Rating: 
Summary: Excellent book, but not a good financial history
Review: The subtitle (A History of Financial Crises) is misleading. This is an excellent book as far as dissecting manias and trying to understand them, but it is mainly that -- a study of how manias develop and turn into panics or crashes. The impression that I got is that Dr. Kindleberger assumes the reader already knows financial history. If history is more of what you're looking for, I highly recommend Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". You can always come back to "Manias, Panics, and Crashes" later for a deeper study.
Rating: 
Summary: Disappointing and non-useful
Review: The subtitle of this book, "A History of Financial Crises", is misleading since the book is actually a *commentary* on the history of financial crises. As such, it assumes that the reader is already familiar with the history of financial crises from 1600 to the present. The book is organized by the phases of a financial crisis, resulting in a near-complete lack of chronological coherence. The author may typically be talking about the Dutch tulip mania of 1636 in one sentence and the panic of 1907 in the next sentence, a style which quickly becomes exasperating. The overall purpose of the book appears to be the promotion of a thesis favoring the concept of a "lender of last resort" in order to mitigate financial crises. Consequently the book reads like an academic treatise, which is basically what it is. This approach is, in this reviewer's opinion, self-indulgent on the part of the author who appears to be addressing a readership primarily in academia, government and perhaps a limited segment of the banking industry. This book is neither instructive nor useful for the general reader.
Rating:
Summary: Disappointing and non-useful
Review: The subtitle of this book, "A History of Financial Crises", is misleading since the book is actually a *commentary* on the history of financial crises. As such, it assumes that the reader is already familiar with the history of financial crises from 1600 to the present. The book is organized by the phases of a financial crisis, resulting in a near-complete lack of chronological coherence. The author may typically be talking about the Dutch tulip mania of 1636 in one sentence and the panic of 1907 in the next sentence, a style which quickly becomes exasperating. The overall purpose of the book appears to be the promotion of a thesis favoring the concept of a "lender of last resort" in order to mitigate financial crises. Consequently the book reads like an academic treatise, which is basically what it is. This approach is, in this reviewer's opinion, self-indulgent on the part of the author who appears to be addressing a readership primarily in academia, government and perhaps a limited segment of the banking industry. This book is neither instructive nor useful for the general reader.
Rating: 
Summary: Wordy but informative
Review: This book goes through the economic history of our country. This book gets very wordy at times and goes into almost too much needless detail, but can be very informative. Kindleberger shows us that bad behavior can happen even now on the economic market, and that there is a definable parren to economic crises. Chapter one talks about how economic lows usually follow peaks in our economy. Chapter two discusses the patterns of a crisis. Chapter three compares crises and describe how they differ. Chapter four says that bad credit adds to the problems.Chapter five discusses those who help add to the problems of a crisis. Chapter six looks at the feelings of people as they make and lose money. Chapter seven deals with economies effects domestically and chapter eight internationally. Chapter nine talks about the good and bad of trying to let the problems fix themselves and chapter ten discusses the leaders of the economy. Although going into great detail, almost too much detail at times, it proves informative in the end. Three stars.
Rating:
Summary: Wordy but informative
Review: This book goes through the history of all types of lows in the economy. It is extremely wordy and goes into great detail of how the mismanagement of money and credit by individuals and the government has led to financial crises. Kindelberger discusses that irrational behavior does occur from time to time and cannot be stopped. That it has a defined pattern that can be seen in order to stop it from happening again. Chapter one talks about how crises usually follow a peak in the economy. Chapter two talks about the patterns of crashes. Chapter three talks about the differences between crises. Chapter four talks about credit and using it too fast will increase the chances of a mania. Chapter five discusses those who are usually involved in a crisis. Chapter six discusses the emotions of people as they gain or lose money. Chapter seven talks about the impact of the economy on individual businesses which goes into chapter seven which increases to the international market. Chapter nine discusses whether government should play a role in it and finally chapter ten looks at government leaders and their roles. It goes into great detail and almost too much detail at times, but it is very helpful in reviewing the history of our economy.
Rating:
Summary: Only for serious economists
Review: This book is definitely not for the arm-chair investor. Although the idea is very good, a thorough understanding of economics will be required to make this very factual book worthwile.
Rating:
Summary: Masterly analysis of financial crises.
Review: This book is in fact a plea for a 'lender of last resort' in case of financial crises, and also an attack on monetarism.
"A monetarist view of the matter - that mania and panic would be avoided if only the supply of money were stabilized at some fixed quantity, or at a regular growing level - is rejected." (p.6)
"The Chicago School of monetarism assumes that authorities are universally stupid and the market always intelligent. In the panics we are examining, this uneven distribution of intelligence cannot be tested against crisis management because authorities and leading figures in the marketplace both exert themselves in the same direction: to intervene in one way or another, in order to halt the spread of falling prices, bankruptcy, and bank failure." (p.158)
Kindleberger proves that authorities aren't always that stupid: see the Marshall Plan after WW II.For the lender of last resort, Kindleberger remarks: "The historical record suggests the leading financial centre of the world, often assisted by other countries." (p.201) This is a fascinating study covering 500 years of economic history and crises. This book not only gives an objective view on the different crashes, but also tries to extract necessary lessons from them.
A must for every economist and for the layman.
Rating:
Summary: Relevant to today
Review: This book is well written and quite relevant to todays World of finance. It describes various events from the past which have helped to shape our global economy and inadvertantly have created the institutions which regulate our market -although regulation is not dealt with herein. Kindleberger's history though is often difficult to read as it does not follow a chronological structure. Further he assumes that the reader has attained a certain level of knowledge as he seems to only make very brief mention of certain events. This book would have been far better if it was chronological and far more detailed. Still a great read with some interesting lessons from the dim, dark past of speculative manias ...???
Rating:
Summary: A must for your collection
Review: This book lays out the blueprint to spot a financial crisis in the making.
A. Plenty of money in supply and preferably at cheap rates.
B. A 'new technology'-from the birth of railroad stocks, to letter stocks of the 1960s and dot coms of the late 1990s.
C. A willing and enthusiastic media outlet (think CNBC and the dot com boom).
D. Cab drivers and plumbers suddenly trading actively in the respective markets. Another note I would throw in is when the investment community are saying 'it is different this time, simple valuation of securities is no longer possible'.
Kindleberger's work draws on this scenario time and time again.
A required reading for anyone actively trading in the markets.
Rating:
Summary: A chronicle of financial irrationality
Review: Those who lost money in the 1990's stock market bubble may be tempted to think that they have been cursed with misfortune of unparalleled proportions. Reading "Manias, Panics, and Crashes" will surely change their mind. Bubbles, they will learn, are an enduring feature of financial markets, and generations of investors have fallen in the trap of buying very high to sell even higher, only to find that the frenzy cannot last for ever. The mania part of the story is familiar: a new invention will revolutionize the economic landscape and bring forth unimaginable profits. The abundance of credit, coupled with leverage (buying with borrowed money), accelerates this process and buying leads to more buying. Then comes the panic: some event shakes confidence and wakes up investors to the mania that has clouded their judgment. This panic leads to a crash: borrowed money needs to be repaid and investors will sell anything at any price to meet the bankers' needs. Charles Kindleberger has chronicled dozens of financial bubbles spanning more than four centuries. His historiography is impressive and the reader can often wonder how Kindleberger amassed such large amounts of data: his sources are primary and secondary, and they come from economics, history, politics, and even literature. The text is well written and the reader hardly notices that the ride covers centuries' worth of financial troubles. What, in the end, is Kindleberger's moral? Most cures for dealing with financial troubles, he writes, are no cures at all. Raising interest rates has not proven particularly useful and neither has continued warning from authorities that the investing public is inflating a bubble. The solution, he believes, lies in having a lender of last resort. The trick, of course, is to avoid moral hazard and prevent the public from gambling due to the reassurance of a lender of last resort. The answer is ambiguity: the lender can come in and save the day but investors should never be certain that help is forthcoming. In the end, "Manias, Panics, and Crashes" is a classic account of financial bubbles and its immense history and shrewd analysis will appeal to both the layman and the expert. And the book's message, that financial bubbles have to be met with an artful lender, should be taken at heart by those interested in the past and future of financial crises.
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