Rating: 
Summary: How a bully destroyed IBM
Review: In order to appreciate the essence of Gerstner, I would recommend you first read chapter #12 ('A brief history of IBM'). It's actually much more about the IT industry, or at least Gerstner's understanding of it. The man admits more than once that he came to IBM knowing nothing about IT, but that he should pen a chapter so littered with errors when leaving IBM is truly lamentable. For example, contrary to what he writes, IBM aimed the PC at businesses, not 'hobbyists and students', right form the outset. Contrary to what he writes, IBM was not a 'one-product company' in 1984: highly profitable products like the System/34, the Selectric typewriter and the Displaywriter had been around for years; even the IBM PC had been around for three years.It confirms what many in the industry suspected: that Gerstner never understood IBM's product lines. That's the main reason why he gave so few interviews -- it was virtually impossible to find a journalist who knew less about IBM's products than he did. If it was to be an open-ended interview, by the time the journalist got to the third question in any line of inquiry, Gerstner would be embarrassed and humiliated. He could do the occasional Comdex keynote speech, but there you don't have to take any questions, and anyway your speechwriters draft the text for you. Anyone wondering why the immensely successful AS/400 line fared so poorly under Gerstner will be none the wiser. He mentions it just once in the book, and then it is just in passing, in a list of products in an appendix. Gerstner complains in this book about other 'outspoken' CEOs like Gates, Ballmer and Ellison, but frankly he could never dare to take them on in open debate, because his understanding of any of the technical issues was so poor. In this book, he says that every decent CEO must be intimately acquainted with the finances of his or her company, but I cannot believe that a decent CEO should be so distant from the company's own products. Maybe if Gerstner hadn't spent so much time on public education and non-executive directorships in unrelated companies, he would have had more time to understand the product issues that drive strategy in the IT industry. So what does a bully do when he arrives at a company dominated by products and technology architectures? Answer: the only way he could begin to level the playing field -- i.e. to reduce the daily embarrassment -- between himself and the existing IBM directors was to shift the focus away from products. That's why Dennie Welsh's plan to massively expand IBM's services empire became so attractive. And it's why the whole e-business thing became so attractive to Gerstner in the mid-1990s. But IBM benefitted little from its e-business mindshare; by then IBM just didn't have the products, and so the main beneficiaries of the Internet boom were Sun and Microsoft. Gerstner admits in this book that, under his direction, IBM now plays the IT markets on a portfolio basis, quickly getting in and out of businesses as the hoped-for profits come and go. But, in the face of Microsoft, this approach is a disaster for any company with long-term aspirations. Microsoft is known for its tenacity, for trying again and again with new generations of products until it dominates markets -- witness the desktop market, the office suite market and the handheld markets. Currently Microsoft is playing the ERP market as a 10-year game. IBM now gives up on a market after two years; Microsoft almost never gives up. Which is the more successful? Indeed there are some who say that the installation of Gerstner was a Microsoft plot to destroy IBM from within -- to get IBM to ditch OS/2 and all its other proprietary architectures, under the "open systems" banner, in order to hand over the highly lucrative server market to the company that realised that to create value, you have to offer differentiated, proprietary products protected by patents. We'll never know how many Microsoft shares Gerstner held; certainly he dumped much of his IBM stock over the years. This book proves what we already knew: that Gerstner is neither an entrepreneur nor a technocrat. He is a destroyer, not a builder. When your company is in trouble, you need someone like Gerstner for 2-3 years to take the really tough decisions about which businesses and assets to sell off. But it is too much to expect such a person to continue at the helm when rebuilding and rapid growth is needed. Gerstner stayed at IBM about three years too long -- his dismal revenue record in Appendix C shows this.
Rating: 
Summary: On the Backs of Employees
Review: Little Lou did his "magic" by cutting employee medical care, cutting employee retirement benefits, cutting employee vacation time, and finally... cutting employees! He stopped training and investing in people. If you didn't have current skills, you were fired and someone younger and more naive was hired, for a while...
Ya, what a genius!
Rating: 
Summary: 'Lessons Learned' Chapters are Very Strong
Review: One caveat: Lots of these reviews are really reviews of "do I like Lou Gerstner?" and not the ideas he offers in his book. My review is about the book and whether its arguments are useful to business people. On that basis alone, I rate it highly. I thought his chapters on lessons learned are quite good, especially where he distinguishes between vision and strategy. In my opinion, he offers a lot of great insight on this in a small amount of text. I couldn't get a clear picture of whether people were treated with dignity in the downsizings. On one hand, I've heard some pretty cold stuff outside of Lou's book. On the other hand, I worked at IBM in the late '80s as an intern and the culture was DEEPLY complacent and isolated from the real world. I suspect that the reality is somewhere in-between but the "numbers guys" argue one extreme while the people who paid the price argue just as forcefully the opposite extreme. I also think his chapters on being willing to challenge the conventional wisdom were valuable. I remember when Gerstner went to IBM and the conventional wisdom really WAS that Gerstner should become a high-tech hipster who could talk client/server acronyms, should 'harvest' the 390 business, and break the company into a bunch of 'baby blues.' I think it underestimates his (and clearly IBM's) accomplishments to not acknowledge it took serious decision clarity and courage to go against that conventional wisdom at the time -- especially given the financial pressures on the firm. So the bottom line is I think the book offers good insight for how to think clearly about your business, what your franchise really is, what your opportunities really are, and how to make clear decisions based on trusting a clear thought process that filters out lots of background noise.
Rating: 
Summary: When a great organization meet a great leader
Review: I picked up this book while at the Sydney airport, and I read it non-stop for the 7 hours' flight. This book is very personal. Only those who have ever been in IBM, or are still there can fully feel beyond the words. I wouldn't call this a regular management book. But if you want to know what separates a great leader, then this is the book. This book demonstrates how clearly Lou saw the issues. Despite his effort, IBM is a big organization, and some of the same problems continue today. Lou can claim a lot of credit for what IBM is today. And most of us can see how far he has brought the organization. What sets this book apart is that Lou is really writing from his gut. In the book, he was unsparing about his feelings with various incidents, and revealed a person who not only has the business mind to turn this business around, but is passionate about it. The last chapter is especially worth reading.
Rating:
Summary: Who says elephants can't write?
Review: It is strangely ironic that, after doing his best to suppress all negative communication within IBM, it should be the reader feedback on amazon.com that alerts Gerstner to what the world at large really thinks of him. Ever since 1994 the newsreading public has been conned into a set of beliefs about IBM and Gerstner, simply through IBM's vice-like control of all media that wanted a share of IBM's ad spending. It is bizarre that he expects us to read through a critical employee e-mail on pages 81-82 of his book, when he admits that he couldn't even spare the time to reply to it himself. Gerstner was the IBM CEO with a worse revenue record than John Akers, the man he replaced. The only way Gerstner could find to grow revenue was by buying firms like Lotus. He turned what was a fantastic company to work for into a an ordinary one. He writes in the book that he transformed the company into a firm where the most able got the most rewards. In fact he converted it into a firm where the most aggressive individuals, like Gerstner, win through. He destroyed IBM's employee benefits schemes across the world, claiming they were unaffordable at the time of IBM's darkest hour. Perhaps they were at that time, but Gerstner's greatest sin was that he never returned any of the benefits to the employees when business improved, except through a silly bonus scheme that in my experience never motivated anyone. The result is that IBM has become a company that people still want to have on their CV, but those who join in mid-career almost never stay more than two years. Gerstner groped around and never really found the right idea for growing revenue. His shift to services meant that he took his eye off all the products in the IBM catalogue, and IBM architectures have become an irrelevance in a world now dominated by Windows, TCP/IP, Linux, Solaris and Oracle. He used the AS/400 as a cash cow when a very aggressive pricing scheme could have seen the system create the market that Windows NT instead built. Gerstner has said the Internet saved IBM, but frankly it did a lot more for rivals like Microsoft and Sun. There's a part of me that makes me think this book is one huge, ironic joke -- the guy only pretends to be unaware of the impact of his decisions on others. He boasts about a turnaround that never was and advocates management behaviour that no-one should accept. That would be fine if it were confined to the pages of this book. But unfortunately the impact of Gerstner is written large across the lives of many, many individuals who crossed his path, both inside and outside IBM. The blight cast over their lives means that, when they get the chance, they usually don't recommend IBM products. Gerstner just doesn't understand that. These pages on amazon ought to be required reading for anyone foolish enough to think they want a career in IBM.
Rating:
Summary: Over simplified and superficial
Review: If you are looking for a condensed version of IBM highlights under Gerstner's lead, this book will meet your needs. If you are interested in gaining an understanding of IBM's issues that led to the "elephant" stumbling, and Gerstner's solutions, you will be disappointed. "Who says..." is a quick read with a superficial treatment of the various issues facing IBM and a simplified view into Gerstner's techniques to turn the company around. Many different scenarios are rushed through, leaving the reader wanting to know more about how and why. The solutions offered by Gerstner and his team seem pat--surely there was more going on. Gerstner can not answer all his critics or the legion of angry ex-IBM'ers in a single book, particularly so close to his career transition. Unfortunately, this book misses the opportunity to provide the reader with anything more than a superficial insight into one man's view of IBM.
Rating:
Summary: All business owners must read this!!
Review: I am shocked at some of the bad reviews of this book I have read on Amazon. As an Ex-CEO, business owner and involved in the computer industry for the last 20 years, I found this book brilliant, exciting and a must read for anyone thinking of or currently running a business. Gerstner gives a frank look at the challenges he faced and how he dealt with them. He is open about discussing his inner feelings, desires and wishes for the turn around of IBM.. If I had a chance to met Mr. Gerstner, I would give him a hardy Here Here and thank him warmly for writing this book..
Rating:
Summary: How much can you believe this account?
Review: Very early in his reign at IBM, Gerstner gave an interview to Fortune magazine, which subsequently wrote an unflattering profile of the man and the company. Unable to believe that the publication had revealed any of the truth about him, Gerstner was livid. Shortly afterwards, IBM stopped all advertising in Fortune. It was an expensive loss for the magazine, particularly as IBM was relaunching itself with the costly 'Solutions for a Small Planet' campaign. We'll never know whether the two events were linked, but the magazine industry certainly took on board the message that if you publish an uncomplimentary article on IBM, you'll lose a major advertising customer. In this book, Gerstner portrays himself as a private figure, reluctant now to make speeches, answer analyst questions, or do interviews. He hopes that his written account will be the definitive version of his life at IBM. It's hard to find any other: as soon as he arrived at IBM, he forbade all other executives from writing about their IBM careers. (Shortly before that, IBMers such as Jacques Maisonrouge and 'Buck' Rodgers had published their stories.) Gerstner admits in the book that he's into amassing personal wealth -- and with wealth comes status, something he craves even more. I don't think he cares much about society or about employees. The fact that he spent a number of years at the head of a cigarette firm (obsessed with market share, by the way) indicates that he had few qualms about the impact of his firm's products on the customer or society. Set against that, the foundations of his recently acquired 'passion' for education seem insecure. But then the english Queen gave him a knighthood for that. This book is a reasonably frank account by a man largely insensitive to the blight he cast on thousands of lives. My guess is that whether you buy this book or not will make no odds to him -- his personal fortune is too massive to notice -- but if you're influential, he'll care very much what you think and say about him.
Rating:
Summary: A classic in self-deception
Review: The title of this book says it all: elephants don't naturally dance, it takes years of cruel training to make them do it, and in the end, there aren't many customers for the show. IBM's revenue record in Appendix C of this book also says it all: Gerstner has the worse revenue growth record of any IBM CEO, and that is despite the the Internet boom, despite the ERP boom, and despite the acquisition of such big players as Sequent, Lotus and Tivoli. Some turnaround, mate! More than once in this book Gerstner cites the pleas of others: "You owe it to America to take this job." It's hard to see what he has done for America during his nine-year tenure... Where once there were many readers who wanted to learn about SNA, CICS, RPG/400 and other IBM inventions, today there seem to be no IBM technologies that a sufficient number of people are interested in to propel a manual even in to the bottom of the amazon bestseller list. For the story of Gerstner's tenure at IBM is really the story of IBM's hollowing out, of an extraordinary sell-off of IBM's assets to the short-term benefit of shareholders, of whom Gerstner was one of the biggest. As one of the IBM UK CEOs during Gerstner's reign, Barrie Morgans, said of Gerstner's skill at cutting costs and inability to boost sales: "Well, anybody can slash and burn." Gerstner says on page 87 that the dismissal of the EMEA head, Hans-Olaf Henkel, was for subverting his memos to employees. It wasn't: Gerstner got rid of Henkel because Henkel dared to tell Gerstner that one of his strategies wouldn't work.. There is no reference here to the classic case, Churchhouse v IBM, which was heard in a US court. Gerstner also dismisses, in a page or two, the needs of employees in terms of benefits and pensioners. He simply says they were unaffordable; and yet he has no difficulty in negotiating an extraordinary compensation package for himself. And of course, as one of IBM's biggest shareholders, the more he could screw down the employees' packages, the more he himself benefitted. Never in IBM history had their been such a huge disparity between the compensation of the CEO and that of the lowest worker. The truth is that Gerstner sees himself as an elite -- ever the McKinsey consultant (and by the way, there were McKinsey consultants crawling over IBM throughout the 1990s, yet he fails to give them much credit in the book)...
Rating: 
Summary: Sterile
Review: Consistent with Gerstner's cold and impersonal management style, "Elephants" is a clinical and sterile analysis of the author's days at IBM. What is surprising is that while living in the eye-of-the-storm through this mostly tumultuous period in IBM's extraordinarily rich and often bizarre history, Gerstner writes from afar, more an outsider looking in than the leader credited with the turnaround. It is the success of the System 360, which carried IBM for decades and helped entrench an already insular and isolated culture, that was the villain, claims Gerstner. IBM needed to get in touch with the customer, get focused, and get back to the basics of execution. This is all true, and provides some interesting reading and insightful observation, but it leaves the reader yearning for more of the infighting and political maneuvering that was occurring both inside and outside the boardrooms. Those not familiar with IBM's unique culture will chuckle at some of the sparsely used anecdotes, while insiders will be disappointed in the virtual absence of any of the real drama that occurred, especially in the early months of Lou's tenure. Always the politician, names aren't named except for fleeting praise for select individuals. While Gerstner closes by claiming his deep love for a devotion to IBM, he still comes off as the perpetual outsider. Perhaps one of the more interesting elements of the book is not what is told, or even what is left out, but rather what yet cannot be told. That is, five-years from now, will Gerstner's grand but unfinished plan to transform IBM into a services company still be considered a brilliant and bold strategic coup? Or will many of the changes in IBM over the past decade be simply attributed to adroit realignment of employee-related benefits and retirement benefits and long overdue expense reductions? We'll have to wait for Sam Palmisano's book to find out.
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