Rating: 
Summary: Pretty boring - only the title and conclusion are useful
Review: Actually a pretty boring book. The treatment is very academic, and the organization is divided into about 10 chapters (don't have it in front of me) which are supposed to be the general stages of a mania. each stage is covered in a chapter, answering questions such as "Who plays the role of the lender of last resort", or "What if there is no lender of last resort" (as in the great depression).
The book would have been outstanding if it hadn't been wholly qualitative, allowing very few concrete conclusions to be drawn. Even the summary tables in the back covering dozens of manias were too short to be useful as a reference to anyone wondering about the current bubble. There was an excellent opportunity to pick one, two, or three "almost typical" manias (the author claims there is no "typical mania") and do a case study explanation of the manias to build reader understanding of the stages of a mania. This opportunity was lost. There was another really excellent opportunity to describe what changed about our economy in order to prevent a future mania of the same type from happening again, for each mania in the book. This opportunity was also lost.
The irritating thing about this book is the writing style, e.g. "Who precipitated the crash ?? A run on banks from the king's decision to abandon the gold standard. Who was the lender of last resort? J.M. Hamemmacher but he ran short of cash after he mortgaged his farm". This terse academic writing style does not build understanding in the mind of the reader. The book is actually written more like an exercise on the part of the author who is trying to shoehorn each mania into a general model of a panic.
To really get anything valuable out of the book you'd have to read all 200+ references and then you'd have a chance to check for yourself if what the author is saying makes sense. Mostly, since i don't know 17th, 18th, and 19th century economic history this book was very uninteresting to me.
Rating:
Summary: Pretty boring - only the title and conclusion are useful
Review: Actually a pretty boring book. The treatment is very academic, and the organization is divided into about 10 chapters (don't have it in front of me) which are supposed to be the general stages of a mania. each stage is covered in a chapter, answering questions such as "Who plays the role of the lender of last resort", or "What if there is no lender of last resort" (as in the great depression).The book would have been outstanding if it hadn't been wholly qualitative, allowing very few concrete conclusions to be drawn. Even the summary tables in the back covering dozens of manias were too short to be useful as a reference to anyone wondering about the current bubble. There was an excellent opportunity to pick one, two, or three "almost typical" manias (the author claims there is no "typical mania") and do a case study explanation of the manias to build reader understanding of the stages of a mania. This opportunity was lost. There was another really excellent opportunity to describe what changed about our economy in order to prevent a future mania of the same type from happening again, for each mania in the book. This opportunity was also lost. To really get anything valuable out of the book you'd have to read all 200+ references and then you'd have a chance to check for yourself if what the author is saying makes sense. Mostly, since i don't know 17th, 18th, and 19th century economic history this book was very uninteresting to me.
Rating: 
Summary: Very Disappointing - a book only an "academic" could like.
Review: Aparently Mr. Kindleberger has been cloistered in his "ivory tower" too long to write a book of interest and value to those who do not share his expertise. He expects the reader be intimately familiar with the details of a number of obscure events dating back to more than 350 years ago. For example, the author mentions, references, alludes to ... "the South Sea Bubble" at least fifty times(!!) in this book, Yet having read the text completely all I know about the famous South Sea Bubble is that it had something to do with speculation in a stock of the South Sea company, that it happened in England, and it occurred in 1720. The simple "Who, What, When, Where, Why and How" are never spelled out. Never. (Yes that simple and straightforward informantion is what I'd really hoped for, thus I wax bitterly.) If you feel you must read this book, first ask yourself if are familiar with all of the following :the south sea bubble, the missippi bubble, the london crisis of 1866, the new york crisis of 1907, the writings of Walter Bagehot, tulipmania (holland, 1600's), Bleichroder, ....... (this list could go on for pages). If "no" then reconsider your desire, as all the above are ASSUMED to be well known by the reader and such knowledge is essential to understanding the arguments and information presented. It is very scholarly - Plenty of obscure words and fully 50 pages of apendices and endnotes (!! in a 250 page book). But it is poorly written. And the endless "obscure name dropping and event referencing" failed in its intention to make the author appear profoundly knowledgable; I found it little better than irritating. I was very very very disappointed with this book. It was writen for those who have completed graduate work in "Financial History". If you haven't, you won't find this book readable or illuminating. I am a curious person who enjoys learing from books, but THIS was a painful read. The useful and significant infromation in this book could be very well presented in a concise, well written 20 pages. We all have better things to do with our time and money. D. J. Tarico, Ph.D.
Rating:
Summary: Not a history - more of a survey
Review: Definitely NOT a "Popular" history. Very much a survey of the topic. Appears to me that there is an assumption that you are quite familiar with the events briefly alluded to in the discussion. Interesting concepts and fascinating historical glimpses. The details of the book's title will be found by reading the source notes and then going to the library to read the source documents.
Rating: 
Summary: Kindleberger gets it right
Review: Fascinating and entertaining take on the history of boom/bust cycles in markets, that functions also as a reply to the monetarists of the Austrian school. The monetarists seem to see panics and crashes (such as those that heralded the beginning of the Great Depression) as the function solely of improper monetary policy by the central bank. Kindleberger, in my opinion correctly, realizes that while monetary policy may either enable speculation or exacerbate a panic, one must not ignore the behavioral psychology that grips the masses of investors once a mania has set in. He also sees a panic as the natural and inevitable consequence of an investment mania. It seems impossible to have a mania without a panic, as night follows day. Are you folks at the Fed listening? Pumping more air into the bubble through the current ultra easy money policy could well be simply setting us up for an even bigger set of problems down the road. Whether or not you agree with the author, he has written a very thoughtful and important book.
Rating: 
Summary: Essential read for people concerned about their investments.
Review: Few subjects in economics are as basic as financial crisis, yet in trying to explain them, one can be at a loss for words. Kindleberger's thoughts on the subject are summed up in this book in a way that few have chosen to follow. Instead of providing mathematical equations to try to explain the various crises that have arisen, he has chosen to explain his ideas in a more tangible method. This method involves interspersing his ideas with annecdotes and real life examples. To begin, Kindelberger takes the traditional thought that people are rational beings and introduces the fact that speculation leading to destabilization is very much present, and that many of history's crashes have come from this irrational behavior, ie manias and panics. To explain, one must first define what a mania is, what a panic is, and ultimately, what a crash is. According to Kindleberger, a mania is basically just excessive speculation in the market. It follows, as Kindleberger suggests, that if one observes someone else, ie a friend, who is making money through speculative investments, one tends to follow. Mania is movement from cash or money into illiquid real assets. As more and more people begin to investment on speculation, people that would normally be indifferent to this type of behavior decide to invest, it is called a mania. Also used interchangeabley with the term maina is the term "bubble". The use of the word "bubble" to explain this speculation foreshadows bursting. In this book, bubble refers to "an upward price movement over an extended range that then implodes. Extended negative bubbles, or periods of disinvestment are what are called crashes. Panics refer to the period after the mania has died down, and people are beginning to speculate in the opposite direction. As the maina was the upswing, the panic is the downswing. Panics are easily defined as the movement away from illiquid assets to money or cash. Crashes are sometimes thought to be the result of an extended period of panic. More often, a crash involves the collapse of prices or the failure of important firms or banks. However, financial crisis can result from one or the other or both, in no particular order. Kindelberger sites the crash of 1929 as an example. " The 1929 crash and panic in the New York stock market spread liquidation to other asset markets, such as commodities, and seized up credit to strike a hard blow at output." In spite of this Kindelberger explains that there was no money market panic as evidenced by the increase in interest rates. Informative and concise, Kindelberger is able to encompass more than three hundred years of financial crises in about 200 pages. In he majority of these cases, he asks the important question of whether or not there was a lender of last resort, and if not, would it have made a difference. A lender of last resort acts to halt a run out of illiquid assets into money by making more money available, through a discount window. The author goes into great detail of who has been the lender of last resort in past crises. For example in the various crises that affected France in the nineteenth century, The Bank of France has acted as lender of last resort. While in Prussia in 1763, the king acted as lender of last resort. From all of this, Kindelberger attempts to explain some of the lessons that all of the crises in the past have given us. Besides of the advantages of having a lender of last resort, he warns us that it is not the whole solution. Having a lender of last resort can pose its own problems. Many institutions, because there is someone to bail them out, partake in more risky practices. By simply bailing out these mismanaged firms, we are not giving them incentive to improve their operation. Manias, Panics, and Crashes is a well of information on the topic of financial crises. Kindelberger has made this book an easy read for the everyday person, not just economists. By avoiding the mathematics and jargon used in so many other economics books, he has produced a book that is necessary reading if one is contemplating in "playing the market." Manias, Panics and Crashes would be a wise investment for them as well as anyone curious in financial history . The old adage is true, those who do not know the past are condemmed to repeat it. By learning of others past mistakes we can more successfully navigate our own way.
Rating:
Summary: Great for Anyone and Everyone
Review: First off, I am an "average Joe" type of guy who is younger than the boomer generation. Learning and reading things like this is interesting although I don't read books like this a lot. But I do have two cents to give, like everyone else. I read this book from reviews and the fact that Alan Greenspan reads this author and apparently has been influenced by him. Dr. Kindleberger focuses on the most driving stimulant behind the market: human psychology. Price to earning ratios, earning reports, and numerous economic indicators are the rational guides, but once the major forces of the market--greed and fear--take root, they can cause momentous shifts in upwardly and downwardly directions quickly, or painstakingly slow and steadily. Mob or Crowd mentalities and the irrational forces behind them, are a recurring psychological and historical cyclical pattern according to Kindleberger, and he provides ample data to back this up. And, if one wants to do well in the market they can focus on picking when the gyrations will occur, choosing when to get in and when to get out. I often talk with two sets of boomers: those who "hopped on" in the 1990s and "got off" at the right times, or nearly at the right times. It is cyclical, cyclical, cyclical. They are the ones who have benefitted. I also speak a lot with boomers who didn't get out of the market in time, or even at all (as of July 2002). The results are significant and life-long. Lifestyles are permanently affected for the rest of ones life, both in positive and negative ways. And as Dr. Kindleberger notes, there will be another Mania that will come, and the opportune thing to do, is pick when to get on, and when to get off. Although what I am describing is very simplistic, the theme of the book is that natural patterns of behaviour are buying excessively (euphoria), and also rampant dumping (panic), which again, exceedingly sends the market in both directions. Baby Boomers that jumped on the stock-buying bandwagon in the 1990s, and didn't get out in time may not like this book. They may be reading it to try to figure out what's going on, and if one is to read this book they shouldn't assume the author will dumb it down with simple analogies, and dummy charts for laymen. It's not a simplistic Rick Edelman or Motley Fool type of book for the Boomer-come-lately, so stop complaining about the author's presentation.
Rating:
Summary: extremely valuable and informative, though incomplete
Review: for the economist in me, i resent the fact that the author didn't include the relevant quant / charts of the macroecon factors that precipitated the various extreme situations he describes. having said that, this book does describe the aforementioned factors, as well as detailed accounts of precipitiating factors, outcomes and, sadly, reoccurrences. if one had read this book prior to 99, one would have profited from the nasdaq meltdown. ---if that's not an endorsement, i don't know what is.
Rating:
Summary: A Crashing Disappointment Despite the Mania Surrounding It.
Review: I had high expectations for this book after seeing a favorable reference to it in the "WSJ". I was looking for insights and generalizations that characterize market explosions and their inevitable collapse which could be applied to future financial booms and busts. Instead I was treated, check that, tortured by a dry narrative that wandered between centuries and continents and back again all in the same breath. As I read, I kept asking myself, "What's the point? Where are those nuggets of insight? Where is the critical thinking? Surely, they must show up at some point!" They never did. Kindleberger presented a lot of historical (and disjointed) facts, but the meat of it was sorely lacking. He clearly would be classified as an economic theorist rather than a practitioner, but I can't see his work being useful to pure economists either. While Greenspan may be acquanted with him on the cocktail circuit, I doubt he has much use for Kindleberger otherwise.
Rather than repeat what others have said, I recommend the reviews of 12/26/98, 11/8/99, 2/16/00, 9/15/02, 1/18/03, and 2/25/03 which are on target and worth reading.
Rating:
Summary: A Crashing Disappointment Despite the Mania Surrounding It.
Review: I had high expectations for this book after seeing a favorable reference to it in the "WSJ". I was looking for insights and generalizations that characterize market explosions and their inevitable collapse which could be applied to future financial booms and busts. Instead I was treated, check that, tortured by a dry narrative that wandered between centuries and continents and back again all in the same breath. As I read, I kept asking myself, "What's the point? Where are those nuggets of insight? Where is the critical thinking? Surely, they must show up at some point!" They never did. Kindleberger presented a lot of historical (and disjointed) facts, but the meat of it was sorely lacking. He clearly would be classified as an economic theorist rather than a practitioner, but I can't see his work being useful to pure economists either. While Greenspan may be acquanted with him on the cocktail circuit, I doubt he has much use for Kindleberger otherwise.
Rather than repeat what others have said, I recommend the reviews of 12/26/98, 11/8/99, 2/16/00, 9/15/02, 1/18/03, and 2/25/03 which are on target and worth reading.
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