Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace

Rating:
Summary: it is educative.
Review: it very interesting and informative

Rating:
Summary: A Constitutional Convention for Cyberspace?
Review: July 10, 2000 Who or what rules in that romantic frontier called cyberspace? As it evolves into an increasingly central part of "real space," will cyberspace take on the zoned and regulated and law bound character of the rest of civil society? In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig addresses these questions in three different ways: 1) he makes a crucial conceptual articulation between two kinds of code-computer code and law: each entails the sorts of structuring constraints familiar from architecture (code and law as two forms of architecture becomes the guiding metaphor of this book); 2) Lessig sounds a warning about the dangers of the regulated world he sees coming to cyberspace; and 3) Lessig submits a plea to his reader: that we deliberate about the sorts of code(s) within which (remembers it's an architecture) we will choose to live. What gives this argument its conceptual power and plausibility is a series of carefully developed theses about the code of cyberspace, the problem of regulation, and the solution: the deliberation upon a constitution for the digital age. 1: The open code of cyberspace. Since the matrix of cyberspace is woven from code, there is no fixed nature or essence to cyberspace. The Web may have started as a network woven from open software code, thereby embodying an ethos of liberty, but a comparison of the many different networks and network communities (AOL, listservs, avatar based networks, etc.) suggests the variety of different possible networks, the different sorts of social life they enable, and the way they are changing under the pressure of commerce. The code of cyberspace can be rewritten, and that process is going forward at this moment. The openness of digital code can be used to restructure cyberspace so as to subvert the celebrated values of openness (public access, transparency, equality) mistakenly thought to be the Web's essential nature.

2: The problem of regulation. Lessig's book complicates and expands the concept of regulation. Government may regulate by direct laws, but the example of tobacco smoking shows that government can use both direct and indirect means to achieve its ends. But it is not just the government (as libertarians think) that regulates. Instead, regulation in both real space and cyberspace happens through the convergence of the law, the market, social norms, and architecture. Through the centrality of code to cyberspace-it is the infrastructure of every aspect of its functioning-- computer code produces a kind of architecture... and, Lessig insists, "Architecture is a kind of law: it determines what people can and cannot do. (59)" If the basic assumptions of the net were openness and liberty, anonymity and freedom of expression, now the web is being reshaped so that it can become the site for commerce. Commerce requires networks that are closed, secure, and robust, and forms of digital identification that compels a certain form of personal accountability. The powerful new players on the net (business aided by government) have an interest in rewriting the codes of cyberspace. Lessig is most dire and most convincing in his description of the power of networks to control in such a way that those controlled have little or no choice, especially because they don't even know they are being controlled by a network structure that represents itself as nature. Here Lessig's 1999 book rhymes with the most popular film of the same year, THE MATRIX. It is this strand of the book that is "dark" for the way it resonates with those many paranoid dystopian s/f narratives that warn us about a use of technology to create a world of total control. Like Morpheus character in THE MATRIX, Lessig is trying to wake us up ("welcome to the real world," Neo) and scare us into action. Lessig supports the open source software movement associated with Linex. Open code, because it is no one's property, can help users resist the enclosure of the Net in private and proprietary software systems. But Lessig does not see open source software movement as a sufficiently powerful counter-force to the regulatory potential of large corporations aided by government. That is why Lessig's book is something of a call for a constitutional convention.

3: The solution: a constitutional convention? Lessig book insists that the web's architecture shapes the spaces in which we live as well as the quality of our freedom; therefore it is the stuff of politics and it should be open to informed inspection, analysis and control by citizens. This leads to the constitutional strand of his argument. Liberty in real space is not the result of a simple absence of government; instead it is the result of a Constitution that offers a legal architecture to promote certain values (like property, privacy, free speech, etc.) sustained by courts, governments, institutions. In three chapters that are at the core of this book, Lessig offers compelling accounts of how the new technology poses a threat to old equilibrium between intellectual property and a public commons (e.g. fair use), privacy and surveillance, free speech and constraints upon speech and access. Lessig is particularly strong in his survey of the legal implications of the changes brought by cyberspace. Some Constitutionalists will always try to return to the values as defined by the founders of the United States so as to translate them into a new historical context. But the founder's reality and technology is not ours. Our technologies may expose latent ambiguities in the very concept of copyright, privacy, and free speech. This situation requires that we make difficult new choices. In each of these areas, Lessig describes the kind of digital and legal code he favors. For example, he is against privately developed "trusted systems" for enabling a fine grained control of access to intellectual property, for these systems will erode the valuable balance between copyright and fair use that has developed since the invention of copyright.

This is a compelling and important book. It offers a valuable counter-point to those many accounts of the Internet that emphasize its autonomous development and spontaneous solutions to countless human problems. However, I can't help avoiding the sense that I have been led, through admittedly convincing arguments, to an impossible prescription for the way software code should be written and software systems adopted. Thus against the co-equal interaction of law, market, architecture, and norms as constraints (or protections) of the human subject that Lessig's book outlines, Lessig book finally advocates a hierarchical transmission model: Values as defined by Us (at the Constitutional Convention for Cyberspace?) will lead to Code as Law (as defined by legislatures and courts) which will in turn define the possible legal Architectures for Cyberspace, to which the market and social norms will be obliged to accommodate themselves. Could one constrain software and network development in this way? If we could, should we? Perhaps not unsurprisingly, for this Constitutional lawyer, the policies Lessig advocates ends up leaving the crucial step in his reform-the application of values-to the lawyers: "Our question should be the values we want cyberspace to protect. The lawyers will figure out how."(181)

Rating:
Summary: A Constitutional Convention for Cyberspace?
Review: July 10, 2000 Who or what rules in that romantic frontier called cyberspace? As it evolves into an increasingly central part of "real space," will cyberspace take on the zoned and regulated and law bound character of the rest of civil society? In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig addresses these questions in three different ways: 1) he makes a crucial conceptual articulation between two kinds of code-computer code and law: each entails the sorts of structuring constraints familiar from architecture (code and law as two forms of architecture becomes the guiding metaphor of this book); 2) Lessig sounds a warning about the dangers of the regulated world he sees coming to cyberspace; and 3) Lessig submits a plea to his reader: that we deliberate about the sorts of code(s) within which (remembers it's an architecture) we will choose to live. What gives this argument its conceptual power and plausibility is a series of carefully developed theses about the code of cyberspace, the problem of regulation, and the solution: the deliberation upon a constitution for the digital age. 1: The open code of cyberspace. Since the matrix of cyberspace is woven from code, there is no fixed nature or essence to cyberspace. The Web may have started as a network woven from open software code, thereby embodying an ethos of liberty, but a comparison of the many different networks and network communities (AOL, listservs, avatar based networks, etc.) suggests the variety of different possible networks, the different sorts of social life they enable, and the way they are changing under the pressure of commerce. The code of cyberspace can be rewritten, and that process is going forward at this moment. The openness of digital code can be used to restructure cyberspace so as to subvert the celebrated values of openness (public access, transparency, equality) mistakenly thought to be the Web's essential nature.

2: The problem of regulation. Lessig's book complicates and expands the concept of regulation. Government may regulate by direct laws, but the example of tobacco smoking shows that government can use both direct and indirect means to achieve its ends. But it is not just the government (as libertarians think) that regulates. Instead, regulation in both real space and cyberspace happens through the convergence of the law, the market, social norms, and architecture. Through the centrality of code to cyberspace-it is the infrastructure of every aspect of its functioning-- computer code produces a kind of architecture... and, Lessig insists, "Architecture is a kind of law: it determines what people can and cannot do. (59)" If the basic assumptions of the net were openness and liberty, anonymity and freedom of expression, now the web is being reshaped so that it can become the site for commerce. Commerce requires networks that are closed, secure, and robust, and forms of digital identification that compels a certain form of personal accountability. The powerful new players on the net (business aided by government) have an interest in rewriting the codes of cyberspace. Lessig is most dire and most convincing in his description of the power of networks to control in such a way that those controlled have little or no choice, especially because they don't even know they are being controlled by a network structure that represents itself as nature. Here Lessig's 1999 book rhymes with the most popular film of the same year, THE MATRIX. It is this strand of the book that is "dark" for the way it resonates with those many paranoid dystopian s/f narratives that warn us about a use of technology to create a world of total control. Like Morpheus character in THE MATRIX, Lessig is trying to wake us up ("welcome to the real world," Neo) and scare us into action. Lessig supports the open source software movement associated with Linex. Open code, because it is no one's property, can help users resist the enclosure of the Net in private and proprietary software systems. But Lessig does not see open source software movement as a sufficiently powerful counter-force to the regulatory potential of large corporations aided by government. That is why Lessig's book is something of a call for a constitutional convention.

3: The solution: a constitutional convention? Lessig book insists that the web's architecture shapes the spaces in which we live as well as the quality of our freedom; therefore it is the stuff of politics and it should be open to informed inspection, analysis and control by citizens. This leads to the constitutional strand of his argument. Liberty in real space is not the result of a simple absence of government; instead it is the result of a Constitution that offers a legal architecture to promote certain values (like property, privacy, free speech, etc.) sustained by courts, governments, institutions. In three chapters that are at the core of this book, Lessig offers compelling accounts of how the new technology poses a threat to old equilibrium between intellectual property and a public commons (e.g. fair use), privacy and surveillance, free speech and constraints upon speech and access. Lessig is particularly strong in his survey of the legal implications of the changes brought by cyberspace. Some Constitutionalists will always try to return to the values as defined by the founders of the United States so as to translate them into a new historical context. But the founder's reality and technology is not ours. Our technologies may expose latent ambiguities in the very concept of copyright, privacy, and free speech. This situation requires that we make difficult new choices. In each of these areas, Lessig describes the kind of digital and legal code he favors. For example, he is against privately developed "trusted systems" for enabling a fine grained control of access to intellectual property, for these systems will erode the valuable balance between copyright and fair use that has developed since the invention of copyright.

This is a compelling and important book. It offers a valuable counter-point to those many accounts of the Internet that emphasize its autonomous development and spontaneous solutions to countless human problems. However, I can't help avoiding the sense that I have been led, through admittedly convincing arguments, to an impossible prescription for the way software code should be written and software systems adopted. Thus against the co-equal interaction of law, market, architecture, and norms as constraints (or protections) of the human subject that Lessig's book outlines, Lessig book finally advocates a hierarchical transmission model: Values as defined by Us (at the Constitutional Convention for Cyberspace?) will lead to Code as Law (as defined by legislatures and courts) which will in turn define the possible legal Architectures for Cyberspace, to which the market and social norms will be obliged to accommodate themselves. Could one constrain software and network development in this way? If we could, should we? Perhaps not unsurprisingly, for this Constitutional lawyer, the policies Lessig advocates ends up leaving the crucial step in his reform-the application of values-to the lawyers: "Our question should be the values we want cyberspace to protect. The lawyers will figure out how."(181)

Rating:
Summary: A Profoundly Important Contribution
Review: Larry Lessig in his new book Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace finds that he who controls the code on which cyberspace is founded will control whether freedom can exist in cyberspace. Lessig pounds home this conclusion again and again. We find it fascinating that Lessig ignores ICANN. For we note the reason for ICANN's being in such a hurry. It knows what Lessig knows about ownership and control. It must craft its architectural code on behalf of e-commerce and government before the rest of us awaken.

Lessig writes "cyberspace [is changing] as it moves from a world of relative freedom to a world of relatively perfect control' ..... The first intuition of our founders was right. Structure builds substance. Guarantee the structural (a space in cyberspace for open code and (much of) the substance will take care of itself." . . . "We are just beginning to see why the architecture of the space matters -- in particular why the ownership of that architecture matters."

"I end by asking whether we, meaning Americans, are up to the challenges that these choices present. Given our present tradition in constitutional law and our present faith in representative government, are we able to respond collectively to the changes that I have described?"

"My strong sense is that we are not. We are at a stage in history when we urgently need to make fundamental choices about values. But we trust no institution of government to make such choices. Courts cannot do it because, as a legal culture we don't want courts choosing among contested matters of values and congress should not do it because, as a political culture we so deeply question the products of ordinary government."

"Change is possible. I don't doubt that revolutions lie in our future. The open source code movement is just such a revolution. But I fear. . . that too much is at stake to allow the revolutionaries to succeed."

"The argument of this book is that the invisible hand of cyberspace is building an architecture that perfects control -- an architecture that makes possible highly efficient regulation. . . . a distributed architecture of regulatory control an axis between commerce and the state..... much of the liberty present in cyberspace's founding will vanish in its future."

Lessigs conclusions decode what ICANN is doing. It is quite clear to The COOK Report that, on behalf of commerce, ICANN will own that architecture. ICANN will control the code. It will allow neither diversity nor open source code. ICANN owns all domains and all DNS. It has one uniform dispute resolution policy. It hammers out its uniform rule in pursuit of the facilitation of electronic commerce. It embodies what Lessig fears.

Lessig writes: "In many [cases] our Constitution yields no answer to the question of how it should be applied, because at least two answers are possible-that is, in light of the choices that the framers actually made."

"For Americans, this ambiguity creates-a problem. If we lived in an era when courts felt entitled to select the answer that in the context made the most sense, there would be no problem. Latent ambiguities would be answered by choices made by judges-the framers could have gone either way, but we choose to go this way."

"But we don't live in such an era, and so we don't have a way for courts to resolve these ambiguities. As a result, we must rely on other institutions. My claim, a dark one, is that we have no such institutions. If our ways don't change, our constitution in cyberspace will be a thinner and thinner regime."

"Cyberspace will present us with ambiguities over and over again. It will press this question of how best to go on. We have tools from real space that will help resolve the interpretive questions by pointing us in one direction or another, at least some of the time. But in the end the tools will guide us even less than they do in real space and time. When the gap between their guidance and what we do becomes obvious, we will be forced to do something we are not very good at doing -- deciding what we want and what is right," Lessig concludes. We find that Lessig has put his finger squarely on the reasons that ICANN has won its fist round and may win successive rounds.

Note....amazon may have these words, but they are the same words that I will use to introduce this subject in my newsletter, and I do not grant amazon any rights to use of them there or on my web site.

Rating:
Summary: Bugfix needed?
Review: Lawrence Lessig - a professor at Stanford Law School - is one of the first legal scholars to step into the risky business of publishing a booklength, bestseller argument for regulating the cyberspace. This book is legal hype if such a concept exists. That is also the dilemma of the book: not too academic, not too profound, but full of original viewpoints and opinions.

Lessig has written a kind of counterargument to all those who manifest for the total freedom of cyberspace. The message of the book seems to be: cyberspace is governed by its architecture and, thus, by its architects. Code is law. And we, the people, are responsible for it. "How the code regulates, who the codewriters are, and who controls the codewriters - these are the questions that any practice of justice must focus on".

Lessig argues that government must get closer to this mystical code if democratic values are to be maintained in the digital age. He points out that "government is a player in the market for software". Lessig likes to compare the "democratic east coast code" (Washington D.C.) to "west coast code" (Silicon Valley), which is controlled by high-tech corporations and hackers. His conclusion is that it is unwise to leave the power to the west coast where it has been so far.

A reader interested in specific intellectual property issues is a bit disappointed. Lessig does not have anything new to say and, in overall, intellectual property law plays a minor role in Lessig's arguments. On the other hand, in his strongest areas covering public law issues such as privacy, anonymity and free speech, Lessig is clear and insightful. He captures the essence of current discussion.

One of the weaknesses of Lessig's book is its US centric view of the world. Most of the values he derives are from US legal cases and examples. And as a constitutional lawyer, he also seems to speak a bit too easily in the favor of the "east coast code".

If you are new to the ongoing debate on the regulation of cyberspace, this book is an easy introduction. But if you are looking for a full coverage of discussed arguments - not found in Lessig's presentation - you might be better off by spending some hours browsing through YRO at slashdot.

Rating:
Summary: Internet is Simply Another Frontier Requiring Government
Review: Many people wrongly perceive the Internet as a frontier unlike no other in human history. The immature comments of John Perry Barlow is indicative of this mindset: "Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather." Mr. Barlow takes for granted the protections and privileges afforded to us by our police departments, court systems, and military. These governmental entities perhaps do their job too well. This has resulted in allowing those possessing a flower child anarchist mentality to deny that government is mandatory in underpinning a viable social order. Lawrence Lessig recalls the naiveté of those advocating radical capitalist economic measures immediately after the fall of Communism. It was overlooked that without an established rule of law, the evolution of the Russian economy would be impossible.

The Internet is simply another frontier requiring government. It's just that simple. There is no reason to overcomplicate the obvious. Cyberspace is akin to the nascent beginnings of America's past. The early settlers braved their way into the new uncharted territories. They initially formed rudimentary private associations to respond to the challenges confronting their everyday lives. Inevitably, though, lynch mobs left much to be desired. Property disputes had to be resolved, and the weak protected from the more powerful. Nature abhors a vacuum. Somebody is going to be dictating the rules and regulations of the Internet. Lessig contends that our democratically elected governments should be the ultimate authority to decide these awkward and troubling issues. John Perry Barlow, AT&T, AOL, and the myriad other individuals, non profit groups, and businesses must definitely not be excluded from participating in the formulation of these desperately needed new laws, but none should have the final say. Should we be wary of granting power to the government? The answer is an adamant yes. The enactment of carefully crafted checks and balances is still an unavoidable necessity. Winston Churchill rightfully cautioned us that democratic institutions are messy, fragile, and somewhat yucky to behold, but far better than all of the alternative political systems devised in human history. Ultra Libertarians make much of this lack of perfection. Alas, so did Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and other tyrants. Democracy is unpalatable to all extremists embracing the delusion that utopia is attainable in this vale of tears.

Lawrence Lessig has written a brilliant book that should be read by all. It would be a mistake for the reader to seriously wonder if Lessig's book published late in the previous century might be dated. On the contrary, he addresses both the philosophical premises and practical issues that will remain relevant long into the next few decades. I am hoping that some television network might even do a series on "Code." Also, it is best that readers living in the United States not allow their presidential candidates the luxury of ignoring the controversial questions raised by Dr. Lessig.

Rating:
Summary: Possibly the Most Important Book on Law Since Holmes
Review: Nothing short of revolutionary, this superb piece of scholarship identifies both the fundamental changes and the *lack* of fundamental changes affecting law brought about by the technological revolution and the Internet in particular. It would be worth reading the whole book if only for Lessig's shattering insight that "architecture" often renders legal regulation unnecessary, obsolete or sometimes far too easy to enforce. I find this work important because of how firmly American law, which is based on Common Law, is rooted in ancient assumptions about how the world works -- assumptions that are starting not to be true...

Rating:
Summary: A significant treatise on Internet regulation
Review: Professor Lessig has done an admirable job of tackling the subject of Internet regulation. By reviewing the constraints placed on a person through the interaction of law, the market, norms, and architecture, he seeks to reconcile us to the power of the state and of software code. To protect freedom, he argues, we must react to these powers and decide a safe course of action. It is the result of democracy that "where through deliberation, and understanding, and a process of building community, judgments get made about how to go on." The call to debate has been sounded; let us hope we can answer, for we have something to lose if we don't.

Rating:
Summary: Revealing and so much more!
Review: Public perception of the information superhighway is this massive and complex place that only the super intelligent have access to control. Lawrence Lessig has other ideas and his book is the definitive answer to those questions and more.

Right from the beginning the book dispels the myth that the world of cyberspace cannot be controlled and regulated. The book also disproves that belief that this "being" is immune from any government or anyone's control.

What Lessig proves throughout the book is that cyberspace is nothing more that hardware and software and we are in control of the future of this colossal giant. The author proves that true "nature" of cyberspace is one that man is forever looking for ways to control.

It takes a great understanding to know that cyberspace is in its infancy and that we must take the right steps to make sure that the next and future generations have something to work with. Lessig has written a deep and complex book, and as is the case with cyberspace we must endeavor to understand the meaning.

Rating:
Summary: Important Insights Life in Cyberspace
Review: Rather than add to the volumes that have already been written regarding this important work, I'd note that despite the fact that Lessig thoughtfully covers vexing foundational constitutional issues regarding privacy, sovereignity and property rights etc.. in cyberspace, he does so in a manner that is straighforward, compelling and which inspires further thought and disucssion. In other words it was very readable.

I found myself often putting the book down to discuss a point made by the author with friends and colleagues, I'm thinking that's exactly what Lessig intended.

While I may have my differences on several issues, this book is fundamntal reading for those interested in the impact of our emerging cyber-society.