Rating: 
Summary: Disappointing...
Review: .....to say the least. I wish I had skimmed the book a little before buying it. Over half of this 225-page book is historical background, and the rest is eseentially a clip job of recent events, with occasional self-indulgent comments thrown in. The analysis is superificial, and the book overall lacks sophistication, depth, and any new facts or insights.
Rating:
Summary: The Number
Review: A book about accounting written by a nonaccountant. A waste of your time and money. My copy went into the trash.
Rating: 
Summary: A must read for any who would invest in financial markets
Review: Alex Berenson has done the public a huge public service with this book. He clearly and logically describes serious problems with the US Stock markets, based on corporate avarice, greed and cowardly, dishonest politicians. His sections on the creation then the gutting of the SEC are perceptive and insightful. His overview of the decline of corporate accounting standards, led by the big US accounting firms, including, of course Arthur Anderson give a clear picture of the problems and what needs to be done.
We need transparent and honest markets. We don't have them.
A great book for experienced investors and for novices.
Rating:
Summary: quite a read
Review: As a student interested in finance, I found The Number illuminating. In clear, insightful prose, Alex Berenson demystifies the markets. I would recommend The Number to anyone interested in business.
Rating:
Summary: Very good
Review: Concise and crisply written. Shows in a way how the 1990s were an inevitable outcome of prior history
Rating:
Summary: A Century of Sleazy Stock Market Manipulations Chronicled
Review: How do the financial markets work? How good are the information flows? How far can you trust what you read and hear? Where are there conflicts of interest? Why are these conflicts dangerous? Those are the fundamental questions that Mr. Alex Berenson addresses in his century-long look at how the government, companies, investment banks, brokers and investors have interacted. Unlike other books about the need for reform in the financial markets, this one also looks thoroughly at thoughtful commentary by market experts, academics and regulators over the years. The book is enlivened by entertaining writing, a willingness to say "shame on you" to those who have done wrong and insights into the work that short sellers do to make the market more rational when it isn't. If you just want to read about the current market or you know a lot about the market history, you can skip over the first 70 pages. If you are new to the market, you may find the first 70 pages to be the most interesting. Stock promotion and trading have always been corrupt. Over time, that corruption finds new ways to manifest itself. What's new now is that the potential financial stakes are so large that they would blow the mind of an ancient Egyptian pharaoh. At the same time, the social cost of corruption is equally large. I found the book to be quite thorough when it came to the recent market bubble (and partial bursting in 2000-2002). The main area that did not receive enough attention was pointing out why boards go wild with options and CEO pay (even for lousy performance). The book has two technical weaknesses in its observations that deserve note. First, like almost all financial writers, Mr. Berenson assumes that the current way companies employ stock options is unfixable except through accounting changes. Actually, the current use of stock options (although excessive in many cases for senior management) could easily be made into a major source of profits for companies. If companies bought back shares equivalent to the options they grant at lower prices than the option exercise price, any options that were later exercised would generate real cash and real earnings for the company. That's because Uncle Sam provides tax deductions for these options (as the author thoughtfully points out). Companies could achieve this positive result simply by granting options at exercise prices well above the current market while simultaneously purchasing the equivalent shares. The premium on the exercise price would have to account for the cost of capital on the money tied up in the meantime. If a company couldn't afford to do this, then it has a real cost of issuing options that should be recognized. Actually, that cost is recognized now through an increase in shares outstanding. Option grants are disclosed. If investors ignore these points, they deserve to bear the consequences. There's no real need to change accounting in this situation . . . just to improve financial management and board behavior. The other problem is that Mr. Berenson doesn't quite understand accounting, and says things that are "almost" right . . . but not quite right in several places. Take his accounting comments with a grain of salt as exposing an issue . . . but don't quote him literally. The book would have been much improved if Mr. Berenson had also examined those who managed their companies well. How did they avoid the evils portrayed in the book? What clues do those companies provide for the future? I hope that in the future Mr. Berenson will write a book about the government numbers that mislead companies, investors and consumers about what's going on in the economy. The political propaganda that is disguised as economic information also plays a large role in stock market problems . . . and has an even larger social cost. This book makes an eloquent piece of evidence for only investing in stocks through index funds. When you do that, you reduce your risk of being tricked by any particular corrupt company or person. You will also outperform 90 percent of all professionally managed portfolios (and a higher percentage of individually managed portfolios) when you do. Keep that in mind as you invest. As I finished the book, I realized that the lack of practical economic education in high schools and colleges leaves each new generation exposed to the con men and women in the securities industry and those they use to weave their schemes and scams. Be sure that your children and grandchildren don't have to learn Enron-type lessons the hard way. Teach them what you know!
Rating:
Summary: A Century of Sleazy Stock Market Manipulations Chronicled
Review: How do the financial markets work? How good are the information flows? How far can you trust what you read and hear? Where are there conflicts of interest? Why are these conflicts dangerous? Those are the fundamental questions that Mr. Alex Berenson addresses in his century-long look at how the government, companies, investment banks, brokers and investors have interacted. Unlike other books about the need for reform in the financial markets, this one also looks thoroughly at thoughtful commentary by market experts, academics and regulators over the years. The book is enlivened by entertaining writing, a willingness to say "shame on you" to those who have done wrong and insights into the work that short sellers do to make the market more rational when it isn't. If you just want to read about the current market or you know a lot about the market history, you can skip over the first 70 pages. If you are new to the market, you may find the first 70 pages to be the most interesting. Stock promotion and trading have always been corrupt. Over time, that corruption finds new ways to manifest itself. What's new now is that the potential financial stakes are so large that they would blow the mind of an ancient Egyptian pharaoh. At the same time, the social cost of corruption is equally large. I found the book to be quite thorough when it came to the recent market bubble (and partial bursting in 2000-2002). The main area that did not receive enough attention was pointing out why boards go wild with options and CEO pay (even for lousy performance). The book has two technical weaknesses in its observations that deserve note. First, like almost all financial writers, Mr. Berenson assumes that the current way companies employ stock options is unfixable except through accounting changes. Actually, the current use of stock options (although excessive in many cases for senior management) could easily be made into a major source of profits for companies. If companies bought back shares equivalent to the options they grant at lower prices than the option exercise price, any options that were later exercised would generate real cash and real earnings for the company. That's because Uncle Sam provides tax deductions for these options (as the author thoughtfully points out). Companies could achieve this positive result simply by granting options at exercise prices well above the current market while simultaneously purchasing the equivalent shares. The premium on the exercise price would have to account for the cost of capital on the money tied up in the meantime. If a company couldn't afford to do this, then it has a real cost of issuing options that should be recognized. Actually, that cost is recognized now through an increase in shares outstanding. Option grants are disclosed. If investors ignore these points, they deserve to bear the consequences. There's no real need to change accounting in this situation . . . just to improve financial management and board behavior. The other problem is that Mr. Berenson doesn't quite understand accounting, and says things that are "almost" right . . . but not quite right in several places. Take his accounting comments with a grain of salt as exposing an issue . . . but don't quote him literally. The book would have been much improved if Mr. Berenson had also examined those who managed their companies well. How did they avoid the evils portrayed in the book? What clues do those companies provide for the future? I hope that in the future Mr. Berenson will write a book about the government numbers that mislead companies, investors and consumers about what's going on in the economy. The political propaganda that is disguised as economic information also plays a large role in stock market problems . . . and has an even larger social cost. This book makes an eloquent piece of evidence for only investing in stocks through index funds. When you do that, you reduce your risk of being tricked by any particular corrupt company or person. You will also outperform 90 percent of all professionally managed portfolios (and a higher percentage of individually managed portfolios) when you do. Keep that in mind as you invest. As I finished the book, I realized that the lack of practical economic education in high schools and colleges leaves each new generation exposed to the con men and women in the securities industry and those they use to weave their schemes and scams. Be sure that your children and grandchildren don't have to learn Enron-type lessons the hard way. Teach them what you know!
Rating:
Summary: Insightful and easy to understand
Review: I am a professor of finance and economics and must recommend this book for anyone with even a basic interest in corporate markets. I've asked my students to read The Number largely because it presents a fair and in-depth perspective on this fascinating economic fallout without ignoring the historical context. Berenson writes clearly and perceptively while analyzing from both top to bottom as well as left to right the market growth and its subsequent implosion.
Rating: 
Summary: Solid introduction for the financial novice
Review: I approached this book with deep skeptism. However, Berenson was often spot on in his observations, and I'd give the book high marks - think a more readable, less detailed, version of Irrational Exuberance. The strongest parts of the book are his concise review of the history of bubbles and his entertaining descriptions of short sellers. He is clearly a strong writer and has some excellent insights on the events leading up to the bubble. He is dead on about the failures of growth through acquisition. Finally, he provides a balanced view that does not have a strong preset agenda. While a history lesson would serve most folks on the Street well, financial experts will find it lacking in several areas. In particular, the oversimplification of accounting works well as a writing device but leads to somewhat superficial insights on the challenges managers face in managing to the Number. Moreover, Berenson confuses the dotcom bubble with the telecom bubble - which really ought to be looked at seperately. In any case, the Number is an excellent read. Berenson's a great writer and a strong historian. I'd recommend it as background meeting for the expert financier so they can see that history repeats itself. And it is a fine introduction for the financial novice.
Rating: 
Summary: Nothing really new here
Review: I can see why Berenson is touted as one of the top authors under 30. His writing is great. Crisp, clear, well researched and understandable. However, if you have kept up with all the shenanigans going on in the market over the past years, there is very little new here. Folks who are not as in touch with the details behind the financial chincary that has gone on will find this a quick, enlightening and enjoyable read. I would love to see the author tackle another topic in the future.
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