Game Theory and the Law

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Summary: Unique
Review: Altough it's often just theory, is a unique book, rxpressing the Chicago school's view on law. Do not expect something you can use practically.

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Summary: Website for Game Theory and the Law
Review: The website for the book at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/AGTL/gtl.html has additional information, including a table of contents, the preface and other material of interest

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Summary: good treatment
Review: This book is a solid introduction both to game theory and its application in legal analysis. It does a nice job of serving two audiences: lawyers who want to see some game theory and how it can illuminate analysis of things like liability regimes, and game theorists/economists/formal political scientists who are interested in a novel application of game theory. (Well, I'm only the second audience, but it seems like the first would be well served also.)

The book is very verbal. I believe there are two equations in it, in all (but many game matrices). So for legal scholars it can be a useful introduction to what game theory has to say, but it can't give much guidance on how to build a model. Given the importance of spreading these ideas, the non-technical nature is probably a plus.

The authors deserve credit for covering a lot of ground in game theory, much of it seemingly impossible to understand without the math, with minimal technical investment. Most basic topics that might be covered in a graduate course for economists are treated -- at an intuitive level, but one that is very understandable.

A couple drawbacks come to mind. First, the authors do not stress enough the knowledge assumptions behind Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there is not enough discussion of solution concepts, like correlated equilibrium, that subsume wide possibilities of communication or even implicit contract signing, which seems important, given the nature of the book.

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Summary: A pathbreaking work of importance and clarity
Review: This book popularizes and extends a new approach (non-cooperative game theory) to the economic analysis of law. Readable and concise, this book is a must for students and scholars wishing to understand the ways in which legal rules can be usefully modeled as non-cooperative games. As a professor in the discipline, I am awed by the important and brilliant scholarship presented in this book with superb skill.

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Summary: Great analysis of common strategic behavior problems
Review: This is a great example of how the rigor of game theory can give startling insights into outcomes of common situations. Although I'm no mathematician or economist, all business people are at some point required to base their decisions on how they think others will behave. This book provides some great frameworks for structuring that thought process.