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A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

List Price: $80.00
Your Price: $68.21
Product Info Reviews

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Rating: 5 stars
Summary: Great, even for a compilation-plus
Review: For a book that is basically a compilation of published papers plus some additional intro and extended review problems, this book is very good. It functions nicely for several purposes, both methodological and substantive.

Methodologically it is a great introduction to the theory of mechanism design, with regulation used as a backdrop to provide context. (It could use a short section describing the basics of optimal control theory (and using standard optimization theory to help orient the reader), but it possible to work through the exposition without it.) Once the basic tools are acquired the reader is prepared to read the vast array of additional developments on the theme, including dynamics, lack of commitment, multidimensional mechanism design, common agency, etc.

Substantively, it also serves as an good introduction to the "new" economics of regulation. In particular, it studies how regulators can use traditional pricing and regulatory tools to provide a regulated firm with the incentives willingly to reveal its private information about cost to the regulator, to take socially optimal cost reducing activities, to pay appropriate attention to quality, etc. This is certainly an interesting application of mechanism design theory and this book comprehensively treats a family of models in this field.

I used it for self study and found it adequate for that purpose. Knowledge of noncooperative game theory is essential to get anything out of it. The book is fairly technical so don't buy it if you're not into that.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: A book good for economic researcher's computer simulation
Review: I bought this book for the grand name of "Jean Tirole" and the title. Pretty disappointed. This book only focus on modeling factors, nonetheless, quite through compiled.
If you're interesting about this field, might want to refer to;
1. Willison, the institution of capitalism ( also hierarchy )
2. Olsen, the collective action ( and other books from Olsen )
3. Tirole, the theory of industrial organization
Some books regarding "principle and agent" (no recommendation here )

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: A book good for economic researcher's computer simulation
Review: I bought this book for the grand name of "Jean Tirole" and the title. Pretty disappointed. This book only focus on modeling factors, nonetheless, quite through compiled.
If you're interesting about this field, might want to refer to;
1. Willison, the institution of capitalism ( also hierarchy )
2. Olsen, the collective action ( and other books from Olsen )
3. Tirole, the theory of industrial organization
Some books regarding "principle and agent" (no recommendation here )

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: NON PLUS ULTRA
Review: This is a MUST own for scholars teaching advanced microeconomic theory, in particular for courses that emphasize in labor contracts under asymmetric information. It is written in a crisp, approachable style (for advanced undergraduate and graduate level) relying wherever possible with rigorous proofs. This book provides not only an "action packed" and up to date guide to economic theory, it takes you to the knowledge frontier in this field. I recommend it to all serious scholars and economic practitioners.


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