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Rating: 
Summary: Disappointing
Review: Brain-wise is, to say the least, a less than impressive effort from a philosopher as prominent in philosophy of mind as Churchland is. A short list of complaints includes:-Churchland collapses the distinction between 'consciousness' in the phenomenal sense ('subjective character of experience') & 'consciousness' in the psychological sense (awareness or self-consciousness)(see Chalmers, 'The Conscious Mind') -most of her conclusions are simply asserted rather than argued, & when she does make arguments they are startlingly simple-minded -the book completely overstates the progress of neuroscience, a field still very much in its infancy. She speaks about neuroscience as if she were in complete awe, which is quite unjustified, & she seems to have a bad case of science-envy -she assumes that all sciences are reducible, which ignores the fact that (as Chomsky argues, although to say he 'argues' this neglects to express the obviousness of his conclusion) we are cognitively limited beings, & that there may simply be aspects of the world that are beyond the reach of our scientific capacities. -she hauls out the tired vitalist analogy -she admits the failure of logical supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, yet fails to see why this counts against materialism (again, see Chalmers) -the section on religion is just feeble, & includes not one original thought. Most of her 'insights' are along the lines of 'the prospect of [death] ... need not be [unsettling] ... one can live a richly purposeful life of love and work--of family, community, wilderness, music, and so forth--cognizant that it makees sense to make the best of this life'. Anyway, I suppose someone interested in philosophy of mind should read this, if only because Churchland and her husband are such celebrities in the field. But don't expect much. As an introduction to neuroscience, I am not in a position to judge Brain-wise; my hunch is that if you simply want to become informed as to the latest developments in the field, there are more appropriate books out there. As philosophy, the book is depressingly weak.
Rating:
Summary: Disappointing
Review: Brain-wise is, to say the least, a less than impressive effort from a philosopher as prominent in philosophy of mind as Churchland is. A short list of complaints includes: -Churchland collapses the distinction between 'consciousness' in the phenomenal sense ('subjective character of experience') & 'consciousness' in the psychological sense (awareness or self-consciousness)(see Chalmers, 'The Conscious Mind') -most of her conclusions are simply asserted rather than argued, & when she does make arguments they are startlingly simple-minded -the book completely overstates the progress of neuroscience, a field still very much in its infancy. She speaks about neuroscience as if she were in complete awe, which is quite unjustified, & she seems to have a bad case of science-envy -she assumes that all sciences are reducible, which ignores the fact that (as Chomsky argues, although to say he 'argues' this neglects to express the obviousness of his conclusion) we are cognitively limited beings, & that there may simply be aspects of the world that are beyond the reach of our scientific capacities. -she hauls out the tired vitalist analogy -she admits the failure of logical supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, yet fails to see why this counts against materialism (again, see Chalmers) -the section on religion is just feeble, & includes not one original thought. Most of her 'insights' are along the lines of 'the prospect of [death] ... need not be [unsettling] ... one can live a richly purposeful life of love and work--of family, community, wilderness, music, and so forth--cognizant that it makees sense to make the best of this life'. Anyway, I suppose someone interested in philosophy of mind should read this, if only because Churchland and her husband are such celebrities in the field. But don't expect much. As an introduction to neuroscience, I am not in a position to judge Brain-wise; my hunch is that if you simply want to become informed as to the latest developments in the field, there are more appropriate books out there. As philosophy, the book is depressingly weak.
Rating: 
Summary: Not traditional philosophy (thank goodness!)
Review: Philosophical purists will criticize Churchland for refusing to engage the philosophical "tradition" on its own terms, i.e., she refuses to stick her head in the sand and theorize as if neuroscience and psychology didn't exist. Rather, what Churchland has done is invert this traditional philosphical stance : survey the scientific results on topics philosophers have wanted to claim as their own: consciousness, free will, the self, human knowledge, religion, and the like (each gets a chapter in her book). That is, make a conscious effort to bring empirical results to bear on these thorny problems of human existence. While neuropsychology can't provide decisive answers yet, its data provides new ideas, new constraints, and casts doubt on those doctrines (such as the 'unity of the self') previously taken as sacrosanct by the head-in-the-sand philosophical establishment.
Overall, a very clearly written book, with lots of interesting ideas and data. If you want your traditional convoluted philosophical treatise, go somewhere else. If you want to be invigorated with new ideas and data from cutting edge neuroscience, then pick up this book!
Rating:
Summary: An excellent update to her prior book
Review: The mind/body problem, as understood by philosphers for the last few centuries, has been buried under a mountain of neuroscience. One can of course still tunnel into this mountain if desired and dig further in the mine of armchair argumentation and speculation. But more and more philosophers are abandoning this mine, and employing their unique talents and restless desire to get at the truth, to a view of the mind/brain that is more in tune with empirical research. It is perhaps difficult for the traditional philosopher to make this transition, for they feel perhaps that they are abandoning their commitment to the goals they have set. To these philosophers science is a derived field of knowledge, and has an underlying foundation given by philosophy. To turn against this view would be a sacrilege to many philosophers. The author of this book is one of the best examples of what can happen when a philosopher has made the decision to investigate what neuroscience has to offer for the understanding of the mind/brain. It is packed full of highly interesting insights from someone who has been deeply engaged in research in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. The advances in neuroscience in just the last few years have been breathtaking, particularly in experimental methods. Some of these developments are discussed in the book, along with good arguments that cast further doubts on the ability of philosophical speculation to produce a workable theory of the mind (brain). The need for such a theory of mind (brain) is argued especially well for in the first few chapters of the book. The author emphasizes that merely refuting various materialist views of the mind (brain) will not by itself lead to an understanding of it. The dualists and idealists must put forth a constructive theory of the mind that will assist not only in forming a theory of knowledge and thinking, but also with shedding light on the cause of Alzheimer's and other mental disorders. The author gives as an example of this the ideas of the neuroscientist John Eccles who held that the mind-brain interaction is mediated by a "psychon", but the properties and dynamics of psychons were never elaborated on. The author bases the book on three hypotheses, namely that mental activity is brain activity and can be studied scientificially; that neuroscience is dependent on cognitive science in order to know what phenomena need to be explained; and that to understand the mind one must understand the brain at all levels of organization. The examples and argumentation/counterargumentation given througout the book bring out these hypotheses especially clearly, and the author expresses a rare intellectual honesty in all of the discussion. This is perhaps because she has chosen to assign weight to both the scientific and philosophical viewpoints, and such a careful consideration will only raise the level of objectivity, and suppress the vitriole or subjective biases that sometimes accompanies discussion of the mind/body problem. One of the most interesting discussions in the book concerns the scientific study of consciousness, in particular the discussion on "Crick's assumption": there must be brain differences when a stimulus is presented and the subject is aware of it, and a stimulus is presented and the subject is not aware of it. The author discusses a fascinating experiment, dealing with "binocular rivalry", that allows an experimental study of Crick's assumption. This discussion, among many others in the book, are excellent examples of what is now available experimentally to help settle the mind/brain debate. In another example, the author points to the use of artificial neural networks with recurrent projection to model consciousness-related functions such as attention and sensory perception. She also discusses a clever experiment to test this idea, but cautions that even if back projections are necessary for consciousness, it is known that they are not sufficient. The author then draws up a list of possible experiments that might identify the neural correlates of consciousness, which, even if shown to be not viable, will assist in the fulfilling of the goal of viewing consciousness in terms of mechanisms. In addition, and to emphasize the necessity for a hierarchical "systems level" study of consciousness, rather than merely at the "neuronal level", she discusses the very interesting work of Antonio Damasio on viewing the capacity of consciousness as the outcome of high-level self-representational capacities. His work, as discussed by the author, emphasizes the role of evolutionary pressures in shaping the nature of human consciousness. Further, the author addresses (nine) of the arguments against a scientific theory of consciousness in terms of brain function put forth by those who advocate dualism. She is not shy about saying that the dualist theories are beginning to appear as an "outdated curiosity", but she analyzes these nine objections fairly and objectively, and she is clearly open to possible future arguments put together by dualists. The author also discusses some "hardcore" issues in philosophy, such as free will, epistemology, and religion. She addresses some possible reasons why nonempirical epistemology continues to be around, one of these being the rise of modern logic in the twentieth century. The other is the slow progress in the understanding of the human brain. Both of these reasons are interesting because of their importance for research in artificial intelligence. Both formal reasoning and an understanding of how the brain does pattern matching, generalizations, and induction is crucial to the efforts in machine intelligence. Fortunately, the author and others like her, with their formulation of ideas like the ones in this book, will be of enormous assistance to those involved in bringing about the rise of intelligent machines.
Rating: 
Summary: Hardly philosophy
Review: This book is only one example of the current practice by philosophers of essentially abandoning their craft and worshiping at the altar of science. Philosophy had always tried to go beyond observation of perceived physical reality alone, and deal with questions such as--in the branch of philosophy known as epistemology--how is knowledge of that reality, or of matters like principles of logic and mathematics, acquired. What is pitiful is that the author of the book tries to subsume even these questions under physical science, thus putting the cart before the horse. She tries to find answers to what constitutes consciousness by studying the brain, forgetting that our knowledge of the brain and other physical occurrences depends itself on their manifestation in consciousness. We first have to know how reality is constructed in our minds, before exploring further physical particulars. The author of the book, and she is not the only one to do so, goes as far as attempting to define consciousness in terms of the brain, committing the gross fallacy of equivocation. The fallacy consists in giving a name a new meaning and then trying to prove something about the originally named. But something proved about the newly meant does not thereby apply to what was meant before. A basic endeavor of Professor Churchland is to eventually in some such way equate consciousness with some part of the brain. But although she tirelessly cites and illustrates minute and extensive studies, she fails to indicate what kind of findings so made would establish that identity. In the process, while a number of times branding other authors with circularity--with assuming a fact before proving it--though she does not say where the circularity resides, she indulges in the persistent circularity of arguing for the brain as the self while beforehand assuming that the brain, as the self, learns and so forth, and she names a chapter accordingly (p.321). Circularity, the act of begging the question, is, to be sure, another fallacy, and the book contains additional lapses of logic. Earlier in the book (p.55) its author suggests that if A implies B then not-A implies not-B. This commits the fundamental fallacy of "denying the antecedent", and the book exhibits other failures in reasoning. Its author, concerning again definition, argues (p.267) that "the indivisible", which was the original meaning of "atom", turned out to be divisible. This is of course a glaring contradiction. The word "atom" was later applied to a physical unit found divisible, but this was merely a redefinition. The book asserts similar nonsense regarding parallel lines. They are in geometry defined as straight lines that never meet, and the book's author claims they meet. She is obviously not only illogical but insufficiently acquainted with geometry, in some of which parallel lines are said not to exist, rather than to, contradictorily, meet. "Half knowledge is worse than no knowledge", as they say, and a similar warning can apply in general when philosophers dabble in science. By wanting to in the preceding manner downgrade past understandings, the book tries in the main, as do related ones, to forcibly dispense with the presence of consciousness by insistence that it must be material, instead of viewing it as the phenomenon it is, alongside other events connected with matter.
Rating:
Summary: In the depths of the mind
Review: Traditional philosophy has had a rough time lately. The wealth of new information on the brain is forcing us to re-think what the mind is and how it works. Churchland offers the most comprehensive and understandable overview of these challenges currently in print. This outstanding panoramic view of "brain science" provides any reader with challenging questions and offers means to derive the answers. These come not from the reader's knowledge of cognitive science, but from the applicaton of logic. Churchland imposes few responses of her own. Fluent in the science and its presentation, she has varied experience in cognitive science. Her earlier book "Neurophilosophy" coined a term indicating where further work is needed and how the results might be applied. This book brings us up to date and enlarges on that earlier study. The book is well organized with a superb Introduction surveying the history of thinking on the mind-body relationship. Brain research, hindered by physical difficulties and traditional thinking, was slower to develop than other sciences, such as astronomy or physics. The fundamental organization of brain structure and mechanics are well described and illustrated. The remaining body of the book discusses the three "big questions" philosophy has dealt with over the millenia: Metaphysics, Epistomology and Religion. Each topic is defined with an historical synopsis. Applications of the brain's reaction to phenomena as applied to the subject fill the remainder of each section. Bibliographies and Internet sites are listed at the end of each section within the topic. The questions she poses are the "deep" ones - pondered and debated for centuries. We call them "deep" because all prior thinking and arguing hasn't resolved them. What, she asks, is the neurobiological basis of consciousness, the self, and free choice? Churchland contends that neurosciences are, at last, bringing answers in view. Her queries aren't limited to classroom debate. She addresses ideas many of us have pondered. Her approach is still novel in the minds of many - she wishes to merge science and philosophy into an integrated discipline. This seems simple, but the task is immense. Tackling it with confidence, she proposes methods for the merger and applies examples. Churchland simply asks, "what is the evidence supporting the notion?". If there is no buttress available, she urges dismissal of the idea in favour of a new thesis. She teaches us to look for ourselves - what are the pitfalls of blind acceptance? The traps we have fallen into may be filled in with empirical evidence. The result, she stresses, is a sounder footing for our thinking about many issues, moral, psychological and ethical. Classifying this book as a "textbook" may have been appropriate for the earlier edition, clearly this volume goes beyond the realm of academia. Churchland's expressive style makes the issues available to anyone interested in the subjects of belief, behaviour, "free will" and how we deal with them. Churchland has adapted an effective trove of illustrative material to enhance her excellent prose. Ranging from photographs through various graphics, the illustrations provide further explanation of the points she makes. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating:
Summary: In the depths of the mind
Review: Traditional philosophy has had a rough time lately. The wealth of new information on the brain is forcing us to re-think what the mind is and how it works. Churchland offers the most comprehensive and understandable overview of these challenges currently in print. This outstanding panoramic view of "brain science" provides any reader with challenging questions and offers means to derive the answers. These come not from the reader's knowledge of cognitive science, but from the applicaton of logic. Churchland imposes few responses of her own. Fluent in the science and its presentation, she has varied experience in cognitive science. Her earlier book "Neurophilosophy" coined a term indicating where further work is needed and how the results might be applied. This book brings us up to date and enlarges on that earlier study. The book is well organized with a superb Introduction surveying the history of thinking on the mind-body relationship. Brain research, hindered by physical difficulties and traditional thinking, was slower to develop than other sciences, such as astronomy or physics. The fundamental organization of brain structure and mechanics are well described and illustrated. The remaining body of the book discusses the three "big questions" philosophy has dealt with over the millenia: Metaphysics, Epistomology and Religion. Each topic is defined with an historical synopsis. Applications of the brain's reaction to phenomena as applied to the subject fill the remainder of each section. Bibliographies and Internet sites are listed at the end of each section within the topic. The questions she poses are the "deep" ones - pondered and debated for centuries. We call them "deep" because all prior thinking and arguing hasn't resolved them. What, she asks, is the neurobiological basis of consciousness, the self, and free choice? Churchland contends that neurosciences are, at last, bringing answers in view. Her queries aren't limited to classroom debate. She addresses ideas many of us have pondered. Her approach is still novel in the minds of many - she wishes to merge science and philosophy into an integrated discipline. This seems simple, but the task is immense. Tackling it with confidence, she proposes methods for the merger and applies examples. Churchland simply asks, "what is the evidence supporting the notion?". If there is no buttress available, she urges dismissal of the idea in favour of a new thesis. She teaches us to look for ourselves - what are the pitfalls of blind acceptance? The traps we have fallen into may be filled in with empirical evidence. The result, she stresses, is a sounder footing for our thinking about many issues, moral, psychological and ethical. Classifying this book as a "textbook" may have been appropriate for the earlier edition, clearly this volume goes beyond the realm of academia. Churchland's expressive style makes the issues available to anyone interested in the subjects of belief, behaviour, "free will" and how we deal with them. Churchland has adapted an effective trove of illustrative material to enhance her excellent prose. Ranging from photographs through various graphics, the illustrations provide further explanation of the points she makes. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating:
Summary: Great
Review: Well, it took more than a decade, but finally those interested in philosophy and neuroscience get an up to date version of Churchlands's NEUROPHILOSOPHY, the groud-breaking and field- creating textbook. Churchland, witht he clarity that characterizes her writings, and the no-nosense naturalistic viewpoint she takes, explains what neuroscience has to say about philosophical problems like consiousness, freewill, the self, theory of knowledge, religion (the fact that some of these problems in fact are now considered neuroscience problems, not philosophical ones, show that neurophilosophy as a field has been succesful, as has been Churchlands approach). But philosophy is still of value, only that its value only exists when it takes science seriously. Just as ancient philosophical problems like the origin of life, the nature of matter, space and time, have become the subjects of independent scientific fields of biology and physics, the mind, and its faculties, is being reduced to the field of neuroscience. There is no reason why this fact should be seen as unexpected or strange or weird. It is as obvious as it can be, and it has brought unprecedented understanding and predictive power, facts that render dualism and its branches an unecessary burden, and a potential setback towards understanding the mind. The chapters are well written, clear and referenced superbly, with notes and suggested readings. The choice of topics is timely, and Churchland does a good job (although understandably she presents mostly theories in accord with her views and what she thinks is really important) of presenting the main theories and keeping them clear even when omitting certain technical details. The philosophical parts are also well argued for, and her position is defended well. I have allways thought the Churchlands to be the most seriously naturalistic and common sensical of all cognitive scientists. Although the chapters will not explain the self, learning, representationalism, or even less, consicousness, they will point the reader towards what seem to be the right paths to be taken towards genuine understanding. This book is simple and reader-friendly, the kind necessary to ilustrate the layman that there is little of philosophy worth arguing for left untouched by scientific advancements. Science is just philosophy that is understood,effective, that explains, and that makes genuine progress. We have a much more complete theory of the mind after 50 years of neuroscience research than we got in thousands of years of philosophical discourse. Neurophilosophy is the branch that aims to ground philosophy of mind in neuroscience research, and this books is the best introduction to it out there. Churchland has done it again, and although much work remains to be done, given that the mind is seen by some as the last standing mystery, the progress made for a moment brings back confidence in our ability to understand these issues...finally. In sum, philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, psychologists....anyone that uses the word mind, consicousness, self, thinking....should have this book, and pretty much every intelligent reader should too.
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