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Summary: Consciousness and Functional Reduction
Review: Kim's proposal about reduction is persuasive. Since Nagelian Model of standard reduction collapsed, philosophers haven't dared to build up a new one. Now we have Kim's functional reduction. But it is doubtable that his reduction can be applied to the case of consciousness. In his another book (Philosophy of Mind), he said that qualia problem is not captured by materialism and non-reductive materialism must meet the problem of downward causation or causal realism. Thus, he confessed that the two difficult problems are entangled: consciousness and mental causation. This book can't solve that problem, but I'm expecting his next elaboration. Anyway, in this book, he achieves new model of reduction through his original arguments! If his model is decisive, he has overcome the problem of functionalism vs. physicalism! Overall, Kim's arguments are clear and easy to follow. But the debate about "generalization" (chapter 2 & 3) leaves a room for controversy.
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Summary: In my top ten philosophy books! Wow!
Review: This book is great because after a great page you turn and get another, and another.... For the reader, an orgiastic feast of clear, insightful explanations of reductionism, the reigning non-reductive materialism, and dualism. Kim admittedly has no startlingly new theory which he hasn't expressed before, so the book is more of a textbook than a new thesis. But it simply overflows with illuminating presentations of the various aspects of the mind-body problem. And the argument that our only real choices are substance dualism and hardcore reductionism is excellent. Kim, no substance dualist, opts for reductionism. Non-reductive materialist functionalism, property dualism, anomalous monism - all these are either confusions or substance dualism in disguise. It gives us epiphenomenalist property dualists a kick in the rear. CORRECTION: I recently met Kim and asked him whether he was a reductionist, just to make sure. He said that people often misread him that way. Yes, he's saying there is a stark choice between dualism and reductionism, with no "non-reductive materialist" middle ground. But he's a dualist (actually, a property dualist, not a substance dualist).
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Summary: Let's get serious about the metaphysics of mind
Review: This is a must for anyone who's in need of an adequate physicalist metaphysics for the mind. Kim's clarity invites even the not so technically trained young philosopher to consider the puzzles that arise when one is committed to an antireductionist stance on the nature of mentality. Aside from its excellent historical account of the mind-body problem since the Smart-Feigl central-state materialism, I think that the major contribution this book makes is precisely the confrontation of the possibility of us remaining antireductionists and still consistently claim that the mental is real, in the sense of its having autonomous causal potency. If you believe, as many functionalists do, that mental properties (functional properties) could be understood as second-order properties defined in terms of the causal/nomic relations of its first-order realizers, please read this book!! You'll be surprised by how untidy the metaphysics of functionalism has been since its inception in the late sixties. Kim once more has shown that his work is here to stay.
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