Rating: 
Summary: Just a marketing gag
Review: The authors praise the real options approach as t h e new and effective method to decide on uncertain investments. When it comes to elaborate on methods and techniques, however, they fall short of explanations and try to get away just with a presentation of final results. It seems to be no more than a marketing gag. If you want to waste your money than buy the book.
Rating: 
Summary: Easy to read and understand the value of real options
Review: The book goes through basic concept of real options and presented in a way that easily understood. Nice examples using both binomial method and Black-Scholes to identify real options value. Also some practical application of real options are presented as guidelines for people who is new to the subject. Finnally, real options doesn't have to be a topic for rocket scientist.
Rating:
Summary: The authors lost an unique opportunity
Review: The importance of the subject can't be overstated. The authors, however, are more interested in selling advice, keeping unrealistic cases without a full solution, using phrases like "We used a simple binomial model to get illustrative results". What results? Incomplete answers, however, are nothing compared to basic conceptual mistakes. In chapter 10, the authors estimate the value of an established firm using a current multiple; then, for using the B&S formula, they bring it to present value!! Want more? Just read the book...
Rating: 
Summary: You must read before any investment decision
Review: The model presented in the book is really useful and gave me a different perspective on how to analyze investments in real assets.Moreover, this approach is simple to apply in any kind of business
Rating: 
Summary: At least this book is readable
Review: The only saving grace about this book is that it is readable. However, the reason for this is because there is not much to learn about RO from this book. The author's talk about numerous examples and the "concept" of how RO was applied. But, you will not learn the actual process of using RO, unlike Copeland's or Trigeorgis' book.
Rating:
Summary: At least this book is readable
Review: The only saving grace about this book is that it is readable. However, the reason for this is because there is not much to learn about RO from this book. The author's talk about numerous examples and the "concept" of how RO was applied. But, you will not learn the actual process of using RO, unlike Copeland's or Trigeorgis' book.
Rating: 
Summary: Shamelss self-promotion
Review: This book is another good example of a phenomenon I call "Fad-peddling" at its worst. "Real Option Valuation" is just a fancy new name consultants-for-hire have made up to describe a set of problems economists like Dr. Pindyck have called "contingency claims" problems for years. Given the history of the two terms, I prefer "contingency claims", because of its record as a term used by economists in academic journals and because "real options" sounds too much to be like some new fad, like "reengineering" or "liberation management." Most of the other reviews are absolutely right: this book seriously lacks any quantitative explanation. No need to look for kind words; this is a serious oversight. And yes, this book does read like a long sales resentation. While the authors adequatley describe broadly how economists and financial executives solve contingency claims problems (generally using binomial methods, simulation, or partial differential equations), they don't teach any of these methods in any useful way. At best, after reading this book, you will be able to recognize whether or not your organization has any "real options". Beyond the quantitative short-comings of this book, however, there are some flawed fundamentals about their whole approach: this book treats real options as a new finance panacea for the 1990's, and suggests that the world of finance in 20 years will be a very different place because of these revolutionary ideas. Contingency claims problems are limited to a very specific set of economic phenomena with specific criteria. If the criteria are not present, contingency claims models fall apart. Consider the amount of abuse something as well-known as the black-scholes option pricing equation is subject to when it is applied to "real options valuation": the black-scholes equation is a function of two variables, primarily: time and stock price variance. When you take this equation and try to apply it to, say, the valuation of an option to market patented drug, how do you define variance and time? Time in an option contract is fixed in the contract. Variance is empirically observable from stock prices. Plus, how do we know that the value of drug patents resembles stock prices (log-normal process)? What if it is more like the behavior of a commodity (mean-reverting process)? And where are we going to get the data from anyway? In that case, the black-scholes equation needs to be abandoned and an alternative partial differential equation needs to be developed. But who is going to do that? At what cost? Obviously, at a certain point the benefits derived from exactly modelling your options is eclipsed by the cost and effort involved in doing so. The scariest part, however, happens when you realize that the greater the variance (risk) and the longer the timeframe chosen, the greater the final value of a project or investment. Now the project manager who wants to sell ice to the eskimos has the quntitative methods available to justify such a high risk project. (Just think, the project manager could sell this project to top management as a long-term investment anticipating the melting of the polar ice caps, when the price of ice in Greenland is expected to go through the roof). This book tries to reach too far, suggesting that phenomena which never should be valued as contingency claims can be valued as such. Real options (or contingency claims) are best treated as a very specialized set of quantitative techniques used to model very specific phenomena which a company may or may not be subject to see "Investment under Uncertainty" by Dixit and Pindyck for an inventory of those phenomena). Push the envelope too far and the paper tears as it does here.
Rating:
Summary: Shamelss self-promotion
Review: This book is another good example of a phenomenon I call "Fad-peddling" at its worst. "Real Option Valuation" is just a fancy new name consultants-for-hire have made up to describe a set of problems economists like Dr. Pindyck have called "contingency claims" problems for years. Given the history of the two terms, I prefer "contingency claims", because of its record as a term used by economists in academic journals and because "real options" sounds too much to be like some new fad, like "reengineering" or "liberation management." Most of the other reviews are absolutely right: this book seriously lacks any quantitative explanation. No need to look for kind words; this is a serious oversight. And yes, this book does read like a long sales resentation. While the authors adequatley describe broadly how economists and financial executives solve contingency claims problems (generally using binomial methods, simulation, or partial differential equations), they don't teach any of these methods in any useful way. At best, after reading this book, you will be able to recognize whether or not your organization has any "real options". Beyond the quantitative short-comings of this book, however, there are some flawed fundamentals about their whole approach: this book treats real options as a new finance panacea for the 1990's, and suggests that the world of finance in 20 years will be a very different place because of these revolutionary ideas. Contingency claims problems are limited to a very specific set of economic phenomena with specific criteria. If the criteria are not present, contingency claims models fall apart. Consider the amount of abuse something as well-known as the black-scholes option pricing equation is subject to when it is applied to "real options valuation": the black-scholes equation is a function of two variables, primarily: time and stock price variance. When you take this equation and try to apply it to, say, the valuation of an option to market patented drug, how do you define variance and time? Time in an option contract is fixed in the contract. Variance is empirically observable from stock prices. Plus, how do we know that the value of drug patents resembles stock prices (log-normal process)? What if it is more like the behavior of a commodity (mean-reverting process)? And where are we going to get the data from anyway? In that case, the black-scholes equation needs to be abandoned and an alternative partial differential equation needs to be developed. But who is going to do that? At what cost? Obviously, at a certain point the benefits derived from exactly modelling your options is eclipsed by the cost and effort involved in doing so. The scariest part, however, happens when you realize that the greater the variance (risk) and the longer the timeframe chosen, the greater the final value of a project or investment. Now the project manager who wants to sell ice to the eskimos has the quntitative methods available to justify such a high risk project. (Just think, the project manager could sell this project to top management as a long-term investment anticipating the melting of the polar ice caps, when the price of ice in Greenland is expected to go through the roof). This book tries to reach too far, suggesting that phenomena which never should be valued as contingency claims can be valued as such. Real options (or contingency claims) are best treated as a very specialized set of quantitative techniques used to model very specific phenomena which a company may or may not be subject to see "Investment under Uncertainty" by Dixit and Pindyck for an inventory of those phenomena). Push the envelope too far and the paper tears as it does here.
Rating:
Summary: Hand-waving polemic on real options
Review: This is a book where the faculty thinks it's doing you a favor by writing the book, handwaving through proofs, stating results, and saying the proofs are in the handouts. In this book, the handouts are the spreadsheets. On page 19 the authors state "The numerical calculations for these and other examples in this book are at out website. In my opinion, this is a bald-faced mis-statement. Some simple spreadsheets are given, but no spreadsheets are given for chapters 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 which are 9 of the 10 chapters in Part III, 'The Portfolio of Applications.' And what are those missing topics? Just the following... Chapter 11 -- Investing in a Startup, Chapter 12 -- Exploring for Oil, Chapter 13 -- Developing a Drug, Chapter 14 -- Investing in Infrastructure, Chapter 15 -- Valuing vacant land, Chapter 16 -- Buying flexibility, Chapter 17 -- Combining real and financial flexibilty, Chapter 18 --Investing to preempt competition, and Chapter 19 --Writing a license. Yes folks, the REALLY INTERESTING subjects are MISSING those spreadsheets! What a delightful surprise! Don't buy this book until the authors pony up the missing spreadsheets on their website. (The authors may also want to place on their website the complete references for the numerous 'forthcoming' citations that litter this book.)
Rating:
Summary: A must for those interested in real-option theory/practice
Review: This is a solid book that provides background as well as insight into how to use and finanically benefit from applying a real-options approach. The authors have done a nice job in furthering real-option research in blending the academic with the practicality of implementation. An unexpected benefit of the book was discovering that Professor Kulatilaka has also established a useful website, appropriately titled real-options.com. In addition to the book, todate, this is the most comprehensive website on the subject.
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