Rating: 
Summary: Certainly An Excellent Economic Policy Analysis & History!
Review: I enjoyed reading this book from brilliant authors, thoughtful economic analysts, and policy leaders in Robert Rubin and Jacob Weisberg. I very much doubted Rubin's policies when he served as Secretary of Treasury. I was concern he was bailing out international wealthy economic experts that actually made more errors and were rewarded anyway. Upon reflection, Rubin seemed to do the wrong thing at the right time but it worked. It is my belief; it is the start of future global economic coordination to solve lazy global economic problems. The very success of this one time bail out will no doubt increase it use another time, but this alone could end up making uncertain outcomes not to anyone's benefit. But Rubin was right in the end and that cannot just be washed away without merit to him. I could not agree with the entire book since it is pushing policies that are preferred by nations practicing more socialism. Plus, individuals who can well afford such policies as they set up a global system that they will influence on others but can exempt themselves. At the same time, we cannot stand still and do nothing either. For example, telling governments they should not offer tax cuts but should pass tax increases to support failed programs will only result in more burdens and failures, not a better world. Although Rubin does admit, tax cuts that target certain consumers can be good at certain times. And to be fair, Republicans are now spending higher than Democrats did and with tax cuts that are increasing our debt far faster out of stubborn political goals rather good economic planning. I mean, in all honesty, both party's have abandoned their own policies unlike the 1990's. In 19993, Clinton's Administration along with a Democratic congress and senate actually stumbled upon their tax increase as required by the Federal Reserve to retire debt before lower interest rates would be made to increase spending of the peace dividend. Later in 1995, a Republican congress & senate was elected to force President Clinton to adopt, deficit reduction policies that added investments and fueled an even hotter economy by error not just good planning. Thus, President Clinton's raising of taxes in 1993 combined with Republican debt reduction in 1995 did show cooperation that gave confidence to investors, lenders, and consumers. So, everyone went wild looking to increase spending today thinking higher payments will come tomorrow and ending up with California economics? The real result was a higher price paid later taking away investment value from every citizen in his or her stock, pension, and mutual fund plans. Now we see politicians blaming everyone but themselves when corporate dealers were contributing to them to look the other way, under the author's supervision I might add. Both party's experts including Rubin ignored oversight warnings over stock options, mutual fund after hours dealing, and auditor's manipulations that went undiscovered until 2001 but being revealed today. They took credit for a "Roaring 1990's" not totally in their control and thus cannot take credit for all of the benefits without responsibilities for the losses too. However, Rubin was willing to bail out very wealthy persons to save the system from their own mistakes, something few smaller investors ever see happen to them. Hitherto, it was necessary from what I read, but I am not confident it will always remain a good thing to do either. When the small citizen savings and earnings are hurt there is no way big businesses expand without real pain. What few Americans realize is that the people and consumers are being directed by more and more "International Independent Economic Institutions" not accountable to anyone. This is causing some chaos on the local and regional market levels consumers driven by uncertain outcomes like the book says too. International Institutions like the WTO, NAFTA, Federal Reserve, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and others do not really have real influence from the people. They are setting policies often in direct conflict of local, state, and national goals in the name of uncertain global goals few can see now. For examples, American Political parties may soon find that foreign tax credit will be eliminated as Europeans respond with economic tariffs upset with what they do to their own high and dependent taxation policies. On the other hand, do Americans want green onions with hepatitis; cheap goods without environmental regulations and forced taxes needed to maintain a bureaucracy burdening businesses without common dollars and sense? Thus, the book is certainly uncertain on answering these questions. In the end, this is what Rubin is warning us of too. We have to go along to get along. So, does this mean, America will soon end up with the French created "Value Added Taxes" to support a bloated bureaucracy? Or a 90% Income Taxes like Europeans pay in return for a cradle to grave welfare state? Or do we want loss freedoms that stop inventions and expansion of free enterprise without governmental approvals? I do not know and neither does the authors. On one hand, I see the wisdom of not letting mobs stop sound global economic policies, but I see tyranny growing when individuals cannot compete with these institutional influences accountable to no governmental or private approval except in the mystery of their own creations. This is why you need to read this book. It outlines the uncertain times ahead but cannot predict all of the outcomes for us either. The book helped me understand where and why our economic policies will be changing. But also scares me that few people will have future rights should these institutions over step their bounds leaving us in a global economy of higher taxes, mandated redistributions of wealth ending in economic tyranny along with lost of personal freedoms. In closing, the best lesson this book conveys is Rubin old adage learned from his mentor, "Never Wait To Do Something Tomorrow You Can Do Today." I suggest you read this book today to try to understand the uncertain tomorrow!
Rating: 
Summary: Great (If you can stand the politics)
Review: I found Mr. Rubin's work to be very interesting and thought provoking. As someone who works for a large investment brokerage house, I thought his accounts of working at Goldman, and later at Citi, were very interesting. As somone who is trying to learn more about the various financial crisis from 1994-1999, I thought it was interesting to learn about what Rubin was thinking at the time, his account of these actions does not seem to be self serving (even thought it seems like he got lucky as much as he made brilliant decisions). I would have liked a little more explanation and detail about these event, but that is a personal area of interest that not many people would be interested in. My only criticism is that the book is clearly a political work. While Rubin seems willing to take a pretty objective view of his own actions, it seems that Bill Clinton can do no wrong and George W. Bush can do no right. Clinton recieves only high praise for every action and Bush is wrong every time. I think that an objective observer would be more critical of Rubin's friend Clinton and give Bush a little more credit. Rubin's discussion of the switch from budget surplus to defecit is especially political, and Rubin makes a few arguements that disregard economic cycles and extraordinary events, things Rubin knows play into that change and that he is too smart to ignore, but he does to make his political point. Aside from my disappointment with Rubin's politics, overall this is a very good book and definitely worth reading.
Rating:
Summary: So diplomatic and restrained!
Review: I respect Rubin as a very capable person who did great things in his term as the Secretary of Treasury. However, I really dont enjoy his book at all. I did expect him to tell many inside stories or insights about the Mexican crisis in 95, Asian Crisis in 97 and the Russian/LTCM Crisis in 98. So disappointed that his coverage of them is so impersonal, light and even dry. All you can read is Rubin's praise of Clinton, Greenspan and Summers. In fact, you can hardly find a passage where Rubin criticized strongly any person at all, except a Korean minister whose name had not been disclosed! Though he emphasized regularly the significance of his probabilistic way of decison making which he acquired through his trading and management life in Goldman, readers can learn little of his philosophy with his so diplomatic and restrained covering of simply anything in the book, even those long gone days in Goldman.
In case you want to read a bio of an outstanding person who can carry his success from the private sector to the public one and "survived" with honor, this book is okay. If you want to read for the benefit of your trading or investment interest, you will be disappointed.
Rating:
Summary: In and Uncertain World
Review: I thought the book was very well written. I just finished an MBA course in, Business and Public Policy, and I thought this book was great for reviewing what we learned in class.
Rating:
Summary: A Certain Success in an Uncertain World
Review: I would recommend this book as probably the best politico-economic book I've read. Robert Rubin, as Secretary of the Treasury and head of the National Economic Council during the Clinton years, was at the center of some of the most exciting times of the last few generations: the first balanced budget in thirty years; a run-up in the stock market that made millionaires out of average people; and a thriving economy. But not everything was wonderful. The Republican Party started a revolution of their own in 1994 when they swept control of Congress for the first time in forty years and the Asian economic crisis of 1998 threatened a global economic meltdown. In the center of it all was Robert Rubin. Educated at Harvard, Rubin became an arbitrageur at Goldman Sachs in the 1960s and rose to co-ceo of the company before leaving for Washington during the Clinton years. His theme for life was that that there are no certainties. He called his philosophy probabilistic thinking. He explained it this way: "Success came by evaluating all the information available to try to judge the odds of various outcomes and the possible gains or losses associated with each." It was a philosophy that enabled him to succeed in both public and private endeavors. His book is highly interesting but may be a difficult read for someone without any knowledge of economics. For those familiar with economic terms and concepts the book will be both enlightening and educational. While we may live in an uncertain world this book is a certain success.
Rating:
Summary: CLASSY, HUMBLE AND SMART
Review: Mr. Rubin is one of the most outstanding figures, both in the private and public sectors, of the last few years. In this book, Rubin maintains his posture as a man of few, carefully chosen words, which helps us understand the reasons for his success. In its structure, this is a typical biography, tracking his childhood influences and his early years as a student at Harvard and Yale, then his career at Goldman. His success at Goldman is clearly understated, since he nowhere mentions being very sucessful at anything he did. Then he explains his entrance into government through fundraising, giving interesting advice to those interested in joining politics. However, the most interesting portion of the book, from my standpoint of international economics, is his work during the economics crises from 1995 to 1999. Rubin explains in great detail the policy choices made at the time and the diplomacy going on behind the rescue plans for Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia and Russia. For anyone who followed the markets during that period, this book provides new insights into the real workings of politicians and economists in trying to avert a global meltdown. Rubin also provides two interesting analyses: first, his method of making decisions, through probabilistic analysis. Though obvious, most people clearly do not understand or follow it, so it is important to outline its characteristics, which Rubin does well. His main point is that a decision can be the right one even if it leads to failure. The second analysis is one of the current economic condition and the direction in which the country is going. Rubin is critical of the recent tax cuts and raises worries about the future of the US eocnomy based on the large deficits being accumulated and the future prognostics for social security. Overall, it is an outstanding work, one that gives insights and teaches one about history and how to think. I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in politics or economics, but especially anyone interested in international economics and globalization.
Rating:
Summary: Nice Read and a Useful intro to Economic Topics
Review: My decision to read this book was based on an editorial I read many months ago in the Wall Street Journal. I remember the Journal's editors announcing that they thought "Rubin was probably correct" about some policy regarding interest rates and the deficit. Frankly, I didn't much understand the admission at the time but made a mental note. One day I wanted to make some time and understand this issue. Needless to say, I was excited to have that opportunity sooner rather than later. I saw Mr. Rubin's book mentioned in the Financial Times, recalled the editorial, and immediately bought the book. In short, I was pleasantly surprised. Not only do I now understand the relationship between America's deficit and interest rates, but I have a whole new appreciation for topics such as arbitrage, probabilistic thinking, political uncertainties, bailouts of other countries, the interconnectedness of economies in a globalized world, and for Mr. Rubin himself. The book is one part autobiography, one part business and political memoir, and one part economic instruction (101 level, for people like me). We learn about Mr. Rubin's upbringing, the fortuitous circumstances that took him to Harvard and later Goldman Sachs, the challemges of building an arbitrage department, and of course the challenges of the Clinton years and serving as the Secretary of Treasury. No doubt Mr. Rubin has lived a good and interesting life, and I enjoyed following his account and many observations. One nice aspect of this book is that I don't feel like I am reading a highly biased or revisionist spin on history. Sadly, the same cannot be said of other characters from the Clinton administration (e.g., R. Holbrook). I have read enough about the Clinton administration to feel that the author is giving a pretty fair account of events and people. I also appreciate his taking the time to make slightly complex ideas very clear and simple, such as arbitrage or the relationship between deficits and interest rates. Finally, when reading his accounts of international financial crises, I felt the tensions of a very difficult decision. Mr. Rubin has convinced me that the choices we face when dealing with international economic crises are never as simple as the media pundits would have us believe. These are very complex issues with good arguments on both sides--and our leaders must make decisions. I like to think I have a greater appreciation for just how difficult these decisions must be. I can't claim this book was as interesting as a good mystery or a John Fowles novel, but compared to other nonfiction this is a very enjoyable and fairly well-written book. I feel like I have learned something about economics, business, politics, and the author. I am left with the sense that talking with Rubin about these issues, over a cup of coffee, would be very rewarding. He has an interesting mind. I guess this book is worthwhile for that fact alone--it has made Mr. Rubin's interesting thoughts available in a very readable style.
Rating:
Summary: A masterwork
Review: Our country should long for the days of Robert Rubin as Treasury Secretary. Under his stewardship, our country practiced responsible economic leadership.
Rating:
Summary: Fiscally Conservative Democrat Is Worth Two in the Bush
Review: Presiding over our nation's largest economic growth period, Bill Clinton's former Secretary of Treasury under Robert Rubin has written an insightful book on how he was able to formulate fiscally conservative policies in face of great uncertainties and reduce the budget deficit. While it is ostensibly a personal memoir, the book has a far greater purpose and if the Bush administration would listen, a strong relevance to the problems we face today in enacting economic policy, which could bring our deficit down. Rubin explains how he uses "probabilistic decision making", assigning likelihood to various potential outcomes. This is how he dealt with the Asian financial crisis of the nineties, when he decided that with some reforms, the emerging economies of Thailand and other nations were basically sound - and needed a credit guarantee in the near term to roll over debts and resume growth.
But the far more interesting part of the book is his comprehensive description of how Rubin worked on reducing our federal deficit from the high spending, low tax years of the Reagan and elder Bush presidencies. It was a commitment Clinton made, and the question among his advisors was how long should it take to realize a surplus. Rubin highlights the serious political risk that the public would not understand the importance to the U.S. economy of reducing the deficit, especially when compared to easily grasped programs such as health care and education. It was not a tangible course of action to most, especially in how it would feed into the strong economy of the late nineties. As Rubin spells out clearly, if interest rates didn't drop, the economy kick-start, or foreign investments pour in, the political cost to Clinton could have been huge. The aggressive deficit reduction plan they embarked on was based on a thoroughly investigated debate where all sides had their point of view heard, unfortunately not a concept that appears to be tested by the current administration. This is valuable insight to anyone who wants to understand how democratic processes, when performed correctly and with conviction on the face of uncertainty, can reward itself with economic benefit. I highly recommend reading this thorough account of our nation's political and economic history during the Clinton years, as it appears those in power now are doomed to learn Rubin's lessons the hard way....and we unfortunately will be paying for those mistakes for years to come.
Rating:
Summary: Great Read, UnderstandableEconomic Policy, Useful
Review: Probabilistic decision making is a tool that is the corollary to the premise that nothing in the world requiring a decision is certain. Rubin states that, "Probabilistic thinking isn't just an intellectual construct for me, but a habit and a discipline deeply rooted in my psyche." Warren Buffett and Charles Munger of Berkshire Hathaway fame have long preached this discipline too. Its application is mentioned over and over again in Rubin's approaches to various economic crises faced by him at the National Economic Council and Treasury. The methodology is widely taught and is available to all of us in such books as "Probabalistic Thinking" by Richard Jeffrey. A very burden-lightening idea for all of us, stated repeatedly by Rubin, is that given unavoidable uncertainty, not all decisions will turn out to be right, but that probabilistic decision making is the best way he knows to maximize the number of correct choices. There are many detailed, but non-technical, non-mathematical, discussions of such issues as "bail-ins" (e.g., IMF loans) for countries in deep economic crisis in the '90s (Mexico, Russia, Maylasia), floating currency exchange rates vs. tied-to-the-dollar rates (China) and the part they play in economic crises, and the issue of "moral hazard" (that huge infusions of outside money into failing economies might just encourage more bad behavior by the recipients). Both Republicans and Democrats can enjoy this read. Democrat Rubin's strong position on a balanced budget, reduced deficits and consequent reduced debt interest payments prompted George Will, the conservative columnist of the Washington Post, to comment in a January 2004 piece that "Rubinomics is more Republican than Republicans have recently behaved." Rubin expresses great admiration for then-President Clinton's thought processes, quick intellect, and his actively pursuing divergent views, i.e., he thinks Clinton's decision process was right on. He indicates that Clinton's political genius was a great overlay to the technical insights Rubin and others, such as Alan Greenspan, brought into discussions. Illustrative specifics abound. At the same time, Rubin clearly abhors Clinton's personal shortcomings, such as the Lewinsky matter. This may not be first rate literature, but it is most definitely very well written for such works. It is a fascinating read and very informative. Much of the thinking processes advocated are useful for individuals in their daily lives as they try to make the best possible decisions in the absence of complete information and in the face of considerable uncertainty.
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