The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Rating:
Summary: The Flashlight in the Dark
Review: As a former student of Professor Mearsheimer's, I was fairly familiar with many of the arguments he puts forward in this book. However, it is very gratifying to see finally his theory codified into a single volume, a Magnum Opus. Professor Mearsheimer's theory of "Offensive Realism" offers, without a doubt, the most comprehensive explanation for the behavior of Great Powers available to the student of international relations. While it does not explain everything in the world, it is like, in his own words, a powerful flashlight in a dark room, illuminating most of the room, but not every nook and cranny. However, given the profoundly pessimistic conclusions he reaches, many will wish to remain in the dark.

His theory is based on some very simple assumptions that really cannot be contested, such as anarchy, meaning the absence of an international police force that possesses the coercive wherewithal necessary to enforce rules of conduct among states, the desire to survive, and the uncertainty of intentions. From his basic assumptions, Professor Mearsheimer proceeds to discuss their implications for state behavior. His frighteningly rigorous logic leads to the conclusion that states must maximize their power vis-à-vis other states in order to survive. Therefore, the quest for security, which is, in reality, a quest for power, is a zero-sum game where the gains of one are always at the expense of another. States must aggressively seek power and expand whenever possible in order to assure their own survival. States that do not seek to maximize their power fall victim to those that do. Therein lies the "tragedy of great power politics." States must harm each other, not out of malice, but only because of the fear caused by the lack of physical security. This is a system that no one designed or intended. Unfortunately, it is not a system that we can leave or that is likely to be changed. The need for security overcomes any and all other considerations, such as ethics. How states seek to increase their security is also outlined. As much a historian as a political theorist, Professor Mearsheimer trolled through some two hundred years of history to provide ample evidence to support his theories as well as examples of their behaviors. The amount of historical evidence that he has marshaled for his work is staggering. It is this reliance on history that provides his theory with a credibility that one does not find in other works of international relations theory, especially those of the liberal schools. His work is more than a simple academic thought exercise in a vacuum, but rather one solidly grounded in reality.

Unfortunately, I do not believe his work will receive the credence that it deserves, despite the sound assumptions, powerful logic, and vast array of supporting historical evidence. I believe this because of the nature of his work and the method of his delivery. With an efficiency and rationality that borders on the ruthless, Professor Mearsheimer tears apart the halcyon pipedream held by many in the west, and lays bare the world, not as we would like it to be, but as it really is; a world where aggression is rewarded, where power matters, and where, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, force and fraud are the cardinal virtues. These are realities that are hard to accept. Professor Mearsheimer also makes no attempt to sugarcoat or palliate the harsh realities of the modern state system, using terms like "bleed them white" and "bait and bleed" to describe policies and strategies. People are accustomed to a peaceful world, where liberalism dominates and prosperity abounds, and are likely to blanch at the descriptions and especially the policy prescriptions found in this book, where aggressive warfare is a legitimate tool of statecraft and democracy has no special place or value. I imagine it will be difficult for most people to get past the harshness of the world as Professor Mearsheimer describes it, and may believe him to be a violent warmonger himself. This is, of course, completely wrong. His policy prescriptions are designed to improve the prospects of peace in light of the nature of the international system. While Professor Mearsheimer also provides clear explanations for the decades of peace that have been enjoyed in much of the world, most people will wish to reject them because they are based on the distribution of power. In addition to these fears, I have some particular disagreements with Professor Mearsheimer, but they are minute points and not ones that greatly oppose or disturb his overall theoretical framework. For example, I disagree with his use of GNP as the sole indicator of potential power. I would consider it to be an aspect of a composite index with, say energy consumption (which he uses earlier on) and total manufactured goods. I cannot stress enough my belief that this book is the most insightful and useful tool for understanding international politics available today, nor can I recommend this book strongly enough to anyone with an interest in world affairs or foreign policy.

Rating:
Summary: Realism is back (with an offensive flavor)
Review: It is widely assumed the world over that the end of the Cold War marked a new era - where the cynnical calculus of power politics will not apply and where the trading state will replace the warring the state. In short, many proclaim that interdependence (and globalization) forces states to cooperate and forgo relative gains. John Mearsheimer challenges this view. With his theory of 'offensive realism' he successfully shows that states are power-maximizers and the end of the Cold War did not change the anarchic nature of international politics. Nuclear weapons may have reduced the probability of war between the great powers, but great powers still try to maximize their share of power and this may very well lead to conflcit in the 21st century. (That the Great Powers are power maximizers is evident from the fact that the US plans to go ahead with the NMD and plans to develop an aerospace force - in the post-Cold War era without any systemic threats to US interests). There is no systemic proof for the liberal view that interdependence reduces the likelihood of war. In fact, globalization (with diffusion of technology and capital) will cause uneven growth rates around the world and will allow potential peers (China) to modernize and create wealth and ultimately challenge the leading power (US). In this book Mearsheimer shows that land power is still the dominant form of military power (even in the information age) and that states prefer buck-passing over balancing. This book is a must-read for all students and scholars in the fields of international relations and strategic studies. This book is in a league of its own and challenges among others Waltz's defensive realism (and supersedes it).

Rating:
Summary: Clearly written realism
Review: Mearsheimer's argument is well developed and thought out. Besides being a definitive realist's work, this book does a good job of explaining a number of grand strategies and educating the reader to the effective use of force to supplement statesmanship. The best part about this book, however, is that you can just as easily disagree with it as agree with it - you can think whatever you want of the argument, but one thing is that Mearsheimer's argument is clear. His ideas of what is to come in the next quarter century are especially interesting, and written exactly as the Chicago Professor speaks, which is relatively entertaining in its own right.

Rating:
Summary: For Graduate students
Review: Read this comment if you are a graduate student, faculty, or any other serious intellectual.

I have three concerns:

1) This BOOK is wrong in the EMPIRICAL cases: European States did not balance against united states in the 19th century. Mearshimer has a lot of awfull empirical mistakes in his analysis. Those who are graduate students in International Relations will notice this coming up in their resepctive seminar discussions.

2)The theory he advances is UNFALSIFIABLE: hence unscientific, though it wishes to be. e.g. Why did not the united states nuke the soviet union or any other country when it had the monopoly over nuclear weapons immediate afterwards of 1945? It could have been the global sovereign/hegemon? : His answer is that States sometimes Do bid for power and hegemony sometimes do not (BUT WHY AND WHEN?). So Mearsheimer is arguing for an empty theory, IN EVERY case he presents he wins- because it is unfalsifiable- like a religious or ideological doctrine.

3) Every intelligent graduate student would recognize the POLITICAL voice in Mearsheimer's theory, although it cries to be 'objective' and scientific. Mearsheimer is clearly a political conservative and isolationist, which one can find in any current 'fascist' debate in politics. The underlying argument is clear in the favor of "Shoot first ask questions later"/"since we're in the security dilemma: Kill Em All" redneck fascist rhetoric. If one really wants to know what the causes of war are, just CONSIDER thinking about the publication of this book and those who believe in it because it is "objective, scientific and real". It is for such understandings of world politics that a foreign policy is shaped for war-mongering, hence the causes of war.

THESE COMMENTS ARE FORTHCOMING IN AN ACADEMIC JOURNAL-PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

(I can already imagine the negative votes to be given to this review, since all who are reading Tradegy of Great Power Politics is under an idelogical restraint: meaning the inability to see beyond the state system. I accept that most negative reviews would come from the 'heroic students' of Mearsheimer and fellow 'realist' blinded conservatives. Hence the theory is pure political as all realist doctrines are: THEY ARE unable to see beyond the state system that is supposed to reflect the 'reality'.

The problem is : They can not see beyond the state system: what about houndreds of thousands, millions of people who are refugees throughout the world? A good realist answer: Ignore them they do not exist because they do not have enough power= this means realism as a whole, is a POLITICAL theory rather than a 'pathological' all explanotory theory that 'explains most'. But then again the question stands what about the millions of people: and here comes the political nature of Realist scholars: "THEY ARE NOT IMPORTANT". This last remark was actually an exhange between me and a scholar at the International Studies Association Conference last year)

Rating:
Summary: The Tragedy of Structural Theory
Review: The theory of international relations proffered in Mearscheimer's new book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, is a variation on the theme first introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics. However, Mearsheimer has not used the intervening 20 odd years to repair the essential flaw in Waltz's theory; unfortunately Mearsheimer merely embellishes the failure of logic intrinsic to Waltz's structural theory of international relations.

For Waltz, Mearsheimer's precursor, all that is necessary to produce the constant threat of war is (1) for states to exist under conditions of anarchy, with anarchy defined as the absence of a central international policing authority that supplies nations with confidence that they will not be invaded and conquered by other nations. (2) That states' primary goal is survival. (3) That states strategize to achieve their goals.

Because states exist under conditions of anarchy, they are unanimously afraid of each other at all times, regardless of what is going on in the world. Fear among nations varies, but it never varies such that fear becomes less than the most significant factor in international relations. Fear is the most important motivator of nations. Waltz and Mearsheimer agree on this. They differ, however, in the insights they draw from this conclusion.

Waltz sees that states seek to acquire only enough power to maximize their security, and that having too much power can sometimes be as dangerous as having too little. Mearsheimer sees that power and security are effectively identical, and that nations seek to maximize power because in an anarchic world this is the only way to maximize security.

We will not here go further into the differences between the insights Mearsheimer and Waltz draw from their theories, because, as mentioned before, both theories suffer from an identical failure in logic. This failure renders both theories fatally unpersuasive and deprives them of the merit that would allow them to point to the future of international relations theory.

This failure, briefly, is in what is said to be "the logic of anarchy," what Mearsheimer calls his "bedrock assumptions." For Waltz, as mentioned above, three assumptions explain why war among nations is always in the air. Mearsheimer, perhaps sensing that something is missing from Waltz's logic, adds two more assumptions: (1) That all nations "inherently possess some offensive military capability " even if these weapons are only the bare hands of the populace, and (2) That "states can never be certain about other states' intentions." Probably few would bother to quarrel with these assumptions, yet it is difficult to see how they make any difference to the logic of anarchy. Plugging these two new assumptions into the model in which nations are "black boxes" whose behavior is governed by certain assumptions, one sees no behavior in Mearsheimer's model that is different from the behavior of the black boxes (nations) in Waltz's model. That is, in both models, contrary to the repeated assurances of Waltz and Mearsheimer, the black boxes (nations) perceive nothing, therefore don't know what to do, and therefore do nothing. Waltz and Mearsheimer claim that their assumptions produce a logic that compels nations to be always frightened of each other, yet, really, they do no such thing. Mearsheimer claims that the greatest challenges to his theory come from those who dispute one or another of his assumptions, yet even granting all of his assumptions, still his black boxes (nations) do nothing. The absence of a central policing authority, the desire for survival, the presence of offensive military capability, etc., are not sufficient environmental factors to compel fear in nations, without some stipulation about the way these black boxes (nations) evaluate their environment.

Waltz and Mearsheimer assure us over and over again that nations are frightened, and Mearsheimer provides numerous commons sense examples of why nations should be afraid, yet there is nothing within the model, nothing about the three or five assumptions that actually compels fear.

Both Waltz and Mearsheimer claim that their models can handle all sorts of variation within nations, and within the international environment. Both Mearsheimer and Waltz tell us that states are frightened because there is no one to turn to for help in the case of a threat to survival, and common sense tells us that yes, nations often have good reason to be frightened, but the assumptions of Waltz and Mearsheimer are said to do far more than provide common sense explanations; they purport to explain state behavior in the face of an enormous range of variation both within states and in the external international environment. Mearsheimer and Waltz claim that once these assumptions are in place, then vary whatever else you like, states will behave as Mearsheimer and Waltz claim they do.

This is a very large claim, and this is why it is very important that the logic of anarchy produces the theoretical effects as advertised. If it does not, then the assumptions do not provide a genuine explanation for state behavior, but a spurious one. The assumptions provide the façade of an explanation, while something else, perhaps common sense, does unseen work within our minds of convincing us that state behavior has been sufficiently explained. Beware, when employing Mearsheimer's assumptions, of unconsciously importing common sense into the model.

Given that Mearsheimer has not provided a genuine explanation for state behavior, it is improbable that he is correct in his conclusions and insights. It is too bad , then, that most of this book proceeds from Mearsheimer's spurious explanation, and attempts to provide an elaboration and demonstration of the theory through historical examples. Mr. Mearsheimer works hard, but he has built his edifice on sand.

Because Mearsheimer's theory is flawed in the way I have outlined above, there is little in this book that can be recommended as an advancement in international relations theory. Perhaps this theory will one day be widely viewed as the curiosity that it is.