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Maestro: Greenspan's Fed And The American Boom

Maestro: Greenspan's Fed And The American Boom

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Product Info Reviews

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Rating: 1 stars
Summary: Bland and Blander
Review: Bob Woodward peaked when he was Robert Redford in "All the President's Men" or to be less tongue in cheek, when he wrote that book with Carl Bernstein. Since then he churns out book after book, appears on TV and is Bland. I don't get it. Why is he considered the Guru of Washington? If he is, G..d help us. Because this man is always, unswervingly unimaginative. I agree with reviewers who say he should stick to journalism and forget this book mania. He produces nothing that stimulates, nothing in "Maestro" that teaches us anything in depth about Alan Greenspan. And his arrogance... Don't get me started! But DO save your money and don't buy this book.

Rating: 2 stars
Summary: flawed Washington hagiography
Review: The conduct of monetary policy in the US is important to the US and the rest of the world. Alan Greenspan is an interesting figure of historical significance. This book sheds little light on either subject.

The book is hampered by its episodic nature, and, apparently, limited range of sources. Woodward tries to sustain a narrative based largely on the twin themes of Greenspan's ability as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to manipulate the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) which sets an important benchmark interest rate, and whether that instrument, the federal funds rate, is moved up or down.

The first theme is of questionable interest: the institutional structure of the Fed gives the chairman enormous power. It is not at all clear than another chairman, with a different substantive agenda and a different personality, could have just as effectively dominated the institution. Despite Woodward's efforts, it is not at all clear that Greenspan is a "maestro" - on the contrary, he comes across as a mildly unpleasant character who treats his colleagues shabbily.

As for the second theme, well, it doesn't exactly make for a page turner.

These flaws alone would not earn the book such a low rating. The real problems are sloppy writing and factual inaccuracy. To give one example: Woodward tells us that Greenspan was born in 1926. After graduating from high school, he attended Julliard School of Music for two years and then dropped out to join a touring big band. He then quit the band, went back to school, and graduated from NYU with a degree in economics in 1948 . Woodward writes that Greenspan received a masters degree in economics from NYU in 1950 and then entered the Columbia Phd program but quit before completing his dissertation. In the 1970s, NYU then "finally awarded" him what amounted to an honorary doctorate

This description begs more questions than it answers. How did Greenspan spend two years in a conservatory, tour with a band, and graduate with a degree in economics at the age of 22? What about military service? Greenspan would have been of prime draft age for the Second World War. Did he get some kind of exemption? If so, for what reason? And why would NYU "finally award" the doctorate if the work had been done at Columbia?

One might overlook these flaws (even in biography) but they carry on into the more substantive sections of the book. To give another example: Woodward's chapter 12 description of the Korean financial crisis of 1997. He argues that the US government wanted US bankers to rollover their loans to Korea; that the bankers would have been able to resist pressure from Bob Rubin and Larry Summers of the Treasury, but not from the Greenspan Fed; and that Greenspan stood back while the Treasury jawboned the bankers. This account is deeply flawed.

The critical rollover meeting was convened on 22 December 1997 by New York Federal Reserve President Bill McDonough in his office and attended by the heads of JP Morgan, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bank of NY, Bank of America, and Bankers Trust. McDonough convinced the six money center banks to rollover their Korean loans, and having whipped the US banks into line, he then successfully brought the Europeans and Japanese on board. The 22 December meeting was arguably the turning point in the crisis.

So why no mention of it in Woodward's account? Its hard to believe that the author is unaware of it. One is tempted to surmise that he deliberately omitted it from the narrative to set-up his interpretation in the succeeding chapter of the next crisis Greenspan encountered - the near collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Credit Management. Again, there is a financial crisis, and again, the head of the New York Fed uses his office to jawbone US financial institutions to act against their own narrow interests. However, in Woodward's telling, this is an unprecedented event, and Greenspan stands (well, actually sits) shoulder to shoulder with McDonough in the face of hostile Congressional critics. Why this portrayal of the Fed's action in the LTCM case as being unique? Is it because that action was seen as stopping a threat to the US economy, while the earlier intervention merely saved Korea (and did not save Russia and Brazil which subsequently encountered similar problems)?

At root, the problem with this book is as a rather hagiographic biography, it simply does not address the broader, and to my mind, more interesting questions such as whether it is desirable to have monetary policy conducted by an institution with little democratic accountability steered by the "pains in the stomach" of its chairman?

Perhaps this is unfair. In the end, we don't expect journalists to be deep-thinkers. But we do expect them to get their facts straight. Inaccuracies and heavy reliance on unnamed sources (from the man who, in a prior work, gave us Nixon talking to the White House paintings) makes me deeply skeptical of the value of this book either as biography, as an examination of the Fed, or as an analysis of monetary policy.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: What a conductor
Review: After reading this book you get the definite impression that Alan Greenspan is the driver behind the wheel of the free markets. An excellent historical chronology, with many inside insights, on monetary policy, interest rate philosophy and political integration of these. Bob Woodward delivers again.

Rating: 1 stars
Summary: Bob Woodward- Dull and Without Depth
Review: This book is not only poorly written, but it also lacks any insight whatsoever. Normally a biography would convey a sense of the subject's personality and the source of their motivation. This does nothing but recite interest rate movements.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: Blah...
Review: I expected two things from this book, and got neither of them. I wanted to see some crisp explanation of the complicated economic conditions driving Mr. Greenspan's thinking ("Being Greenspan for Dummies"). If I didn't get that, then I wanted Maestro to be more biographical ("Who is Greenspan, and why does he operate the way he does"). Instead the reader is presented with 200+ pages dull historical narrative that reads something like "Greenspan thought the economy was getting too hot so he argued for 1/2% increase. He won and the rates were raised with an asymetric directive toward further rate hikes. Then he realized he'd put the brakes on too hard so he argued for a 1/4% decrease." This book is clearly not worth your time or money.

Rating: 2 stars
Summary: Maestro - You Can Find Him in Here
Review: Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom, Bob Woodward (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000)

Maestro is not a traditional biography. It is, rather, a professional biography, a history of Alan Greenspan's tenure at the Fed. The subtitle, Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom is a more accurate description of this book's goals. Woodward should not be criticized for producing a professional biography rather than taking on the substantial task of examining the mind of the enigmatic Chairman; it is what he set out to produce.

Woodward hints at the complexity of Greenspan's mind but concentrates on details and techniques. If there is a limitation to Woodward's work it is that he tells us more about Michaelangelo's techniques for chipping stone than how that great artist arrived at the ultimate vision of his David. The substance of Greenspan's vision is left to another.

Still, Woodward peppers his reportage with intriguing personal details, details which, if explored, might lead to some understanding of the curious, complex mind, and man, behind the mechanics of modern Federal Reserve policy. What Woodward tell us about the Chairman's personal life is in the last paragraphs of the book's chapters - afterthoughts. For example, Greenspan went to Julliard, then known as the Institute of Musical Art, dropped out after two years and played tenor sax with the Henry Jerome band, a big band in the 1940s style.

Somehow, Greenspan discovered the lure of economics, and studied at Columbia under Arthur Burns, who subsequently became Fed Chairman (1970 - 1978). He sometimes solves complex mathematical equations for the joy that solutions can bring. Greenspan, the mathematician cum musician, was a member of Ayn Rand's inner circle. "Objectivism," mathematics, and music are things we normally don't put together. Rand encouraged Greenspan's involvement with Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign, an intriguing start to a political life. Greenspan's roots in Rand's objectivism, the connection between his mathematics and music, and his actions as Fed Chairman would make a powerful intellectual biography.

There are homier details as well. Greenspan called his mother every day, and, before his marriage to Andrea Mitchell, a national news correspondent, was reputed to have been a "ladies' man," if that phrase is still current. Other sources relate that Greenspan participated in meetings lying on the floor to ease a bad back. Certainly Greenspan's is a life worth examining, however Woodward offers us a different, less interesting view.

Woodward assumes readers come to the book with knowledge of how the Fed effects interest rates, at least mechanically. This should not be a bar to they ordinary reader. If the Fed sells government bonds, buyers pay with checks. Payment lowers the amount of money the banking system holds. This creates upward pressure on the interest rates banks charge each other for overnight or extremely short-term loans. If the Fed buys bonds, its checks increase the amount of money the banking system holds, creating downward pressure on the same interest rates. The Fed targets a short-term rate, called the Fed Funds rate, by either buying or selling bonds. The mechanics of the Fed's operation are simple; the policy behind them complex. Woodward's details of Greenspan's rule at the Fed are, quite simply, annoying, as is his use of unending quotes from parties at private meetings in the Fed, the White House, Treasury, and other places the reader will sense Woodward he could not have been. Woodward has been frequently criticized for this; there is no reason to say more. The most important limitation of Maestro is that Woodward confuses details of the Chairman's day-to-day activity and coalition building among members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) with the actual creation of monetary policy. To give him his due, Woodward has done his homework. It's painfully obviously he's read transcripts of innumerable FOMC meetings, far too many. His joy at sharing details is all too apparent. The reader can cut through to grasp Greenspan's vision for the economy. Once the reader has accomplished this, Greenspan's analytic powers and instincts as a survivor emerge.

One of the crucial tasks for the Fed Chairman is to assert the independence of the Fed; if not done, and done properly, the Fed would quickly devolve into an ordinary political vehicle like so many Washington think-tanks. What president doesn't want low interest rates and full employment, even at the price of increased inflation - a price paid by his or her successor? Equally crucial is the Chairman's credibility. Without it, the Fed would become a handy political target. It would be blamed for every minor economic downturn and scrap of negative news. Perhaps Greenspan learned more than even he is aware of in his musical days. In the end, after a circuitous, complex journey, Woodward does show us a real maestro: a master coordinator of all sections of his important big band. Through a unique vision for the economy, the mysteries of mathematics, and the subtleties of long-gone rhythms, Greenspan pulls together the faith of the New York financial community, the trust of the Washington Establishment, and the confidence of banks and businesses to produce his own precisely orchestrated performance for the economy.

It may be that Greenspan's essence is hidden in the details of Maestro, perhaps as hidden as the rhythms of the economy are in the details and complexities that Greenspan uses as his score.

Rating: 2 stars
Summary: Greenspan's role is overrated
Review: Alan Greenspan had a limited impact on the economy in the 1990's. The boom was brought about by record low oil prices in real dollars and the "dollarization" of the world economy. In effect,the US was able to run substantial trade deficits with minimal negative impact since foreign banks (OPEC and the Far East) held dollars as their reserve currency. The demographics of the American population also contributed to unprecedented economic growth. With a record number of baby boomers entering their prime income earning years during the mid-80's through the 1990's, the demand for housing and cars was bound to grow with a Democrat or a Republican in the White House. Don't forget that the S&L bailout in the late 1980's forced the government to compete with the private sector for capital, further stalling the economy. Clinton had the fortune of taking office at a better time than any president in American history.

Rating: 1 stars
Summary: Be forewarned
Review: I always knew that Woodward has a vested interest in building up democrats and taking down republicans, but I had no idea how much his political agenda pervades his writings until I read the prolog and last chapter of this book. Perhaps there is some good info in between about the fed, which is why I bought the book in the first place. Unfortunately, the overwhelming political bias is so strong that I can't get past it. I'll have to gain my fed education elsewhere.

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: Scary to find out about the politics of money in Washington.
Review: Excellent book. It is not as much about economics as it is about politics.

A lot of inside stories and behind the scene deals. Well worth it.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: Lively and readable
Review: Woodward manages to bring the enigmatic Greenspan to life and explain his influence on the economy in a lively way. Laypeople with no background in economics will receive a healthy explanation of the maze-like working of the economic system.


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