Mandates and Democracy : Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Rating:
Summary: Why do betrayal of campaign promises occur?
Review: Normative theories of democracy affirm that one of the most important advantages of such a regime is its responsiveness to citizens' preferences. Economic theories of democracy also predict that politicians have incentives to answer the median voter's concerns due to the electoral competition for power. However, the empirical evidence around the world shows that democratically-elected governments sometimes violate their own campaign promises. That is, once in power, after have been offering a specific platform that satisfies most of the electorate, the new elected authorities decide to implement a different set of policies. This book explains under what circumstances such a betrayal of mandates occurs and with what consequences.
Stokes takes into account forty-two presidential elections in Latin America from 1982 to 1995 and focuses her analysis on the twelve cases where a dramatic change of policy took place. She uses statistical tools to test different hypotheses about the main determinants of policy switches. Her most surprising conclusion is that "governments that want nothing more than to promote the welfare of their constituents may sometimes not only renege on campaign pronouncements, they may in fact dissimulate in campaigns and then switch to unpopular policies" (p. 5). By defining political representation as the behavior of politicians aiming to maximize the welfare of their constituents, Stokes challenges scholars that explain policy switches as the attempt of rent-seekers to take advantage of the asymmetry of information between the voters (principal) and the office holders (agents). This latter approach would support the skeptical view of market-oriented reforms as policies that favor the interests of the rich. But she argues that "neoliberalism by surprise" is the result of a dissimulation- strategy that aims to solve the problem of conflicting beliefs between politicians and voters. What she calls "efficiency-oriented" policies (i.e. liberalization) are unpopular for voters because they do not have enough information about the benefits of such policies. Thus, politicians propose "security-oriented" policies (i.e. protectionist) to get into office and then switch.
The central argument of this book is that voters care about economic performance and not too much about policies. It stresses the role of beliefs and uncertainty in shaping politicians and voters behavior. For instance, the author claims that "politicians' choices of economic policy are shaped by ideology and technical beliefs, as well as by the desire to win votes" (p. 56). Taking into account the conflicting beliefs of politicians and voters, her theoretical discussion about the tensions between the idea of popular mandates and the independence of representatives does not exclude the possibility of a government that decides to violate mandates to govern well because has more knowledge and information than its constituents, and expects that at the end of the day they will adjudicate according to the economic outcomes. It implies that the electorate hardly knows which might be the appropriate policies due to its lack of information about the real situation of the economy and the actual effect of a specific set of policies.
The book contains valuable information about citizens' preferences, candidates' promises, and governments' performance. It is an analytic effort based on impressive data collection. The first chapter is an introduction to the research question. Chapter two describes the Latin American cases of consistent politicians, as well as the cases of vague campaigns and policy switches. The third chapter summarizes the plausible explanations of early policy switches. Chapter four analyses the impact of political parties on representative democracy. In chapter five the author explains why in most of the cases citizens support and reward the violation of mandates. Stokes concludes that politicians who switch to "unpopular" policies may be reelected, as long as outcomes are satisfactorily beneficial, as in the cases of Menem in Argentina and Fujimori in Peru, because voters will "make general ex post judgments about how incumbents have performed over a range of actions and policies" (p. 153). In chapter six, she examines in detail the principles of unconstrained representatives and why campaign pronouncements are still important for both politicians and voters. The final chapter is a summary of the central findings about causes and implications of mandate violation: under certain conditions, such as competitive elections and young political parties, "campaign messages will sometimes fail to predict policy in any democracy" (p. 188), and voters will not necessarily punished policy switchers because they will pay more attention to policy outcomes. Stokes also proposes important questions for further research: How politicians' arguments shape voters' opinions and beliefs? And, how to explain the origin and evolution of politicians' beliefs and ideology?
A shortcoming of this book is that starts with a sample of 42 cases and ends up analyzing only 3 cases. In fact, as Stokes recognizes, policy switches are anomalies (29 percent of the cases of the sample) while consistency is the rule (64 percent). If it is true that efficiency-oriented policies were unpopular, then another interesting research question is why in 17 cases (40 percent of the sample) the pro-market reforms were a successful campaign offer. Thus, the initial puzzle of "neoliberalism by surprise" should be replaced by the more accurate phrase of "neoliberalism by consent". From a different perspective, if security-oriented policies were inappropriate for voters' welfare and for the prospects of politicians' reelection, then why in 10 cases (24 percent) did politicians decide to obey the popular mandate?
This is definitively an interesting book that will be useful for graduate students who are trying to obtain a better understanding of the broad set of explanatory arguments about the economic policies implemented in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. It is also a good example of how to combine theory and statistics, in a comparative perspective, to shed light on a relevant question.

Rating:
Summary: Why do betrayal of campaign promises occur?
Review: Normative theories of democracy affirm that one of the most important advantages of such a regime is its responsiveness to citizens' preferences. Economic theories of democracy also predict that politicians have incentives to answer the median voter's concerns due to the electoral competition for power. However, the empirical evidence around the world shows that democratically-elected governments sometimes violate their own campaign promises. That is, once in power, after have been offering a specific platform that satisfies most of the electorate, the new elected authorities decide to implement a different set of policies. This book explains under what circumstances such a betrayal of mandates occurs and with what consequences.
Stokes takes into account forty-two presidential elections in Latin America from 1982 to 1995 and focuses her analysis on the twelve cases where a dramatic change of policy took place. She uses statistical tools to test different hypotheses about the main determinants of policy switches. Her most surprising conclusion is that "governments that want nothing more than to promote the welfare of their constituents may sometimes not only renege on campaign pronouncements, they may in fact dissimulate in campaigns and then switch to unpopular policies" (p. 5). By defining political representation as the behavior of politicians aiming to maximize the welfare of their constituents, Stokes challenges scholars that explain policy switches as the attempt of rent-seekers to take advantage of the asymmetry of information between the voters (principal) and the office holders (agents). This latter approach would support the skeptical view of market-oriented reforms as policies that favor the interests of the rich. But she argues that "neoliberalism by surprise" is the result of a dissimulation- strategy that aims to solve the problem of conflicting beliefs between politicians and voters. What she calls "efficiency-oriented" policies (i.e. liberalization) are unpopular for voters because they do not have enough information about the benefits of such policies. Thus, politicians propose "security-oriented" policies (i.e. protectionist) to get into office and then switch.
The central argument of this book is that voters care about economic performance and not too much about policies. It stresses the role of beliefs and uncertainty in shaping politicians and voters behavior. For instance, the author claims that "politicians' choices of economic policy are shaped by ideology and technical beliefs, as well as by the desire to win votes" (p. 56). Taking into account the conflicting beliefs of politicians and voters, her theoretical discussion about the tensions between the idea of popular mandates and the independence of representatives does not exclude the possibility of a government that decides to violate mandates to govern well because has more knowledge and information than its constituents, and expects that at the end of the day they will adjudicate according to the economic outcomes. It implies that the electorate hardly knows which might be the appropriate policies due to its lack of information about the real situation of the economy and the actual effect of a specific set of policies.
The book contains valuable information about citizens' preferences, candidates' promises, and governments' performance. It is an analytic effort based on impressive data collection. The first chapter is an introduction to the research question. Chapter two describes the Latin American cases of consistent politicians, as well as the cases of vague campaigns and policy switches. The third chapter summarizes the plausible explanations of early policy switches. Chapter four analyses the impact of political parties on representative democracy. In chapter five the author explains why in most of the cases citizens support and reward the violation of mandates. Stokes concludes that politicians who switch to "unpopular" policies may be reelected, as long as outcomes are satisfactorily beneficial, as in the cases of Menem in Argentina and Fujimori in Peru, because voters will "make general ex post judgments about how incumbents have performed over a range of actions and policies" (p. 153). In chapter six, she examines in detail the principles of unconstrained representatives and why campaign pronouncements are still important for both politicians and voters. The final chapter is a summary of the central findings about causes and implications of mandate violation: under certain conditions, such as competitive elections and young political parties, "campaign messages will sometimes fail to predict policy in any democracy" (p. 188), and voters will not necessarily punished policy switchers because they will pay more attention to policy outcomes. Stokes also proposes important questions for further research: How politicians' arguments shape voters' opinions and beliefs? And, how to explain the origin and evolution of politicians' beliefs and ideology?
A shortcoming of this book is that starts with a sample of 42 cases and ends up analyzing only 3 cases. In fact, as Stokes recognizes, policy switches are anomalies (29 percent of the cases of the sample) while consistency is the rule (64 percent). If it is true that efficiency-oriented policies were unpopular, then another interesting research question is why in 17 cases (40 percent of the sample) the pro-market reforms were a successful campaign offer. Thus, the initial puzzle of "neoliberalism by surprise" should be replaced by the more accurate phrase of "neoliberalism by consent". From a different perspective, if security-oriented policies were inappropriate for voters' welfare and for the prospects of politicians' reelection, then why in 10 cases (24 percent) did politicians decide to obey the popular mandate?
This is definitively an interesting book that will be useful for graduate students who are trying to obtain a better understanding of the broad set of explanatory arguments about the economic policies implemented in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. It is also a good example of how to combine theory and statistics, in a comparative perspective, to shed light on a relevant question.