Rating: 
Summary: Enlightening and Very Well Written
Review: "The Savage Wars of Peace" is a book that is likely to surprise all but the most ardent military history buffs. Once and for all it does away with the myth that before World War Two, America was completely "isolationist" in its foreign policy. The book focuses on America's many "smaller" military actions, from the Tripolitan War circa 1801-1803 to the hundred years (1840-1941) that American troops were continuously stationed in China to the Phillippine "Insurrection" (1900-1902) to the many 20th Century American interventions in Latin America.Surprises abound, the biggest being how Author Max Boot demonstrates that for the most part America's interventions happened for idealistic reasons, rather than the usual sterotype that has the U.S. always watching out for big business interests. Also surprising is Boot's account of how effective America was at fighting anti-guerilla wars, at least up until Vietnam, when our misguided tactics may have actually snatched victory from our grasp. Boot covers each intervention seperately, combining politics with actual battle narratives in an excellently readable manner. Colorful figures emerge, like "The Fight Quaker" Marine General Smedley Butler, who for over thirty years was America's foremost (and most successful) guerilla fighter, only to become a staunch pacifist upon retirement. Though it is a historical narrative, it is obvious that the author is trying to send a message to today's military leaders, especially in the wake of such misguided post-Vietnam policies as the "Powell Doctorine." The message is that America has a duty to continue to fight small wars to make the world a safer place (especially after September 11th), but that it should also not encorage our enemies by cutting and running from such engagements after the first casualties. Overall, Boot has wrtitten and extremely enjoyable military history book that carries with it a powerful message.
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Summary: An Expert Critique of the Powell Doctrine !
Review: A thoughtful history cum policy paper on the role of guerrilla warfare in the building of the American empire. No stranger to polemic as editorial features editor for the Wall Street Journal, Boot (Out of Order, 1998) has little use for the so-called Powell Doctrine limiting American soldiers' exposure to the possibility of dying in combat. When applied in Iraq with the decision not to topple Saddam Hussein's government after the liberation of Kuwait, that doctrine may have helped avoid a "Persian Gulf Vietnam," as Colin Powell said it would, but instead, Boot writes, "it turned into a Persian Gulf Hungary, a replay of 1956, when the U.S. encouraged a rebellion against the Soviets and then stood by as the rebels were crushed." An unapologetic imperialist, the author urges that America take its superpower and world-policeman roles seriously, stepping into "small wars" (Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan) to fearlessly pursue "punitive and protective missions." Along the way, Boot examines the little conflicts of the past that citizen-soldiers have not much enjoyed but professionals have gladly undertaken: here the suppression of the Filipino revolt from 1898 to1902, there a modest 1871 invasion of Korea and the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1954. He shrugs aside the specter of collateral damage, asserting that, "although wars against guerrillas tend to be particularly savage, atrocities are endemic to all wars, not just colonial ones." More compelling is his Monday morning quarterback analysis of Vietnam, which he argues could have yielded American victory had it been fought not as a conventional conflict but as a guerrilla war, an approach for which commanding general William C. Westmoreland was neither equipped nor trained. Boot's generally evenhanded approach makes some of his more immodest proposals palatable, and serious students of foreign policy, no matter what their leanings, will want to entertain his arguments. Author tour; radio satellite tour.
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Summary: The more things change...
Review: A very well-written history of America's small-scale conflicts that should warm any soldier's--or (especially) Marine's-- heart. Having read the Corps' Small Wars Manual several years ago, I believe Boot's account belongs on every military historian's shelf. And it's exciting stuff. Yes, it's assiduously researched, but the writing is clear and tight. There are about 20 small chapters that prevent his stuff from getting bogged down the same way some of our troops do. His premise is that small wars are not only doable but also necessary. Referencing everything from the jarhead clash against the Barbary pirates to troubling deployments in Beirut and Somalia, Boot separates food service social work from incursions that are a necessary national interest. America needs a small wars strategy to complement its highly conditional 'Powell Doctrine' and Boot's book is a terrific piece of that puzzle
Rating: 
Summary: Presenting A Naive Understanding of War and Politics
Review: Although informative as to the many obscure conflicts involving the United States since the early 1800s, Mr. Boot's analysis and conclusions as to why these wars were fought is at best naive; indicating an infantile patriotic myopia that severely clouds his judgment as a historian. The work is therefore reduced to being an informative reference guide as to when and where these conflicts occurred but not why and how. The problem with Mr. Boot's analysis is that he justifies these conflicts based on their pretext as opposed to the actual motives that brought them into being. As with almost any war, pretext is only the rhetorical justification for the war but hardly the motivation for it: it is the means but not the end. In most cases, the rhetorical purpose is soon marginalized to achieve the war's primary and controlling purpose which is almost always based on strictly economic or geopolitical factors that are at odds with the pretext. For example, although the pretext for the Spanish-American War was to liberate an "oppressed" peoples from the Spanish crown, the real motivations, as with the Mexican-American War, were strictly territorial control: geopolitics. Specifically, the US had reached such a potential for naval [authority] by the late 19th century that it needed strategic territories to manifest it: unfortunately for Spain, it happened to possess such territories (i.e. Phillipines, Samoa, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.) Thus, it was simply convenient for Spain to be an "oppressive monarchy violating the Monroe Doctrine" in control of these territories as a pretext for hostilities. Realistically however, the US would probably have taken military action regardless of whether the countries were democratic or tyrannical because the real reason for war was that a foreign country (regardless of political structure)refused to open its ports to a foreign navy (i.e. the US Navy.) Finally, Given the US' open support and participation in brutal campaigns against indigenous peoples by corrupt pseudo-democratic regimes in many of these territories until all too recently (e.g. Batista in Cuba and Marcos in the Phillipines) simply to continue using its precious naval bases, one begins to wonder whether ideals of freedom or realpolitik was the primary motive for these conflicts. I think that any half-intelligent person without patriotic bias will really consider the latter as opposed to the former as the most likely conclusion. This conflict is but a small example of the countless engagements the US has engaged into to carry out its strategic interests under the pretextual guise of "freedom". Given his analytical framework, Mr. Boot would probably argue that the systematic displacement and [destitution] of American Indians was for their benefit: a war with honest intentions I'm sure. I suppose one could see such tragic conflicts as the noble taming of a people's "savage ways"; a necessary method by which they'll happily learn the sound principles of "freedom" and "democracy" for their own good. After all, people always become cooperative and longing for freedom after being pushed on booze, displaced at gun point, and infected with smallpox for a couple of generations (...).
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Summary: Just wonderful
Review: America was born in blood and throughout our great history we have fought wars on almost every continent against almost everyone. We fought the British, the French, the Germans, the Mexicans, the Spanish, chinese, japanese, barbery pirates, Cubans, Iranians, Afghanis, nicaraguans and many others. What a wonderful past!!!! This is the most masterly account of all the 'little wars' that america has fought in 'times of peace'. It gives wonderful discriptions of such central conflists as the guerilla war in the phillipines(1898-1900), the intervention in mexico(1914), and the Sandino affair. A must read. For more information also purchase 'Splendid Little Wars' which covers the 'little' conflicts from 1975-2000.
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Summary: Extraordinary book, timely and well-done!
Review: Amid the welter of exploitation books starting to appear on terrorism and "America's New War," this splendidly-researched and handsomely-written overview of America's "little wars," some well-known, others obscure, stands out for its genuine value to any reader who wants to understand our long tradition of fighting what the author calls "The Savage Wars of Peace." The military missions we are called upon to execute now are not anomalies, but very much in the tradition of what our military has done frequently since the early days of the republic--and what it has frequently done well. This books reads like a labor of love for the author--the research is impressive and must have taken a number of years--but, best of all, it reads well. While the contents are scrupulous of fact in the best academic sense, this is no academic book in the dry, turgid, ivory-tower meaning. This is meaty, visceral writing, and the author tells fascinating stories very well. This "old Army" and Marine Corps tradition has long been an interest of mine, so I can attest that the book's facts and narrative lines are right on target. I'll leave it for other readers to address the book's political themes and conclusions--suffice to say that this is great, informative reading that follows our military from early fights against pirates, to expeditions into China, to the tough little fights in living memory. Highly recommended for soldiers, leaders of all kinds, interested citizens--and for academics who retain a streak of humility.
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Summary: Max Boot hits homerun on his history of small wars
Review: As one w/ 20 years in the active and reserve components of the US Army including a deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1990, I had a very difficult time putting this book down. I learned more from this book about our small wars (and their foreign affairs context) than in countless hours of "professional development" classes I've endured over the years in the Army (which has maybe tended to emphasize big battles in big wars). Mr. Boot demonstrates that instead of having a history of peace occasionally interrupted by war, America has a history of war (large and small) punctuated by brief moments of peace. Our short-attentioned citizenry hasn't quite caught onto that, perhaps because our education system has failed at teaching Americans their history. One example of this book's timeliness: we are now sending Marines into Haiti. Max Boot explains how we initially got pulled into that country's affairs in 1915 and 1994; it appears not much has changed in that God-forsaken country in the last 85 years (and the pessimist in me thinks it probably won't improve in my lifetime). For those that say America shouldn't be the world's cop, Mr. Boot provides a compelling counterpoint to such impulses; while foreign entanglements are inherently messy, the alternative of doing nothing is frequently worse. His style is not politically correct (his orientation is more WSJ than NYT). I will highly recommend this very readable book to my fellow soldiers.
Rating:
Summary: Max Boot hits homerun on his history of small wars
Review: As one w/ 20 years in the active and reserve components of the US Army including a deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1990, I had a very difficult time putting this book down. I learned more from this book about our small wars (and their foreign affairs context) than in countless hours of "professional development" classes I've endured over the years in the Army (which has maybe tended to emphasize big battles in big wars). Mr. Boot demonstrates that instead of having a history of peace occasionally interrupted by war, America has a history of war (large and small) punctuated by brief moments of peace. Our short-attentioned citizenry hasn't quite caught onto that, perhaps because our education system has failed at teaching Americans their history. One example of this book's timeliness: we are now sending Marines into Haiti. Max Boot explains how we initially got pulled into that country's affairs in 1915 and 1994; it appears not much has changed in that God-forsaken country in the last 85 years (and the pessimist in me thinks it probably won't improve in my lifetime). For those that say America shouldn't be the world's cop, Mr. Boot provides a compelling counterpoint to such impulses; while foreign entanglements are inherently messy, the alternative of doing nothing is frequently worse. His style is not politically correct (his orientation is more WSJ than NYT). I will highly recommend this very readable book to my fellow soldiers.
Rating:
Summary: Great recitation of America's forgotten small wars
Review: Everyone knows the US fought in Korea in the 1950's but how many know that it also fought there in the mid-1800's? Or how about in Russia in the early part of the 20th century? These and other forgotten episodes of American history are brought forth in vivid, lively text by the author. From the war with Tripoli to the Boxer Rebellion to the numerous landings in the Caribbean, the reader gets a good overall view of how many times the US fought on foreign shores for a myriad of reasons (to protect US property and citizens, to aid other powers, and even to avenge insults to US) plus how US power grew steadily over its history. I recommend it for all military buffs.
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Summary: When Will We Finally Learn?
Review: For non-scholars such as I who have a keen interest in U.S. military history, this book provides information and analysis which are probably not available in any other single volume. Boot tracks various "small wars" during the rise of America's global power from the Barbary Wars (1801-1805, 1815) until the application of the "Powell Doctrine" during the Gulf War in the 1990s. In the final chapter, he then provides what he calls "In Defense of the Pax Americana: Small Wars in the Twenty-First Century." Boot identifies four (among several) distinct types of small wars: Punitive ("to punish attacks on American citizens or property), Protective ("to safeguard foreign territory"), Pacification ("to occupy foreign territory"), and Profiteering ("To grab trade or or territorial concession"). For me, one of the book's greatest strengths is comprised of Boot's analysis of lesser-known but uniquely important historical figures such as Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Smedley D. Butler, Stephen Decatur, William Eaton, William Edmund ("Tiny") Ironside, Victor H. Krulak, Augusto C. Sandino, and Littleton W.T.. Waller. Within his narrative, he also analyzes the role played by each of various U.S. Presidents, notably Jackson, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and George H.W. Bush. I also wish to commend Boot on his brilliant analysis of the pivotal (often decisive) role played by the Marines Corps throughout more than 200 years of U.S. military history and, especially, his explanation of the importance of the The Small Wars Manual which the Marines created in the 1930s. This handbook grew out of the their own experiences in the early years of the 20th century as well as Britain's colonial involvements. Here are two brief excerpts from the manual: "As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation." "In a major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal -- the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. [The more ambiguous mission is] to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy." Thirty years later, as the war Viet Nam continued, it became obvious (at least to some) that the lessons to be learned from The Small Wars Manual may have been validated but, for whatever reasons, were either ignored or forgotten by President Johnson and others in his administration. With a new century underway, given the events of September 11th, it will be interesting to see to what extent (if any) the Marines' Small Wars Manual will guide and inform the allied response to global terrorism. With regard to "the lessons of history," Boot offers this advice in his book's final chapter: "In deploying American power, decisionmakers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble. Yes, there is a danger of imperial overstretch and hubris -- but there is an equal, if not greater, danger of undercommitment and lack of confidence. America should not be afraid to fight 'the savage wars of peace' if necessary to enlarge the empire of liberty.' It has done it before."
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