Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System

Rating:
Summary: Clear, concise, visionary
Review: Tirole has written an invaluable book that sheds light to a complex and extremley actual topic. By showing once again his seriousness as an economist (as opposed to others; i.e. Stiglitz), he goes back to first principles to understand the source of problems in international contracts. The application of modern corporate finance to international finance is extraordinary.
Even the first chapters should be obligatory reading to any student of international macro (even in the first macro course). The first one gives a concise history of modern currency crisis -the so called first twenty-first century crisis- while the second one masterfully summarizes the economists views on the subject.
Good economics, great topic, amazing timing.

Rating:
Summary: An original and groundbreaking approach to financial crises
Review: While most economists are still puzzled by the most recent foreign exchange and banking crises - such as the ones that took place last year in Argentina and Uruguay - and some of them (like Stiglitz) are proposing reckless and innefective solutions, such as abolishing the IMF and most of the existing international agencies, Jean Tirole presents a more pensive and fruitful explanation of why these crises occur, and sheds new light towards a much more effective solution. His approach is based on a new field of agency theory called Corporate Finance, which deals with the set of institutions that make it credible for the suppliers of funds to recover their investments in an specific firm.

Tirole applies the basic principles of the prudential regulation of banks, that he worked before in collaboration with Mathias Dewatripont (MIT Press, 1994, ISBN: 0262041464), and which contains much of what we have learned through the twentieth century about financial crises. According to this approach, both the international financial and monetary systems would work much better if we had international risk classifying agencies on the one hand, providing information to investors about the liquidity and solvency of debtor countries, and a lender of last resort on the other. The trouble with the IMF is that it tries to perform both functions.

However, what makes external borrowing more complicated than a typical financial arrangement is the presence of a third player, that is the borrower's government which has both the incentives and the means to affect the foreing investor's return by manipulating the exchange rate or the capital mobility. Because the investors' return is affected by the behaviour of two agents, the borrower himself and its government, Tirole calls this a dual agency problem.

Tirole proposes an institutional reform in which the IMF should redefine its original mission, by concentrating in the role of facilitating the country's favourable access to foreign borrowing. This role underlies the (controversial) task of pre-qualification and conditionality. The IMF should also redefine its internal structure if it wants to perform well this new role. Its Board of Governors is too big and too heterogeneous to allow rapid and efficient decisions.

In summary, this book presents and original and groundbreaking approach to financial crises which, as we expected from the beginning, arises more questions than answers. However, we know that the only way to find the appropriate solution to a problem is by formulating the right questions, and this is exactly what Tirole does. I am convinced that if the international agencies follow this approach they will soon find the right way to prevent or to lessen international financial crises, in the same way as central banks and financial regulatory agencies did with domestic banking crises during the last century.