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Close To The Sun : How Airbus Challenged America's Domination of the Skies

Close To The Sun : How Airbus Challenged America's Domination of the Skies

List Price: $25.95
Your Price: $16.35
Product Info Reviews

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Rating: 4 stars
Summary: A Great Account, Despite the Euro-Propaganda
Review: Aris has crafted a highly entertaining and informative account of the development of Airbus Industrie, despite a few errors and ommisions.

Like all European industry analysts, Aris' supporting arguments for government subsidies of Airbus are one sided and self-serving. The now standard mantra that Boeing commercial aircraft development benefitted from the USAF funded KC-135 is rolled out here again. This completely ignores the development of the Boeing Model 367-80 several years in advance, at a cost equivalent to the net worth of The Boeing Company at the time. It was through this gamble that Boeing succeeded in convincing the USAF that a jet powered aerial tanker was necessary, as well as spurring airline interest in this technology. In addition, most countries favor their indigenous industries in their government's military procurement, Europe included. By claiming that government subsidization of a civilian aircraft industry infrastructure is necessary, the Europeans are effectively admitting that they were underfunding their own defenses throughout the cold war, relying on Uncle Sam's presence to enable them to invest public funds in industrial development and international trade.

The other ommisions are of a more minor nature, including the statement that the A310 featured the industry's first 2-man flight deck (what about the DC-9 and the option on early 737's?). Aris also falls for the "revisionist history" arguement that the 777 was only meant to compete with the A330 and the MD11, leaving the A340 solely in competition with the 747. What about all those ads in Aviation Week extolling the virtues of 4 engines on long over-water flights? Why did Singapore airlines "trade in" its A340's (before the last one was delivered) and buy 777's? And the claim that the A340-200/300 is "as fast" as a 747 is pure comedy to anyone with any knowledge of these aircraft. I guess Aris just didn't want to have to explain that the 777 outsold the A330 and the A340-200/300 combined.

Okay, so having said all that how can I rate this as a four-star effort? The large commercial aircraft industry has become so highly politicized that I expect any account of either of the two remaining participants to be heavily biased. Having this expectation, I was able to concentrate on the positive aspects of this account, and there are many. The inside details of the politics between the partners is especially interesting and something we in America don't appreciate enough. European industry can be rightfully proud of what they have accomplished so far, and they will no doubt continue at the industry's cutting edge.

I would recommend this book to any serious student of the commercial aircraft industry, but as part of a "balanced diet". I also recommend "Flying High" by Eugene Rogers (no, not the company sponsored "Legend and Legacy"), as well as "Birds of Prey" by Matthew Lynn. Finally, "The Sporty Game" By John Newhouse (if you can find a copy) remains king of the hill.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: Good For Political Intrigue, Weak On Aviation Knowledge
Review: As a pilot who has flown all the Boeing airliners except the B-707 and the B-777, as well as the A-320, I was intrigued by this book, although in the end it was not exactly what I expected. My preconceived notion that this book would be rather technical was proven decisively wrong, yet I have given the book three stars for good background information on the formation and machinations of Airbus. In particular the sections devoted to the political intrigue of the British on-again, off-again approach to the consortium (and the resulting consequences) was especially good, and gave me a fresh appreciation for the good judgment exercised by Margaret Thatcher during the debate about the A-320 wing construction, and the positive effect it had for her policy of privatizing British industry. For a political history of Airbus this book is an excellent resource.

While the book may be excellent in dealing with the politics of Airbus, it is poor in evaluating technical aviation information. Aris repeatedly makes horrendous technical and terminology errors which tell me he does not grasp any of the underlying technology of flight, and is particularly ignorant of how Fly By Wire (FBW) actually works. He continuously makes the grating error of saying that conventional aircraft, including the entire Boeing line, have "joysticks" to control them, for instance. This is of course exactly wrong, they have control yokes; the controversy when the A-320 was introduced was in fact precisely because Airbus was deleting the yokes for side sticks (or if you must, "joysticks"). This entire section of the book is muddled by his improper terminology: an unknowledgeable reader would conclude that it was actually Boeing that had sticks in their products. This is perhaps the worst, but is not the only, technical gaffe in the book. I noted numerous misspellings (including of airline names) and imprecisely worded statements which will lead some readers to improper conclusions. Likewise, in his section on A-320 technology, he leads the casual reader to believe that the pilot is just along for the ride, which is totally incorrect. The A-320 has a lot of slick, very useful technology, but it operates as it is directed to by the pilots at all times (with the exception of some pre-programmed envelope protection features outside the scope of this book or review.) In discussing Airbus accidents, he makes the unfortunate error of technologically lumping the A-300, A-310, and A-320 into the same group, which is blatantly incorrect from a flight control point of view. He likewise has either not read, or certainly has not understood, the factual accident reports concerning the early A-320 mishaps. Be cautious, in other words: do not take the information presented here for fact unless confirmed elsewhere.

I sometimes wonder about Aris' research techniques given the construction of many sentences in this book. Very frequently he quotes the author of other books verbatim, with introductions like "...in the words of [author's name]...." I would find this appropriate if dealing with unique references or technical data, but it is generally taken from other books written by laymen for laymen. While there is nothing technically wrong with this, as he does give appropriate credit, I am simply saying that given the relative shallowness of the material involved, he could have seemingly conveyed the information in his own words: I paid to read his thoughts, not those of others I have likely already read.

While some people have dismissed this book as Airbus propaganda, I think it is better than that. I do think that Aris favors Airbus over Boeing (and frankly, so do I), but I do think that he attempts to be fair to both sides in general, and gives Boeing credit where credit is due for the most part (sometimes I think too much credit, in fact.) If anyone gets the short shrift here it is Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas, who come across as blundering corporate idiots with their trijet programs, which dramatically over-simplifies the situation as it actually existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, for instance, Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) was not even conceived of: aircraft needed a minimum of three engines to fly more than 60 minutes from shore, clearly making the idea of a widebody twin less appealing. In fact, the trijet was a great idea: the market was just not able to support two similar designs. Interestingly, Lockheed had desired to build a twin engine version of the L-1011, but the engine technology of the time didn't allow an engine of sufficient thrust.

This book is worth reading, but principally for the political intrigue involved, and for some of the interesting information on dramatic sales campaigns waged by Airbus; particularly the Eastern, Pan Am, and Northwest campaigns. For information of a technical nature, go elsewhere. Overall I recommend "Birds of Prey" by Matthew Lynn as a superior Airbus versus Boeing text, although it was written considerably earlier.


Rating: 1 stars
Summary: A Poor Read - Don't Bother
Review: One of the most one-sided, uninspired books I have ever read. Trashes American industry and government at every opportunity while Europeans can do no wrong. The lack of proofreading undermines what little factual information is contained such as confusing Lockheed for McDonnell Douglas. Numerous typos further show a lack of attention such as misspelling the term "CEO" (no joke) - AND THIS IS THE SECOND EDITION! Save your money and download a mix of Airbus press releases - at least they may contain a picture or two to distract from the propaganda.


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