The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness (Cognition Special Issue)

Rating:
Summary: MUST READ.
Review: Along with Neural Correlates of Consciousness, this is the best book on consciousness yet. Nowhere else will you read anything that gets as close at explaining consciousness scientifically. Its main theme is the workspace theory, in neuropychological, cognitive, philosophical and neurobiological terms. Anyone familiar will notice how naturally this theory follows work done in the last 7 years on the science of consciousness. The theory is simple: conscious representations get their content from diverse modules, but this is not enough. The representations are made available globally to other modules. Synchronization attention,and spatial context help carry this out. Parietal, Frontal and probably cingular cortices are essential in this stage. Consciousness is the global availability of information through the distribuited workspace.

So in all,there is a consensus as to the adequacy of this theory. in quick review of literature, we have Edelman (2000)(Universe of Consciousness) who proposes a dynamc core distribuited in the thalamocortical system, coheherent activity in a sort of workspace. Singer (2000)(paper in NCOC)who postulates that neuronal assemblies are distribuited and accessible to many modules. Lumer(1998), Rees (1999)(papers in NCOC and journals) who find that consciousness is correlate with activity not only in sensory cortex, but parietal and frontal areas- that is, distribuited activity, in a global workspace. Baars (A cognitive theory of consicousness) of course has argued for global workspace theory for years. Papers by Kjaer (2001), Beck(2001), who also find similar evidence, etc.....

The book has 8 papers, every one a jewel. Dehaene reviews the theory and evidence that supports it, as well as placing it in a context of the scientific study of consicousness and its prospects. Driver et al. review neglect syndrome, and how it can serve as evidence for the workspace model, as well as how the model may explain the condition. Knwisher reviews evidence for the neural correlates of consciousness, and concludes that a form of the workspace model emerges. Merikle et al. discuss some methodological issues on unconsicous perception. Parvizi et al. discuss the neurofunctional role of the reticular activating system and its putative role on consciousness. Jack et al. discuss some methodological issues on instrospective reports, and propose an executive function model that fits in with the worspace model. Finally, Block and Dennett both philosophically analyze the workspace model. This is the Dennett paper that I agree with the most, almost in everything, but he again dismisses qualia as merely dispositions.

In short, this book presents the most exiting results on resent research of consicousness, from many prespectives. A consensus as to the neural correlates of consciousness is clearly emerging, and these are indeed exiting times. This book is a must for anyone who has ever wondered about how consciousness "emerges" from the brain. Absolutely great and necessary read.

Rating:
Summary: Fantastic
Review: This excellent book, written more for experts than for laymen, consists of eight closely linked papers, six written by cognitive neuroscientists, the remaining two by philosophers. Its primary raison d'etre is to discuss the relation between a human's response to his environment and his consciousness of it. It seems that we can muster certain responses to stimuli ONLY when we are conscious of those stimuli, but that other kinds of responses don't require consciousness. It seems to follow that the brain states accompanying consciousness of particular events are capable of executing functions that other brain states cannot. If true, this fact will help us to identify WHAT consciousness-producing brain-states look like, which is currently one of the chief goals of consciousness research. Speculation along these lines is provided. However, we need to know more about which behaviors only occur when consciousness is present. Further, many experiments will remain difficult to interpret until we understand better the relationship between conscious experiences and experimental subjects' reports ABOUT those experiences on which investigators rely for evidence. What happens if a subject sometimes reports having been conscious of an event when he wasn't, or vice versa? How can we verify/rule out that such things happen? Methodological issues along these lines are also discussed.

The main ideas presented in this book have been around for a long time, but until recently experiments allowing us verify/refine them, have been few and far between. In the last decade, as consciousness research has become a legitimate discipline, and as neuroscience research has exploded in general, the situation has improved, due in part to the research described here.

The book's organization is exemplary for its type. One of its distinguishing features is that the contributing authors read each others' papers and wrote about them in their own. As a result, experiments and ideas are revisited multiple times from different perspectives, an agreeable feature in a work on a subject as difficult as consciousness. What the book lacks in breadth it makes up for many times over (in my opinion) in the depth of its treatment of a few key issues.