Rating: 
Summary: Excellent Attempt by Damasio to Explain Us to Ourselves
Review: Damasio breaks down into minute, qualitative descriptive detail how the boby/brain functions in humans, and ergo, de facto, many mammals. This book's strength is that Damasio backs up his claims regarding neural anatomy, physiology, and function with specific examples from comparative neuropathology. The book's weakness is that he goes on at length with qualitative descriptions for non-intuitive notions like how the body and brain function as a singular unit, and how emotions and feelings are integral along with body/brain physiology. I say this is the book's weakness because Damasio often bogs down and even tries to describe phenomena that are possibly ineffable, but these attempts at qualitative description are also one of the strengths of this book. This may seem contradictory, but possibly the book would have read differently if the author had stuck to purely quantitative case studies. However he did not, so we get through Damasio's several qualitative, alternate descriptions of singular phenomena an attempt to flesh out and make organic the dry clinical data. On the one hand the book could have been more concise without the extended descriptive sections, on the other hand the book possibly becomes richer and more meaningful because of them; this is up to the reader to decide.Having said this, the book itself endeavors to demonstrate how consciousness emerges from gross neuroanatomy and physiology. In this Damasio is successful in using neuropathology to define terms such as: homeostasis, consciousness, language, mental images, neuronal maps, cathexis, and hedonic tone (although he does not use these two latter terms explicitly). In all honesty Damasio is very strict about defining his terms. Even though the author writes to a popular audience some knowledge of neuroanatomy and physiology is helpful in reading this book for maximum effect; although this book would be a good beginning for those interested in neurology. In General, the appendix, 'Notes on Mind and Brain,' should probably be read prior to reading the main body of text, especially if the reader is weak in basic neurology. In any event, Damasio is big on forming neologisms although he spends adequate time defining and explaining them. As a neurologist, he always couches his arguments in materialist, Darwinistic terms. A good way to describe the structure of this often rambling, inchoate book, is to briefly compare it to Dr. Paul McLean's triune brain model. The triune brain posits the reptilian brain (brain stem) as primary, the mammal brain (thalamus, limbic, etc.) as secondary, and the primate brain (cortex) emerging evolutionarily later as tertiary. Damasio uses a similar foundation in positing the proto-self, the core self, and the autobiographical self (I told you there were a lot of neologisms), but he does so in a way that has them all hang together as a synchronous, functioning unit. The proto-self is rather the sense of homeostatic organism state, where the core self is the 'transcient but conscious reference to the individual organism in which events are happening' (to get a taste of Damasio's descriptive effluence), and the autobiographical self is the more cortical, temporal sense of self derived from transcendental yet highly efficacious ideas about past and future. It can all get pretty incoherent, but a complete reading of the book supplies numerous neural correlates which shore up the author's assertions. In the end it is hard not to recommend this book because, in the reading of it, the author lights upon accurate though transitory descriptions of what it means to have a brain and be conscious. He places emotions and feelings (better see his definitions of these two terms) in their proper place in neural events. Indeed Damasio does well in defining a neural basis for epistemology [p. 130, 137, 138, 296, 305, 316] and idealism [p. 320, 322]. In closing Damasio admits that 'we cannot characterize yet all the biological phenomena that take place between (a) our current description of a neural pattern, at varied neural levels, and (b) our experience of the image that originated in the activity within the neural maps.' Indeed we may never be able accomplish such a correlation absolutely, but in the reading of a book such as this one, and say, Edelman's "A Universe of Consciousness," we see we are not very far off either.
Rating: 
Summary: The Science of Writing Over Your Knowledge
Review: Damasio has clearly mastered the art of big words and antiquated phrases to explain that which he couldn't explain in plain English. I think that if he had left the thesaurus alone instead of trying to write this book as though he were writing to college professors, I would have enjoyed it more.
I don't think of myself as a dummy by any means, yet I felt I had to keep looking up words or presuming their meaning as I read his book.
Rating:
Summary: Tony tumbles temples
Review: Damasio is not one to let traditional concepts restrain expression of good research. This book overturns many long-held ideas, replacing them with fresh insights on how our minds and bodies interact. Not afraid to tackle the big questions, Damasio offers a rich, substantial analysis of how our brains and bodies interact. That interaction is called our "mind". It's not always easy to see how these two aspects of ourselves are so intimately merged, but Damasio makes it all clear in this book. Why does consciousness feel to us in the manner it does? Essential to Damasio's analysis of consciousness is his division of it. "Core" consciousness is the brain's "automatic" processes - breathing, heartbeat and the countless other biological functions. "Extended" consciousness is the realm of memory, conception, "thinking" and other aspects we generally associate with the mind. The latter are those featured in most cognitive studies, which he argues are inadequate. Damasio stresses repeatedly that the "core" - "extended" distinction isn't absolute. The links between core and extended consciousness are multiple and varied. They occur in many places in the brain and its association with the rest of the body. He calls for further studies on those interactions as the foundation for a better understanding of full consciousness. Damasio has particularly fine presentation skills. He puts us at ease in describing his patients, his theories and how they fit together. His patients, after all, are only us with some brain disturbance. Many are people we could encounter daily. They have, however, suffered some malady that disconnects essential parts of their brains' mechanism. Damasio explains in an intimate conversational style what they are suffering. Consciousness in these people has been impaired. The impairment is in the realm of emotion and feeling. Those two terms are the core of Damasio's thesis. Unlike mainstream cognitive scientists, he separates them, with one being the "public" expression and the other private. Feelings belong to us, where emotions are shared with the world. He is breaking new ground in cognitive studies with his work. The result is a highly detailed book, with intense examination of brain operations. A reader unfamiliar with these topics may find the book increasingly challenging as you progress through the topics. The rewards for persistence, however, are rich. Damasio has provided an innovative scenario of how consciousness is structured. This book deserves serious attention and will remain fundamental for some time.[stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating:
Summary: Tony tumbles temples
Review: Damasio is not one to let traditional concepts restrain expression of good research. This book overturns many long-held ideas, replacing them with fresh insights on how our minds and bodies interact. Not afraid to tackle the big questions, Damasio offers a rich, substantial analysis of how our brains and bodies interact. That interaction is called our "mind". It's not always easy to see how these two aspects of ourselves are so intimately merged, but Damasio makes it all clear in this book. Why does consciousness feel to us in the manner it does? Essential to Damasio's analysis of consciousness is his division of it. "Core" consciousness is the brain's "automatic" processes - breathing, heartbeat and the countless other biological functions. "Extended" consciousness is the realm of memory, conception, "thinking" and other aspects we generally associate with the mind. The latter are those featured in most cognitive studies, which he argues are inadequate. Damasio stresses repeatedly that the "core" - "extended" distinction isn't absolute. The links between core and extended consciousness are multiple and varied. They occur in many places in the brain and its association with the rest of the body. He calls for further studies on those interactions as the foundation for a better understanding of full consciousness. Damasio has particularly fine presentation skills. He puts us at ease in describing his patients, his theories and how they fit together. His patients, after all, are only us with some brain disturbance. Many are people we could encounter daily. They have, however, suffered some malady that disconnects essential parts of their brains' mechanism. Damasio explains in an intimate conversational style what they are suffering. Consciousness in these people has been impaired. The impairment is in the realm of emotion and feeling. Those two terms are the core of Damasio's thesis. Unlike mainstream cognitive scientists, he separates them, with one being the "public" expression and the other private. Feelings belong to us, where emotions are shared with the world. He is breaking new ground in cognitive studies with his work. The result is a highly detailed book, with intense examination of brain operations. A reader unfamiliar with these topics may find the book increasingly challenging as you progress through the topics. The rewards for persistence, however, are rich. Damasio has provided an innovative scenario of how consciousness is structured. This book deserves serious attention and will remain fundamental for some time.[stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating: 
Summary: Consciousness is emotion
Review: Damasio's book is sometimes very technical (neuroscience, brain physiology) and sometimes very philosophical.
He shows us convincingly that consciousness is emotion and that core-consciousness is not a 'homunculus in the brain' or language or memory or mental representation (images).
He refutes D. Dennett's proposition that consciousness has something to do with language. On the contrary, it erupted before (not with) the dawning of language.
He admits the Schopenhauerian (and Darwinian) point of view that consciousness came into being and developed rapidly only as a means of survival because the living beings who got it, had a better chance to live longer and procreate more.
But more fundamentally, for him the key to the biology of consciousness is the homeostatic regulation and its fundamental values: reward or punishment, pleasure or pain, attraction or rejection, personal pros or cons and ultimately good (in the sense of 'life') or harm (in the sense of 'death').
This profound observation has deep moral implications, because it assumes a biological foundation of good (peace) and harm (war).
The author himself doesn't develop the human aspects of his statement, but we should at least think about those, as the great evolutionist George C. Williams said.
This is a thought-provoking book, although the presentation was for me more or less confusing and sometimes too detailed.
I should also recommend G. Edelman's 'A universe of consciousness' and V. Ramachandran's 'Phantoms in the brain'.
Rating:
Summary: great Book.
Review: Dmasio has been setting the background for his theory of consciousness from the early 90es with publications on convergence zones, and on neuropsychology. His book Descartes Error discusses emotional and affective states as regulated by homeostatic processes, an important part of his theory of consciousness. His is a second order theory of consciousness with an special role for the self. He starts with definitions, and he introduces many concepts, some of which are useful, others too vauge or not-obviously helpful. He introduces the proto-self, the core-self, and the autobiographical self. Consciousness will itself consist in core consicousness and extended consciousness. The proto self is just an image of the body as represented by homeostatic and regulating mechanisms of the brain. Brain stem nuclei, hypothalami, insular and somatosensory cortices are essential in this story. The proto self in nonconscious, and is the foundation of the core self one of the protagonists of the making of consicousness. Consciousness is a feeling because it is rooted on the proto self, on body signals. The core self is is a transistent and repeatedly re-created entity for each object. Damasio holds that it is the core self in relationship with an object that is essential for consciousness. The object is just the content of perceptual representations, and is largely understood. Core Consciousness then is about two things. The organism (core self)involved in relating to an object, and the object in the relation causing the organims to change. (So perception has effects on bodily states, on musculoskeletal reactions, etc..). Consciousness is create in 3 steps according to Damasios model. The first step leads to a non verbal account of what happens in the brain when the organism interacts with the object, a mapped narrative that creates the feeling of knowing. Then objects of the organisms experience are reactivated mnemonically in recall by core consicousness. Collections of these memorized objects become the objects of ones autobiography, and so the autobiographical self is created. Finally, the holding simustaniously active the images of the autobiographical self and the object, with the enhancement of language, memory, attention and learning, creates the extended consciousness familiar to humans. The neural mappings of the object and the organism reacting to the object are first order maps. This is insufficient for core consicousness. Consciousness occurs when an organim forms a second order mapping of the happenings of the first orer maps, second order maps that describe the relationship between the object and the organism. The second order maps represent the organism in the process of making first order maps related to the aprprehension of an object. This is the crucial step in Damasios account. Proposed neural sites of these second order mappings are the colliculus, the thalamus, the cingulate cortices, some medial parietal areas and the predrontal areas. For theoretical reasons, Damasio favours the thalamus and the cingulate cortices. Damasio presents a lot of evidence in favour of his theory, but to my mind, not all of it is remotely conclusive. For example, Damasio cites that cingulate damage creates akinetic mutism, and holds this helps his case. But he does not tells us that not all cingulate damage causes akinetic mutism, nor that akinetic mutism is not described by patients as unconsciousness, but as a loss of thought and volition. Thalamus damage causes loss of consciousness, as do some nuclei involved in creating the proto-self. But the reasons for this are that (thalamus, and reticular activating system) these contribute to cortical activation in general. They may play a role in Damasios speculations, but this is not obvious. He dismisses frontal and parietal areas too quickly. Parietal damage can cause neglect, whcih is a disturbance of consciousness. If it is true that frontal lobe damage does not cause loss of consicousness, it is not clear that it might not be a sufficient(assuming there are many of these) but not necessary condition for it. Working memory and planning might enrich extended consciousness considerably. Damasio is also holding a philosophical position when he holds that a second order patern is whan creates consciousness. Contrast this whith HOT theories who claim that consicousness is having second order thoughts about other thoughts. If so, objection to HOT theories might be raised against damasio. Is this higher order map necessary and sufficient for consciousness, or only to instrospective mechanisms, self-consciousness, or cognitive higher abilities? How about phenomenal consicousness? Is the cingulate important for consicousness because of the role damasio gives to it, or because (as many studies show) the cingulate modulates attentive, emotional, and intrasensory integration functions? Damasio himself notes that attention, emotions and other functions may be linked to consciousness, but are not consicousness . How about theories that hold that the sufficient and necessary conditions for, say, consicousness of color, is simply activation in v4, a first order map, as many studies suggest? is attention really independent of consciousness, as Damasio holds? research shows that attention might be a pre-condition for a stimulus to enter awareness. Damasio got some things right, but he undoubtedly got others wrong. His approach is ambitious and informative, as well as very plausible. I recomend this book highly, but I do not think at the end Damasios theory will stand as it is presented in this book.
Rating:
Summary: Remarkable Ideas
Review: I am not a neurologist or a philosopher. The book was in the 'new books' rack at our library and I picked it up out of curiosity. Except for the technical descriptions of different parts of the brain (which were way beyond my ability to absorb) I found the book fascinating! Within the first few chapters I wanted to write Dr. Damasio and complement him on several of his insights. Having read the book I am dying to find someone to discuss some of the ideas he introduces. There are dozens of exciting implications to his work. For instance, he talks about consciousness making consciences possible. On a strickly biological level it may be difficult for an organism to have more than one 'self' and survive, but could consciences be the result of a 'self' feeling that more than one organism 'belongs' to it? If we could get past DNA and draw parallels between families or societies and biological organism, a human's self would take on multiple dimensions. Another tantalizing question - could the 'search for truth' Dr Damasio mentions also be rooted in the homeostatic mechanism? The mind appears to be a very complex information system. It must have 'diagnostic' capabilities to sort out and deal with failing components (we all get hurt, become ill and grow old). Perhaps the search for truth, the process of ferreting out contradictions, is a 'diagnostic' grown to a new level. It is a very though provoking book.
Rating:
Summary: shoddy writing, wonderful ideas
Review: I have to take a middle-ground stand here. I agree with both the negative and positive reviews. Damasio has written what could have been a terrific book; yet he missed the mark by a mile. He writes like a sociologist instead of neuroscientist: he repeats his thesis twenty different ways. It seems he didn't have enough information to make a real book, so he restates the same points, and it gets tiring. The subject is facinating. The brain anatomy is facinating. The book, however, is not. My recommendation is only lukewarm--and I'm sure there are other books out there that tell the same story in more readable writing.
Rating:
Summary: The Feeling of What Happens is Extraordinary!
Review: I've read The Feeling of What Happens several time over -- it's extraordinary. Ledoux's Emotional Brain use to be my "most important book ever written." Now this one is. These guys really are getting to the essence of who/what/why we humans are. Maybe in time to save the species. That emotion and consciousness are not separable and that origin of self comes from a representation of the body via body signals/emotions/feelings is almost obvious/intuitive now that I've read Damasio's book. He biologically/scientifically (and convincingly) explains consciousness without getting bogged down in the qualia/quantum theory mumbo jumbo. All psychotherapists/counselors should/must read this book. But most of them are too ignorant of the biology of emotions and consciousness, relying instead on the Holy Scriptures of cognitive therapy, to appreciate this book's importance. A must read for any one who is reasonably conscious. Phenomenal book. Thanks Damasio
Rating:
Summary: The biological roots of consciousness explored.
Review: Like Damasio, I never believed it when people told me that language produces the conscious mind. Following Damasio's line of thought is actually a lot easier. His central idea, that our sense of self arises from our need to map >relations between the self and other objects, is thoroughly explained in the book. He backs it with numerous medical case stories,
where some are a bit unsettling. After all we are talking about real people here, real people with some serious problems. His model of consciousness works like Lego bricks, where his notions of proto-self, core-self, autobiographical-self etc. gives a very credible account of what is going on. Surely, one could think that consciousness is way to complex to begin to describe - but here you actually get some valuable insights without being thrown into the all to popular explanations! The vital points begins to sink in, when they are explained from different angles. Still it is not an entirely trivial matter to state something like: Core self is created out of nowhere in the account where an organism is caught in he act of representing its own changing state, as it goes about representing something else. But Damasio gets away it, and in the end you tend to believe him. It is really a wonderful book about a difficult and extremely interesting subject. A major work that you are really happy to have read.
-Simon
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