Rating: 
Summary: Shows how much I know-- I really enjoyed it.
Review: I read it because so many of the books I was reading referred to it. Despite the negative reviews, I have to say that I found it neither dusty nor boring. Particularly given the last bubble that we have just been through, I found it fascinating to read his theories about what fuels a mania.
Disclaimer: I can't even claim to be an armchair economist. Just an interested business bystander.
If you get confused as to which financial crisis Kindleberger refers, use the appendix at the back. One flaw that the book really does have is to assume that you know all about the various events upon which it draws for its evidence. Perhaps for future editions it would be smart of the publisher to include a brief introductory chapter on the subject. While real economists would have no need for that introduction, the other readers of the book (and it does seem to be marketed at a wider audience) would benefit.
Lots of great references to further reading included as well.
Rating:
Summary: Shows how much I know-- I really enjoyed it.
Review: I read it because so many of the books I was reading referred to it. Despite the negative reviews, I have to say that I found it neither dusty nor boring. Particularly given the last bubble that we've just been through, I found it fascinating to read his theories about what fuels a mania. Disclaimer: I can't even claim to be an armchair economist. Just an interested bystander. If you get confused as to which financial crisis Kindleberger refers, use the appendix at the back. One flaw that the book really does have is to assume that you know all about the various events upon which it draws for its evidence. Perhaps for future editions it would be smart of the publisher to include a brief introductory chapter on the subject? Lots of great references to further reading included as well.
Rating:
Summary: Sorry amazon, I read the library's copy...
Review: I'm puzzled by some of the negative comments about this book here, as I'm neither an economist nor a historian and I found the book quite accessible and interesting. The fairly predictable sequence of events leading to crashes, which have been played out many times in the past, is the book's central theme. Some of the story-telling could even be described as fascinating at times, though my knowledge of the subject was pretty much limited to what one learns of the famed `29 crash in high school american history. Anyway, the critics here are not entirely wrong, though I think they're being a bit nit-picky. I don't think the widely-read and educated lay-person should be scared off. I liked the book, learned something significant from it, was mildly entertained and impressed by the author's plethora of knowledge, and occasionally recommend it to those with an interest in financial markets, especially their so-called irrational side.
Rating: 
Summary: Much Improved 4th Edition of an Investment Classic
Review: If you are interested in how Alan Greenspan will probably handle the financial weakness that follows the year 2000 collapse of the Internet stocks, this book is a good guide. Chairman Greenspan is basically a follower of Professor Kindleberger. Both believe that pragmatic, flexible activism by the Federal Reserve can shorten up the pain from financial excesses. Those who are interested in the psychology of financial markets are often drawn to Professor Kindleberger's book after reading Charles MacKay's classic, Memoirs of Extraordinary Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. In this new edition, Professor Kindleberger has added useful perspectives on the Mexican and Asian financial crises of the 1990s and adjusted his interpretation to allow for more differentiation among crises than he did before. I found this edition by far the most satisfying of the four he has written. Professor Kindleberger is one of the few remaining literary economists, those who make their points in essays rather than through long equations that depend on questionable assumptions. This makes his work very accessible, even though it is as rigorous as it can possibly be while still remaining a popular work. If you believe in efficient markets or the overriding importance of macroeconomics, you will be angered and annoyed by this book. Milton Friedman and John Maynard Keynes each take their shots here, although in polite ways. As Peter L. Bernstein summarizes nicely in his introduction, Professor Kindleberger's argument boils down to four principles: (1) Irrational behavior does occur from time to time in financial markets. (2) There is a general, repeatable pattern in how this irrational behavior plays out (a positive economic displacement is followed by euphoria that takes the form of overtrading, then distress following revulsion, discredit by lenders in the overtraded assets, and then panic leading possibly to a crash brought on by those who bought high). (3) The economic system needs a lender of last resort to step in at the right time and in the right way to restore confidence and liquidity. (4) Trying to solve these problems by being doctrinaire is "wrong . . . and dangerous." Chapter one looks at how financial crises often accompany peaks in the economic cycle. Chapter two looks at the patterns of typical crises, described by "lumping" them together. Chapter three considers how speculative mania are begun by knowledgable insiders who then unload on overoptimistic outsiders who buy high and sell low. This chapter looks at how the crises differ from one another. Chapter four shows how either excess credit or too fast monetary expansion adds fuel to the flames. Chapter five considers the frequent association of swindles with these manias. Chapter six looks at the psychological stages of the whole process in more detail. Of central importance is the discomfort that many feel as they see a neighbor or friend become wealthy. Chapter seven looks at how the economic impact spreads to other domestic markets. Chapter eight looks at the transference to other international markets. Chapter nine looks at the pros and cons of trying to let these cycles take care of themselves. Chapter ten looks at the role of domestic lenders of last resort (the Federal Reserve in the U.S.). "How much? To whom? On what terms? When?" are the questions that require different answers each time in terms of who should get credit. In Chapter eleven, you see the special problems of the IMF. Will someone take the lead in time, or will everyone dally? The conclusion in Chapter twelve nicely summarizes the book. He argues tentatively that "a lender of last resort does shorten the business depression that follows the financial crisis." He also says there is "a presumption . . . that halting a cumulative deflation helps shorten the depression that follows." One issue that is not addressed in this edition is how such crises may occur more rapidly and with greater amplitude than before due to improved information flows. As a result, it will be more difficult for lenders of last resort to take correct action in a timely way. Clearly, "jawboning" such as talking about "irrational exuberance" will do little good. As we sort out the results from the crash of the "dot com" stocks, the groundwork is probably being laid for a fifth edition. How will you respond to the next mania that builds? Keep sight on rational values, even in times of irrational exuberance. For a deflation along with a credit squeeze will usually follow.
Rating: 
Summary: Poorly organized, poorly written
Review: If you're looking for an interesting review of the panics and stock market crashes of the past, look elsewhere. This book reads as if a well-organized, concisely written history of panics was thrown into a blender and pieced together out-of-order.
Rating:
Summary: Good book.
Review: It shows u step by step to finanical crashes in history. It tells u what will happen in each stage toward the crashes. In the beginning, it says : "For historians each event is unique. Economics, however, maintains that forces in society and nature behave in repetitive ways. This is always true in 1929, ..., 1987, 1997, 2000, 2001 crashes.
Rating:
Summary: An elegant and informed look at markets
Review: Kindelberger's work is a classic study of speculative bubbles and their consequences, and should be read as such. From the first, this is a book that aims to seperate market moves from genuine crises - important in an age were there is a tendancy for the media to seek to dramatise the mundane in order to winn a BAFTA. The definitions provide a framework for examining the development of an irrational interlude in financial markets. Kindelberger's analysis is not, therefore, a classic "history" primer for the curious - there is no spoonfeeding of facts, for that is not what the book sets out to present. Instead, this is an elegant and informed look at what how financial markets have departed from the course theoretical "rational" behaviour suggests that they should have taken. For all that, it is still an accessible text to those who take a casual interest in financial markets.
Rating: 
Summary: Not for the armchair economist
Review: Kindleberger dissects manias and panics to arrive at his conclusions. In the process, though, he bombards the reader with an abundance of detail and assumes a good understanding of university economics. A non-economist will have difficulty to follow his line of reasoning. For example: "A synthesis of Keynesianism and monetarism, such as the Hansen-Hicks IS-LM curves that bring together the investment-saving (IS) and liquidity-money (LM) relationships, remains incomplete, even when it brings in production and prices (as does the most up-to-date economic analysis) if it leaves out the instability of expectations, and credit and the role of the leveraged speculation in various assets". For those who enjoy thoughtful, dense reading, this book will make you a smarter investor. Unfortunately, for the large investing masses, those that have lost large sums in their 401k plans lately, the academic nature of this book puts this knowledge out of their reach.
Rating:
Summary: this book is excellent and particularly timely.
Review: Mr. Kindleberger explores a little understood/discussed topic and brings it into focus for investors of varying levels of sophistication. It is especially good reading in the context of the headlong rush into "emerging markets" that the Wall St. pundits have advocated in recent years. As foreign markets come unraveled his chapter on international propogation of crises is spectacular for its insights.
Rating:
Summary: Little value added
Review: The book is a mess where the author seems to try to show off all the names he learned reading history books. I would expect to find some descriptional or analytical value of financial crisis, but by page 60 I still haven't found any, and thought I should report this to you. So if you want 232 pages of.. "Bouvier's interest lies in whether Bontoux, a Catholic, failed of his own mistakes or was done in by a conspiracy of establishment Jewish and Protestant bankers resisiting an intruder. The subject lies outside our purview, but for the record, Bouvier issues a Scottish verdict of "not proven".", then this book is for you. There is another 44 pages of references to other books, newspapers etc for you to.. ehm, do nothing with. If you want to learn about financial crisis or recognize the next opportunities or pitfalls for your wallet this is not the book for you.
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