Rating: 
Summary: The case for small wars
Review: Franklin Roosevelt once said that the US Navy could not see a ship smaller than a destroyer. To some extent the same thing applies to students of military history: they are considerably more interested in the great struggles than the minor conflicts. Max Boot's important and deftly written new book is both a history and an argument: a description of almost two centuries of American small wars and a case for the importance of being ready to wage them. The former are handled very well indeed: for those who know about Sandinistas but not Sandino this is a good place to go. The latter is powerfully put, although some will reject his contention that "undercommitment and lack of confidence" are more dangerous than "imperial overstretch and hubris." No matter, this is at once a contribution to military history and to contemporary policy debates -- a rare achievement.
Rating:
Summary: Delightful surprise
Review: I admit that this book sat on my shelf for several months before I tackled it. I had bought it thinking that this is history that which I SHOULD know about - but I wasn't sure if I wanted to invest the time to learn about it. Well, as soon as I started reading SAVAGE PEACE I found myself entralled. Max Boot writes history with a narrative energy that is often all too wanting in contempory nonfiction. The author takes the time to paint a portrait of the men behind the history, their personal lives, professional careers, and their familial and professional relations with each other. This is extremely important because the American military was so small back then that the same people keep popping up again and again, first as a lieutenant, then a major, then a general. Did you know that Oliver Hazard Perry (Battle of Lake Erie) was the older brother of Matthew Perry (opening of Japan)? Or that John Pershing lost his wife and daughters to a fire at their home in the Presidio (San Francisco) and was grief-stricken at the time of the Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa? If you enjoy that kind of historical fact, you will love this book as much as I. (Why only 4 stars? Because the book skims a bit where I wish it would have gone deeper; it sacrifices profundity for comprehensiveness.)
Rating: 
Summary: Highly readable account of overlooked U.S wars
Review: I discovered Boot in the Wall Street Journal. His column is always informative and illuminating. Some reviewers don't like his pro-US world view, but it's overall thrust is very mainstream for all but the rabid left or isolationist right. The book's great benefit is as an enjoyable reference text for important American military events that the reader may be only vaguely familiar with.
Rating:
Summary: Highly readable account of overlooked U.S wars
Review: I discovered Boot in the Wall Street Journal. His column is always informative and illuminating. Some reviewers don't like his pro-US world view, but it's overall thrust is very mainstream for all but the rabid left or isolationist right. The book's great benefit is as an enjoyable reference text for important American military events that the reader may be only vaguely familiar with.
Rating: 
Summary: Interesting history, misguided polemic
Review: I found Boot's history of America's foreign interventions during our heroic age interesting, if perhaps somewhat revisionist. Only during his critique of current American policy does Boot mention that soldiers prefer big wars to small ones, and that most small war soldiers were unhappy in their work.Boot's assessment of our loss of Vietnam is far out in left field. If not for LBJ's commitment of American divisions, North Vietnam would have completed a conventional conquest of the South in 1965. Boot's small war strategy might indeed have saved South Vietnam, if given sufficient time and backed by large units to keep the PAVN at bay. Of course, the Communist fifth column in America made such expenditures of time, men, and material impossible. Boot's criticism of the Powell Doctrine is unconvincing. His own history reveals that, with the possible exception of the Phillipines, America's attempts at "nation building" have been dismal failures. In Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, the locals reverted to their old ways almost immediately after the departure of American forces. Cuba continues to suffer under an oppressive Communist regime. Thinking Americans should comprehend that most of the world's peoples (including most Americans nowadays) are simply unsuited to Western-style democracy. Our government should formulate foreign policy accordingly.
Rating:
Summary: A must-read for US history and military history buffs
Review: I just finished telling a favorite listserv of mine about this book, so I thought that I would post a formal review as well. This is one of the most interesting books I've ever read. A must-read for US history and military history buffs. I cannot remember the last time I read a book where I learned so much that I did not know. I like to think, anyway, that I'm fairly knowledgable about US history, but kept turning the pages of this book and saying to myself, "Jeez, you're kidding....." Boot discusses in some detail the numerous "small wars" of America's past and present, going back to the Barbary Pirates and all the way up to Afghanistan, with probably two or three dozen conflicts in between...some you've probably heard of, others you may not have. There are very obvious connections made between the wars that we have fought in the past 30 or so years, and those of the previous 200...maybe that's the point of the whole book. He destroyed several incorrect beliefs that I had about our military past, was fair and honest (I thought) about controversial military interventions, and has created a book that is entertaining, easy-to-read, but strongly presented. At the end, he evaluates the US military operations of the 1990s, looks at the "Powell Doctrine," and reveals somewhat how he thinks the US military should adjust for the future, and where he thinks we need to be as a nation, not only from a hardware perspective, but as a national mentality. Well worth the time, in my opinion.
Rating: 
Summary: Arm chair general Boot
Review: I love books like this one by 'historian' Max Boot. While he acknowledges the Imperial Nature of America and its expansionist policies, he does a disservice to his country by not engaging in war himself. Like most neo conservatives, he is most happy writing about wars and not actually being in one. For his cowardice, I award his book one star.
Rating: 
Summary: misses the point!
Review: I think that Max Boot misses the point completely by dwelling on the Barbary Coast as a major piracy feud. The big issue at the time was the sinking or seizure of over 1000 USA merchant ships and the enslavement of over 10000 USA sailors by the British Navy. Those British seizures c1803-1810 led to the War of 1812, not even mentioned by Mr Boot. The few USA ships seized by the Barbary Coast should be reviewed for possible British influence too. Boot mentions that after 1776, American ships lost the protection of the British Royal Navy. That is quite an understatement! What American ships got from the British Royal Navy after 1776, was accusations that the USA was a gigantic land of pirates to be ruthlessly attacked and enslaved on the high seas. Those 1000 USA merchant ships were not pirates; they were peaceful unarmed ships bringing commerce to Europe. The British were also supplying numerous Indian tribes with muskets, captured Fort Michilimackinac, Detroit, burned Old Chicago, etc.
Rating:
Summary: Blech, bush league hack job
Review: I was a historiography major in undergrad and 15-years after graduating I still read history books for fun. The subject interested me, but this work is so shoddy I couldn't get through it. The combination of topic and timing had so much to offer, yet this was a very weak attempt. The book is little more than a survey of similar events in U.S. history. The author offers no insight or conclusions; he simply borrows the pithy and blatantly heroic/patriotic conclusions of others. The U.S. had some great moments, and some less-than-great moments in its short history of international police actions, yet the author treats them all the same. There were so many good trails the author could have followed: trends in public opinion, legislative action, presidential prerogative, the changing role of the military, the use of military action as a quasi procurement policy, the establishment of precedent and reasonable cause for action in U.S. foreign policy, yet they were all left untouched. Hopefully someone else will take up the topic and do it justice. Don't buy this book unless you are teaching a course and need a good "how-not-to" example.
Rating:
Summary: FIRST RATE--BUY IT, READ IT, DISCUSS IT!
Review: I'm amused-one cannot be anything other than amused-by the reviewers who object to the fact that Max Boot is a civilian. The vast majority of military historians are, and have always been, civilians. Furthermore, the few soldiers who later excelled at writing history were usually not-so-successful warriors. Thucydides and Josephus come to mind. Indeed, among the great captains of history, few were even talented memoirists, let alone military analysts. After Caesar and Grant, the list of great soldier-writers shortens shockingly. So let's dispense with Boot's lack of epaulets. What Boot does bring to this topic is a fine command of the secondary source material, a lively-and even dashing-prose style, and excellent analysis, given space constraints. It's clear that those who object to Boot's civilian status are invariably those who object to his analysis. The former is an absurd subject for discussion, the latter the only relevant concern. I regard Boot's conclusion that such "savage wars of peace" continue to be vital to the security of the U.S. and the preservation of American lives to be well substantiated by this text. The accusation that he favors "war for the sake of war" cannot be made by any serious reader who approaches this book with even a shred of dispassion. On the contrary, Boot is very Clausewitzian in his recognition that all wars are ultimately political and can be judged as successes or failures not by the number of enemy killed or land conquered but by their long term political and national security results. Pungent, authoritative, and controversial, this book is both a scholarly and literary treat. Highly recommended.
William Altimari, author of LEGION: A Novel of the Army of Rome
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