State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century

Rating:
Summary: Essential Reading
Review: Less government is to be preferred as a rule, however when no societal or cultural constructs or traditions exist to provide a framework for organized positive behavior, governmental organizations are to be preferred to chaos. In many areas of the world the infrastructure is not able to cope with either the problems facing the population or the volume of help offered by the relief agencies. The situation is further complicated by the imposition of aid structures by the relief agencies that compete with the existing frameworks for available resources. According to Fukuyama , keeping civil society from degenerating into simple rent-seeking interest groups is dependent more on the nature of that civil society than the design of its institutions. The Westphalian model of the nation-state implying state sovereignty has been challenged many times in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. It is unreasonable to accept the breach of sovereignty for humanitarian reasons, but not to prevent security threats, implying that defense of others is more legitimate than self-defense. Fixing this problem leads to the physical intervention in other states and the reform of their governments in order to eliminate them as a threat and prevent new threats from emerging. This is nation-building. Nation-building , to be effective , must create state services that can be effective after foreign support is withdrawn. Successful examples have been Germany and Japan after WWII due to strong bureaucratic populations that survived the disruption of war and occupation. Other examples are India, Singapore and Hong Kong, for the British, Taiwan and Korea for the Japanese. Fukuyama stresses the need for international aid organizations to make structural capacity building their primary concern rather than simple short-term crisis solving
He is not optimistic since aid organizations or any other interested constituencies want to show quantifiable results to justify their efforts. Due to their competitive advantages, aid organizations marginalize locals and reduce the effectiveness of existing societal chiefs. The result is non-sustainability of their structures. Sustainability is still the goal and should be attempted. That being said, empowering local organizations at the lowest level possible to implement the policies is recommended as is the clear statement of organizational policies and objectives throughout the organization. Fukuyama further favors the use of small NGOs who can be more efficient than governments to implement policy and can make more effective use of local knowledge. The overall goals of state-building should be to create self-sustaining structures that can maintain order, security, accountability, education, and the rule of law. Finally Fukuyama contrasts the European universalist world view with that of Americans. He says that Europeans see the state as a guardian of public interest separate from and superior to the views of the citizenry. They see international or collective bodies (like the EU) as having legitimacy superior to their individual components. They also justify laws embodying social policy as expressions of social objectives. Americans do not. The American view is that unachievable social aspirations made into law weaken the rule of law itself. They also see no legitimacy of governments beyond the constitutional democratic nation-state. In this view international organizations have legitimacy only if and as long as duly elected majorities grant it. Only states can aggregate and deploy legitimate power. Fukuyama concludes: the withering away of the state is not Utopia, but disaster. Once again, as in his "The End Of History And The Last Man" Fukuyama has produced an erudite, compelling, and controversal book that no student of modern history should miss.


Rating:
Summary: Delirious rantings from a feeble mind
Review: A neocon like Fukuyama should stop publishing tracts that no educated person would take seriously, and which are not worth the paper they are printed on.

Rating:
Summary: The Next Global Challenge: Strengthening States
Review: For many Americans, including almost all libertarians, state power is something to be diminished. While there is usually some acknowledgement that the state is necessary for the national defense and for administering the rule of law, many Americans do not willingly concede that the regulation of certain aspects of the economy -- to give one example -- is a legitimate use of state power. In the early 1990s, this American ideology naturally became a part of the ideology of the international institutions in which the U.S. played a major role. Developing countries which came to these international institutions for help were usually told, and sometimes even required, to reduce the scope and power of their states.

In this short volume, Fukuyama shows how inappropriate - and even disastrous -- this American ideology is when applied indiscriminately in developing countries around the world. Claiming it is no longer supported by most academic empirical research, he provides a rough and tentative alternative to the idea of the shrinking state by demonstrating where states must be strong and where it is okay for them to scale down. Finally, he shows how such various global problems such as fighting terrorism and AIDS, the nonproliferation of WMD, and encouraging the spread of democracy, depend upon strong, not weak states, and that the U.S. and Europe must both come to terms (in their own ways) with this new international approach.

Fukuyama claims that what is needed is a paradigm shift. For much of the last half-century, the trend has been to weaken the state. Now, the evidence suggests that a new approach is needed, one that goes beyond simply shrinking or enlarging the state, and begins to deal with making the state more effective based on local conditions. While some basic outcomes (a democratic, capitalist state, for example) are to be expected, the way each nation gets there will be different.

Rating:
Summary: The Next Global Challenge: Strengthening States
Review: For many Americans, including almost all libertarians, state power is something to be diminished. While there is usually some acknowledgement that the state is necessary for the national defense and for administering the rule of law, many Americans do not willingly concede that the regulation of certain aspects of the economy -- to give one example -- is a legitimate use of state power. In the early 1990s, this American ideology naturally became a part of the ideology of the international institutions in which the U.S. played a major role. Developing countries which came to these international institutions for help were usually told, and sometimes even required, to reduce the scope and power of their states.

In this short volume, Fukuyama shows how inappropriate - and even disastrous -- this American ideology is when applied indiscriminately in developing countries around the world. Claiming it is no longer supported by most academic empirical research, he provides a rough and tentative alternative to the idea of the shrinking state by demonstrating where states must be strong and where it is okay for them to scale down. Finally, he shows how such various global problems such as fighting terrorism and AIDS, the nonproliferation of WMD, and encouraging the spread of democracy, depend upon strong, not weak states, and that the U.S. and Europe must both come to terms (in their own ways) with this new international approach.

Fukuyama claims that what is needed is a paradigm shift. For much of the last half-century, the trend has been to weaken the state. Now, the evidence suggests that a new approach is needed, one that goes beyond simply shrinking or enlarging the state, and begins to deal with making the state more effective based on local conditions. While some basic outcomes (a democratic, capitalist state, for example) are to be expected, the way each nation gets there will be different.

Rating:
Summary: "It's Back," And This Time It Means Business
Review: Francis Fukuyama provides in this slender volume a solid diagnosis of one of the most daunting obstacles impeding global security today. Specifically, Fukuyama's central argument is that the creation of new government institutions and the strenghtening of existing ones are the most important tasks we face at this point in history. Policy-makers have an impressive record when it comes to the dismantling, largely through the privatization of functions, of modern states; the ability to build sustainable political institutions is another matter. Developing countries -- at least the "majority" of them according to Mr. Fukuyama -- simply don't demand institutional reform. When reform has been imposed upon them, usually as a condition for the receipt of multi-lateral loans, the donor countries lack the patience to foster the requisite indigenous skills. The bulk of Mr. Fukuyama's text is an analysis of the distinc nature of, and unique problems posed by political insitutions in general -- that is, the ambiguity of goals, insufficient performance measures and, most significantly, the problem of delegating discretion.
The upshot of this analysis is that there is no "one-size-fits-all" organizational template that, as a drug to a disease, can be confidently applied across the board to bolster weak states. Globalization compounds the problem to the extent that its tendency is to erode the autonomy of the sovereign state. Similarly, the modern premise that governing legitimacy is exclusively derived from the consent of the governed through democratic processes (where is old-fashioned colonialism when you need it), runs the risk of raising expectations in developing countries that may very well be unrealistic, at least in the short-term. As Mr. Fukuyama notes, this is an area that will require significant research in the future. Nation-state building is not a new challenge, but is has never presented itself with the level of urgency we witness today. And, finally, that "end of history" notion. Read this book and you'll discover that not everybody is having the "end of history" experience.

Rating:
Summary: "It's Back," And This Time It Means Business
Review: Francis Fukuyama provides in this slender volume a solid diagnosis of one of the most daunting obstacles impeding global security today. Specifically, Fukuyama's central argument is that the creation of new government institutions and the strenghtening of existing ones are the most important tasks we face at this point in history. Policy-makers have an impressive record when it comes to the dismantling, largely through the privatization of functions, of modern states; the ability to build sustainable political institutions is another matter. Developing countries -- at least the "majority" of them according to Mr. Fukuyama -- simply don't demand institutional reform. When reform has been imposed upon them, usually as a condition for the receipt of multi-lateral loans, the donor countries lack the patience to foster the requisite indigenous skills. The bulk of Mr. Fukuyama's text is an analysis of the distinc nature of, and unique problems posed by political insitutions in general -- that is, the ambiguity of goals, insufficient performance measures and, most significantly, the problem of delegating discretion.
The upshot of this analysis is that there is no "one-size-fits-all" organizational template that, as a drug to a disease, can be confidently applied across the board to bolster weak states. Globalization compounds the problem to the extent that its tendency is to erode the autonomy of the sovereign state. Similarly, the modern premise that governing legitimacy is exclusively derived from the consent of the governed through democratic processes (where is old-fashioned colonialism when you need it), runs the risk of raising expectations in developing countries that may very well be unrealistic, at least in the short-term. As Mr. Fukuyama notes, this is an area that will require significant research in the future. Nation-state building is not a new challenge, but is has never presented itself with the level of urgency we witness today. And, finally, that "end of history" notion. Read this book and you'll discover that not everybody is having the "end of history" experience.

Rating:
Summary: Another Excellent Work From Fukayama
Review: Francis Fukuyama's newest book, State Building, while well written and insightful as one would expect from a scholar of his caliber, feels rather like a patchwork quilt at times. It is unclear at times whether the book is written for an academic audience or for a more general audience, and while in the end I would recommend it for either, the general reader would be well advised to read carefully and ask lots of questions regarding some of the fine points of industrial organization theory and their application to Fukuyama's final goal of explaining the art of state-building in the 21st century.

While the index indicates that the book has four primary sections, in reality there are just three sections, the four is comprised of simply of a summary and conclusion. In the first section Fukuyama covers the basics of political economy. Most of his time in covering the basics of political economy is spent clarifying the difference between the scope of government power and the strength of government power, and while this is a well-known distinction to be drawn to most academics, fewer of the general readers may be familiar with it. The remainder of this section is devoted to explaining the importance of institutions, both native and imported, to all aspects of applied political economy. Fukayama covers a great deal of ground in this section, but he does an admirable job of covering the ground effectively.

The second section of the book is devoted to a much more academic analysis of the problems of institutions and institutional design. In this section in particular general readers would likely struggle. The topics approached are not easy nor intuitive, and while the first section does lay a reasonable groundwork for understanding them, an individual approaching them for the first time through this book is likely to be either confused, bored, or both. This problem is particularly acute when Fukuyama slips into the realm of corporate organization and the role of CEOs in developing the corporate culture because the connection to his primary thesis is one recognized by social scientists, but not always by the general public. That said, his eventual conclusion that institutions matter but cannot just be imposed, like the Washington Consensus, is both accurate and important to understand. His explanation, that culture and history really matter, while not as complete or rigorous as one would ideally hope for, is plausible.

The final section of State-Building deals with a more political and less economic topic, a justification for the very act of state-building. In my opinion this is the most interesting section of the book because it provides a very interesting perspective on a topic that has never really been resolved, the issue of the power and foundations of legitimate statehood. Fukuyama's analysis is as strong here as anywhere else in the book, perhaps stronger, and it is more than accessible to the average reader (or at least the average reader of non-fiction books).

My Two Cents:
As much as I would like to believe that there is a simple answer to the questions raised, that given facts of the world X, Y, and Z then sovereignty should/should not be protected, or that institutional design X/Y is the absolutely efficient one, I agree with Fukuyama that our current state of knowledge is simply insufficient to make such judgements. While Fukuyama seems to be holding out hope that one day we will know enough to make such decisions, I am more skeptical. The world is not a static place, it is constantly changing, what is true now will not be true in a month, let alone a year or more. With such a rapid change in the facts of the world, I do not believe that answers on statehood and institutional design will ever be truly answered, all we can do is to discuss what we think we know, debate the options that we believe we have, and to try to not be too surprised when we're wrong. We can only hope that people like Francis Fukuyama will continue to be involved in the process and to make such contributions as they can.


Rating:
Summary: Excellent Analysis of Problems related to Nation Building
Review: Fukuyama will probably always be identified by the title of his first book---The End of History and the Last Man---but as this book demonstrates, he has moved on to tackle some of the most difficult problems facing our country today. This book, which is really a long essay , analyzes the problems and opportunities of state building, and reaches some conclusions which are not particlarly optimistic, but nevertheless seem to be realistic. Fukuyama revisits some of our past experiences in similar endeavors, and notes our failures as well as the limited successes we have had. This book should be required reading by all decision makers as our nation struggles to overcome our mistakes and failures in the aftermath of the Iraqi War. It is an excellent, even great book, written by a brilliant scholar in language which is easily grasped and appreciated.

Rating:
Summary: Statebuilding starts by looking at our selfs
Review: This book about state building is based on very actual world affairs. You only have to think about Afghanistan and Iraq to see the West struggle with it. But when you read this book, it also becomes clear how little we know about how we organize our own societies.

The book starts by describing the role of the state in two dimensions: the scope and the strength. After exploring the consequences and historical facts he comes to a convincing conclusion that it is not so much the scope (size) of the state that is important but the strength of the state. The more strength a state has, the more effective is in playing its role in providing safety and prosperity to the people it is serving. This is quite a refreshing idea, as most emphasis nowadays is mostly on smaller (vs. bigger) state power instead of stronger (vs. weak) state power.

Also the book explores the management and economic theories and comes to the conclusion that there is no blue print that will give us the best practices to operate government institutions. Because institutions depend heavy on culture and local conditions and hence need to be developed in the local context. As Fukuyama argues the best thing to do is to develop best practices that help to grow institutions in a local context.

In the later part of the book he also explains the difference in politics between Europe and the US. In my opinion he quite convincingly explains some failing European policies and some totalitarian tendencies in Europe, who tend to place the interest of the state above the interest of the people living in it.

All in all an enlightening read, that binds current affairs with a deeper understanding of our own Western society.