Rating: 
Summary: Problem of Free Rider
Review: Cost/Benefit When we look at cases of organizations like labor union, pressure group or firm, Even if members share the common interest, it doesn't guarantee they will act on that interest. To achieve the purpose, one should pay the cost. But 'a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by it achievement.' So if one could get the benefit without cost, he would let others bear the burden.
Public Good/Taxing: Everybody's business is nobody's business let's take example. The state provides public good like the defense, police protection, law system, which 'must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone'. It can't be free to provide those services. The burden is charged as tax. But tax evasion is as old as human history. It's the reason why the tax has been defined as 'compulsory payment'. Likewise 'collective good' of organizations cause the same free rider problem.
Size matters: Individual acts on the function of cost and benefit: The lower cost to get the collective good, the more willing to bear the cost. The smaller is the size of group, the larger is the share of collective good one gets in relation to total cost. Even though only one member with greatest interest pays all the cost, he will do so as long as benefit exceeds cost. This kind of group can provide collective good without relying on coercion or incentive apart from the collective good itself. But without arranging the share of burden (group-oriented act), the amount of collective good can't be optimized (exploitation). 'Accordingly, the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good.' Moreover, the larger is the group, the less likely noticeable is the effect of individual's contribution. So here the leviathan comes in: Coercion and incentive. Once there is the formal organizing, the larger the better, for it leads to lower cost to each. But organizing itself should be obtained at cost. 'These are the costs of 'communication among group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the costs of creating, staffing, and maintaining any formal group organization.' These costs put on the total cost of getting collective good. And it makes the supply of collective not optimized. This reinforces the need of coercion/incentive.
Inclusive/Exclusive Group: If the nature of collective good is fixed (scarce) in supply, members doesn't resist to newcomers. In this case, members become competitor or rival to each other, for the availability of collective good is exclusive to each member. 'The firms in an industry would be an exclusive group when they sought a higher price in their industry by restricting output.' Here the monopoly is the ideal to participant. But in nonmarket situation, the opposite is true, for collective good is not fixed in supply. In other word, it's inclusive. In such a case, if permitted, the group tends to expand upto the point that benefit equals cost. When seeking lower taxes, or tariff, firms would make 'an inclusive group, and would enlist all the support they could get.
Privileged/Intermediate/latent Group: Privileged group refers to the small group providing collective good for sure without organizing or coordinating. Intermediate group refers to the small group where nobody gets the benefit sufficient to motivate him to provide the good himself but it's not big enough to demotivate completely. Latent group refers to the large group where the problem of free riders is salient.
Case Study-Unions are for collective bargaining: We take it for granted that labor union is by nature big organization. But contrary to common guess, the first labor unions in Britain and States began not as large, impersonal, metropolitan organizations (latent group) but as small, committed, local organizations (privileged group). It was better to be the privileged group with member's devotion and sacrifice (noncollective good cf. Owen), for it launched in hostile environment. But once a local union exists, a few factors drive it to organize the whole industry and to be large, national union.
1. In market economy, employers should compete each other, so they can't survive with higher wage.
2. Employers could find source of strikebreakers, were industry-wide organization.
But when it comes to large, national union, there should be the problem of free rider. Workers can't hate collective good like wage raising, better work condition, job security. But the strike, weapon to get it, means the cost, and that, strikebreakers are legally free to cross picket line and would enjoy better paying than ever. And bargaining with employer cannot help being collective not individual or restricted to union member. So here comes the compulsory membership i.e., closed shop or union shop. 'Compulsory membership and picket lines are therefore of the essence of unionism'. This explains away why the early history of union was flooded with violence between/among workers and employers. The decline of labor union in States could be illuminated in the same way; 'No Closed Shop'. Without coerced participation, there is no means to support the union. For individual efforts wont change the whole picture. To attract members, unions relied on noncollective benefit such as insurance, welfare benefit, seniority rights. But the advent of welfare state deprived them of incentive to offer.
Rating: 
Summary: All large systems fail
Review: Every system will expand to fill the univerese, corrupting all that it comes in contact with. that is the entire book. a few storys, ect. but that is it. THE WHOLE BOOK.
Rating:
Summary: All large systems fail
Review: Every system will expand to fill the univerese, corrupting all that it comes in contact with. that is the entire book. a few storys, ect. but that is it. THE WHOLE BOOK.
Rating: 
Summary: Good in theory, lacking proof
Review: I once read that Olson was on the short list of people being considered for the Nobel Prize at the time of his death. Certainly, this list is not so short: at least three of my college professors were rumored to be.... Enough of that, though....This work takes a simple premise and expands on it to explain processes that at the outset seem contradictory. Organisations exist, in economic logic, to seek either economic rent or ideological satisfaction. Olson in this book works through organisational logic and explains group behavior in a clear, concise fashion. This behavior influences economic performance and politics at all levels. Moreso than other books which in part relate to the same areas (including Olson's the Rise and Decline of Nations and a few by Douglass North) this is THE key text for this issue, and a must read for anyone who is into political economy.
Rating:
Summary: THE crucial book on political economy
Review: I once read that Olson was on the short list of people being considered for the Nobel Prize at the time of his death. Certainly, this list is not so short: at least three of my college professors were rumored to be.... Enough of that, though.... This work takes a simple premise and expands on it to explain processes that at the outset seem contradictory. Organisations exist, in economic logic, to seek either economic rent or ideological satisfaction. Olson in this book works through organisational logic and explains group behavior in a clear, concise fashion. This behavior influences economic performance and politics at all levels. Moreso than other books which in part relate to the same areas (including Olson's the Rise and Decline of Nations and a few by Douglass North) this is THE key text for this issue, and a must read for anyone who is into political economy.
Rating:
Summary: Logically indeed
Review: In this influential work, Mancur Olson is dismissing the 'classical' group theories, as he calls them. Rational individuals will rarely contribute to a common (or collective in the economics-lingo) good, because their contribution will be insignificant and the good will be produced whether the individual provides the good or not. With his stringent logic, the late Olson reminds his readers that groups of all kinds consist of individuals, and that these individuals usually follow there own interest, which not necessarily correspond with the organization's. The book's explanatory powers are tremendous. Why large groups very rarely if ever are able to organize, and at the same time why some small groups exercise extraordinary amounts of power is Olsons main point of interest. In the very interesting last chapter he describes which features an organization, be it a farmer union, a labor union, a profession lobby or a special interest group, must inhibit to attain members. The best trait of the book (at least for this reviewing economist) is the persuasive logic with which the arguments are hammered home, and the instructive examples that are used to illustrate the point just made. One little objection should be Olson's (human) tendency to arrogance when he is most pleased with his own conclusions. However: still an excellent read, 40 years after it's first printing.
Rating:
Summary: The Few, The Proud, The Worthwhile
Review: It continually amazes the curious mind how few books are written about important matters. It would seem groups are a fecund area for study, a kind of natural playground for better minds, but this is not the case. 'The Logic of Collective Action' is one of the thankfull exceptions to this rule. Although now somewhat dated in discussions of labor matters as a whole, I found this book to be nearly dead on in its critiques of larger groups, especially on point of larger socialist ideas concerning the proper workings of groups. The discussion on when and where groups fail is one of perfect Voltairian pitch- measured, intelligent, thorough, and agressively objective. Although a left-wing economist, everyone from a a free-marketer to a marxist and everywhere in between can find solace in the even handedness and range which Olson rangfes his examples. He appears to have read every significant book and thought ever produced on structural matters from the range of economists open to him at the time. This is something of a marvel of a feat considering the disrepute objective scholarship has taken recently. Comparative economics should start with this book.
Rating:
Summary: GREAT LOGIC, CLEARLY WRITTEN ARGUMENT
Review: Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action is one of the best arguments I have read on the theory of groups. Given its age (it was originally written in the 1960s), it does not include much of the later scholarship on the subject. However, it is a great introduction to collective action, as the basic argument has not changed: groups in which the benefits from collective goods cannot be denied to people are very difficult to organize. Organization will more lilkey come about when there is one (or a small number of) individual whose cost of action is lower than his own expected benefits; this leads to an exploitation by the small of the large, which is an interesting and counterintutive situation. Olson provides a wide array of examples, which are of course old but nonetheless relevant. Examples include farming organizations, trade unions, business pressure groups, medical associations, etc. Overall, I found this book to be very interesting and easy to read, as the economics hardly ever go beyond basic math. For people who like rational arguments, it will be a pleasure to read this. The most interesting portion of the book, in my opinion, is the author's argument why Marxism does not work in practice in the way that Marx predicted.
Rating:
Summary: GREAT LOGIC, CLEARLY WRITTEN ARGUMENT
Review: Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action is one of the best arguments I have read on the theory of groups. Given its age (it was originally written in the 1960s), it does not include much of the later scholarship on the subject. However, it is a great introduction to collective action, as the basic argument has not changed: groups in which the benefits from collective goods cannot be denied to people are very difficult to organize. Organization will more lilkey come about when there is one (or a small number of) individual whose cost of action is lower than his own expected benefits; this leads to an exploitation by the small of the large, which is an interesting and counterintutive situation. Olson provides a wide array of examples, which are of course old but nonetheless relevant. Examples include farming organizations, trade unions, business pressure groups, medical associations, etc. Overall, I found this book to be very interesting and easy to read, as the economics hardly ever go beyond basic math. For people who like rational arguments, it will be a pleasure to read this. The most interesting portion of the book, in my opinion, is the author's argument why Marxism does not work in practice in the way that Marx predicted.
Rating:
Summary: Insightful look at political stability and the economy
Review: Olson uses economic rationality to explain the creation of stable social/political organizations. He offers a facinating glimpse at the full relationship between politics and economics through the lens of the self-interested, roving bandit.
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