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Rating: Summary: Not recommended for self beginners in the course Review: Excellent contents. Or can say self contained book. Very less practicle examples. For beginners who want to study course on his own it is strongly not recommended.
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Rating: Summary: Maybe for class but not for personal exploration... Review: I agree with a previous review that this book is not good for individuals. Solutions to the excersizes are only available to educators. If the book is assigned for a class and the teacher has access to the solutions and can coach the student through the excersizes this is probably a great book because of it's depth. It is probably also a good reference book for those already familar with the subject. However if you are like me and were looking for a strong book that will help a motivated individual learn game theory this book is not for you. I have tried many of the excersizes and I am still not positive that I my answers are correct. The material in the book is very complex but accessible, that is not the problem. The problem is the lack of development because I can not go over my answers to the excersizes and see what I did right and what I did wrong...
Rating: Summary: Game Theory Review: mathematic treatment on the subject is reasonable to describe the complexity of the Game-Theorectic study in understandable manner for beginners and intermediaries.
Rating: Summary: Worthless for autodidactics Review: The book provides numerous excercises but solutions are only available to course instructors. I.e. the book is worthless for autodidactics.
Rating: Summary: Indispensible for MAS Review: This book makes a great reference for students and research interested in game-theoretic aspects of multiagent systems. Together with Fudenberg, et al, they are probably the most refered combination in MAS publications.
Rating: Summary: A solid, concise textbook Review: This text is a solid introduction to game theory for mathematical economists at the graduate level (but apparently logicians love it, too). In principle, the book could be read by someone without any prior knowledge of game theory, but I would strongly advise such a reader to spend some time on a less "dry" text (such as Kreps's "A Course in Microeconomic Theory") before (or at least while) taking up this one.The authors (like Myerson's "Game Theory" and unlike both Kreps and Fudenberg and Tirole's "Game Theory") cover both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, with a nice balance. Two topics not covered in other major texts are "Complexity Considerations In Repeated Games" (Chapter 9) and "Implementation Theory" (Chapter 10). The implementation theory chapter is a wonderful introduction to the topic, but is unfortunately limited to the perfect information case (mechanism design under imperfect information is covered by both Fudenberg-Tirole and Myerson.) The only application of game theory to which the authors devote considerable space is bargaining (those who know the authors won't be surprised!) - and its treatment could have been a little less abstract. In sum, it is a very good book that is not dominated by (nor dominates) any of its competitors cited above. If I were to teach a graduate game theory course, I would probably adopt it as the major text and supplement it with papers and parts of the other books.
Rating: Summary: An essential course in game theory. Review: This was one of the first books I read in Game Theory, and definitely the hardest. Those who want a gentle introduction to the concepts of modern game theory might do better with a simpler text such as Gibbons. That said, there is no substitute for quality. The depth of analysis is entirely necessary to get to the meat of the theory. Osborne and Rubinstein write extremely well, softening the blows of some of the more complicated concepts. Their own substantial publication records in the Game Theory literature do much to recommend their version of analysis over others.
Rating: Summary: To much Math. Review: To much math and not easy to understand.
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