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The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell Studies in Political Economy)

The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell Studies in Political Economy)

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Rating: 4 stars
Summary: Renewing the Debate about the Causes of European Integration
Review: Andrew Moravcsik boldly makes the case for the centrality of the three largest member states in the construction of Europe. In this volume, Moravcsik articulates his "liberal intergovernmentalist" (LI) framework of analysis and utilizes primary sources to strengthen his response to Paul Pierson's "historical institutionalist" (HI) account of European integration. As Moravcsik explains, in making the choice for Europe

"...it was the deliberate triumphs of European integration, not its unintended side-effects, that appear to have increased support for further integration. This is the key point of divergence between HI theory and the tri-partite "liberal intergovernmentalist" interpretation advanced here. For most governments, inducing economic modernization-even with unpleasant side-effects-was the major purpose of European integration." (p. 491)

One of the strongest contributions of Moravcsik's volume is to revisit the classic neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist debate and to place it in a new theoretical context. To Moravcsik's credit, this tome offers a detailed, thorough and remarkably organized assessment of competing explanations in the European integration literature. Students and scholars of integration will grapple with the issues raised as a result of this work for years to come.

Moravcsik's volume challenges the "myths" of European integration and calls into question the relevance of actions taken by supranational entrepreneurs. National versus supranational debates notwithstanding, Monnet's (and later Delor's) talent was to seize a moment in history when Europe was at the brink of continuity or change. Monnet's use of crisis as opportunity sought to alter fundamentally the way in which France and Germany interacted within the European system. Is this not the essence of the Schuman Plan in 1950, namely, to use the opportunity to modernize France economically as part of an equation to make future wars with its neighbor across the Rhine impossible?

Although convergence was already apparent among European economies, did the initial political decision to pool the critical resources in the making of war, to integrate in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), require individuals like Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer and Hallstein to work against the fact that European states mistrusted each other and were therefore disinclined to integrate? It is most unfortunate that volume length does not permit Moravcsik to cover this initial case. In the light of the ECSC experience, was the agreement to create the Common Market in 1958 intrinsically about making European countries richer? The archival research of Raymond Poidevin and Andreas Wilkens sheds light on the experience of the ECSC. Their writings may help us evaluate the extent to which the initial experiments in integration, including the aborted European Political Community (EPC) and European Defense Community (EDC), influenced the interests of the Six during the Treaty of Rome negotiations. References to Poidevin's work are scarce among the 1116 footnotes in The Choice for Europe. There are some citations of Wilken's writings, but not those that critically evaluate the impact of Monnet's role during the period 1950-57.

In Moravcsik's analysis, economic interests, asymmetrical interdependence and more credible commitments, respectively, drive states to negotiate, cooperate and integrate in Europe. Moravcsik candidly (and correctly) acknowledges that his primacy of economics explanation is less helpful to our understanding of German motivations to cooperate in Europe. In the French case, does Moravcsik's revisionist account successfully convince us that de Gaulle emphasized national economic interests over geopolitical priorities or an ideology of grandeur? By asserting that ideas motivate only when no strong interest is involved, does Moravcsik's account draw an unnecessary dividing line between the General's socio-economic and geo-political goals? It may be argued that the General's priorities were inextricably intertwined as President to assure the country's place as the first among states in Europe. My own volume on the Maastricht process demonstrates the relevance of two-level analysis. Other writings about Britain's role in the Maastricht negotiations likewise stress the importance of simultaneous domestic-international interactions in intergovernmental conference diplomacy. Given that Moravcsik's own prior writings strikingly illustrate the contributions of Putnam's model, it is puzzling why he does not emphasize two-level games in The Choice for Europe. Moreover, the potential for interactions among the three analytical stages Moravcsik defines in his book, namely, preference formation, interstate bargaining and implementation, also warrants more attention in future editions.

The phenomenal number of sources cited in Moravcsik's tome is a compelling reason to include a bibliography, including the names, places and dates of all interviews conducted. This would help the reader locate cited materials more efficiently. Moreover, it would underline Moravcsik's attention to primary sources which brings us to a methodological point. Moravcsik does not cite magazine or newspaper articles and relies a good deal on confidential interviews. It may be argued that journalistic writings are helpful when "hard" primary sources, namely, internal government documents, are systematically cross checked with these accounts. Accurate journalistic reporting, when referenced consistently, can also confirm or deny explanations given in confidential interviews. These techniques allow for a greater degree of transparency in source materials.

The preceding points are evidence that, given the numerous questions this volume raises, Moravcsik has admirably achieved his most important objective: to renew the intellectual-practitioners' debate about the fundamental causes of European integration. The Choice for Europe is recommended to a wide audience as an unprecedented work that incorporates elements of comparative politics, international relations and political economy in a historical narrative that challenges us to think critically about the reasons why states choose to cooperate.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: Renewing the Debate about the Causes of European Integration
Review: Andrew Moravcsik boldly makes the case for the centrality of the three largest member states in the construction of Europe. In this volume, Moravcsik articulates his "liberal intergovernmentalist" (LI) framework of analysis and utilizes primary sources to strengthen his response to Paul Pierson's "historical institutionalist" (HI) account of European integration. As Moravcsik explains, in making the choice for Europe

"...it was the deliberate triumphs of European integration, not its unintended side-effects, that appear to have increased support for further integration. This is the key point of divergence between HI theory and the tri-partite "liberal intergovernmentalist" interpretation advanced here. For most governments, inducing economic modernization-even with unpleasant side-effects-was the major purpose of European integration." (p. 491)

One of the strongest contributions of Moravcsik's volume is to revisit the classic neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist debate and to place it in a new theoretical context. To Moravcsik's credit, this tome offers a detailed, thorough and remarkably organized assessment of competing explanations in the European integration literature. Students and scholars of integration will grapple with the issues raised as a result of this work for years to come.

Moravcsik's volume challenges the "myths" of European integration and calls into question the relevance of actions taken by supranational entrepreneurs. National versus supranational debates notwithstanding, Monnet's (and later Delor's) talent was to seize a moment in history when Europe was at the brink of continuity or change. Monnet's use of crisis as opportunity sought to alter fundamentally the way in which France and Germany interacted within the European system. Is this not the essence of the Schuman Plan in 1950, namely, to use the opportunity to modernize France economically as part of an equation to make future wars with its neighbor across the Rhine impossible?

Although convergence was already apparent among European economies, did the initial political decision to pool the critical resources in the making of war, to integrate in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), require individuals like Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer and Hallstein to work against the fact that European states mistrusted each other and were therefore disinclined to integrate? It is most unfortunate that volume length does not permit Moravcsik to cover this initial case. In the light of the ECSC experience, was the agreement to create the Common Market in 1958 intrinsically about making European countries richer? The archival research of Raymond Poidevin and Andreas Wilkens sheds light on the experience of the ECSC. Their writings may help us evaluate the extent to which the initial experiments in integration, including the aborted European Political Community (EPC) and European Defense Community (EDC), influenced the interests of the Six during the Treaty of Rome negotiations. References to Poidevin's work are scarce among the 1116 footnotes in The Choice for Europe. There are some citations of Wilken's writings, but not those that critically evaluate the impact of Monnet's role during the period 1950-57.

In Moravcsik's analysis, economic interests, asymmetrical interdependence and more credible commitments, respectively, drive states to negotiate, cooperate and integrate in Europe. Moravcsik candidly (and correctly) acknowledges that his primacy of economics explanation is less helpful to our understanding of German motivations to cooperate in Europe. In the French case, does Moravcsik's revisionist account successfully convince us that de Gaulle emphasized national economic interests over geopolitical priorities or an ideology of grandeur? By asserting that ideas motivate only when no strong interest is involved, does Moravcsik's account draw an unnecessary dividing line between the General's socio-economic and geo-political goals? It may be argued that the General's priorities were inextricably intertwined as President to assure the country's place as the first among states in Europe. My own volume on the Maastricht process demonstrates the relevance of two-level analysis. Other writings about Britain's role in the Maastricht negotiations likewise stress the importance of simultaneous domestic-international interactions in intergovernmental conference diplomacy. Given that Moravcsik's own prior writings strikingly illustrate the contributions of Putnam's model, it is puzzling why he does not emphasize two-level games in The Choice for Europe. Moreover, the potential for interactions among the three analytical stages Moravcsik defines in his book, namely, preference formation, interstate bargaining and implementation, also warrants more attention in future editions.

The phenomenal number of sources cited in Moravcsik's tome is a compelling reason to include a bibliography, including the names, places and dates of all interviews conducted. This would help the reader locate cited materials more efficiently. Moreover, it would underline Moravcsik's attention to primary sources which brings us to a methodological point. Moravcsik does not cite magazine or newspaper articles and relies a good deal on confidential interviews. It may be argued that journalistic writings are helpful when "hard" primary sources, namely, internal government documents, are systematically cross checked with these accounts. Accurate journalistic reporting, when referenced consistently, can also confirm or deny explanations given in confidential interviews. These techniques allow for a greater degree of transparency in source materials.

The preceding points are evidence that, given the numerous questions this volume raises, Moravcsik has admirably achieved his most important objective: to renew the intellectual-practitioners' debate about the fundamental causes of European integration. The Choice for Europe is recommended to a wide audience as an unprecedented work that incorporates elements of comparative politics, international relations and political economy in a historical narrative that challenges us to think critically about the reasons why states choose to cooperate.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: excellent revisionist overview of European integration
Review: I found this book one of the best I have read on European integration history. It is a good example of revisionist history at its best. Compared to other books i have studied on the same subject this one makes a number of novel points and gives a completely different emphasis on driving factors & driving actors of the process of EU integration, putting the role of the Member States at centre stage all the way, and their economic interests as primary driving elements. To me, as an economist, this sounded convincing and certainly puts a novel slant on the traditional 'high politics' integration story. At the same time, I also found it a somewhat depressing account of the ineffectiveness of the Commission at crucial times of decision making. The book certainly puts into question some cherished notions about the role and functioning of the Commission, and since I am proud to work there it was not easy to take this in.

I found the first chapter hard going and somewhat obtruse, although i can appreciate the methodological points he makes, which are all to often ingnored. Once one is through that, though, the real story begins and a fascinating account it is, especially since it certainly does not follow the analysis i have read previously on this subject.

An excellent reference work, and certain to stimulate many a (heated) debate.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: excellent revisionist overview of European integration
Review: I found this book one of the best I have read on European integration history. It is a good example of revisionist history at its best. Compared to other books i have studied on the same subject this one makes a number of novel points and gives a completely different emphasis on driving factors & driving actors of the process of EU integration, putting the role of the Member States at centre stage all the way, and their economic interests as primary driving elements. To me, as an economist, this sounded convincing and certainly puts a novel slant on the traditional 'high politics' integration story. At the same time, I also found it a somewhat depressing account of the ineffectiveness of the Commission at crucial times of decision making. The book certainly puts into question some cherished notions about the role and functioning of the Commission, and since I am proud to work there it was not easy to take this in.

I found the first chapter hard going and somewhat obtruse, although i can appreciate the methodological points he makes, which are all to often ingnored. Once one is through that, though, the real story begins and a fascinating account it is, especially since it certainly does not follow the analysis i have read previously on this subject.

An excellent reference work, and certain to stimulate many a (heated) debate.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: Absorbing study of the EU's development
Review: In this deeply researched book, Andrew Moravcsik studies five key moves toward wider and deeper European integration: the Treaties of Rome, consolidating the Common Market, monetary integration, the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. He argues that the member governments chose ever closer union in order to promote their countries' economic interests. He aims to prove that economic interests, not political ideas, drive EU integration. He focuses on how the governments of Germany, France and Britain made their decisions.

Moravcsik argues that the British government's policy in the 1950s of opposition to joining the Common Market "was the rational one for a government that traded little with the Continent, had high tariffs in place, and feared competition with German producers." So there was economic logic to staying out. It is less clear that there was good reason for the subsequent reversal of policy: trading with a bloc does not oblige us to join it!

He shows that De Gaulle vetoed Britain's application not out of chauvinism, but because we opposed generous financing for French farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy. In 1969, Pompidou lifted the veto, but only in exchange for the British government's huge concession of agreeing to a permanent financing arrangement for the CAP. This made it CAP reform impossible.

Similarly, member governments have pursued integration through creating the Single Market and EMU. Moravcsik shows how Europe's multinational companies and the national employers' organisations backed integration. The European Commission admitted, "The single market programme has done more for business than it has for workers", a judgment true also of Economic and Monetary Union. Economic interests may well have determined the drive to a single state, but paradoxically the closer the cooperation between EU members has become, the worse their economies have performed.

Capitalist states and multinational companies have taken the EU road to lost sovereignty and economic integration, but the peoples of Europe are increasingly choosing otherwise, as the Irish people showed in the 7 June referendum on the Nice Treaty. In particular, here in Britain the option of leaving the EU looks more and more inviting.


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