Rating: 
Summary: Complete and accurate, relatively high level
Review: I read this book in three evenings. The authors -- two of the best in space journalism -- did an outstanding job of retelling the story of the final flight of Columbia. If you followed the news closely after the disaster you will not find too many new revelations in this book. What you will find is a high level, but gripping narrative similar to going back and re-reading all the news papers from February 1, 2003 onward, but with the advantage of perfect hindsight. The book is necessarily high level. What do I mean by that? A lot of detail had to be left out. For instance, a book this size could be written on the recovery efforts alone. A book this size could be written on the foam impact testing alone. On the work of the CAIB alone. And so on. (And those would all be very interesting books -- especially on the recovery efforts; do you know how often the volunteers encountered 6 ft long water moccasins?) Other reviews are right -- there is no NASA-bashing. It is a fair and unbiased retelling of the story, as you'd expect from people like Bill Harwood and Mike Cabbage. Its impact lies in having the whole story told all at once. It's a lot to take in. The gravity of the disaster hits the reader pretty hard, especially when reading the theory of exactly how the shuttle disintegrated, stage by stage. The authors were vivid but at no time disrespected the lost crew or their families. I highly recommend this book. Below is the table of contents: 1 Re-Entry
2 Preparations
3 "Safe to Fly with No New Concerns"
4 Launch
5 A Shot in the Dark
6 Mixed Signals
7 Disaster
8 Aftermath
9 Echoes of Challenger
10 Re-Entry Revisited
11 Returning to Flight
Rating: 
Summary: NASA's conflicting mandate
Review: I thought the most important revelation in this book was the space industry's inability to design a replacement for the shuttle that can reach space cheaply and routinely. It sounds like we might simply lack the technology at this point in history. As the book points out, the shuttle is a dangerous, expensive, experimental vehicle. To build and operate a space station we need a cheap, reliable "space truck". Otherwise, inevitable delays for vehicle repairs will fatally disrupt the station's construction and operation schedules. That is exactly what NASA was trying to avoid when they decided to continue launching after a nearly disastrous foam strike (during the October 2002 launch of Atlantis). Continuing to launch RISKED a major setback, but stopping the program to deal with a technical glitch that had already proved all but insoluble GUARANTEED a major setback. Not an easy choice. We, the public, give NASA a conflicting mandate. We want the space program to accomplish something, and we also want it to be safe. The reality seems to be that we humans are still struggling just to reach space, and to insist that something more meaningful be done there requires compromising safety.
Rating:
Summary: NASA's conflicting mandate
Review: I thought the most important revelation in this book was the space industry's inability to design a replacement for the shuttle that can reach space cheaply and routinely. It sounds like we might simply lack the technology at this point in history. As the book points out, the shuttle is a dangerous, expensive, experimental vehicle. To build and operate a space station we need a cheap, reliable "space truck". Otherwise, inevitable delays for vehicle repairs will fatally disrupt the station's construction and operation schedules. That is exactly what NASA was trying to avoid when they decided to continue launching after a nearly disastrous foam strike (during the October 2002 launch of Atlantis). Continuing to launch RISKED a major setback, but stopping the program to deal with a technical glitch that had already proved all but insoluble GUARANTEED a major setback. Not an easy choice. We, the public, give NASA a conflicting mandate. We want the space program to accomplish something, and we also want it to be safe. The reality seems to be that we humans are still struggling just to reach space, and to insist that something more meaningful be done there requires compromising safety.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent Account
Review: Once started, I couldn't put this down. I was a little leery, expecting another "NASA bashing" and lots of Monday morning quarterbacking, but I must congratulate Cabbage and Harwoord on an extremely thorough, and balanced account of this sad tragedy. Like the CAIB lead by Adm. Gehman, which decides early in its investigation that it would stay away from searching for individuals to blame, the authors have adopted the same course. This is not to say that they are NASA apologists - the book devotes much attention to the managerial and cultural environment within the agency that leads to the Columbia's damage and subsequent loss. A realistic discussion of the options that faced the crew and NASA, even had they known of the leading edge damage to the left wing, once in orbit is also well handled. The "flow" of this work is also very well thought out in starting with the events of Feb. 1 as they were experienced, then detailing the investigation before returning to those events, this time detailed in light of the new findings. In addition, the authors are very successful at introducing the personal side of all the participants, especially the astronauts. I doubt that anyone will be able to get through this book without an increased respect for everyone involved in the shuttle program, and having shed more than a few tears along the way.
Rating:
Summary: Great book - thorough analysis
Review: This book presents a thorough first analysis of the Columbia accident - Not nearly as thorough as Diane Vaughan's telling of the Challenger accident, but similar in scope and tone. Although these are journalists reporting on the accident, the book contains a good analysis and enough technical details to keep the engineer as well as the layperson interested. The book is insightful regarding risk management cultures at large organizations and is a worthwhile read for anyone managing risk in any industry.
Rating:
Summary: Will NASA culture change THIS time?
Review: When Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart over East Texas, the morning of February 1, 2003, the country mourned for astronauts and the space program yet again. Columbia, on Mission STS-107, came apart during reentry just a few minutes away from its scheduled landing in Florida. My first fear upon hearing about the tragedy was that it was a terrorist attack, especially since the mission included the first Israeli on a shuttle mission. That was replaced by the fact that a small chunk of foam doomed Columbia. I listened to as many newscasts, read as much as I could and tried to understand how that small piece of foam insulation could bring down one of the most complex machines ever built.
Soon transcripts were made available of the last few minutes of the flight. Houston finally realized that there was a problem long after veteran observers on the California coast noticed the shuttle breaking apart. Transcripts and data from onboard sensors revealed that the shuttle was burning up, inside out from the heat of reentry. They also revealed that the crew had no idea that anything was wrong.
News started falling off about the loss of Columbia and the crew of STS-107 until I saw a blurb about "Comm Check." Apparently someone had received a pre-publication copy and I knew that I had to get my hands on a copy when it came out.
I read the book in only a few settings. Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, veteran space journalists presented fairly tight storylines from the background of the astronauts, past NASA history (including the Apollo launchpad fire and the 1986 Challenger disaster), a timeline of Columbia's reentry interface, NASA business culture, the accident investigation, findings and a wrap-up. The most incredible portions of "Comm Check" dealt with the investigations and findings and the internal problems that NASA has.
The investigation and their subsequent findings show that the only plausible explanation is that a small piece of lightweight foam impacted Columbia just a few seconds after liftoff and severely damaged (breached) the wing. Upon reentry superheated gases entered the breach in the wing and allowed the shuttle's infrastructure to disintegrate. The authors explained every detail, narrowing the breach down to a specific spar on the left wing. The writing was extremely thorough but not overly complex. High school level readers will be able to comprehend this. Thankfully the book doesn't contain scientific or mathematic equations to explain points - just great, sound writing. One thing that I never understood was the sudden failure of communications and then a return to a stream of (albeit garbled) data. This meant that the systems (at that time) had not completely failed. I long wondered why this dropout occurred in the last few minutes of the mission. The authors revealed that as the wing?s aluminum structure melted, molten globules were flying off and were caught in the windstream. These globules, it was explained, acted like "chaff" from a jet fighter to interfere with the enemy?s radar. The molten globules interfered with the shuttle's communication and data streams. The title of the book "Comm Check? relates to the radio call that Houston used in the last few seconds, trying to reestablish contact with the stricken craft.
The other section of note deals with NASA culture as a business. A few mid level engineers examined video and low-resolution still photos of the launch and were concerned with the shedding of the foam piece. Their request for high-resolution photos from Earth to examine any damage were snubbed by those at higher levels within NASA. These managers were of the opinion "there is nothing that can be done now." The book revealed many complex levels and egos within the NASA community. While the shuttle may never have been able to reenter safely, engineers may have been able to come up with a possible solution but were completely negated by NASA management. The book also showed problems with NASA's operating culture dating back to the 1986 Challenger disaster. A 1996 book by Diane Vaughn (The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA) was heavily quoted. She has shown that in the ten years after the 1986 disaster little was done at NASA. In fact she had recommendations for NASA. They were adopted by all sorts of other institutions but not NASA:
"I heard from many organizations that were concerned with reducing risk and reducing errors and mistakes. The U.S. Forest Service called and I spoke to hot shots and smoke jumpers, I went to a conference the physicians held looking at errors in hospitals, I was called by people working in nuclear regulatory operations, regular businesses where it wasn't risky in the sense that human lives were at cost. Everybody called. My high school boyfriend called. But NASA never called."
The interviews in the book were first rate and were done with respect.
All in all "Comm Check" is a unique read. It is very interesting for those interested in space exploration but also for those who need to look at the struggles with corporate structure. Godspeed to Rick, Willie, Kalpana, David, Michael, Laurel and Illian.
| 
