Rating: 
Summary: Pulling Back the Historical Veil to the Past
Review: Max Boot's The Savage Wars of Peace is excellent! It is a timely edition to "lessons learned" on how to approach the wars of the future which are now--termed 4th Generation War by Marine Colonel GI Wilson and William S. Lind--but are being fought by a U.S. military stuck in the industrial age of war, or Second Generation War. The planners at the Pentagon would harvest some good lessons if they pull away from their power point slides long enough to read--and maybe it is becoming clear they have by committing smaller units so far to the war in Afghanistan. This book is clear, concise and gets an A plus for research. The chapter that stands out are the lessons on Vietnam. Max Boot did his historical homework here and is one of the few to admit it was not disloyalty back home that did us in when we "won all the battles." The army, as it is today, is still mired in conducting large battles of attrition, counting on body counts to prevail-vs pushing down decisions to well led cohesive units. From the very beginning the reader is pulled in when they read the wars against the pirates of the Barbary Coast. From that point on, I could not put the book down when it finally ended with a constructive criticism of the total victory committment of the "Powell Doctrine."
Rating:
Summary: Deserves six
Review: Maybe I'm overreacting to my first war history/tactics book, but I learned so much about limited war and our record of minor interventions in various countries from reading this. Plus,the author posits that we lost Vietnam because we tried big war tactics in a place where local diplomacy and small unit patrolling would have certainly brought the people of South Vietnam closer to us and our cause. Instead, bloodless(on our side) air campaigns and a heavy militarized presence caused the public to support the Cong and the NVA.
We would do well to try to apply Boot's theory of limited war to our current situation in Iraq. Perhaps now that Saddam and his sons will never return, we might want to consider drawing down to maintain a friendly, but strong presence in each town. But Boot maintains we are still suffering from Vietnam syndrome and are fearful of anything short of total victory, so we use the same heavy handed strategy that killed 53,000 troops in Indochina. The irony is unsettling and pathetic.
Ignore the critics of this book who say Boot is playing "armchair general". They too are sitting in an armchair making proclamations on matters of war and peace, and I am certain none as fluent in history,the trends of politics and war as Max Boot.
Rating: 
Summary: wars for empire!
Review: mssr. Boot's thesis is that little wars made us a "great power."
Which begs he question: is raw influence/empire a good thing? Or do little wars begat bigger ones? From Boxer rebellion to Mao; from no-name Cubanos to Castro etc. Or--is "gunboat diplomacy" even possible in age of readily available ak47s, plastique ec. -- for more on this, see Black Hawk Down.
Rating:
Summary: The exploits and characters of yesterday's wars
Review: School kids can recite major American wars such as the Civil War, but how many understand the foundations of the Barbary Wars, Boxer Rebellion, and others around the world? Smaller actions have lead to world-changing larger conflicts and these smaller engagements are the subject of Savage Wars Of Peace, a title that uses lively narrative to reveal the exploits and characters of yesterday's wars. These small wars contributed, ultimately, to American power and should be understood by all.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting stories, light analysis
Review: The author gives some background on a variety of small wars, but some of his conclusions are poorly supported.Boot seems to spin the stories to suggest: 1. U.S. soldiers were amazingly effective at fighting insurgents and natives (the 20-1 body counts are kind of hard to believe, though) 2. Marines are the best fighters of small wars. 3. British and U.S. forces have always shared a very special relationship. (I have no reason to doubt or believe those conclusions, but they seem to pop up frequently in this book.) Interesting analysis of the "right" lessons to learn from Vietnam. They were pretty convincing to me.
Rating: 
Summary: Ultimately, a disappointing book
Review: The concept of this book is excellent, but it suffers from poor execution. On the positive side, this book provides a good introduction to the many small wars that the US has conducted over much of the globe in more than 200 years, from the Barbary Coast to Kosovo. While some would dispute the inclusion of Vietnam in a book on small wars, Mr. Boot provides an excellent analysis. Understandably, given the breadth of the topic, Mr. Boot has relied heavily on secondary sources. Perhaps far too heavily. There is a jarring lack of constancy - for example, when discussing the US role in the Caribbean, there is an undercurrent of concern about legality and imperial interventionism; when dealing with the two half-hearted US invasions of Russia late in World War I after the new Soviet government had signed a peace treaty with Germany, that undercurrent is notably absent. There are also distracting changes in style from section to section, along with some plain poor editing. Perhaps most disappointingly, Mr. Boot failed to draw the obvious conclusions from the information he assembled. The reader is struck repeatedly by the contrast between the fortitude demonstrated by American fighting men in difficult circumstances and the casual incompetence (sometimes even venality) of the politicians and generals who put them there. Mr. Boot's conclusion is that, "In deploying American power, decision makers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble". He really should have read his own book.
Rating:
Summary: A look at "hidden history"
Review: The history of the U.S. is often broken down by the major wars it has been involved in, especially the Revolution, War of 1812, Civil War, Spanish-American War, World War I and World War II. Boot's book looks at the many other little wars we have been involved in and their impact on both our history and our military thinking. The first thing that must be done in a book like this is define what a small war is. Boot defines it as an undeclared war basically done at the insistence of the President, fought usually in an atypical field of battle and usually with a goal other than unconditional surrender of the enemy. Duration or scale is not a factor; by Boot's definition, the Vietnam War was a small war and the much shorter Gulf War was a big war. Going from the battles against the Barbary pirates to Bosnia, Boot selects some of the U.S.'s more significant minor wars and discusses their causes and resolutions. His tone is sometimes critical of American action, but generally depicts the U.S. in a better light than other countries engaged in these (often) imperialistic efforts. Boot is definitely not an isolationist: the final part of the book deals with his argument that these wars are necessary and that America is damaged more from reluctance to fight than by fighting. This is an excellent book. For a somewhat alternative look at U.S. history, this fits the bill. Even if you disagree with his interventionist viewpoint, there is still enough valuable historical material here to be a worthwhile (and enjoyable) read.
Rating:
Summary: Give War a Chance
Review: The Savage Wars of Peace is a fascinating summary of the United States' successes and failures during 200 years and twenty-plus "small wars" from the Barbary Coast in 1801 to the Philippines in 1899, the Mexican border in 1915, the Yangtze Valley in 1927 and Kosovo in 2000. This well written book provides both entertainment and food for thought. Most of these "small wars", especially the numerous pre-World War II conflicts, are little, if at all, remembered. Even military professionals seem to have forgotten some of the principles and lessons learned which could have served us well in more recent forays. Besides the entertaining narratives, Boot makes a convincing case that 1) murky conflicts without identifiable conclusions or "exit strategies" can lead to favorable results (although sometimes it takes hindsight to realize that), 2) fighting styles that limit casualties (on both sides) can achieve lasting results and 3) there have been far more undeclared "small wars" in American history than big ones and yet the professional military perceives the small wars as aberrations rather than the norm. The Savage Wars of Peace makes a great jumping off point for detailed study of the individual campaigns. The 22-page bibliography plus 34 pages of notes provides many starting points for further research. My only criticisms are that I would like to see more photographs and maps, and the proofreader needs to check more carefully for a few date errors (e.g., on page 305 a Marine unit arrives in Vietnam in June 1966 and then engages in a significant action in September 1965; which year is correct? This type of thing occurs elsewhere.). I thoroughly enjoyed this book and highly recommend it to everyone interested in U.S. history or military history and strategy.
Rating:
Summary: An Expert Critique of the Powell Doctrine and Isolationism
Review: The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power is both polemic and history by a new, independent contributor. Most of the text includes expert prose narrating some of the more obscure events in world history across a dizzying span of time from the founding of the American Republic to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Like so much recent commentaries, 9/11 gives the argument greater importance. Max Boot argues, that small wars, often undeclared and with no clear purpose or exit strategy, have comprised most of the American military record and have contributed most to the Pax Americana. Drawing on stories of Americans from Decatur to Farragut to Butler, Boot recovers a sense of the American character more realistic than Hollywood movies. Boot's audience clearly are isolationist and unilateralist elements within the political establishment, for whom he delivers a critique of the Powell Doctrine. Boot assumes, that America needs to be a global sheriff, as it has for almost two centuries through small wars. Boot argues, that the resistance to a more visible international role stems from erroneous lessons learned from the Vietnam War. First, Boot argues, that political leaders in Washington and senior commanders, like Westmoreland, fought a large war, when they should have learned from the history of small wars and conducted a counter-insurgency campaign. The resulting loss of nerve conditioned military leaders to eschew small wars, the overwhelming staple of military combat previously, for large set-piece wars where overwhelming force could be deployed. Also, after conducting two successful large wars in World War Two and Korea, the United States forgot the lessons, previous soldiers had learned in small wars. Boot also argues, that American reluctance to conduct humanitarian missions and nation-building is also another legacy of Vietnam. However, before that, the United States had trained police forces, conducted civil affairs training, and health campaigns as a part of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in Asia and the Caribbean. American troops had even served under foreign commanders in such places as China, where the United States maintained a presence on and off for a century. When opportunities arose in the 90's for similar missions, American troops had little experience and military leaders were too reluctant to stay the course. Implicit in Boot's argument is the assumption, that the United States' various campaigns contributed to world peace and the rule of law. His discussions of Caribbean campaigns in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua highlight the role of the Marines in construction, disease eradication, and police reform. He takes issue with the view, that the United States was merely protecting business interests. In the longest and most controversial counter-insurgency war against Filipino rebels, Boot highlights the benefits of American efforts, even considering the brutal military tactics employed. Boot's narrative is buttressed with impressive accounts of colorful American and indigenous personalities, 30-odd pages of endnotes, an index and bibliography. His prose is competently lively and analytical. Aside from an awkward chapter on the Marine Small Wars Manual, his argument is expertly rendered. And his argument is never more needed, as the United States embarks on low-intensity counter-insurgency campaigns in numerous countries.
Rating:
Summary: Superbly Informative- A Giant
Review: This book about "small wars" is an extraordinary source of concisely presented information about American military and diplomatic history, creating a unique perspective on the American role in the world. Crisply written and dramatic while scholarly, it performs a critical function: it helps Americans understand themselves. And how to meet future challenges.
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