Rating: Summary: Reasonable or Hardened Skepticism - Progress of Discovery Review: In their conclusion, the authors write:"The reasonable skeptic - as opposed to the hardened skeptic for whom no evidence is sufficient - should at least consider the possibility that nature exists for a purpose. For those open to such a possibility, the correlation between habitability and measurability should be a compelling discovery." Indeed. The evidence and observations in this book clearly complement the recent resuscitation of the argument of Intelligent Design, but their specific argument certainly stands on its own merits. The book is both easy to comprehend and filled with very detailed information, some of which personally astonished me. The authors eloquently reveal the paradox of the Copernican Principle as well as the mistakes and misguidings of SETI. Furthermore, the authors make a number of prediction risks to enable the book to be evaluated as more evidence is discovered. Either evidence will mount that continues to support their argument (which has been the recent trend), or the argument will wither on the vine as future evidence invalidates it. The authors clearly believe the former is inevitable, and so do I. Highly recommended.
Rating: Summary: The Truth Will Set You Free Review: Last night 1/25/05 I was at The University of South Florida for the grand premiere of the Privileged Planet. Dr. Jay Richards was there and he answered questions after the showing. He was challenged by one of the questioners about life on other planets that might not need the same physical makeup of our life forms and maybe these life forms are different than our life forms. His answer was pure genius. Dr. Richards said that we cannot base fact on an assumption that will prove another assumption as truth. Truth must be the standard by which we base truth.
I used to feel that it was us (Christians) against them (Scientists) and no matter what the truth was science would never acknowledge intelligent design. Here is an example of this philosphy.
Dr George Wald is one of the most famous evolutionists. Before his death he was a Harvard University professor and Nobel Prize winner in physiology and medicine. Dr Wald wrote and I quote "One has only to think about the magnitude of this task to concede that the spontaneous generation of a living organism is impossible. Yet here we are-as a result, I believe, of spontaneous generation"
Dr Wald was asked why he would defend evolution even though he himself said it is impossible. DR. Wald said "I will not accept that philosophically because I do not want to believe in God, therefore I choose to believe in that which I know is scientifically impossible, spontaneous generation arising to evolution."
I am glad that Dr Jay Richards will not let his own personal beliefs stand in the way of scientific research. The Privileged Planet presents the facts and when one observes the cosmos we see intelligent design. The Privileged Planet bridges the gap between science and religion.
The truth will set you free.
Rating: Summary: Enrichment for believing God and its Creation Review: Like any books about "evolution" and "creation", including those on intelligent design, this book will not change the mind set of those who do not believe in God, at all. Those scientists or science-minded people who do not believe in God will keep believing in their 'evolutionism' which is, in fact, their religion. They are even passionate. (We read a word 'racist' in this book review.) However, for those who believe in God and its wonderous creation and those who love reading, this book can be a gem to be added on their reading list. One more comment for those who want to know how to deal with this problem of creation vs. evolution, I urge to read a small extraordinary book by Gitt (a German information scientist) titled "In the Beginning was Information" (English translation). We have to know first 'how to talk' before we take up a position for either 'evolution' or 'creation'. Unless we know why they talk the way they do (presenting their non-sense of dogmatic 'scientism' as if it is erudite scientific endeavor), no argument would be helpful. "Darwinism" is long ago dead (well, he just happened to be in the age where scientific knowledge was limited); already proven wrong and replaced by 'neo-Darwinism' (they claimed that it has 'superceded' and itself is still undergoing to cover up their deficiencies). No amount of 'information' has been generated by itself, no matter how long period time is given. As for me, information is at the core of all the existence and the order; the universe, the life, the matter, and by extension, the spirit. P.S. Science itself is evolving! How I love the word 'evolve'. I myself am evolving till I die. Long ago some Greeks had helicentric cosmology. The geocentric cosmology of the pre-modern gave a way to the heliocentic one. As we now well know, thanks to science itself (relativity theory, etc.), that both are right and both may be wrong, depending on perspective and derivatives. In the vast universe where you cannot put a finger as its center, why cannot be the planet earth taken as its center?
Rating: Summary: Enrichment for believing God and its Creation Review: Like any books about "evolution" and "creation", including those on intelligent design, this book will not change the mind set of those who do not believe in God, at all. Those scientists or science-minded people who do not believe in God will keep believing in their 'evolutionism' which is, in fact, their religion. They are even passionate. (We read a word 'racist' in this book review.) However, for those who believe in God and its wonderous creation and those who love reading, this book can be a gem to be added on their reading list. One more comment for those who want to know how to deal with this problem of creation vs. evolution, I urge to read a small extraordinary book by Gitt (a German information scientist) titled "In the Beginning was Information" (English translation). We have to know first 'how to talk' before we take up a position for either 'evolution' or 'creation'. Unless we know why they talk the way they do (presenting their non-sense of dogmatic 'scientism' as if it is erudite scientific endeavor), no argument would be helpful. "Darwinism" is long ago dead (well, he just happened to be in the age where scientific knowledge was limited); already proven wrong and replaced by 'neo-Darwinism' (they claimed that it has 'superceded' and itself is still undergoing to cover up their deficiencies). No amount of 'information' has been generated by itself, no matter how long period time is given. As for me, information is at the core of all the existence and the order; the universe, the life, the matter, and by extension, the spirit. P.S. Science itself is evolving! How I love the word 'evolve'. I myself am evolving till I die. Long ago some Greeks had helicentric cosmology. The geocentric cosmology of the pre-modern gave a way to the heliocentic one. As we now well know, thanks to science itself (relativity theory, etc.), that both are right and both may be wrong, depending on perspective and derivatives. In the vast universe where you cannot put a finger as its center, why cannot be the planet earth taken as its center?
Rating: Summary: Scientifically and Philosophically Rigorous Review: One of the most extraordinary things about The Privileged Planet is the maturity of the argument. This is evident not only in the deep and broad array of empirical evidence its authors marshall as evidence of a correlation between life and discovery, but also in the many objections the authors anticipate and soundly refute. It reads as if the authors were writing a second edition after spending years on the lecture circuit in the refining fire of repeated question-and-answer sessions. One instance will serve to suggest the strength of the many objections Gonzalez and Richards thoughtfully consider: "How can you have a correlation with a sample size of one?" A good question. The only inhabited planet we have to go on is the earth. But, as the two authors note, their case isn't based strictly on the particulars of earth and its inhabitants. For instance, they make a detailed case that any organic life elsewhere in the universe will take a form roughly similar to earth's (at least at the biochemical level), life based on water and carbon. (Incidentally, that's conventional wisdom in astrobiology, not the puddleglummish opinion of an anomolous few.) They also make a thorough case that technological life will need a planet similar to earth. They don't assume this point: the provide abundant evidence for it. One can disregard their evidence or dismiss it out of hand, but for all that, it remains in the book waiting for objective, thoughtful scientists to consider and even extend. From these twin conclusions the authors go on to scrutinize a range of environments beyond earth, availing themselves of the wealth of information pouring into astrobiology during the last several decades, particularly the last few years. They conclude their response to this objection with examples like the following: thanks to insights provided by stellar astrophysics and climatology, we can ask whether an earth-like planet around an M dwarf star is more or less habitable and more or less conducive to making discoveries than here on Earth. The various chapters of the book offer countless such examples of close, empirical treatment of the hypothesis of a correlation between life and discovery. And yet one could also object that whatever environment we found ourselves in, we would find examples conducive to its measurability. A good point, but guess what? They deal with it. Certainly, there are numerous questions raised by the book's thesis; these questions and the authors' trenchant, scientifically and philosophically rigorous answers make up the contents of this groundbreaking work.
Rating: Summary: Lacking scientifically Review: Please click on "see all my reviews" to see the full text of my comments
Now that the DVD for `Privileged Planet' has been announced, it is time to remind the readers of why I believe that the Privileged Planet makes for a very poor scientific argument. Although I do believe that the argument serves well as an apologetic and rhetorical tool, which may help explain why it is given such a `privileged' position at the DDD-V conference or creationist websites.
So why do I believe that the Privileged Planet approach is wrong? To quote Xia-Li Meng at the 2004 ENAR Spring Meeting in Pittsburgh PA on statistics:
"If you have not seen all the data, how can you estimate how much you haven't seen? But, as statisticians, we can do anything!"
As statisticians we can do anything. Especially when the argument is based on a correlation. Mark Twain had this to say about "lies, damn lies, and statistics"? It's not that statistical arguments are necessarily lies but it's a warning that good statistics requires a careful approach to avoid obvious and less obvious pitfalls. I argue that in Privileged Planet the authors have failed to do so.
We can show for instance that ice cream sales cause summer drownings, we can show that wet pavement causes rain or even that the Dow Jones causes changes in the skirt length. In other words, correlation can be used and abused and it requires a careful analysis before one can jump from correlation to causation.
Arguments based on correlation need to carefully quantify the terms of interest. How else can one determine if there exists a statistically significant correlation? The authors of Privileged Planet fail to define quantifiable measures of either habitability nor measurability.
Arguments based on correlation need to deal with causal direction. Does rain cause the pavement to get wet or does wet pavement cause rain? The authors of Privileged Planet fail to explain why correlation should be interpreted as causation.
Arguments based on correlation need to deal with additional correlating variables. A good example is the correlation between ice-cream sales and summer drownings. A careless person may argue that this is evidence of a causal relationship between ice cream sales and drownings. Of course the real `cause' was found in the realization that both factors also correlate with a third factor namely `summer'. Summer and ice cream sales correlate, summer and summer drownings correlate.
And finally a correlation requires a sample of more than one. The authors of Privilged Planet however base their argument on a sample of one. More on that later.
What is the Privileged Planet about
The Privileged Planet basically argues that there is a correlation between habitability (is it hospitable to life) and measurability (can one learn about the world around it). Based on this poorly defined concept, the authors are trying to argue that life on earth involves purpose, or Purpose.
Not only do the authors fail to present quantifiable measures for habitability and measurability (making any claim of correlation suspicious) but they are also relying on a single data point (earth) to make their claims. But a single datapoint cannot be used to make any reliable statistical inferences.
Mark Isaak notices that Voltaire in "Candide" observed that:
"It is demonstrable," said he, "that things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles, therefore we wear spectacles. The legs are visibly designed for stockings, accordingly we wear stockings. Stones were made to be hewn and to construct castles, therefore My Lord has a magnificent castle; for the greatest baron in the province ought to be the best lodged. Swine were intended to be eaten, therefore we eat pork all the year round: and they, who assert that everything is right, do not express themselves correctly; they should say that everything is best." [Voltaire 1759)
Single datapoint? Tell me it isn't so
David Grinspoon: "It is always shaky when we generalize from experiments with a sample size of one. So we have to be a bit cautious when we fill the cosmos with creatures based on the time scales of Earth history (it happened so fast here, therefore it must be easy) and the resourcefulness of Earth life (they are everywhere where there is water)."
This is one history, and one example of life. When our arguments rest on such shaky grounds, balancing a house of cards on a one-card foundation, we are in danger of erecting structures formed more by our desires than the "evidence."
The authors have argued that they are NOT relying on a single data point since they show various examples of what they claim to be a correlation. But when I pointed out that there are also examples of poor correlation, they responded by stating that:
"Of course, as we say several times in the book, we don't argue that the Earth is optimal for observing every particular type of phenomenon we cite. Rather, it's optimal in the constrained sense of providing the best overall place for discovery."
so before the authors object by saying that they show several such examples, let it be clear that the authors themselves are arguing for a `constrained optimization' which means that a single observation cannot be independent of another observation but rather that when taking into consideration all aspects of habitability and measurability for lets say the planet earth one has one example of a constrained optimization (in a statistical sense). Otherwise any observation which contradicts the authors' viewpoint would count as an example against their thesis. But they insist that such observations do not affect their arguments.
Hence the conclusion is simple, earth can be at most a single datapoint of an `constrained optimization'.
But things get worse. Think about it, how would we know if a particular aspect of earth makes it a poor platform for scientific discovery? Since we would remain ignorant of our ignorance, we cannot even determine if earth were optimal in some constrained sense. And just when you thought, thing could not get any worse, we now realize that any planet where intelligent life were to develop, the inhabitants would argue that their world is ideally positioned for inquiry.
Maybe a quick thought experiment may clarify this. Let's assume that intelligent life on Planet X has developed a scientific knowledge similar to our with one major difference, their planet is in the worst position to allow them to detect that Newtonian physics is merely an approximation. Ignorant of this fact, they marvel how their planet is in an optimal position to allow them to measure the world and universe around them. Unaware of the fact that a theory of Relativity exists. I argue that this problem is endemic to the whole approach namely that any intelligence would consider its position in the universe to be optimal for scientific inquiry since science has been able to use whatever is available and remains unaware of that which it is missing.
Naive Falsification?
The following statement by the authors
"Finally, we don't argue that Earth is unique. Discovering another planet around another star in the Galaxy would be quite compatible with our hypothesis, so long as that planet is genuinely Earth-like. Finding a fundamentally different planet with (native) complex life on it, in contrast, would contradict our argument that the conditions for life and scientific discovery correlate in the universe."
makes even less sense. Why would finding a `non earth like planet' with complex life contradict their claim of correlation. Since such a planet would show another datapoint in favor of a correlation between life and scientific discovery.
Unless of course the real argument is to show that the Earth has a privileged position but such an argument cannot be used a premise unless the authors want to claim a tautology. On the other hand, from a theological perspective it is much easier to understand why one may consider the earth to be privileged. But what we wish or what we believe by virtue of faith may have little relevance to the scientific accuracy of such a belief.
And that's where my strongest theological objection to the Privileged Planet can be found. By insisting that the earth is privileged based on some mathematical arguments, the authors miss the obvious, the earth is privileged because that's where we are living. To suggest that a Creator would create a universe with countless planets and consider only one to be privileged requires a knowledge and understanding of said Creator, beyond our realm of knowledge. In fact, it shows a certain level of hubris.
In other words, the design inference is based on a flawed foundation (single sample) , poor mathematics, failure to control for confounding factors, failure to address the causal directions.
And of course lets not forget that the Privileged Planet does not present any testable hypothesis of Intelligent Design.
One may wonder why the ID movement gives the Privileged Planet such visibility. The real question is, will ID do better in the (near) future? Can we expect a positive ID hypothesis?
Why the Privileged Planet is not a positive hypothesis
Without any understanding of motive, means or opportunity, we cannot really constrain a hypothesis. The hidden assumption of the Privileged Planet seems to be that a `Designer' would `create' an environment not just suitable for life but also for scientific inquiry. But that presumes a lot about a `designer' of whom we have little data allowing us to determine if such an assumption is warranted or just ad hoc.
An intelligent design hypothesis without constraints fails to be relevant scientifically. In fact, since ID hypotheses are based on elimination rather than on positive evidence, they are not just irrelevant scientifically but unreliable as well.
Gonzalez is well aware of the `weak anthropic principle' (observer bias). In Home Alone in the Universe (From: First Things 103, May 1, 2000 ) with Ross, Gonzalez makes the following assertion:
"It is difficult to quarrel with the simple physical interpretation of the WAP (Ed: Weak Anthropic Principle): it is just a type of observer selection bias. We should not be surprised to observe, for example, that we are living on a planet with an oxygen-rich atmosphere, for the simple reason that we require oxygen to live. The WAP "explains" why we should not observe ourselves to be living on, say, Titan, but it fails to account for the origin of the oxygen in our atmosphere and hence for the rarity of planets with oxygen-rich atmospheres. However, Barrow and Tipler, no doubt motivated by the philosophical CP, have burdened the basic physical interpretation of the WAP with unwarranted philosophical extrapolations. In considering the WAP with regard to the observable universe, they claim that we ought not be surprised at measuring a universe so finely tuned for life, for if it were different, we would not observe it."
In other words, Gonzalez does recognize the risk of philosophical motivations leading to unwarranted extrapolations. And that's exactly what I argue, Gonzalez and Richards have done in "Privilged Planet".
Gonzalez et al appeal to Dembski's _Design Inference_ to show how the correlation of habitability and measurability shows evidence of `purpose' in the universe. Various people such as Wein, or various authors on Talkreasons.org, have already shown what is wrong with the _Design Inference_ argument. I will limit my comments to the claims by Gonzalez et al to show that their appeal to the _Design Inference_ is inappropriate. In addition I will show that their use of correlation to support 'purpoe' suffers from poorly defined and thus poorly quantifiable terms, that it is based on a single observation of what they call a 'constrained optimum' (the earth), that it is biased towards earth-like planets, and that it is based on cherry picking of examples that support the thesis. In other words, from a scientific perspective their claims are meaningless.
Which of course does not mean that their book does not make for a useful apologetic tool (hence my two stars). For people who need their faith to be supported by some impressive sounding but scientifically poorly supported claims, this book serves its purpose. If one is hoping that this book will present a scientific argument for _Intelligent Design_ then one will be quite disappointed.
In simple terms, which would not do full justice to their arguments (hence the length of my review), the main problem of their claims is that on any planet on which life were to develop, complex life would develop some form of 'science' and they would believe that their planet is best suited for their science to have developed, ignorant of what they don't know. For all we know, our science may be light-years behind what science would be elsewhere but how would we know? The authors present no evidence that the expected correlation between our level of science (measurability) and habitability is anything beyond what is to be expected. In other words, we only know scientifically that which we can measure and have no way to know how 'optimal' our knowledge is since we have no comparissons.
A quick overview of the _Design Inference_ is in order to understand the shortcomings in the arguments by Gonzalez and Richards.
Basically, the `Design Inference' attempts to identify events with low probability (or in the somewhat confusing language of Dembski, high complexity) and a specification (an independently given pattern). Such events are claimed to be `designed'. Low probability is determined through elimination of regularity and chance processes, specification is provided through an independent description of the event. It is important to realize that the _Design Inference_ is a purely eliminative argument with all the problems of such an approach such as _gap arguments_ and _argument from ignorance_.
In addition to others such as Ratzsch and Wimsatt's critical remarks about the `Design Inference', Richards himself seems to consider the `Design Inference' of limited usability:
"We think there are lots of events and structures for which we are rational in concluding "intelligent design," but for which it is impossible (or really hard) to run a probability on them. If we had to do so to infer design, we would almost always be unjustified in inferring design. For instance, I still don't know how to run a probability on Stonehenge or the black monolith in 2001: A Space Odyssey. Still, I think both are designed, and I think we're rational in so concluding."
So in order to be able to be able to appeal to the "Design Inference", Gonzalez et al have to show that the events are of low probability and that there is an independent specification. My claim is that they have failed in all aspects to make a convincing case. In fact, I intend to show that the authors are aware of the limitations of their use of Dembski's `Design Inference' yet are still appealing to it to draw their conclusions of `purpose'.
WELL POSITIONED EARTH
"Mankind is unusually well positioned to decipher the cosmos." From: Gonzalez and Richards, The Privileged Planet: How our place in the cosmos is designed for discover.
But Gonzalez et al provide no quantifiable measures that help us determine if their claim is correct. What they do argue, again without much supporting evidence, is that habitability and measurability correlate in zones that are called galactic `habitable zones". They argue that these zones are `rare' but present no quantifiable information as to how many stars would be involved. The statement that habitability and measurability correlate in (significantly sized) zones in the universe undermines the argument that habitability and measurability are improbable and even seems to argue that measurability and habitability naturally correlate.
Even more mysterious than the fact that our location is so congenial to diverse measurement (what is so mysterious about this? Other than that the authors have failed to make their case that the earth is uniquely congenial to diverse measurements) and discovery is that these same conditions appear to correlate with habitability (appear to correlate. That's the risk of not really providing for hard estimates). This is strange because there is no obvious (to the authors at least) reason to assume that the very rare (unsupported) properties that allow for our existence (anthropocentric) would also provide the best overall (and yet the authors provide NO evidence for this optimality) setting to make discoveries about the world around us.
So lets look at some of the examples of measurability they quote from a variety of disciplines. Their article include perfect solar eclipses (astronomy), ice cores in Greenland and Antarctica (geology), deep sea cores (geology), tree rings (biology), stellar trigonometric parallax (astronomy). Stars as isotropic emitters of highly specific information (any ID paper seems to have as a requirement a reference to information and specificity J), supernovae and Cepheids (astronomy), our place in the Milky way and dust extinction (astronomy), the capacity to observe the maximum diversity of star types and the distant universe (astronomy) background radiation (astronomy) and the particle and event horizons of the universe (astronomy). Not as diverse as one may have hoped for and in fact the authors fail to show that the earth is somehow unique in these aspects
So is the earth `the best overall bench in the lab'? The authors do little to support this conclusion other than by pointing out that the earth has certain characteristics but are they optimal? Are they the best bench in the universe? How will we know? Little guidance is provided here.
BIG MOONS AND SOLAR ECLIPESES
Gonzalez suggests that there is a link between life (on earth) and perfect solar eclipses. The moon and sun appear to be of similar size in the sky allowing `perfect' solar eclipses to occur. Not only is a big moon essential for stabilizing the planet (helpful perhaps but not necessarily essential)but it also was essential for the validation of Einstein's theory of relativity and the study of the solar corona. Thus linking habitability with measurability.
But was the solar eclipse of 1919 required for the scientific discover of Einstein? It's hard to argue that this confirmation hurt Einstein's case but lest point out that first of all, Einstein did not base his theory on the solar eclipse so the origins of the theory are not dependent on the solar eclipse but what about its verification?
To understand the relevance of the 1919 solar eclipse we need to remember that Einstein provided in his 1915 paper three experimental tests.
Would the precession of the perihelion of Mercury not have been sufficient? Would the solar eclipse data have been sufficient without the Mercury prediction? In fact to Einstein "This discovery was, I believe, by far the strongest emotional experience in Einstein's scientific life, perhaps in all his life. Nature had spoken to him." Abraham Pais (EM, p. 202)" ".
Einstein commented: "These equations, which proceed, by the method of pure mathematics, from the requirement of the general theory of relativity, give us, in combination with the [geodesic] equations of motion, to a first approximation Newton's law of attraction, and to a second approximation the explanation of the motion of the perihelion of the planet Mercury discovered by Leverrier. These facts must, in my opinion, be taken as a convincing proof of the correctness of the theory."
The same source reports that: To his friend Paul Ehrenfest in January 1916 he wrote that "for a few days I was beside myself with joyous excitement", and to Fokker he said that seeing the anomaly in Mercury's orbit emerge naturally from his purely geometrical field equations "had given him palpitations of the heart".
But of course Mercury and habitability arguments just do not seem to be as impressive as trying to present a case that the moon provides for stability of the earth axis (habitability) and allows for discovery (measurability). Certainly the perihelion of Mercury was an earlier event than the 1919 solar eclipse. We may never know to what extent the solar eclipse data sealed the case for Einstein's theory but it does show how the data appear to be carefully selected to support the thesis.
Here we also encounter another peculiarity of Earth namely that the requirement for habitability (nearly circular orbit) made the earth orbit unreliable for perihelion precession measurements.
THE IMPROBABILITY FALLACY
Gonzalez et al attempt to make their case for the design inference by first pointing out that: " Complexity is improbability" (finally a clear definition of Dembski's version of complexity) and argue that:
1. Conditions that allow for habitability are improbable
2. The conditions that allow for measurability are improbable.
Let's look at there terms in more detail:
HABITABILITY AND PROBABILITY
But is this correct? Are conditions that allow for habitability improbable? Dembski requires a probability of 10^-150 before a design inference can be triggered. In addition Dembski requires the elimination of chance and regularity pathways while Gonzalez et al only consider chance pathways. Richards argues that "But what if you want to know if, say, the structure of the natural laws themselves, or the cosmos as a whole, is the result of purpose or design? Well, you'll at least need to modify Dembski's approach." In other words, when Gonzalez et al infer `purpose' they include natural law as the `designer'.
Richards seems to recognize the challenges and limitations of the `Design Inference' approach when stating on ISCID that: "We view Dembski's arguments as a valuable rational reconstruction for capturing an important subset of designed structures. We also think he makes a critical insight that design detection has as much to do with pattern recognition as with probabilities. However, Dembski's reconstruction is optimized to avoid false positives, not to allow a design inference for all discernibly designed structures. So it shouldn't be treated as a Procrustean Bed into which we have to fit everything that's discernibly designed."
In that light Richards states that "Also, while we use Dembski's criteria for detecting design, we don't depend on them exclusively. We also draw on the work of John Leslie, Del Ratzsch and others.". My biggest gripe with this is that despite this, Dembski's `Design Inference' is given a central position in arguing for `purpose' in public presentations and even in the book itself.
Do we know enough about the parameters for habitability to be able to state that conditions for habitability are improbable? I claim that at most one can argue that with our present knowledge we simply do not know. Certainly it is far too early to argue that habitability is improbable.
In addition, habitability is defined in terms that treat our own situation preferentially. In other words habitability describes a `terrestrial' planet not too warm, not too cold with water and oxygen. Add some ad hoc requirements, like those used by Gonzalez et al, such as for example a large moon, plate tectonics, a large planet to deflect some of the incoming threats etc and one can make a case for the uniqueness of earth. But a similar argument could be made for almost anything. By tightening the requirements for habitability to describe the present situation for our earth one can indeed reach a small probability but then the question becomes one of prediction. Is the earth unique or have we forced upon it enough criteria that make it appear to be unique? Has habitability become a description rather than a prediction? Or in other words are the requirements set for habitability that lead to a low probability actual requirements or `ad hoc' descriptors of our own situation. In other words are we making our own earth `privileged'? If that is the case the outcome is not surprising. However any claim of `purpose' seems to be leaping to conclusions.
While one can certainly attempt to tighten the probabilities, one should not ignore those circumstance which would loosen the probabilities such as the fact that we can only observe a fraction of the total Universe or that habitability requirements need to be loosened to take into consideration other forms of life.
And finally, habitability is not a concept easily quantified. Arguments of improbability thus become subjective claims.
MEASURABILITY AND PROBABILITY
Definition: Measurability refers to those features of the universe as a whole, and especially to our particular position in it - both in space and time - which allow us to detect, observe, discover and determine such features as the size, age, history, laws and other properties of the physical universe.
Gonzalez et al claim that they do not argue is that every single condition for measurability is optimized on the Earth's surface or that it is easy to make measurements and scientific discoveries on Earth. The argument is that the Earth allows for a "stunning diversity of measurements, from cosmology and galactic astronomy to stellar astrophysics and geophysics; and it allows for this rich diversity of measurement much more so than if Earth were ideally suited for, say, just one of these sort of measurements." So in other words, the earth is `optimal' in a weighted, statistical sense. But is that really supportable with quantifiable evidence? I argue that the authors have failed to show that this is the case. Largely because the concepts of habitability and measurability have not been given quantifiable values.
The authors argue that they have avoided `cherry picking' by taking examples from every important discipline. As I will argue, they have done so at the cost of ignoring examples that show poor measurability and thus have failed to show that the earth is somehow unique in this aspect.
So what about measurability? As with habitability, measurability lacks a workable definition, but it also suffers from a selection bias. In case of habitability we may make the mistake of using factors typical for our earth as relevant to habitability in general. With measurability, the same problem arises in that what we cannot measure will remain unknown. So what is the full space of measurability versus what we can actually measure on earth? How do we know if we are optimal if we cannot define measurability due to our ignorance?
In other words, either measurability is trivially true (we measure what we can measure) or it is fraught with an appeal to ignorance since we fail to consider that which we do not know.
Gonzalez et al argue that the moon is an important factor for measurability since `perfect solar eclipses' allowed verification of Einstein's theory of relativity and the study of the corona. As Gonzalez et al point out, these eclipses are not really perfect due to the eccentricity of the Earth and Moon's orbits.
How do we know that Einstein's theory would have fared worse or better if the earth had not had perfect eclipses? If the earth is such a special place how come that astronomy had to wait for space based platforms before it really took off? I will look in more detail into some of the examples used by Gonzalez and show that they do not support their claims.
In summary I argue that the authors have failed to show that measurability and/or habitability are improbable. In fact I argue that given the present status of our scientific investigations and knowledge, any such claim of improbability runs the risk of `appeal to ignorance'.
THE SPECIFICATION FALLACY
In addition to improbability, the Design Inference also a requires a specification. Remember that one of the requirements for this specification is that it is independent of the event. According to Gonzalez "The correlation of habitability and measurability forms a meaningful pattern" or in other words, a specification. Are they correct? Once again I have to disagree with their claim for a variety of reasons. First of all they have not shown that the correlation between the two is independent. In fact the existence of a correlation suggests that these two events are NOT independent. What if measurability is strongly correlated with habitability through some form of necessity? In fact, Gonzalez argues that the correlation between the habitability and measurability effects of the Moon can be explained by natural law. Surely appealing to natural law as the designer of `purpose' seems to weaken their argument.
In addition the authors base their claims on a sample size of one. While the authors try to defuse this criticism by arguing that they have in fact many examples from a variety of disciplines their correlation argument is based on a single data point namely `earth'. No other examples of `habitable' environment are described. Under such circumstance, one should frown upon any claim of correlation. Especially when measurability and habitability are poorly defined, and unquantified.
THE DESIGNER ICE CREAM
Let me give you an interesting example that I hope will clarify some of my objections. When studying data on ice-cream sales and the number of drownings, it was found that there existed a strong correlation between the two. Using the same Design Inference approach chosen by Gonzalez et al, one may argue that drownings are improbable and in addition that the correlation between drownings and ice-cream sales shows evidence of a specification. In other words one should conclude, according to these authors, "design" or purpose. While I am not sure why one would expect design in something like drownings, this example shows the risks involved in using the approach chosen. And in this example ice-cream sales and drownings were actually quantifiable; not much ignorance on our part as to their exact numbers. So statistically the case is much stronger than the case made by Gonzalez et al.
Of course we all `know' that the correlation was not evidence of `design' but caused by a third independent factor namely `sun shine'. Since more people go out swimming during sunny days and since more people eat ice-cream during sunny days one quickly realizes that this correlation was due to a third factor. So what if measurability and habitability are intrinsically correlated or correlated through a third factor? I could think of various reasons why this may be the case.
As an interesting side-note, in addition to drownings, correlations have been found between ice cream sales and murder, boating accidents, and shark attacks.
CONFLATION OF DESIGN AND PURPOSE
My biggest gripe is with the authors' confusion of design and purpose. While science can show function, showing purpose requires a philosophical or theological assumption or direct or indirect knowledge of the motivations of the designer. While Dembski denies that motives, opportunity, means etc are indispensable for a reliable design inference, actual design inferences in archeology, criminology and SETI strongly depend on such assumptions. Would a designer be interested in correlating habitability and measurability and that uniquely to earth? Perhaps, but such an argument is easier made based on theological assumptions than based on unbiased assumptions. Without much knowledge about motives, stating that the correlation between the habitability and measurability is what we would from a designer seems somewhat circular.
In other words. when purpose is inferred based on our ignorance then we enter a dangerous realm of `gap arguments'. Gonzalez et al argue that a designer would be interested in having his creation learn about the world and universe they live in hence measurability and habitability would be expected to correlate. But then again, there may be regularity and chance processes that result in a similar correlation. Lacking a clear definition of both habitability and measurability and the inherent observer bias, it is hard to argue that we can reach a design and purpose inference. After all how can we eliminate regula
Rating: Summary: New Questions, New Answers Review: Science is not supposed to answer questions of "why?" Only the "what?" questions are considered acceptable grist for the scientific mill. Unfortunately for traditional science, the "why?" questions are some of the most important and intriguing. For example, Einstein was continually puzzled by the fact that humans can understand what are biologically irrelevant phenomena (e.g., black holes). Indeed, what survival value is linked to our ability to investigate and understand aspects of the universe beyond this earth? We can easily propagate this planet without knowing Earth is part of a solar system which in turn is part of a galaxy system. This ability has no evolutionary value, yet our ability to know persists and even grows. So, what's up?
Richards and Gonzalez have an intriguing answer to a troubling question: Why is Earth so well-suited for complex life and observation of the universe by its inhabitants? More critically, is there evidence, scientific evidence, to suggest design-a purpose that explains more than the sheer permutations and probabilities which allow for complex life-form existence?
Guillermo Gonzalez (Ph.D., Washington), Astrobiologist, and Jay W. Richards, Philosopher (Ph.D., Princeton), seem to be obsessed with finding some sort of reason behind irregular phenomena. They seems particularly obsessed with challenging some fundamental principles of scientific investigation. Not all obsessions are bad, and when coupled with premise challenges, they can be mind-boggling. Such is the case with The Privileged Planet.
Copernicus discovered the Earth was not the center of the solar system, and certainly not the center of the universe. But the medicine we ingested intellectually to avoid the toxicity of anthrocentrism has had a negative side effect-we have assumed, unnecessarily according to Richards and Gonzalez, that the Earth is not special. Sagan called it a little blue dot in a vast cosmic arena. Sagan is clearly right quantitatively, but qualitatively? Perhaps there is more to the Earth than its size.
Qualitatively, why is the Earth so well configured for life? Theists, of course, have a ready answer. But, science normally leans on the huge ledge of time which affords google-sized permutation possibilities. "Why?" is not a particularly popular nor socially-appropriate question to be asked by a scientist. Some fear losing their credibility by asking "Why?"
Richards & Gonzalez are fearless. Challenging traditional premises, they re-examine the empirical record in biology, chemistry, astrobiology, and especially physics. A rather startling conclusion accumulatively emerges: rather than being a pale blue dot insignificantly placed in a galaxy, evidence supports a quite different conclusion-the Earth is uniquely positioned to support complex life, and-here's the real news-uniquely positioned to observe the universe. Einstein was puzzled that humans have such ability; it is a challenge for biologists as well. Just what is the survival value of being able to understand, for example, a black hole?
Scientists who assumed a deity are not unusual; Newton, Pascal, Copernicus, and Einstein are just a few of the more famous. But, today is different. Deity is neither a premise nor a possibility in traditional science. And to be fair, Richards and Gonzalez are not arguing for deity, per se, but arguing that the empirical evidence of life, chemistry, astrobiology, and especially physics accumulatively suggest purpose, not random permutation.
Amidst the evidence supporting a purposeful design is the rather startling precision of the relationship between the moon's mass/distance from the Earth and mass/distance from the sun. One scholar extols, "were it not for the moon, we would not be." In fact, Gonzalez discovered that the size of the moon is precisely what allows solar eclipses to be scientifically rich experiments. If it were slightly smaller, or larger, we could not observe solar flares (and starlight bending from the sun's mass, a major confirmation of Einstein's theory of relativity). Furthermore, it is the moon's precise mass that stabilizes the Earth's axis to maintain a temperate climate whereby complex life forms can exist.
Richards and Gonzalez continued to reveal a variety of accumulated evidence which supports two pillars of thought: (1) the Earth is particularly well-suited for complex life forms, and (2) the Earth is particularly well-suited for observation. Specifically, Gonzalez argues that both sides of the equation must be considered; i.e., not only the number of possibilities, but also the number of factors that must be precisely "in tune" to support complex life-forms and an observational platform. Small changes in just one factor (e.g., gravity) remove all possibilities of complex life. And there are more than a score of factors which must be precisely tuned not only to a given level, but also tuned systemically with all the other factors. It turns out the probability for a well-suited environment for observing complex life-forms trumps the "other side of the equation."
The debate will continue, and it should. After all, there are few questions more important than "purpose." To be driven by purpose is one definition of obsession, and Richards and Gonzalez are obsessed. Perhaps we too need to be obsessed-as scholars we have some work to do. Surely, there is more to our purpose than mere propagation.
D. Thomas Porter, Ph.D.,
School of Mass Communications,
University of South Florida
Rating: Summary: Rubbish Review: The arguments in this book were covered with more humor and in less space by Voltaire: "Master Pangloss taught the metaphysico-theologo cosmolonigology. He could prove to admiration that there is no effect without a cause; and, that in this best of all possible worlds, the Baron's castle was the most magnificent of all castles, and My Lady the best of all possible baronesses. "'It is demonstrable,' said he, 'that things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles, therefore we wear spectacles. The legs are visibly designed for stockings, accordingly we wear stockings. Stones were made to be hewn and to construct castles, therefore My Lord has a magnificent castle; for the greatest baron in the province ought to be the best lodged. Swine were intended to be eaten, therefore we eat pork all the year round: and they, who assert that everything is right, do not express themselves correctly; they should say that everything is best.'" -- Candide, ch. 1 Even my ten-year-old can see through such stuff. Once when we were talking about vegetarians I asked her why animals are made out of meat if we aren't supposed to eat them? I guess you need a Ph.D. to take that question seriously. Our planet hosts all kinds of life -- including organisms that live in environments we could not survive in -- and as far as we know none of those species contemplates the meaning of their existence or their place in the universe. What do we have in common with them? Were they put here for us to eat? Or perhaps are we just one example, out of millions, of an organism that has gradually EVOLVED and ADAPTED TO our environment? When the environment was less compatible with our species other organisms adapted and thrived. Right now we have exactly ONE data point for life of any kind in the universe: our own planet. That one point supports the hypothesis that our planet is somehow uniquely blessed with the ability to support life. It also supports the hypothesis that we just haven't discovered any other planets supporting life because they are all too far away for us to observe. Drawing conclusions from a single data point is not science.
Rating: Summary: Rubbish Review: The arguments in this book were covered with more humor and in less space by Voltaire: "Master Pangloss taught the metaphysico-theologo cosmolonigology. He could prove to admiration that there is no effect without a cause; and, that in this best of all possible worlds, the Baron's castle was the most magnificent of all castles, and My Lady the best of all possible baronesses. "'It is demonstrable,' said he, 'that things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles, therefore we wear spectacles. The legs are visibly designed for stockings, accordingly we wear stockings. Stones were made to be hewn and to construct castles, therefore My Lord has a magnificent castle; for the greatest baron in the province ought to be the best lodged. Swine were intended to be eaten, therefore we eat pork all the year round: and they, who assert that everything is right, do not express themselves correctly; they should say that everything is best.'" -- Candide, ch. 1 Even my ten-year-old can see through such stuff. Once when we were talking about vegetarians I asked her why animals are made out of meat if we aren't supposed to eat them? I guess you need a Ph.D. to take that question seriously. Our planet hosts all kinds of life -- including organisms that live in environments we could not survive in -- and as far as we know none of those species contemplates the meaning of their existence or their place in the universe. What do we have in common with them? Were they put here for us to eat? Or perhaps are we just one example, out of millions, of an organism that has gradually EVOLVED and ADAPTED TO our environment? When the environment was less compatible with our species other organisms adapted and thrived. Right now we have exactly ONE data point for life of any kind in the universe: our own planet. That one point supports the hypothesis that our planet is somehow uniquely blessed with the ability to support life. It also supports the hypothesis that we just haven't discovered any other planets supporting life because they are all too far away for us to observe. Drawing conclusions from a single data point is not science.
Rating: Summary: Ridiculous attacks show revolutionary nature of this book Review: The authors of the Privileged Planet present an interesting, and revolutionary, hypothesis, namely that the universe is fine-tuned and the earth is specifically designed and placed in order to make scientific discovery more likely. Their analysis of the fine-tuning of physics and the universe is thorough and provocative. They examine the makeup of the earth, it's atmosphere, it's place in our solar system, that system's place in the galaxy, and our galaxy's relation to the rest of the cosmos and build a strong case for a purposely designed universe. Yet, rather than engage the authors in thoughtful dialogue about their unique and interesting ideas, critics are attacking them for all manner of unrelated issues. Not only that, critics are levelling unfounded, serious personal attacks on them. The Spanish Inquisition has nothing on the modern day Darwinian Inquisitors. Don't dare to challenge the scientific status quo or you will find yourself the victim of an internet smear campaign to ruin your reputation and destroy your credibility. Just read the radical reviews on this page that call the authors of The Privileged Planet racist because they are challenging modern scientific dogma and you can see that their proposition has obviously undermined the materialist underpinnings of modern day science.
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