An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts

Rating:
Summary: Information to the reader: this book is good
Review: In less than three hundred pages, the authors are able to introduce Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Signalling in an outstanding accessible way, without no lack of formality. Given the importance of contract theory in modern Economics, undoubtedely this is the first book to be read.

Each chapter is full of examples and graphs that help to understand the mathematics underneath.

The reader is supposed to know Kuhn-Tucker theorem, so any advanced undergraduate student in economics should be able to read it.

The base model, presented in chapter 2, is used as a benchmark to compare the results obtained from the Moral Hazard model (brilliantly presented in chapter 3), Adverse Selection (chapter 4) and Signalling (chapter 5).

Each chapter has very well posed exercises, whose answers are in the end of the book. Furthermore, advanced themes are also discussed in the end of each chapter, giving to the reader a complete overview about theory of information.

So, since this theme has been increasingly important in modern economics, and given that this book is very easily readable, I strongly recommend it to any person who wishes to understand theory of contracts and incetives.

Rating:
Summary: Information to the reader: this book is good
Review: In less than three hundred pages, the authors are able to introduce Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Signalling in an outstanding accessible way. Given the importance of contract theory in modern Economics, undoubtedely this is the first book to be read.

Each chapter is full of examples and graphs that help to understand the mathematics underneath.

The reader is supposed to know Kuhn-Tucker theorem, so any advanced undergraduate student in economics should be able to read it.

The base model, presented in chapter 2, is used as a benchmark to compare wirh the results obtained from the Moral Hazard model (brilliantly presented in chapter 3), Adverse Selection (chapter 4) and Signalling (chapter 5).

Each chapter has very well posed exercises, whose answers are in the end of the book. Furthermore, advanced themes are also discussed in the end of each chapter, giving to the reader a complete overview about theory of information.

So, since this theme has been increasingly important in modern economics, and given that this book is very easily readable, I strongly recommend it to any person who wishes to understand theory of contracts and incetives.