Rating: 
Summary: Short on insight or even new information
Review: This book was written with all the tact and circumspection of someone angling for a top post in a presidential administration... ANY administration, from Bush to Dean!Perhaps that's why you won't get a strong sense from these two that there has been anything particularly reckless, mendacious or radical about the so-called "Bush revolution". Relying on such "unimpeachable" sources as MSNBC and the Wall Street Journal, Daalder and Lindsay are more inclined to depict Bush's policies on Iraq as "bold" than deceitful. On precious little evidence, they're convinced that Bush is a decisive world leader with a "coherent worldview"! And they are almost entirely mute on the subject of neoconservative influence on Iraq policy, except to dismiss it out of hand. Yes, Cheney is an assertive nationalist, not a neocon, properly speaking, but why don't the authors point out that Cheney placed neocons like Wolfowitz in key positions throughout the administration or that it was he who asked Wolfowitz in 1992 for a new manifesto touting American unilateralism? Why no mention of the fact that Cheney and Rumsfeld are members of the neoconservative bastion Project for a New American Century, which in Sept 2000 laid out a national security blueprint (Rebuilding America's Defenses) that bears a striking resemblance to the "Bush Doctrine" of 2002? All in all, this is a patchwork quilt of old newspaper and magazine articles, a hackneyed rush-job that will soon be forgotten. For some really trenchant analysis on the enormous and deleterious influence of Cheney and his neoconservative allies on American foreign and security policy, readers would do better to consult the Internet for the outstanding articles of reporter Jim Lobe. As for books, more thoughtful contributions have been made by Newsweek editor Michael Hirsh (At War With Ourselves) and Professor Joseph Nye (Paradox of American Power). For a more philosophical approach, I'm also looking forward to reading the new book by George Soros: The Bubble of American Supremacy.
Rating: 
Summary: Average, and mostly received wisdom
Review: This book, while illuminating in parts (especially its discussion of the rise of the so-called "Vulcans" in and around the administration, from Wolfowitz to Perle to Rice), seems fairly banal and obvious in its conclusions about Bush's foreign policy (i.e., he is applying a newfound assertiveness and bluntness to foreign policy ideals that already existed but were inconsistently applied by prior administrations), and worse, seems cribbed mostly from quotes in newspaper articles and from journal articles written by Bush policymakers. (It was, however, intriguing to read that Condoleezza Rice wrote in 2000 that the US military was not "a police force" and not "designed to build a civilian society.") It seems that in their zeal to get a book out before the 2004 election cycle the authors did a lot of piecemeal paste work but very little in the way of analysis. That said, the fact is that most books of this type are by definition of limited usefulness, since it is not until several years' time has elapsed (if not decades) that any administration can be fairly or conclusively judged by history.
Rating: 
Summary: A needed assesment
Review: This is a much needed assessment, with one problem its too early to judge. George Bush's foreign policy has accurately been described as a 'revolution' by these very insightful authors. They take the president to task for the unilateralism while also giving him begrudging praise to turning on its head the way we have viewed international bodies and our 'allies'. The authors seem to criticize and congratulate at the same time, thus giving the book an air of unbiased reading that is often hard to find in books about the Bush administration. Unfortunately the case is not closed. We do not know the full extent or effects of Bushs policies yet. All we can do is estimate. The reality is that this insightful books will need an update in a few years and thus maybe it is better to wait until then to purchase it, Nevertheless for those interested in current events this will be a happy pick, especially for the unbiased open minded reader. Bush's policy must be understood in order t o understand Americas new role in the world, as an empire and a hegemon.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting account, relatively objective
Review: This is a thoughtful and generally objective assessment of the impact of Bush Jr on the foreign policy of the United States. The central thesis that runs through the book is that Bush Jr has had a fairly consistent set of foreign policy objectives that were modified by the events of 11 September 2001 - but modified within the existing guidelines. More broadly, the authors see Bush Jr's objectives as in the foreign arena as drawing from some of the purposefulness evident in domestic policy in his first eight months in office (when, of course, foreign policy was subordinate to domestic aims, but still followed an "America first" rather than a multilateral approach). The analysis concludes with warnings about the dangers of Bush Jr's approach, and implies that the administration has not learned the lessons it should have taken away from fighting an enemy that is not a state in the traditional sense. The criticism of the lack of planning for the post Afghan and post Iraq conflict environments is an area of particular emphasis - with the undertone that, in a conflict where "nation-building" is essential if military objectives are to be met long term, multilateralism is critical to the success of operations. Hints of "imperial overstretch" creep into the debate here. The book sets out the background and provides supporting evidence extremely well. For a dual authored piece, Daalder and Lindsay have managed to come up with an extremely readable book, written in a comfortably informal style with (one suspects) the odd appearance of a rather dry humour coming in. The authors are former Clinton staffers, but objectivity is not particularly damaged. The bias, it appears to me, is a strong support for the position of the now rather isolated Secretary of State, Colin Powell. There is no "knee-jerk" analysis depicting Bush Jr as a buffoon, or as a slave to sinister neo-con forces in the administration, and the authors skilfully point out that to characterise Bush Jr in such a way is to misunderstand his Presidency. It would have been nice if there was slightly more examination of the US's perception by other countries under the new Bush Doctrine - for instance, if the US sees itself as a "liberator" of Iraq (which it must as part of the Bush Doctrine), it must see all attacks on itself in Iraq as the work of Baathists, Al-Qaeda and so on (as they can be the only opponents of "liberation"). However, if Iraqis do not share the same world view as Bush Jr, these attacks are potentially legitimised (Iraq's experience with Western incursions into its territory have rarely categorised the incoming authority as a provider of "liberty" or freedom, as the British experiences in the inter-war period demonstrate only too clearly). Bush Jr's failure to pursue multilateral support because of the absolute belief in the righteousness of the Bush Doctrine could be a major problem, if other areas of the world hold different but still legitimate interpretations of liberty. This is an area which leads out from Daalder and Lindsay's work, and would probably benefit from further study.
Rating: 
Summary: Excellent rebuttal of Bush unilateralism
Review: This one is of the best book criticizing Bush unilateralism. The two authors were staffers of the Clinton's National Security Council. Yet, their analysis remains as objective as possible. The book central argument is well accepted: the President unilateralism has produced quick victories in Afghanistan and Iraq but has fractured the world system and has exacerbated anti-Americanism. As a result, the U.S. is less secure. The authors make the case that "the fundamental premise of the Bush revolution that America's security rested on an America unbound was profoundly mistaken." The attacks of September 11, 2001, allowed Bush to refashion American foreign policy in a bolder fashion. But, his vision and goals really had not changed. His key assumption is the belief that states, rather than individuals or groups remain the essential force in international affairs. Bush came up with his phrase "Axis of Evil" when referring to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. He also set his foreign policy in black or white "you are either with us or against us." This refers to countries supposedly supporting terrorism or not. Despite the evidence that al Qaeda is supranational terrorist network with few allegiance to specific State, the Bush doctrine is to fight such terrorist network one State at a time. While the connection between al Qaeda and the Afghanistan Taliban made sense following Bush vision that States do sponsor terrorism; The Taliban was the exception that confirms the rule. Typically, it is not the case, as terrorist networks operate beyond State boundaries. Yet, the conviction derived from victory over the Taliban sent Bush and the U.S. astray on an unbound foreign policy leading to the Iraqi invasion. Regarding Iraq, all the administration assumptions turned out to be incorrect. The U.S. administration three main assumptions where:
1) Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat;
2) Turning Iraq into a viable self-governing state would be easy. The Iraqis would welcome U.S. troops as liberators; and
3) Once weapons were found and postwar normality returned even those countries opposed to the war would want to contribute to Iraq reconstruction. All assumptions were wrong. No weapons of mass destruction have been found. The Iraqi society has collapsed. U.S. soldiers are killed almost daily by Islamic terrorists infiltrating Iraq. And, the U.S. alone is bearing the fiscal and military burden of Iraq reconstruction. Another false assumption driven by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was that the peacekeeping occupation of Iraq would take far fewer soldiers (only 30,000) than the actual war did. This turned out to be a huge mistake. It quickly became clear that the peacekeeping occupation required more soldiers than the war (180,000 for peacekeeping, only 125,000 for the war). The soldiers ranks were quickly shored up; But, at a cost of more than $1 billion per week. We will need that many troops there for at least another year or two. This means $50 to $100 billion alone just for the U.S. troops. This huge cost does not include any Iraq reconstruction cost. Here is the true cost of Bush's unilateralism. Militarily, close to half the U.S. Army is deployed in Iraq, with no exit date in sight. American soldiers are on one-year rotations, and many face the prospect of returning to Iraq within a year of going home. Morale, recruitment and retention are bound to suffer. Our Army is being stretched too thinly on the wrong issue. And, our ability to address more pressing national-security challenges is impaired. The authors make sharp observation regarding the Administration vision. Contrary to popular beliefs, they do not view Bush as a puppet manipulated by a neoconservatives. Instead, they see Bush as an assertive leader effectively imposing his vision. That he does not express it like a Ph.D. in political science is irrelevant. The authors note that the top spots from an executive standpoint are not populated by neoconservatives (Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfovitz, Pentagon adviser Richard Perle), but instead by "assertive nationalists" such as Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. But, the neoconservatives have successfully promoted their opinions. Some of the assertive nationalists have become strong advocates of neoconservative policies. This is particularly true for Dick Cheney. Dick Cheney experienced a transformation after September 11, 2001. He immersed himself in studying Islam and the Middle East, meeting with the top scholars on the subject: Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami. These scholars argued that toppling Saddam would send a message of strength and enhance America's credibility throughout the Muslim world. Having spent time with such tutors, the vice president became the chief advocate of the neoconservative position. Thus, if one can argue with Dick Cheney's position on Iraq; surprisingly, one can't argue he had not consulted the top minds on the subject. With 20/20 hindsight, it is easy to rebut the Administration Iraqi policies. However, it is more challenging to navigate the quicksand of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the book does an excellent job of clarifying one's hindsight on such matters.
Rating:
Summary: America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy
Review: Two Clinton-era National Security Council staffers offer muted criticism of George W. Bush's foreign policy from a realist perspective. September 11th is identified as the reason for Congressional deference to Bush's "revolutionary" tangent as Bush proceeded to wage war on Afghanistan and Iraq, unleash the CIA from previous legal constraints, and generally pursue a "hegemonist" worldview in foreign affairs. Not unexpectedly, they would prefer the multilateral approach towards exercising American power that has largely prevailed over the past five decades.
Rating:
Summary: A reasoned, balanced critique of Bush's foreign policy
Review: Unlike the rather vitrioic and harsh rhetoric of the Bush-hating left, this book presents a fair yet reasoned critique of the Bush foreign policy. It rebuts the common assertion that Bush is an idiot or that he is being a tool by a neo-conservative cabal.
As the authors demonstrate in this book, the major problem with American foreign policy under this administration is the rigid adherance to notions that are demonstratively false. The Bush Administration seems to believe that offending allies carries no risk and that multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, are worthless in the international sphere.
This view is dangerous and in my view, demonstrative of the stunning arrogance of the Bush Administration.
Rating:
Summary: Engaging and thought provoking presentation
Review: While obviously opposed to the Bush approach to foreign policy in general and to Iraq in particular, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay have nonetheless succeeded in producing a remarkably fair book attempting to explain the reasons behind the President's about face from recent U.S. foreign policy. The attacks on 9/11 and other terrorist activities over the past decade had gradually convinced the President that the internationalist view espoused by Bill Clinton and his own father was simply no longer the answer. Bush has chosen instead to embark on a new unilateralist course favored by most of his senior advisors that the authors argue may be somewhat productive in the short run but likely to be a disaster over the long haul. Extremely well written, thoughtful and meticulously documented, this book should be an essential read for any citizen seeking to get up to speed on foreign policy issues before the 2004 Presidential election.
Rating:
Summary: Engaging and thought provoking presentation
Review: While obviously opposed to the Bush approach to foreign policy in general and to Iraq in particular, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay have nonetheless succeeded in producing a remarkably fair book attempting to explain the reasons behind the President's about face from recent U.S. foreign policy. The attacks on 9/11 and other terrorist activities over the past decade had gradually convinced the President that the internationalist view espoused by Bill Clinton and his own father was simply no longer the answer. Bush has chosen instead to embark on a new unilateralist course favored by most of his senior advisors that the authors argue may be somewhat productive in the short run but likely to be a disaster over the long haul. Extremely well written, thoughtful and meticulously documented, this book should be an essential read for any citizen seeking to get up to speed on foreign policy issues before the 2004 Presidential election.
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