question). The book provides a welcome comparison and criticism of different theories. Although Chalmers is more honest and humble in his approach than is Dennet, I still believe we are a long ways away from uncovering the ultimate nature of conscious awareness. This being said, the naturalistic dualism of Scott and/or Chalmers seems more reasonable than the reductionism of the Churchlands or Dennet--denying consciousness doesn't make it go away.
Rating: 
Summary: Among the best of its field, but...
Review: I liked this book. To my opinion, it is one of the best instances
of work in the field, mainly due to its moderation. I would recommend it to anyone wanting to get a picture of modern (analytic) philosophy of consciousness. However, I feel that this approach has very little new to say. Most of the argumentation in the book (and more generally in the particular field it represents) is a reworking and translating into modern jargon of arguments that have been put up long time ago by either the greeks (Plato, Aristotle, Democritus) or early western philosophers (Kant, Hume, Descartes). This debt is mostly ignored or unaknowledged. What's more this field is only a small corner in the field of possibilities for the study of consciousness. It is heavily constrained by the dogma of naturalism, the methodological "necessity" of using analytic philosophy and the underlying effort to find a link with the latest fashions in science. Overall, the presend book is a good piece of work, quite informative, but lying in a restricted and (to my opinion) eventually unpromising approach. For a more global and balanced view I would recommend going beyond analytic philosophy to a reading the basics: Plato, Aristotle, Heidegger and Bergson.
Rating:
Summary: very good views!
Review: I thought this book was a great challenge to the neuro-world of junkies who persistes that consciousness is a product of materialism. David Chalmers has done a great job of bringing a different view to the table as he speaks of the phenomenal world vs. the proto phenomenal world. The only thing that i wasnt so in agreement about was the zombie point of view, as i have already mention quite a few times consciousness cannot be reduced or deduced only illusionated as being reduced, to me it is a matter of the perception of a particular entity that is suffering from a incomplete reality of wakefulness, im sure some [body] will say that this is just a personal construct, and sure it would be for any limited person who cannot see pass the limitations of human logic which is grossly our opinions of how we (relate) to what nature reveals to us. Just imagine how lost we would be without eyesight lmao! a lot worser than most are now. As Chalmers pointed out a third personal point of view can only reveal so much and that is mostly face value information, i see an open program so please lets take away the shock value of presuming that what everyone conceives about their reality is purely just their opinion with out any outside influence. Form being form is limited to understanding what consciousness is, as oppose to what it isnt. If form can only identify with form then how can you truly understand the difference between objective form and subjective form inwhich their is a big difference. Consciousness is not a product of the brain, the brain is a mechanism for the experience of this ideal world were the experience of being created is the main drive............. i am still waiting for a sound explanation for coming into being without there being any intentionality that backed such a force, also no such accident has ever been confirmed about consciousness being a miraculuous whatever from some freak collision of free particles. Question to all serious philosophers, do you really need light to create form or ideas, also what objective forms could be seen without contrast? So to me consciousness is much more than what we can determine or put into a book as if we are beyond limitations, please! we are constantly interacting with our objective reality to improve on our limitations! lmao! and ppls views of consciousness is no execption, so enjoy your limitations ppl is just one instant that is point to point. Consciousness is the true experiencer!
Rating:
Summary: An interesting take on the mind/body problem
Review: I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the philosophy of mind or even for anyone who has ever puzzled over the phenomenon of consciousness. Chalmers argues that consciousness is a fact over and above any physical/functional brain processes. His position has the feel of cogency. After all, prima facie it is difficult to conceive of two more different states of affairs than (say) the smelling of a rose and some neural/chemical brain activity. The problem is that when Chalmers delineates the implications of his view one can't avoid the impression that he has reduced himself to absurdity. For example, he ends up with an epiphenomealism of sorts according to which our consciousness states don't affect our behavior. On this point, I, at least, had to ask myself whether I had more faith in Chalmer's arguments or more faith in mental causality. Nonetheless, I really liked the book. It is (with the exception of chapter 2) easy and fun to read, and Chalmers has a wealth of really cool ideas. I enjoied it more than just about anything else on the philosophy of mind that has crossed my path.
Rating:
Summary: very good views!
Review: I'm a man of qualitative words. Philosophy of mind is a new branch of philosophy concentrating on all philosophical topics: from epistemology to metaphysics, ethics, etc. Chalmers, in this book, really gave the most controversial and versatile ideas with thought experiments, on to how the approach to the study of consciousness would be greatly appreciated. With his naturalistic dualism theory: consciousness is naturally supervenient on the physical processes. The way it can be understood is this. Consciousness can be derived with any beings that have formal and informal computational processes. Materialistic, huh? I don't think so. That's why there is still a dualism to support this, consciousness still cannot be explained because of the experience adjoined with the phenomena we have about the surroundings. I highly commend this book for those who want a further understanding and or study of consciousness. P
Rating:
Summary: A Must-Read for All Anti-Reductionists
Review: Philosophical depth would be an understatement. It took me several days of treadmill running to read this completely through. Reviews consciousness concepts up to 1996. Arguments and reasoning from many philosophers are covered. Chalmers presents many important topics such as logical and natural supervenience, reductive explanations of consciousness, and cognitive modeling. He then covers neurobiological approaches such as Edelman. Naturalistic Dualism is also presented. Conceivability vs possibility is covered early on. However, he only covers some of the possible quantum mechanical explanations, such as Everett's "many worlds" hypothesis towards the back of the book, which I felt should be a front cover topic. Overall a great book for those interested in a good overview of the field of possibilities and routes to better understanding of consciousness by one of the founding fathers of the field. A must for the collector of important texts.
Rating:
Summary: one of the best books in philosophy of mind
Review: This is an incredibly important book, as it cogently & decisively challenges a view of mind that is something of a received dogma in philosophy of mind, namely, materialism/physicalism. Chalmers is machine-like in tearing down the superficially strong but ultimately weak arguments from the materialist side. Any impartial reader will come to the conclusion that something is very wrong w/ materialism; the only ones who will deny this are those in the hold of the dogma themselves. Reading through the other reviews here, I have noticed several criticisms the indicate that the reviewer did not read the book in its entirety. For example, one review complains that Chalmers does not recognize the difference between conceivability & possibility, when it fact a significant chunk of the book is devoted to exactly that distinction, w/ Chalmers making it quite clear why the distinction is irrelevant to his argument. One methodological advantage of the book, by the way, is that it is readable by people w/ all levels of philosophical background. Sections that are largely technical are marked w/ an *, and the book is structured so that these sections can be skipped w/o losing the main story & argument of the book. Beware, however, of attempting to critique Chalmers' view on technical philosophical grounds without reading the * sections (as the reviewer mentioned above seems to). Anyway, this is a well-written, important book by one of the most interesting & exciting philosophers around. Anyone interested in philosophy of mind or cognitive science will do well to own it.
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